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2PREFACE
I have been a trade unionist throughout my working life, as a trawlerman (decky-leamer) 
and various other occupations, finally as a bus driver and Chairman of the 2000 
membership 10/15 Branch of the TGWU in Hull, before being awarded a two year TUC 
Scholarship to Ruskin College Oxford. In 1965, I was appointed as the London and 
Home Counties Organiser for the Clerical and Administrative Workers Union. In 19691 
was appointed the CAWU (APEX from 1971) Deputy General Secretary with industrial 
responsibility for the Engineering, Automotive and Shipbuilding Industry membership. I 
retired due to suffering a heart attack and undergoing quadruple bypass surgery in 1979.
Having recovered my health, in late 19801 was appointed General Secretary designate of 
the National Association of Licences House Managers (NALHM). In 1981 I joined the 
Industrial Society (1981 to 1984) as its Director of Industrial Relation. During this period 
I was appointed by HM Government as Chairman of the Gibraltar Industrial Relations 
Commission, over-sighting the closure of the Naval Dockyard and construction and 
development of a civilian electricity generating station.
From 1984 to 1985 I was appointed General Secretary Designate of the GLC Staff 
Association. An Appointment in which I commenced the process of transfer of 
undertakings with the GMB due to the GLC Staff Association having lost considerable 
membership due to the ‘winding up’ of the Greater London Council, and most of its 
membership having transferred employment to various London Borough Authorities.
From 1985 to 1989 I was Director HR Consulting with William Mercer, and from 1989 
to 1994 Director of HR Consulting with Wyatt UK Limited. With both these 
organisations my role was international, working in Europe, North America, Australia 
and New Zealand. In January 1994 I underwent further quadruple bypass surgery and 
spent some time recovering my health. In October 1994 I established a consulting firm 
with a Japanese Lawyer Tadashi Yamada as a partner, the company Edwards Yamada 
Associates Limited, specialised in industrial relations and employment law services to 
inward investing companies, attaining a prestigious blue chip client portfolio of Japanese 
and United States Companies. The business was wound up and liquidated in 2001 on my 
retirement. Since 1983 I have held a number of appointments through AC AS: 
Independent Expert (Equal Pay); Chairman NHS Grading Appeals Committee; member 
of Employment Tribunals (Reading, Brighton and Southampton). From 1996 to 2001 I
3was industrial relations and Remuneration Policy Adviser to the UK Police Federation 
and General Advisor to the Royal Ulster Constabulary Police Federation.
Ray Edwards 
August 2005
4ABSTRACT
The thesis undertakes an analysis of the decline of trade unions, during the period 1979 
to 2002. It disagrees with those who argue that it was changes in law that were the main 
cause of decline in union fortunes, arguing that it was fundamental contextual changes, 
particularly those of an industrial nature, which generated the decline of trade unions. It 
commences with a brief historic overview of trade union development, and provides 
evidence of how some unions, struggling for recognition, utilised statutory provisions 
never intended for the purpose, to gain recognition.
The divergent experience of TUC affiliated and Non-TUC unions is analysed, illustrating 
the reasons as to why many non-TUC unions have increased their membership during a 
period whilst the majority of TUC unions have lost membership. The thesis exposes that 
whilst unions have responded to the various crises facing them over the past 25 years, 
they have failed to effectively exploit the Employment Relations Act 1999. Whilst the 
Act is apparently producing some advances in union recognition, the developments are 
not producing increased union membership and density.
The trend towards conglomerate unionism as the model upon which to build a future for 
trade unionism is challenged. The thesis illustrates that whilst trade union preoccupation 
with mergers has helped to ensure short-term ‘survival’, the strategy for both individual 
union and aggregate growth is proving to be a longer-term failure1, producing financial 
weakness. A number of examples of this failure of merger to produce improvements in 
either membership or finance are used in the analysis^.
The thesis illustrates how the loss of the employers subsidy and union membership 
agreements have had a serious effect upon union membership and finances, concluding 
that because these ‘supports’ will never be restored, union membership and density can 
never again achieve its pre 1979 density levels.
A ‘live’ example of the value of Partnership Agreements is utilised, which illustrates that 
unions can ‘market’ themselves as vehicles through which employers can accommodate 
statutory and regulative changes in the management of their employees. The thesis
1 Willman (2005)
" The case o f BIFU amalgamation with the Barclays Group Staff Union and the NatWest Staff Association to 
form Unifi, is one example of this.
5argues that the Partnership approach may be the way forward within the changed 
industrial and political context of the UK.
61. METHODOLOGY
Question Structure - Hypothesis and The Initial Research
1.1. The question embraces a number of closely related aspects of change affecting trade 
unions over the period since 1979. The data and analysis contained in the thesis covers 
the period up to December 2002. However, given that its subject is a ‘live’ field of 
research the thesis does have regard for other research, which whilst not published, was 
being developed whilst the thesis research was underway. Such research will be 
referenced within the text as appropriate.
1.2. The initial research identified three trends, which have had a strong influence upon 
the process of change and development affecting the United Kingdom (UK) trade union 
movement. Each of these trends has been subject to the research and analysis of others, 
the published results of which are discussed within the literature review, and as 
appropriate within the body of the thesis. However, much of this earlier research and 
analysis has been of an aggregate nature and has tended to view UK trade unions as a 
‘homogeneous grouping’. The consequence of this approach is that some significant 
aspects of trade union experience, over the past 25 years may not have been adequately 
recorded.
1.3. The body of the thesis comprises four chapters. Chapter One ‘The Changing 
Environment of Trade Unionism’ has been written to incorporate the ‘Introduction’ to 
the thesis. It undertakes a brief historic review of trade union development, analysing 
and discussing the process of change, which affected trade unions throughout the period 
prior to and from 1979. The remaining three chapters:,
ii) Changing Composition of Employment, Demographics and The Changes Impacting 
upon Organising Strategies;
iii) Financial Management;
iv) Survival Strategies, Organisational Change and Union Mergers;
cover the three ‘limbs’ of the thesis. Chapter Two, analyses and explains the data, which 
disclose the divergent experience of trade unions over the period of the past 25 years. 
Unions are disaggregated into their two broad groups of TUC affiliated and non-TUC 
affiliated unions. The analysis illustrates the divergent experience of these two groups, 
and the consequent affects of these changes upon the environment in which trade unions 
operated post 1979. The research undertakes a disaggregated review of each of the two 
union groups, analysing the development/decline of discrete unions and industrial 
groupings of unions. The analysis identifies the reasons for the difference in the
7experience of these two groups, illustrating that many of the same reasons for this 
‘difference’ extended into the differing experience between public and private sector 
unionism within TUC ranks.
1.4. Chapter Two analyses the way in which trade unions have attempted to cope with 
the loss of a great deal of their core membership primarily because of industrial 
restructuring, and develop and pursue recruitment strategies which addressed their 
changing market. Instead the analysis shows how in many instances, unions have 
managed to cope, in the short-term, with the multiplicity of change through merger into 
conglomerate unions. However, the thesis argues that this strategy has not always 
produced all of the hoped for benefits. Most mergers actually contributed to the 
reduction in aggregate union membership of the merging partners and consequently 
aggregate union density, also the depletion of union finances.
1.5. Chapter Three focuses upon union finance, an aspect of trade union organisation less 
visited by previous research3. The analysis explores the critical issue of the 
developments which have taken place affecting union finance, including the importance 
of the employer subsidy and the role of the closed shop in bolstering union finances 
during the period prior to the early 1980’s. In addition, whether trade union finance is 
robust enough to support the reshaping and development of the trade union movements 
mission for the future.
1.6. Chapter Four analyses how unions, particularly the smaller ones, found it 
increasingly difficult to cope with the twin problems of diminishing income and 
increasing costs. In many cases they had little option other than to seek partnership 
through merger or transfer. Therefore, whilst the propensity of trade unions to merge 
may not have added to aggregate union membership it may have helped retain influence 
in some industries and businesses which would have been lost due to individual union 
failure. Whilst the process did little to add to aggregate membership it can be said that it 
did help the trade union movement in general to avoid worse membership loss than 
actually occurred. The thesis reviews the membership decline of a number of unions in
3 During the period whilst this Thesis, research was being undertaken on the subject o f trade union finance. 
Professor Paul Willman as a facet o f the research programme being undertaken by the London School of 
Economics, on The Future of Trade Unions, sponsored by The Leverhulme Trust, was in the process of 
comp[leting his research on the subject. Professor Willman’s latest research was not published at the time 
this Thesis was being written up, therefore it cannot have a detailed regard for its arguments or findings. 
However, that part of his research, which has been produced in draft form pending publication, has been 
taken into account within the appropropriate analysis and arguments o f the thesis. Doubtless, when the full 
results are published, Professor Willman’s latest research will build upon his extensive earlier research into 
union finance, to which detailed consideration has been given in this Thesis.
the years prior to transfer of engagements or amalgamation and illustrates the likely 
accelerating rate of decline that would not simply have destroyed an individual union, 
but also union organisation within various industries.
1.7. The hypothesis is that, analysis of the three issues discussed in Chapters Two, Three 
and Four, may give a better insight to the future of trade unions than a preoccupation 
with the more heavily researched macro causes and affects of change. However, whilst 
there is a strong interrelationship between these developments, they do not lend 
themselves to a singular paradigm of methodological approach. Each has a unique 
contribution to the overall hypotheses structure. Therefore, the research approach that 
has been adopted, whilst it uses aggregate data and analysis as appropriate, disaggregated 
data sets are used by which to effect a more detailed analytical result.
1.8. In the opinion of the author, the broad subject matter of the thesis has become ‘over 
subscribed’ with research which, attempts to apply mathematical precision. The thesis 
research takes an empirical and qualitative approach in its methodology. The thesis 
presents data in a graphic format as appropriate throughout the data analysis. Two 
presentations have been utilised within the body of the thesis to illustrate in the most 
practical manner possible the topics under discussion and analysis. The first concerns 
the use made of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959 by white-collar 
unions in their struggle for recognition. The second is the introduction of a practical 
example of the value of Partnership Agreements, illustrating how in a particularly 
extreme, probably unique, case given the nature of the company concerned (CSC) both 
employer and union can develop mutual gain from the use of this type of agreement. 
This practical example, in all its detail, has been undertaken because it is an excellent 
method of illustrating how the principles enunciated within the TUC model for 
partnership agreements can be achieved.
Initial data capture and research results
1.9. Initial research and data capture was undertaken to test the hypothesis that unions 
were continuing to loss membership, financial resources and influence, and that just as 
strategies in earlier years of the review period had failed to produce a turn-around current 
strategies (post1997) appeared to be achieving little result. The results of this initial 
research led to the determination of the question and the skeletal structure for the overall 
research programme. It also disclosed that, whilst aggregate trade union membership and 
density had declined throughout the period since 1979, non-TUC union’s had for much 
of the period actually increased in membership. However, by undertaking a comparative
9study of TUC and non-TUC unions the research exposes that there were reasons for this 
disparity in performance.
1.10. An important aspect of the research was the review of the available literature. The 
initial review of the literature and data indicated that the ‘divergence’ between TUC and 
non-TUC union experience in membership retention, occurred primarily because of the 
predominantly public and service sector membership of the non-TUC unions. 
Additionally, the unions within the non-TUC grouping organised the professions, which 
had benefited greatly in terms of employment growth during the period when other 
traditional areas of employment, organised by TUC unions, had suffered serious decline. 
However, the ‘phenomenon’ continued to be of interest in that it tended to contradict 
much of the literature on the subject of union decline. Consequently, it was decided that 
this limb of the research held some very important features, which required research and 
analysis.
1.11. The thesis seeks to explain why there has been a sustained divergence between 
TUC and non-TUC union experience during the period since 1979. It approaches this by 
developing aggregated data sets for TUC and non-TUC union membership derived from 
the Certification Officer Annual Reports and data archives. The data is disaggregated 
and analysed to identify and examine the principal characteristics of the non-TUC unions 
in terms of their membership level, sectoral, gender and industrial distributions. These 
have then classified into two groupings identified within the data of, “public-sector 
professional associations ” or “private-sector staff associations ”, in order to provide a 
structure for comparison with TUC unions.
1.12. The data for TUC unions has similarly been disaggregated into private and public 
sectors of employment. However, because the range of employment categories is broader 
than is the case for non-TUC unions the data is then disaggregated into employment 
categories e.g.: clerical, administrative, professional and managerial. Data for each group 
of unions is then divided into: membership level, sectoral, gender and industrial 
distribution, to as far as possible provide ‘mirrored’ data sub sets. The two data sub-sets 
were then analysed to expose the respective variance of TUC and non-TUC unions in 
membership development and retention.
1.13. By this approach, the thesis seeks to ascertain what factors caused most non-TUC 
unions to perform better than TUC unions, in terms of retention and recruitment during
10
the period since 1979. Analysis is also undertaken to show the way in which some TUC 
unions attempted to replace membership losses sustained since 1979, through the process 
of transfers of engagements and amalgamations. This aspect of the thesis updates earlier 
research undertaken by others referenced within the body of the thesis. It illustrates that 
the preoccupation with this process, whilst helping some unions to maintain their 
operation, it may nonetheless have contributed less than was hoped for. The analysis of 
pre and post amalgamation membership levels, illustrates that ‘acquired growth’ may not 
have helped improve membership levels of some unions. Also the structure of the trade 
union movement, certainly so far as removing wasteful competition is concerned, has not 
improved.
1.14. The initial research into the third limb of the thesis question exposed the continuing 
decline in the financial strength of trade unions generally. This research showed a large 
proportion of the financial decline could be attributed to the affects of changes in law 
upon traditional union organising policies, industrial restructuring, and consequent 
membership losses. However, the initial research showed there were aspects of these 
exogenous changes that had far reaching consequences for union membership and 
financial strength. Particularly in respect of the loss of the closed shop and employer 
subsidies, these factors had tended for unions in some industries, over many years, to 
‘underpin’ the finances of unions at local level. The ‘overarching’ data and analysis 
initially developed, covering the thesis topic, showed some very disturbing developments 
in the financial resources of some of the largest unions. The analysis showed that whilst 
the largest unions have the overwhelming number of members. They may be the 
weakest in terms of financial resources, in aggregate and per capita terms. Aggregate 
data, taken from the Certification Office is used to undertake a general analysis of the 
overall disparities in financial performance for TUC and non-TUC unions. Analysis is 
also undertaken across the union groups with 100,000 plus members (the ‘100k+ club’) 
and those unions with less than this figure. The research illustrates that apart from a 
period in the mid to late 1980’s, when because of the perverse effects of ‘economies of 
scale’ emanating from membership losses, per capita income and wealth actually 
increased, the pace of financial decline over the whole period has increased disturbingly 
since the research undertaken by Willman and Morris (1988) and Willman et al (1993).
1.15. The initial research also showed that the propensity to amalgamate appeared to 
have been driven primarily by ‘survival’ rather than growth. The process of 
amalgamation because it was not centrally orchestrated, and lacked any overall strategy,
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and showed it to have led to the possibility of more rather than less inter-union 
competition, which led to the opinion that at best, amalgamations and transfers have 
been of a ‘consolidatory’ nature, in that they were about the ‘redistribution of the 
existing aggregate stock of membership of the trade union movement, TUC and non- 
TUC. Consequently, the process added nothing to union density. It also appeared that 
the process was driven by financial imperatives and motives of a defensive nature. 
However, a significant positive affect had been that it gave some unions ‘respite’, and 
ameliorated some of the worse aspects of membership loss and decline. Furthermore, it 
probably reduced aggregate membership loss below what it would have been without 
this process of consolidation.
1.16. A perverse factor emerged from the initial research, which an extensive literature 
search indicated it had been subjected to less previous research. This was that, the 
process of amalgamation and transfers had actually, based upon available statistical 
evidence, taken from union records and the Certification officers records, been directly 
responsible for reductions in the density of trade union membership. Disaggregated data 
sets were developed covering a sample of unions, which when analysed, illustrated that 
the membership loss in the process of amalgamation and transfer was in some cases quite 
substantial. Overall, the evidence pointed to the developments and consequent changes 
involved in the process of amalgamation, making trade unions generally weaker not 
stronger. Therefore, data has been developed in order to carry the analysis in this limb of 
the thesis further. Whilst the analysis is not extensive in that it focuses upon only a few 
unions, the unions selected for analysis are amongst those more frequently engaged in 
amalgamations and transfers, and represent a substantial proportion of aggregate union 
membership.
1.17. The analysis of this phenomenon was undertaken as follows. Membership data for 
each of the merging unions, as at the year-end preceding a merger and as at the year-end 
immediately after a merger, is compared to illustrate the net loss of membership which 
occurs at the time of two unions coming together. The analysis whilst it has regard for 
the inaccuracies which are endemic in trade union membership accounting, concludes 
that much of the loss of membership must be for reasons other than the historic 
‘overstating’ of membership figures.
Data sources and methods of collection
1.18. The initial research indicated that there were a number of authoritative and readily 
available research resources. Therefore, a considerable amount of the research activity
12
has been in the exploitation of these available resources, from which aggregate and 
disaggregated data sets have been developed. The data resources used were:
a) The Certification Officer for Trade Union and Employers Associations Annual 
Reports. Also the data archives of Annual Returns made by trade unions to the 
Certification Office;
b) Data taken from the Labour Force Survey series Reports was utilised in the 
development of the research in Chapters One and Two, particularly in respect of the 
union membership industrial category densities, also the age and gender profile of trade 
union membership.
c) Data taken from the Research and Membership Department of the Trades Union 
Congress, proved to be invaluable as a means of obtaining a more detailed insight to the 
industrial structure and membership industrial and gender make up of individual and 
groups of unions;
d) Data taken from the Research and Membership Departments of various individual 
unions, also information taken from the Annual Reports and Accounts of various 
individual unions, was invaluable as an insight to the individual unions problems and 
how policies were being developed to deal with the period of the 1980’s and 1990” s;
e) The data and information held in the WERS4 was utilised as one of the primary 
sources of information, particularly in respect of membership density, recognition, union 
activity and management employee relations policies.
f) Data produced by the administration of a survey questionnaire which produced 
responses from 46 unions with aggregate membership in excess of 6.5 million. The 
survey provided, in particular a means of obtaining up to date data which could be used 
as a comparator with earlier research undertaken, particularly in the areas of finance 
administration, by for example; Latta (1972), Willman and Morris (1988) and Willman 
Morris and Aston (1993).
4 WERS: SN 4026 - Workplace Employee Relations Survey. 1998 Panel Survey 1990-1998; UK DATA 
Archive, University of Sussex, website - http://www.dataarchive.ac.uk.
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1.19. The Certification Officer Annual Reports, and data archives, have been used as the 
primary sources of general data and information about trade union membership and 
finance because of its authoritative standing and general reliability of the data. The 
statutory requirement for all listed unions to annually complete Form AR21 (Annual 
Return Form 21 obtained from the Certification officer) and submit various supporting 
documents (financial records, benefit rules, etc) ensures a range of quality data, suitable 
to the needs of this research. Furthermore, the Certification Office data archives are the 
only aggregated and disaggregated data resource readily available at one location, 
covering the membership and financial data of TUC and non-TUC unions.
1.20. However, when considering matters of union aggregate density it is possible that 
the data provided by the Labour Force Survey series series is a more accurate reflection 
of the true membership density of UK trade unions. This is because, trade union density 
is calculated as the percentage of employees in the workforce who are union members. 
Whilst the Certification Office does require each union annual return to show the number 
of ‘non-contributing members’ these are not deducted from the aggregate membership 
figures shown in each annual report. Frequently, however not in all Annual Reports, 
there are references to the percentage of ‘non-contributing members’. There are 
however, no references to the number of members who are self-employed or 
permanently employed outside the UK, and therefore they should not be calculated as a 
part of the UK labour force.
1.21. The Labour Force Survey series series on the other hand asks a simple question as 
to who in employment is a member of a trade union. However, the survey is based upon 
a sample. Therefore when assessing the total number of ‘persons’ who are in 
membership of a union, after allowing for those ‘persons’ who are not ‘contributing 
members’ the Certification Office data is the better aggregate data. In addition, the only 
authoritative source for disaggregated data about individual union membership. 
However, to gain knowledge of the number of ‘employees’ who are in membership of 
unions perhaps the Labour Force Survey series data is a better source.
1.22. Data taken from the Trades Union Congress has been mainly historic primarily in 
the areas of TUC affiliated union membership. Data taken from individual unions has 
been extensively used in the disaggregated research. Such data has been obtained from 
individual union annual reports and accounts, and through the provision, of membership 
record information, financial and accounting records and associated data. This approach
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was used to supplement data in the same or similar areas taken from the Certification 
Office archives. The process gave an opportunity for questions and clarification to be 
sought from responsible staff and officials of each responding union.
1.23. In addition to the foregoing, data was obtained from a sample of 46 TUC unions 
and 31 non-TUC unions within the private and public sector, using a structured 
questionnaire. The sample ranged in membership size, for TUC unions from circa 5,000 
members upwards, and for non-TUC unions from 1,000 members upwards. In aggregate, 
the return of questionnaires covered some 6.5 million trade union members, it is 
therefore a veiy representative and robust sample. The structure of the sample can be 
seen at Appendix B.
1.24. The questionnaire was not used as the base for structured interviews with officials 
or research staff of responding unions. The sole reason for this was the fact that the 
whole of the thesis programme has been self-financed by its author Consequently there 
was a constraint on the amount of financial resources available to fund the extensive 
travel necessary to undertake such a process. The questions in respect of finance within 
the questionnaire were written using a similar approach to that used by Willman et al 
(1993)5 as a ‘template’. However, questions were introduced to ascertain the nature of 
changes, which had been made in investment portfolios in order to ascertain the degree 
of market exposure of union funds. The structured questionnaire was designed using 
PinPoint Software6 and was administered mainly by email. The questionnaire was not 
‘piloted’ primarily for two reasons:
a) the process was much more cost and time efficient, saving on stationaiy, postage and 
manual data entry on receipt of responses; and,
b) at the time of the questionnaire being available for distribution the UK postal services 
were in the midst of a series of industrial disputes causing serious delays in postal 
turnaround.
1.25. A copy of the questionnaire and explanation of the software system are contained 
at Appendix A and B l. The data collected by this process was in respect of various 
aspects of union industrial involvement, financial policies, check off, recruitment
5 Willman et al (1993) pp228-236
6 PinPoint 3 for Windows; Longman Logotron. Peter Cole, Logotron Limited 1995
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policies and general administration. The use of an electronic method of data collection 
was chosen for two reasons:
a) the obvious difficulties, particularly in respect of elapsed time, associated 
with fixing interview dates, times etc;
b) the costs and time taken in travelling to a large number of locations
c) to undertake the interview process.
Responding unions did have the alternative of requesting a hard copy of the 
questionnaire for completion, and 16 responding unions actually completed the 
questionnaire manually and returned it by post.
1.26. In some respects, with the benefit of hindsight, some sections of the questionnaire 
were over-ambitious, in that a number of questions were consistently not answered 
because the respondent union did not have the data requested. There were also a number 
of questions where the information provided was inadequate as a response to the 
question, or information was withheld because of its confidentiality. Consequently, 
where the information provided or the number of unions completing a question was 
inadequate and unrepresentative as a sample, these questions have been omitted from the 
data and analysis. The questions affected by this decision are marked on the specimen 
questionnaire at Appendix Bl. Because the returns of completed questionnaires covered 
unions representing over 6.5 million members (86 per cent of total union membership) it 
was felt that it was sufficiently representative in all major respects, for the purposes of 
the research. It has therefore been incorporation as appropriate within the analysis.
1.27. Finally, data has been taken from earlier published authoritative research. Some of 
this data covers the earliest period since 1979. However, it is valuable data and worthy 
of updating, and where necessary this has been done and it is incorporated within the 
data sets, and has been used in the analysis as appropriate. In all cases such data is 
referenced as to its source and the process by which the data has been updated.
Analytical models
1.28. As discussed earlier, the three developments, which for ease of reference have been 
called ‘limbs’, are closely interrelated, and the change process that has taken place 
within each, has had endogenous affects. Each limb of the question contains discrete 
issues, which require a discrete analytical approach. Consequently, the approach that 
will apply in respect of each limb of the question is explained in brief within the 
following paragraphs.
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1.29. To undertake analysis of membership recruitment and retention a paradigm has 
been chosen that focuses upon the processes of ‘achieved growth’ and ‘received growth’. 
The chosen model is similar to that constructed by Bain and Price (1980)7 to illustrate 
growth and decline in union membership, which they explained involved two processes, 
which they called, the ‘virtuous cycle’ and the ‘vicious cycle’. The model explains 
growth, first developing because of ‘initiated organising (recruiting) activity’ by a union. 
Secondly by ‘received growth’, that is growth which occurs or results from 
developments consequent upon ‘initiated organising activity’ that is, growth that 
develops because of recognition being agreed and facilities for union activities being 
agreed by the employer. Such as, the right and reasons for joining a trade union forming 
a part of the employee induction process, check off, paid release for representatives, 
accommodation, administrative support etc, also agreement to operate a post entiy/pre- 
entry close shop.
1.30. The analysis in this limb is of an ‘overarching’ nature in that it interrelates with 
union finance and the analysis that is undertaken in the second limb. To explain this fact 
a model is constructed which is derived from an approach first devised by Berkowitz 
(1954)8 and reproduced in Willman et al (1993)9. It illustrates theoretically the cost 
structure of recruitment in a ‘green-field’ situation as it might have applied pre 1979. 
Illustrating the manner in which the employer subsidy and ultimately the closed shop 
developed and made a significant contribution to financing trade union growth and 
stability. The model used in the thesis whilst based upon the Berkowitz paradigm 
utilises a different approach to illustrate the analysis and argument. The thesis model 
uses micro economic theory to illustrate the manner in which a union builds membership 
and revenue, and how with the intervention of the employer subsidy net revenue surplus 
increases.
1.31. Disaggregated data sets produced by the research undertaken of individual trade 
union annual reports and accounts and data taken from the Certification Office archives, 
is used to explain the manner in which selected unions have performed financially. A 
comparative analysis of the data is undertaken, to show the way in which TUC affiliated 
unions were more seriously affected by some aspects of the changes in law than was the
7 Bain. G. S. and Price. R., (1980) Profiles o f Union Growth. Oxford, Blackwell
8 Berkowitz, M. (1954) The Economics o f Trade Union Organisation and Administration. Industrial and 
Labour Relations Review, 7: 512-523.
9 Willman. P., Morris. T. and Aston. B.(1993) Union Business, trade union organisation and financial 
reform in the Thatcher years Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. P 40.
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case for non-TUC unions. In particular, analysis will be undertaken of the affects of the 
legislation of 1980-1982-1990 outlawing the closed shop, which appears to have had a 
disproportionate affect upon TUC unions. The data illustrates, that after allowing for the 
membership loss that was taking place because of industrial restructuring, the changes in 
law may have contributed to a series of step reductions in density, and financial decline, 
particularly for TUC unions.
1.32 The thesis does not give discrete conclusions for each chapter. Instead, an 
overarching conclusion is utilised at the end of the document, which summarises the 
analysis, argument and conclusions to be drawn from each discrete chapter of the thesis.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 The thesis overarches a number of areas of the broad literature. Therefore, the 
literature review is divided into ‘sections’, which relate to each limb of the question, as 
follows:
a) the historic operating environment of trade unions which helped shape the
movements structure at a micro and macro level;
b) the changes in law and industrial restructuring and the decline in
collectivism/pluralism;
c) the changes in industrial composition, manufacturing decline and services 
growth and the changing demographics generated by these compositional 
changes;
d) the affect of exogenous change and consequential endogenous change upon 
membership and the financial decline of unions.
e) the policies adopted by unions as a response to their changed operating 
environment and the propensity for unions to merge;
2.2 The thesis seeks to avoid a detailed involvement in the polemic about political 
change and its affect upon trade unions. Nor does the thesis become involved in a 
detailed analysis of statute and common law relating to trade unions and their activities 
over the past 25 years. Nonetheless, given the history and nature of its subject it is 
important to display an understanding of these issues and their role in the overall process 
of change since 1979, and their contextual affect upon trade unions. Therefore, 
appropriate literature in the aforementioned areas of the thesis topic is incorporated 
within the literature review, and the various chapters of the thesis as appropriate
2.3 With the exception of the chapter covering trade union finance, authoritative 
literature in the general area covered by the thesis was large. Consequently, it was 
necessary to apply further selectivity to the available authoritative literature, limiting it 
to:
a) First, the literature which explains the historical context to the thesis topic and 
hypotheses.
b) Secondly, literature which is ‘focused’ upon the subject matter of one or other of 
the three interrelated limbs of the thesis;
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c) Third, to literature, which contains results of research, covering aspects of the 
‘process of change’ upon one or other of the thesis limbs; and,
d) Finally, literature which whilst of a tertiary nature, assists understanding of the
overall hypotheses, research and analysis.
The thesis question focuses upon the period 1979 to 2002. Whilst most of the literature 
referenced within the thesis was published prior to 2002, an amount of research and 
literature is referenced which, whilst it was not published prior to this date, has relevance 
to this research.
The historical context of union growth and decline - Changes in politics, public 
policy and law
2.4 The entry point to the subject of the thesis was a review of some of the more 
important historic research and literature on the subject, in particular:
Buchanan (1974), (1981); Clegg, (1972), (1985), (1994); Flanders and Clegg (1963); 
Flanders. (1970); Fox (1966), (1964), (1969), and (1985); Goldstein (1952); Hayek 
(1960), (1973), (1980); Hughes (1964); Latta (1972); McCarthy (1962); Roberts (1956); 
Undy et al (1981); Voos (1984); Waddington (1988); Wedderbum (1987); Willman and 
Morris (1988); Wrigley (1987). The Donovan Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers Associations 1968, (Donovan), together with the twelve research papers10 
produced by Bain, Hughes, McCarthy, Marsh, McKersie, Munns, Parker, Seear, Staples, 
Steiber, and Whybrew. Donovan encapsulates the state of industrial relations at a point 
in time when the trade union movement within the UK was moving towards its zenith. 
The work was commissioned by the Labour Government. The primary tool used by 
Donovan was a questionnaire seeking responses from trade unions and employers 
organisations to 330 questions under 5 broad heads11. In addition input to the 
commissions enquiries was sought from a wide range of Government Departments, 
Parliament and individuals. Donovan was the largest ‘single’ survey of Industrial 
Relations ever undertaken. It takes an historic overview and develops a detailed analysis 
of its material leading to proposals and recommendations, which helped, shape industrial 
relations throughout most of the succeeding two decades. There is wide-ranging support 
within the literature for the view that from the mid 1950’s and throughout the 1960s and 
1970s there was a growing confidence amongst trade unionists against a background of 
favourable labour market conditions. However, shortly after the election of the Tory
10 A complete listing of these Research Papers is given in the Bibliography under the reference to The Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations
11 Donovan (1968) pp 3-4
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Government of 1979, Pollard (1984)12 starting from the view that trade unions used to be 
necessary and a force for good, claimed that all that now lay in the past. Pollard appears 
to have been heavily influenced in his writing by the political philosophy of Hayek, 
referred to later. However, whilst Pollard’s is not an opinion supported by this research, 
it indicates the background to the legislative programme embarked upon by successive 
Toiy governments. Furthermore, when considered in depth, what Pollard says confirms 
the degree of complacency of trade unions and their leadership about some of the more 
obvious abuses of power that were taking place during the 1960’s and 1970’s.
2.5 However, Taylor (1994) argues diametrically opposite to Pollard, albeit within a 
book funded by the TUC. He is critical of union policies particularly in the methods 
chosen to combat the changing political environment and the consequences of industrial 
restructuring, also the TUC’s inability to give greater clarity of direction in important 
areas of organising and union structure. Nonetheless, he saw continuing relevance and a 
re-growth of unions into the 21st Century. However, Pollard was writing in 1994, since 
which date union membership and density has declined very significantly, as is shown 
within the body of the thesis. Salamon (2000) argues that the:
“power and authority o f the TUC lies in the fact that it has a near monopoly o f 
representation, and has been able to prevent the major rifts developing between sections 
o f the union movement that are characteristic o f other countries ”
Salamon (2000) overlooks the fact that whilst the TUC has retained its position as the 
single central representational body for its affiliated unions, it has had little success 
throughout its history at preventing inter union problems, for example in Rothwell v 
APEX mentioned later.
2.6 However, much of the literature argues it would be wrong to exaggerate the social 
political and economic dominance of unions. For example England and Weekes (1985) 
whilst accepting the growth in the strength and influence of trade unions, say:
“it would be a mistake to ignore the more than compensatory growth in the power o f
the state and o f multi-nationalfirms ”.
Also pointing out that, the central levers of economic power were not in the hands of 
trade unionists, saying: •
12 Pollard. S. (1984) pp 106-107
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“Trade unions do not control exchange rates or interest rates or the levels o f taxation; 
they do not decide marketing strategies or when and where investment will take 
place; they do not determine the price o f oil or the supply o f housing ”. Going on to 
say: “Trade union strength remained therefore, even at the best o f times, defensive 
and opportunistic”.
As part of a wider examination of the factors leading to Britain’s poor economic 
performance, Williams et al (1985) looked at the blame placed upon organised workers. 
Surveying the available evidence, and the arguments of their contemporaries within the 
literature, at best they found the case not proven. Furthermore, the authors argued, 
similar to England and Weekes (1985) that the causes of Britain’s poor performance can 
be said to have been more credibly located in practices well removed from the shop 
floor. Writers such as the aforementioned also Coates.(1994) and Lewis and Simpson 
(1982), and many others referenced within the thesis, argued that trade unions existed to 
control and limit the excesses of the imbalance of power between employers and 
workers. However, the relative weakness of trade unions has been demonstrated on 
more than one occasion. The impact of industrial, political and economic change over 
the past 25 years upon trade unions is proof enough of this fact, without delving too far 
into the literature on trade union and labour history.
2.7 Hayek (1960) (1973) (1980), offers a politically polarised argument, and is often 
credited as being one of the principal architects of the philosophy underlying the 
succession of post 1979 Tory Governments on economic and trade union reform. It is 
evident, when his political background is understood, and his writing is analysed, that 
Hayek had a profound influence upon the leadership of the Tory Government Deakin 
and Morris (2001)13. The continuum of legislation that lead to the regulation and control 
of trade unions certainly bears the ‘hallmark’ of Hayek’s philosophy. The basic 
argument of Hayek was that;
“unions distort the operation o f markets, oppress the individual and create beliefs in 
social justice which cannot be fulfilled”.
His ‘cure’ was to limit union power and create a situation in which the free play of 
market forces could apply which, in turn would undermine the collectivist/pluralist 
underpinning of trade unions. Hayek portrays the institutions of collective regulation as 
anathema to the policies of deregulation, which the Tory Government wished to develop. 
He advocated the removal of all forms of protection for trade unions and their activities
13 Deakin and Morris (2001) pp 34-35
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and a return to the free play of common law, the employment contract and tort as 
prerequisites for Tory policies to succeed.
2.8 Hayek identified unions as the only effective countervailing power that may resist the 
deregulation and fundamental restructuring of the UK economy. He believed such 
change to be essential if the UK was to reap any benefits from the developing changes in 
the global economy. That the developments he advocated would create serious 
distortions in the balance of power as between employers and workers appears never to 
have been in Hayek’s mind. Alternatively, if they were, it is not apparent in his writing 
or pronouncements. Whatever the contribution of trade unions to Britain’s relative 
economic decline, the extent or limit of their affect is not exactly quantifiable, any 
conclusions must be coloured by the wider political views of observers. However, 
Hughes (1986) gives a stark account, and accurate prediction of the maturing crisis of the 
British economy and the economic context in which Conservative policies were formed 
and trade union difficulties may emerge.
2.9 Two further examples of the influence of political perspectives on industrial relations 
can be found in the writings of Fox (1969) and Hyman (1975). Each comes from entirely 
differing polarities of political philosophy to Hayek, indeed have differing political 
philosophy between themselves. In the former, a social democratic view of politics 
sustains a pluralist analysis; while Hyman’s ‘Marxism’ results in very different 
conclusions. In academic circles, the pluralist model of industrial relations tended to be 
dominant throughout the 1960s and 1970s, however, it always faced sharp opposition 
from Marxist perspectives. Perhaps the leading authority and most successful of writers 
from this standpoint is indeed Hyman. Who, whilst demonstrating the complexity of 
industrial relations basically argued that pluralism represented little more than an 
accommodation for the capitalist system of political economy.
2.10 Despite the fact that Fox’s article is over thirty years old, its clarity and quality of 
argument still rewards study and justifies inclusion within this work. There was a time 
when many observers and, perhaps, industrial relations practitioners, would have 
regarded as ‘won’ the argument put by Fox for a pluralist frame of reference. However, 
as Fox points out, the unitary perspective of management and the Courts, certainly in 
respect of the employment contract, is deeply rooted. In addition, while it may appear 
with different emphases in different periods, it is still very much with us today! A fact, 
which is briefly explored within the body of the thesis, in terms of its relevance to the 
changed culture of individualised employment contract, terms instead of collectively
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agreed terms and conditions of employment. Considered against what Hayek expressed, 
and what is now known to have been the consequences of such philosophies having been 
applied. The arguments and opinions of writers such as Coates, Lewis, Simpson, Fox 
and Hyman, and many of their contemporaries, were well founded. These are 
arguments, certainly in terms of the impact of the changes in law upon trade unions, the 
validity of which the approach of this thesis seeks to test.
2.11 Brown (1992); Brown et al (1997); Deakin and Morris (2001); Dickens and Hall 
(2003); Dunn and Metcalfe (1996); Freeman and Pelletier (1990); Painter et al (1998); 
Painter et al (2000); Lord Wedderbum (1995); Lord McCarthy (1992); Wrigley (1997); 
Wrigley (2002) and many other researchers have produced strong arguments about the 
impact of statute and case law throughout the reference period. Their arguments are 
primarily that trade unions were placed in a position where the law in its changed, and 
developing form, inhibited their ability to protect their organisation within industries and 
companies when change was taking place. However, Gospel and Willman (2003) offer 
an interesting opinion:
“unions and employers missed a number o f opportunities to build a system o f employee 
representation based on interlocking collective bargaining and joint consultation. In the 
case o f the unions, in the early 1970s, they missed the opportunity to secure positive 
legal rights when they were strong. When, from the late 1970s onwards, the legal 
framework for the voluntaristic system eroded, the coverage o f collective bargaining 
quickly shrank”.
which encapsulates much of the truth of the mistake trade unions made during a period 
when they had greater power to influence their destiny. The paradox of the 
collectivist/pluralist system was that it relied heavily upon public policy support for a 
framework of legal immunities which, placed no ceiling on union aspirations, when 
politics and public policy was favourable. However, it equally did not provide much 
support in less favourable times. Dickens and Hall (2003)14 refer to the increased 
juridification of industrial relations and the fact that voluntarism has ceased to be the 
keystone of British industrial relations. They point out that the incoming Labour 
administration in 1997 not only continued many of the prevailing laws, but added 
significantly to the manner in which law was to enforce employment standards, both 
procedural and substantive.
14 Dickens. L. and Hall. M. (2003) Labour Law and Industrial Relations: a New Settlement in Edwards. P. 
(ed) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice. Second Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, pp 124-125
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2.12 Thus, once public policy was changed to put in place limitations on union 
aspirations, the fragility of their power was quickly exposed. Gospel and Willman (2003) 
illustrate that the succession of change that has taken place, in the process of 
consultation, by UK and EU legislative initiatives have left a somewhat moribund 
collective bargaining structure, predominantly within the public sector, struggling for 
survival. However, what has taken its place is complicated and not universal in 
application. They believe that unions have been “led by events ” rather than involved in 
the shaping of the new processes and procedures, a view shared by Willman (2005) who 
says:
“Exogenous factors such as sectoral shifts in employment and changes in government 
policy have rightly been accorded causal primacy in the explanation o f union decline. I  
argue that the response to these exogenous shocks has in practice rendered the causes o f 
continued decline endogenous ”.
2.13 Such developments were of course as Hayek had ‘willed’ it, and the legacy of much 
of his philosophy has transferred across the political divide, to continue almost extant 
under a Labour Government since 1997. However, it is with the endogenous 
consequences of the quantum of change, not simply changes in law and legal 
immunities, upon trade unions at a disaggregated level, rather than their aggregated 
effects that the thesis is focused. The foregoing items of the literature present in brief, a 
series of conflicting interpretations of the significance of the pattern of industrial 
relations, the role of trade unions and other factors, for Britain’s poor industrial 
performance. Also, the impact which a changed political philosophy had upon the 
context within which, a pluralist collectivist industrial relations culture had been set for 
some fifty years.
Marginalising the unions, ‘new’ approaches to ‘managing’ Industrial Relations.
2.14 Deakin and Morris (2001) say that:
“Trade unions were characterised as legally over-privileged bodies which by their very 
nature obstructed the operation o f market forces and threatened individual freedoms. ” It 
was precisely this type of opinion that had led to the Donovan Report of 1968 and the 
succession of industrial relations laws, which developed under both Labour and Tory 
Governments up to 1979. Whilst many would argue that during this period the law was 
intrusive and tended to disturb relationships between the two sides of industry, 
nonetheless, the law tended to be ‘supportive’ of the ‘collectivist model’. However, from
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1979 to 1997 the carefully measured legislative steps15 taken by Tory governments 
inexorably led to the attainment of their primary objective of a free market in labour, 
Dunn and Metcalfe (1996). An implicit feature of which was to be the removal of 
collective bargaining as the dominant method of determining contract terms, and the 
primary service of trade unions to their membership. With this ‘service provision’ 
generally undermined and, certainly within the private sector largely destroyed, trade 
union power and their countervailing role could be more easily swept aside. As Deakin 
and Morris say:
“Collective bargaining was seen as an undesirable constraint upon a market which 
required the individualisation o f the employment relationship in order to function 
properly”
Deakin and Morris (2001) also Kessler and Baylis (1992). Entering a lengthy and 
detailed polemic as to the political reasoning behind the decisions of the government, is 
not a route the thesis will take. However, trade unions were seen by the Tory 
governments throughout the material period as a probable effective countervailing 
influence to their economic policies and particularly deregulation, and therefore must be 
“neutered” Coates (1994), and effectively they were. Metcalfe (1998) views this 
development as one of the instruments of turning round the economy
2.15 Human Resource Management has served to reinforce many of the industrial 
cultural changes that have caused the decline of trade unions. It has helped develop a 
culture, which together with other management strategies has supplanted the 
collectivist/pluralist model. For example, its link with the development of individualised 
contract terms as an alternative to collective agreements, also its tendency to exploit the 
partnership philosophy as a ‘tool’ for subverting effective trade-unionism, are important 
developments, which must not be overlooked.
2.16 The philosophy and techniques of HRM have been around for many years. The 
primary problem with many of its techniques was that they were ‘too technical’ requiring 
the commitment of a great deal of resources if they were to be fully implemented and 
managed properly, in a ‘paper culture’. However, with the advent of increasingly 
powerful and accessible computer hardware. Also the development of consultancy ‘off 
the shelf software systems designed to support HRM techniques, or ‘bespoke’ software 
systems designed to the needs of particular employers. HRM and its ‘process and
15 For example, The Employment Act 1982 reversed the liability of unions in tort to where it had been pre 
1906
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procedurally unitarist culture’, has moved dramatically into every facet of employee 
relations management. The result has been a significant contribution to the collapse of 
the pluralist-collectivist model, certainly within the private sector, so dominant prior to 
1979.
2.17 There is a great deal of data and literature which is supportive of the argument that 
Human Resource Management (HRM) techniques, which started to develop during the 
mid 1980’s. Co-incidental with the major changes in labour law was exploited as devices 
to further the marginalisation of collectivism, and collective bargaining. Guest (2001) 
however, argues that HRM has a very ‘chequered’ history in terms of both usage and 
effectiveness. Its growth was mistakenly identified as a derivative of pluralism by some 
trade union leaders and (like Turkeys voting for Christmas), actually supported. 
Amongst these leaders was the TUC General Secretary John Monks (1994)16 who said:
“the more anti-union the employer, the less likely it is that HRM techniques will be
used”.
This view of HRM may apply in circumstances where employers have so little regard for 
their employees, that even an organised approach to employee relations through internal 
administration is regarded as costly and unnecessary.
2.18 Guest (2001) and Millward (2000) appears to provide some grounds for arguing that 
what John Monks believed to be the case is misconceived. However, John Monks after 
some four years appears to have changed his opinion saying:
“In the wrong hands HRM becomes both a sharp weapon to prise workers apart from 
their union and a blunt instrument to bully workers ”
Purcell (2001) gives strong support to Monks initial opinion of HRM, arguing that its 
approach is not too far away from the mission statement of AC AS itself! Storey (1992) 
however, takes the view that HRM in the 1990’s was being used as a means of making 
collective bargaining almost irrelevant. However, Storey is hardly antipathetic towards 
HRM, as he gives clear support to the approach in Storey (2001)1'. However, over the 
period since the early 1980’s HRM has effectively replaced the ‘industrial relations- 
personnel management’ style developed to manage the collectivist-pluralist approaches 
within much of UK industry and commerce. The most rapid growth in the use of HRM
16 John Monks. General Secretary TUC, statement to the TUC General Council, Press Release September 
2002.
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was within the inward investing, foreign owned companies, particularly American and 
Japanese18. Foreign owned employers have tended to be amongst those who most 
rigorously resisted recognition and collective bargaining, and have tended to be amongst 
those employers who have been most innovative in introducing ‘new approaches’, such 
as ‘individualised contracts’. Introducing what has become known as ‘risk pay’, that is 
income subject to the attainment of targeted performance levels of individuals and 
company, profit related and profit linked pay, share schemes etc Lewis (1990).
2.19 All of these innovations providing employees with ‘flexible’ remuneration and 
benefit packages, as part of the ‘individualised performance (HRM) culture’. A 
methodology which has progressively made collective bargaining a virtual impossibility, 
within much of the private sector, and the privatised previously public sector. These 
approaches were exploited by many employers as one of the instruments by which to 
bypass collectivism and ‘wean’ employees away from it, rather than produce worthwhile 
performance results. These are developments which trade unions have found great 
difficulty in combating.
2.20 It was Guest (1987) in the early years of HRM’s development, who is most often 
attributed as having produced the most definitive opinions on the subject in terms of UK 
experience. He argued that HRM was:
“a particular approach to labour management”; 
saying it comprised:
“a set o f policies designed to maximise organisational integration, employee 
commitment, flexibility and quality o f work”.
However, perhaps a clearer impression of the intent of HRM is recorded by Cully et al
(1999) they refer to a statement made by the editor of Human Resource Management 
Journal who said that HRM’s aim was to:
“gain employee commitment” — and — “shift the focus away from management-trade 
union relations to management-employee relations
Interestingly, Guest (2001) appears to have developed a more critical view of how some 
management’s have utilised HRM. He takes the view that where organisations have 
failed to exploit correctly the benefits for both management and employees of HRM, 
there is a very clear role for trade unions saying:
17 Storey (2001) p 9.
18 The Japanese approach o f ‘Sunrise Agreements’ based on single union recognition and binding pendulum 
arbitration (no strikes) is one example of such innovations. See: Lewis, R. Strike Free Deals and Pendulum 
Arbitration ’ British Journal o f Industrial Relations, 1990, Vol.28:l.
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“Management in too many organisations has failed to use its control to introduce the 
kind o f human resource management that might be o f benefit to both workers and the 
organisation. They need pushing. There is still a strong case for some good, traditional 
but very necessary industrial relations ”
Implying that unions have been left in such circumstances only with the role of ‘wielding 
a big stick’ to beat management into applying a philosophy that ultimately may not serve 
their (the union) best interests.
2.21 Based upon the “unitarist” “pluralist” definitions of Fox (1966) this was a clear 
expression of HRM being used as a tool to undermine pluralism and the collectivist 
model. Burchill (1997), Kessler and Baylis (1995) disagree with such argument. They 
saw HRM as based upon aiding the interrelationship of the employer and employee 
through the medium of a ‘individualised’ employment contract, free of the intervention 
of supervening ‘third party’ interests in the form of unions and collective agreements. 
That was an approach, which within a free market economy, they argue, would produce 
the greatest benefits to all. However, such arguments exposed a view of HRM that was 
intensely myopic, and showed its origins to have been in an economic culture, the USA, 
that provided few statutory protections of a collectivist nature. The supervening nature 
of statutory provisions, by incorporation to the employment contract, originating from 
UK government initiatives also, increasingly as a result of European Union (EU) 
statutory provisions, have shown the ‘individualised’ employment contract be what it in 
fact always was, a figment.
2.22 The expansion of human resource management as a ‘management process’ used to 
bypass weakening unions and avoid or evade union recognition is strongly argued by 
Storey (1992). He argues that rather than the improvement of employee relations and 
performance being its primary objective as claimed by its advocates. HRM tended to 
flourish in many companies where trade unions were either emasculated or no longer 
existed or had never been recognised. A perception diametrically opposite to the views 
expressed by John Monks, mentioned earlier.
2.23 There is of course considerable literature that supports the use of HRM. Purcell
(2000) takes a supportive view of the role of HRM. He concludes that HRM where it is 
operated well can benefit employers and employees and cites Cully et al (1999)(WERS) 
research as supporting this argument. However, Cully et al (1999)(WERS) must be 
viewed within its correct context, the views expressed within this sequence of
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publications appear to be dominated by data supporting the opinions and experiences of 
management. The data and narrative however cannot be regarded as representative of 
‘employee views’, much less the views of ‘active trade unionists’. Therefore, whilst 
they are an indispensable source of data (and have been utilised extensively as a source 
of data and as a ‘directional’ aid to the research of this thesis) in the area of change in 
employee management. They must be regarded as less authoritative in terms of the trade 
union-employee opinion. However, Purcell’s arguments about the ‘supportive nature’ 
of HRM have ‘devotees’ in, Ackers et al (1996); and McLoughlin and Gourlay (1994). 
Purcell however, does not develop any strong argument to deny that even in the 
circumstances he defines HRM cannot also be used to undermine the ‘pluralist’ 
‘collectivist’ approach, he quite simply ‘dodges the issue’. Nor does Armstrong (1995), 
another strong advocate of HRM who whilst arguing HRM is not a “unitarist” tool, 
when outlining the management approach in developing strategic HRM policies, deny 
HRM’s use as an ‘anti collectivism tool’. In fact he barely mentions the interests or 
involvement of the workers! Armstrong (1995) concludes that the ‘value’ of HRM;
“depends on the extent to which it is believed that people create added value and should 
therefore be treated as a strategic resource. ”
2.24 Guest and Hoque (1996) have on the other hand argued that HRM is most likely to 
be found operating most effectively in unionised settings. Going on to say that 
‘collectivism’ and ‘individualism’ were not opposites but separate dimensions to the 
employment relationship. If by such an assertion Guest sought to imply that self-interest 
and the individual employees contractual relationship with an employer, was bound up 
within the ‘collectivism, then there is little disagreement. However, it is clear that Guest 
did not mean this at all. What Guest was arguing was that ‘individualism’ within the 
framework of an HRM culture may produce results equivalent to ‘collectivism’. He 
exposes his naivety about the unitarist nature of HRM when he, Guest (1989), expresses 
the view that HRM is “unitarist” however only;
“to the extent that they assume no underlying and inevitable differences o f interest 
between management and workers
He takes the view that HRM quite often gives management a high expectation of 
improving corporate performance without actually delivering the goods! Perhaps those 
trade unionists that embraced HRM had listened too attentively to the arguments of 
Guest and authors of similar persuasion! The thesis supports that section of the 
literature, which argues that HRM, has been instrumental in the decline of ‘pluralism’. 
In addition, that it reinforced any tendency towards ‘unitarism’ as a foil to trade union
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recognition and the ‘pluralist approach’, and has fundamental tenets that are the absolute 
antithesis of ‘collectivism’. The opinion and argument is based not solely upon research 
undertaken for this thesis. It draws upon empirical evidence derived from very long, in 
depth experience of the techniques development and deployment. Also in the design and 
implementation of many of its facets in practical application across a wide range of UK, 
USA and Japanese companies within the UK and internationally.
The contractual relationship: deia vu or back to the future?
2.25 The historic battle between organised labour and employers, going back to times 
when laissez fair was the norm, has always been to decide ‘how’ and ‘who’ would 
determine the terms of the contract of employment. As recent as the 1970’s, in the very 
period of the trade union movements zenith, white-collar unions were fighting these 
battles every day. Therefore, where trade unions ‘are now’, is in large measure where 
they ‘have been before’ in the more recent past. Even the changes in the law that have 
taken place over the period from 1979 cannot be said to be ‘the’ determining difference 
that makes it more difficult to organise and hold on to membership. True, the growth 
period of the 1950’s to 1970’s had the protective benefit for trade unions through the 
system of legal immunities. It is also true that they were at greater liberty to defend their 
rights, without the threats of tort or civil action and sequestration of funds and assets, 
than they have been since 1979. However, in respect of the rights of employers to fix the 
terms of the employment contract, effectively little has changed during the history of the 
trade union movement, except insofaras statutory procedural and substantive rights are 
concerned.
2.26 Adam Smith (1776) recognised the imbalance between the parties to, as Khan- 
Freund (1976) termed it;
“that indispensable figment o f the legal mind known as the contract o f employment”
Fox (1974) argued some years before the current individualised contract vogue 
developed that individualised terms and conditions of employment rarely establish a 
sound employment relationship. They are not the products of ‘mutuality’, and in given 
circumstances can, because of the imbalance of power between the parties to the contract 
“undermine trust”. The use of individual employment contracts as a means of linking 
pay to performance, and meeting the flexibility needs of the business forms an integral 
part of the HRM mission. During the 1980’s and 1990’s, HRM was utilised in designing 
strategies by which to, not only remove employees from the ambit of collective 
bargaining. The consequent affect was to undermine union membership, and deny large
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sectors of employees statutory protections through the use of ‘flexible contracts’. The 
growth of part-time and fixed term contract employee numbers during the period bears 
witness to these facts' The Labour government sponsored a major piece of research into 
this whole area of the changing employment relationship. The research undertaken by 
Brown et al (1999) in respect of matters such as collective bargaining, employee 
representation, union recognition etc, showed that the development of an ‘individualised 
approach’ to employment terms had done a great deal of damage to union recognition, 
membership and density. Brown (1999) also said, that HRM had in fact done little to 
achieve greater diversification of the substantive terms of employment contracts. He 
concluded that HRM had therefore been more about “procedural” rather than 
“substantive ” matters for such employers, going on to say:
“These employers have been withdrawing from collective bargaining”;
and it was for this reason they had utilised HRM, rather than any other approach, an
opinion with which this research has a great deal of empathy.
2.27 Deakin (1999) argues that the tendency has been for individualised contracts to be 
used, “as instruments o f unilateral managerial control”. Further he argues that the 
increasing prevalence of individualised contracts as a device for replacing collectively 
agreed terms and conditions, has placed employers at greater rather than lesser risk of 
intervention by legislation and the courts. A review of the quite dramatic increase in the 
numbers of cases coming before Employment Tribunals gives an indication of the 
veracity of what Deakin says:
“Similarly, the sequence o f legislative action which has been necessary in order to 
regulate areas o f the employment relationship such as, part-time and fixed-term 
contracts, working hours, holidays, equal pay, discrimination etc adds weight to his 
argument”.
2.28 Deakin is supported in his argument by the fact that many authorities within the 
literature, in the mid 1980’s, produced arguments for a change in the employer-employee 
relationship19. They argued that the ‘contract of service’ should be replaced by a broader 
definition of an ‘employment relationship’. The influence of this literature has been that 
the law on employment has progressively moved towards a more comprehensive 
definition of who is and is not an ‘employee’. This has resulted in the removal of 
limitations upon statutory protections for employers simply because of the nature of the
19 The law has now been considerably strengthened to prevent the abuses of part-time employment as a 
device by which to avoid statutory rights, which had developed throughout the period of the 1980’s and 
1990’s.
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‘employment relationship’. These developments, together with the rights created by the 
Employment Relations Act 1999, should have placed many more employed persons 
within the ambit of trade union recruitment. Making trade unions and their ‘services’ 
more attractive, however as yet, unions are to fully exploit the opportunities. Guest and 
Conway (1999) say that even where unions are not ‘empty shells’ not untypically 
employees working in a HRM environment tend not to identify a union as authoritative, 
placing greater reliance upon management as the ‘trusted’ communications source. 
Auerbach (1993), Deery and Mitchell eds (1999), Lord Wedderbum (1995) and others 
have produced a great deal of literature on the subject of personal contract terms.
2.29 The cases o f20Associated Newspapers Ltd -v- Wilson and 21 Associated British Ports 
-v- Palmer are authoritative cases in the matter of personal contract terms. However, the 
decisions have implications far beyond the limited scope of employment contract issues. 
These cases involved the transference of employees from having, the terms and 
conditions of their contract determined by collective agreement and instead accepting 
‘individualised’ terms and conditions of employment. The intent in both cases was 
believed by trade unions to ‘wean’ employees away from collectively agreed contract 
terms and to induce employees to relinquish trade union membership Both cases 
produced a great deal of academic and legal research and opinion to be written. The law 
was amended through provisions within the Employment Relations Act 1999, Kidner 
(2001) which according to Deakin and Morris and others has not effectively protected 
employees:
“against detriment or dismissal employees who refuse to enter into contracts which 
include terms that differ from those o f a collective agreement. ”
However, according to Ewing (2003) there is, in order to give effect to the decisions 
within the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), now a requirement for the UK 
government to make appropriate changes to the law as contained within the Employment 
Rights Act 1999. The far reaching implications of the decisions of the ECHR touch 
upon the whole range of an employees rights to:
1. be and remain a member of a union;
2. avail themselves of union representation if required;
Ewing goes on to say that membership rights, representation rights and recognition rights 
are all implicitly covered by the decision of the ECHR. Also that the decision should
20 Associated British Ports -v- Palmer [1995] IRLR 258 HL, [1993] IRLR 336 CA and [1992] 440.
21 Associated Newspapers Ltd -v- Wilson [1995] IRLR 258 HL, [1993] IRLR 336 CA and [1992] 440.
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make it much more difficult for employers to evade trade union rights to represent their 
members in the future.
2.30 Millward et al (2000) tend to view the development of HRM as not being of great 
importance in the overall changes in industrial relations which were taking place at 
companies. They noted, however, that HRM was not present, to any significant extent, 
within the Public Sector at the time of the WERS. The available data Brook (2002) 
shows that unlike the private sector collectivism and trade union organisation within the 
Public Sector is almost as intact as it had been pre 1979. Millward et al (2000) noted 
that whilst union membership and collective bargaining had declined elsewhere. Within 
the public sector, it was “ubiquitous”. However, whilst decline has been most marked in 
the private sector, in 1980 well over half of all private sector employees were union 
members, by 1998 this had fallen to a quarter, and by 2000 the Labour Force Survey 
series estimated it to be as low as 19 percent. In the public sector (what remains after 
privatisation) the fall has been from 84 percent to around 60 percent between 1980 and 
1999, a reduction of over 33%. Illustrating that whilst the decline in the public sector 
was not as great as for the private sector, membership and density nonetheless declined 
significantly. However, whilst trade unions and the collectivist, pluralist system, 
particularly within the private sector, did not flourish throughout the 1980’s and 90’s, it 
‘lived on’ within the Public Sector and in many private sector companies and industries. 
As Painter et al (1998) suggested because many employers saw in collectivism:
“a disciplinedframework within which corporate management could work".
The conclusions which are drawn is that HRM and the strategies deployed, particularly 
individualised contract terms, using this technique as a vehicle have been instrumental in 
undermining the ‘pluralist-collectivist’ approach the majority of UK industry prior to 
1979. Bacon and Storey (2000) by their overall argument tend to agree with this view. 
Given HRM’s primaiy tenets, as enunciated by its earliest designers and promulgators, 
when used to support the development of remuneration systems that do not allow for any 
participation in design or administration, through consultation or collective bargaining. It 
cannot co-exist with trade union recognition. The result of HRM used in this way is 
inevitably the supplanting of a ‘unitary’ approach, in areas where a recognised trade 
union would claim to have both ‘rights and interests’ on behalf of its members. 
Membership loss, declining density and influence and the trade union response.
2.31 Trade unions internationally have faced dramatic decline in membership and power 
throughout the period since the 1980’s. There has been a great deal of similarity in the 
manner in which this decline has taken place within the UK, Australia and New Zealand.
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In each case, the decline has a mix of political change, economic and industrial change 
and change in law governing industrial relations. In each country unions have faced 
closely similar acute uncertainties and difficulties to those experienced by U.K. unions, 
Cooper (2003), Ebbinghaus (2002). The extent of the problems of decline, have perhaps 
at times been overstated, through arguments about crisis and sclerosis of trade unions, 
Bronfenbrenner et al (1998) and Pocock (1998). The TUC in the early years of this 
period, adopted a totally antipathetic stance as can be seen in the literature produced at 
this time, TUC (1981) TUC (1982). However, the TUC leadership having accepted the 
reality of the situation they faced have, over a period, developed a stance of ‘new 
realism’ (TUC 1989 and 1990). During the early years of the 1990s, a trend emerged for 
the development of improved membership services as discussed in Heery and Kelly 
(1994)
2.32 The TUC began developing its policies to focus upon representation, TUC (1991) 
TUC (1995), and particularly upon organising TUC (1996). It was during this period of 
the late 1990’s that the philosophy of ‘social partnership’ began to gain currency, the 
TUC ‘kite-marking’ the approach as ‘new unionism’ TUC (1999). However, the 
successive novations of policy did not produce the trend back to ‘acceptability’ which 
the TUC was seeking to engender. The consequence of these failures in the efforts made 
to stem union decline and move forward led to the re-launch of the TUC.’ It was at this 
time that the move away from representation as the way forward and the emergence of 
the ‘organising academy’, Heery (1998) Heery (1999) suggested that a process of 
internationalisation was in process. Heeiy appears to have meant an improved spirit of 
international co-operation in the exchange of information and ideas aimed at mutual 
defence and assistance in facing closely analogous problems. He summarises what was 
developing as:
“the emergence o f international networks which can provide for the diffusion o f strategy, 
techniques and organisational forms
Nonetheless, even after the passage of 25 years and, having gone through these phases of 
policy change, designed to meet the challenges set by political, economic, sociological 
and legal changes. UK unions continue to question how they might cope with the 
consequential contextual change.
2.33 The new laws on trade union recognition, and employee rights, brought in by the 
Labour government in 1999, should have given unions new opportunities to move 
forward, grow and increase in power and influence. However, UK unions have yet to
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show that they are reaping the benefits of these laws, Wood et al (2002) doubt that they 
are the panacea hoped for by the unions. Membership has fallen from over 13 million in 
1979 and a density of 55 percent, to just over 7 million and a density of 29 per cent, at 
the end of 2002. A decline that has continued, however, since the mid 1990’s the rate of 
decline has slowed, nonetheless as Brook (2002) shows over the ten year period from 
1991 unions lost 1.3 million members a fall of 15 percent. Fairbrother (1996), Gallie et 
al (1996) and Waddington, (1992)’ argue that the collapse of membership was due to a 
decline in heavy industry. Where trade union density had been traditionally high, and 
because of the growth of private services, where membership was correspondingly low. 
Cully et al (1999)(WERS) illustrates the extent to which UK unions lost large numbers 
of core membership. The loss of income and funds, which this caused, made the 
development of new organisation and membership within new industries and services 
very difficult. These latter factors have been a significant contributor to the unions 
inability to rebuild their membership and density levels. The fact that the Employment 
Rights Act 1999 has not produced what was hoped for by the unions has led to relations 
becoming strained with the Labour Government, a fact recorded by Waddington (2003). 
Which, whilst it has not been the direct cause of the increasing number of days lost due 
to strikes, it has been a contributory factor. In support of this fact the extent to which 
such strikes have been within the public sector, an area of employment for which 
government has some direct culpability, can be cited.
2.34 However, data published by the CAC22 and ACAS2j indicates that some unions 
have continued to pursue recognition with employers engaged in industries where they 
had traditionally organised employees. Notwithstanding that, it was these very same 
industries, which have declined and contributed to membership losses. Which is a 
development post 1999 that tends to confirm the view of a number of authors, that 
unions have become preoccupied with ‘infill recruitment’. That is, unions focus 
recruitment in industries and groups of companies where they already have membership 
and recognition, but where there is scope to extend organisation. Rather than seek to 
organise industries, which historically have been poorly organised, and which, are 
growth industries or services. Colling (2003)24 tends to agree with this analysis
2.35 The fact that the alternative ‘soft options’ of:
22 Central Arbitration Commission Annual Reports (CAC) 2002-2003
2j Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service Annual Reports 2002-2003
24 Colling (2003) p 387
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a) Focusing recruitment efforts in traditional core industries and in-fill recruitment; 
and,
b) Settling recognition claims in conciliation with less than full collective bargaining 
rights.
are understandable given the apparent poor results of using the lengthy and detailed CAC 
procedures under the ER Act 1999 have become prevalent is confirmed in a recent TUC 
publication by Heery and Simms (2003). Commenting upon the results of a survey 
carried out, of employer responses to organising activities by unions they say:
“The pattern suggests that organising holds few terrors for employers once they are used 
to dealing with unions. ”
Whilst Heery and Simms (2003) make no comment in support of the opinion. It is also 
equally reasonable to argue that unions too, have “few terrors o f employers ” with whom 
they already have relations. Consequently, they may have felt more inclined to invest 
time in organising in circumstances where, in most cases, there is a less antipathetic 
management attitude.
2.36 The literature covering this period of change in UK union policies presents no 
preponderant opinion as to the direction that unions might take in the future. There is no 
focused or structured process of change that has developed over the period, the general 
scenario is littered with short-term responses indicating confusion. Much of the literature 
produced from within the trade union movement, and particularly the TUC, overflows 
with ‘truisms’. Some of it to the point of being myopic and veiling the true state of trade 
unions. Some of it more representative of ‘wish lists’ associated with the repeated 
pronouncements that the ‘renaissance is just around the comer’. An example is 
contained in Gospel and Wood eds (2003) in their conclusions where they say:
“Knowledge o f the benefits o f unions is limited, and is a major factor behind relatively 
low membership amongst young workers”, and go on to say that: “Nonetheless, it is 
unlikley that the decline o f unions in the UK will be reversed in any significant way in 
the near future, short o f unions organising beyond their existing territories and new 
groups o f workers ”
Based upon the evidence in Heeiy and Simms (2003), itself a TUC publication, this is 
exactly what is evidently not happening. Not for the first time has advice been 
commissioned by the trade union movement, only for it to be ignored. However, 
Blanden and Machin (2003) put forward an argument that is based upon ‘cultural’ 
identity. They say that:
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“young people are much more likely to join unions where their parents have been or are 
trade union members themselves
2.37 Not surprisingly, such uncertainty gives rise to different possibilities and choices, of 
which there are many. At its starkest, the choice in the late 1990’s was between a form 
of unionism that focused on centralised and national level organising and bargaining, as 
is debated in Mcllroy, J. (1997), Undy et al (1996), Waddington, (1999), Willman et al 
(1993). Also, that unions would fight to protect independent, workplace-based 
unionism, Bronfenbrenner et al (1998), Fairbrother (2000). However, there is no 
consensus therefore, where the balance may be in the wide range of competing opinion, 
remains an issue. Willman (2005) takes a very uncompromising view of the membership 
loss dilemma facing trade unions and how he believes the ‘propensity to merge’ is an 
erroneous route to reversing their decline, when he says:
“The consequence is that, whilst doubtless trade unions will argue it is not so they have, 
because o f the confusion surrounding policy and strategy, been driven down various 
routes non o f which are showing signs o f reversing the decline o f the past 25 years. 
Exogenous factors such as sectoral shifts in employment and changes in government 
policy have rightly been accorded causal primacy in the explanation o f union decline. I  
argue that the response to these exogenous shocks has in practice rendered the causes o f  
continued decline endogenous ”.
Partnership, a 21st Century replacement for the collectivist/pluralist model
2.38 Partnership is an example of a ‘change processes’ that appears to have absorbed a 
great deal of energy and resources and produced little by way of return, calculated in 
aggregate membership terms. The partnership philosophy predates the election of the 
Labour Government in 1997. Bryson (2000) reviewed the development of Partnership 
coming to the opinion that, where it was used by management as a means of deflecting 
unions away from their historic primary role of collective bargaining and representing 
their membership, it may not succeed because of the suspicion of employees that the 
union was neuter and partnership was a ‘sham’. Munroe and Rainbird (2000) conclude 
that partnership because it emanates from a ‘collectivist’ base i.e. it is usually the result 
of an agreement between one or more unions and an employer, provides the:
“basis for the development o f workplace trade union activism rather than being 
indicative o f its decline ”.
This is a view with which Oxenbridge et al (2002) appear to concur. They conclude that 
whilst partnership is invariably not the vehicle by which to facilitate the re-emergence of 
collective bargaining, it has provided a base for unions to gain organisation through
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agreements and procedures by embracing the partnership philosophy. The partnership 
approach was given a significant boost by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry personal endorsements in May 1999 at a TUC conference, when 
they announced the creation of a Partnership at Work Fund. With up to £2.5million to 
spend on projects to improve partnership at work. In addition the government has made 
provision for public funding as a means of ‘modernising Britains unions’, all of which 
must raise the question of what ‘strings’ are attached to this public money, how freely is 
it available and in what ways can unions spend it? In 2001 the TUC launched its own 
‘Partnership Institute’ providing consultancy and advisory services to unions and 
employers. The elements of ‘partnership’ are identified. In Partners for Progress: New 
Unionism at the Workplace, TUC (1999). The TUC sets out six elements25:
a) First, there should be a shared commitment to the business goals of the organisation;
b) Second, there should be a clear recognition that there might be quite legitimate 
differences of interest and priorities between the parties, differences that need to 
be listened to, respected and represented;
c) Third, measures to ensure flexibility of employment must not be at the expense of 
employees’ security, which should be protected by taking such steps as ensuring 
the transferability of skills and qualifications;
d) Fourth, partnership arrangements must improve opportunities for the personal 
development of employees;
e) Fifth, they must be based upon open and well-informed consultation, involving 
genuine dialogue;
f) Sixth, effective partnerships should seek to ‘add value’ by raising the level of 
employee motivation.
These are elements which Fox would have found little difficulty in embracing as 
embodying aspects of his ‘pluralist’ philosophy. However, there is little within them, 
save for element two and three, which indicates that the ‘new’ approach is designed to 
develop into a return to ‘collectivism’, on matters affecting the employment contract. 
Partnership, has embraced what, prior to 1980, would have been termed collective 
consultation and communication, which is an opinion certainly held by authors such as 
those mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs.
2.39 Since the emergence of the ‘partnership philosophy’ a strong body of opinion, has 
developed, led by writers such as Guest and Riccardo (2001), Haynes and Allen (2001),
25 It is these six elements which are referred to later within the body o f the thesis, in the discussion o f the 
development of the Computer Science Corporation (CSC) Partnership Agreement with MSF.
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Kelly (1996) and Terry (2003), and many others. These researchers argue that 
partnership, is wrongly seen by many trade unionists as the new way by which to build 
the pluralist/collectivist renaissance. They argue that when allied to HRM, partnership 
moves the balance of advantage and power even further towards the employer. Heery et 
al (2003) illustrates that considering the length of time ‘partnership’ has been around it 
has made only modest progress, saying:
“the 1990s saw unions negotiating a large number o f ‘partnership agreements’; there 
now exist at least 50 and possibly as many as 80 such agreements, depending on the 
definition adopted”.
Guest adopts an opposite argument to those who identify themselves with HRM and 
partnership as the way forward, pointing out that HRM is not the “only game in town ”. 
Reilly (2001) takes a cynical view of partnership regarding many such arrangements as 
having grown out of crisis, as he says many employers and unions take the view that: 
“Our backs are against the wall so we must do something” Likening the development of 
partnership agreements to employers “badging their employee relations as based on 
partnership”. However, Reilly (2001) accepts that the alternatives of ‘adversarial 
representation’ and ‘antagonism’, a re-tracing of the road from the pre 1979 era, are 
unacceptable. Arguing for a “mixed model” which is so often the case in practice. His 
findings and opinion as to how partnership operates in practice and what its value may 
be, is similar to that of Gall and McKay (2000) and Gall (2002). Heery (2002) identifies 
the policy dilemma of trade unions and particularly the TUC as one of having resisted 
for so long and failed to stem moves away from collectivism, organising, ‘the American 
way’, was seen to be the new way forward. At almost the same time the ‘cooperatist’ 
philosophy was borne and partnership was seen as an alternative way forward. However, 
as Colling (2003)26 discloses, within the literature there is strong dissent from the idea 
that there is widespread commitment to HRM practice, and furthermore where it existed 
it was concentrated in union rather than non-union workplaces.
2.40 However, insidious some authorities may view the Social Partnership philosophy 
which ‘overlays’ the trend towards ‘partnership agreements’, many unions have, at the 
very least, benefited in terms of retaining, if not increasing, membership at companies 
where they have such agreements. For example, the Union of Shop Distributive and 
Allied Workers (USDAW) has acquired the distinction of having the largest group of
26 Colling. T. (2003) >Manaeins without Unions, in Edwards. P. (ed) Industrial Relations Theory and 
Practice. Second Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, pp 368-391
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members employed by one private sector employer within the UK largely attributable to 
its partnership agreement and recognition by TESCO. This means not only that 
USD AW has the distinction, it also has some 25 per cent of its total membership 
employed by one undertaking. Possibly as much a weakness as a strength if things begin 
to go wrong! At another level of the partnership philosophy, Ebbinghaus (2002) takes 
the view that unions have become so ‘enmeshed’ with the state and ‘Social Policies’ that 
they increasingly act as ‘agents’ in the process of social policy. The consequence of 
which may not be helpful to the process of revitalisation and a trade union renaissance. 
His argument is basically that trade unions are in danger of developing too far along the 
road of becoming solely pressure groups, acting upon governments to achieve wholesale 
change in ‘social policies’ affecting industries and workers. The benefits achieved by 
such activities are ‘universal’, or ‘public goods’. However, they are of little utility in 
terms of the efforts of trade unions to recruit non-union employees who benefit from 
these ‘goods’. In consequence, minimum standards are improved for all, at a cost to 
unions in terms of resources, with little or no return in increased membership or density. 
This is of course a situation very much akin to the ‘ffee-loader’ who takes all the benefits 
of trade union activity without becoming a member and contributing to the cost of 
obtaining the benefits.
The Impact of change on Union membership and density.
2.41 The issues of recognition and de-recognition as contributing factors in union 
membership growth and decline, are discussed extensively in Bain (1983) Historically, 
the most effective single device by which to compel an employer to grant recognition has 
been to strike, or take some other form of action short of a strike. Within the UK there 
has never been a ‘ statutory right’ to strike. The right to strike and to use ‘secondary’ 
strike action and picketing in furtherance of a trade dispute have been protected from tort 
through the operation of a system of legal immunities, known as the ‘golden formula’. It 
was this system of immunities that Hayek advocated must be removed, in order to limit 
the countervailing power of trade unions, Wright (1996). Since 1997 and the advent of 
a Labour government there has been an anticipation of a ‘renaissance’ of union 
recognition and with it growth in union membership. Many researchers, amongst them 
Novitz and Skidmore (2001), have concluded that the anticipation was premature and the 
‘renaissance’, if that is to be judged by increased membership density alone, may never 
arrive, certainly in terms of pre 1979. A conclusion expressed by Willman (2005) and 
Metcalfe (2004) but based upon evidence and for reasons different to those of Novitz and 
Skidmore.
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2.42 Boeri et al (2001) together with many of their contemporaries argue that trade union 
growth and decline has been primarily the product of the trade cycle and in turn the level 
of employment-unemployment. Yet there is much research to show that this is not 
necessarily the case. Bain (1967) illustrates that over a period as far back as the 1940’s 
trade union membership density increased by very little27. Primarily because it failed to 
match, increases in the level of employment over any given period (see Appendix C and 
Cl). Only in the early 1970’s did density start to increase, and even then not by an 
equivalence of the increase in the level of employment. Freeman and Pelletier (1990), 
having considered other developments, industrial structure change, inward investment 
etc, as the reasons for the decline in trade unionism, formed the opinion that it was non 
of the traditional economic developments singularly or collectively that had caused trade 
union decline. In consequence, they had, “ looked for something else as the cause ”. 
This led them to develop a ‘legislation index’ that sought to ‘measure’ the favourable or 
unfavourable impact of various strands of the changes in law upon unions in each year. 
They held changes in law to be “responsible for the entire decline ” in density levels. 
They concluded that the primary cause was the intervention of the raft of legislation 
antipathetic to trade unions and collectivism. They took as an inappropriate comparator 
for their analysis, and in support of their argument, trade unions in Ireland. However, 
Ireland cannot be regarded as an adequate comparator in terms of economic, industrial or 
sociological benchmarks. Furthermore, Ireland at the time they were writing had not 
been subjected to the same degree of inward investment and industrial restructuring. 
Guniggle et al (2001); and Roche (1997); produced research showing that union decline 
had begun to develop within Ireland in the early 1990’s, about the time Freeman and 
Pelletiers research. They illustrated that the heavy reliance upon argument by Freeman 
and Pelletier, that it was changes in law that caused the decline of unions in the UK was 
ill founded. Their research points to the demise of pluralism emanating from the 
development of new industry, primarily from inward investment and with it the 
importation of ‘new’ management techniques such as Human Resource Management 
(HRM). A picture of developments somewhat similar to the experience within the UK 
from the early 1980’s.
2.43 Whilst membership levels continued to increase throughout the 1990’s, union 
density levels in Ireland were beginning to decline at the very time Freeman and Pelletier
27 Membership data taken from: Trade Union Growth and Recognition. Research Paper No6. by G.S.Bain. 
(1967) The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations, (1967) also Ministry of 
Labour Gazette 1968.
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were completing their research. Since 1999 both membership and density began to 
decline, and have continued to do so, however, the affect of declining traditional 
industries was not as significant a cause of decline, as was the case in the UK. Gunnigle 
et al (2001) and Roche (1997) showed that in Ireland it was primarily membership 
growth failing to match employment growth, causing trade unions to lose aggregate 
density. Roche and Geary (1999) recorded there was a pronounced decline in trade 
union membership density during the 1990’s. However, noting that membership levels 
began to increase as the economy entered a period of growth in the 1990s, reaching a 
peak of 561,800 in 1999.
2.44 Carruth and Disney (1988) and others have argued that: “the downturn in 
membership was a cyclical phenomenon ”, which was more the consequence of the 
performance of the UK economy than for any other substantial reason. However the 
argument is unsustainable because, if the performance of macroeconomic variables is 
accepted as the sole cause of membership fluctuations, then the almost continuous 
decline in unemployment over the period since 1993, also the fact that real wage growth 
has been relatively low throughout this period, should have helped produce an increase 
in union membership. On the evidence, it did not. Equally, whilst changes in the 
industry mix were a primary contributory reason for union decline, they were not the 
sole reason. The trend away from manufacturing, and large workplace male-intensive 
employment, towards private service small workplace employment, was already taking 
shape in the 1970s, Bain and Price (1980, which was a period when union membership 
rose by nearly 3 million. Therefore, if it was not changes in law, nor was it macro 
economic change or industry structural change that caused union decline was decline 
more to do with management attitudes and union derecognition? Gall and McKay (1999) 
and Towers (1997) research shows that there is no substantial basis for such an 
argument.
2.45 It is with the views of authors such as Bain (1983), Boeri (2001) and Metcalfe 
(2001) and others that the thesis argument finds a great deal of commonality on the 
matter of the affects of law. For, given that the law was not ‘selective’ in its application, 
in that it affected not simply those unions that declined in membership, which were TUC 
affiliated, but also those TUC unions, which also grew. Furthermore, that the law also 
affected the large number of non-TUC unions which grew throughout the 1970’s and 
1980’s. One must ask the question, why then did the law not have the same impact upon
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all trade unions? Machin (2002) attempts to shed light upon the reasons for as he calls 
it “convergence ” or “divergence ”. Machin says:
“What is less well understood is the precise nature o f union decline. For example, we 
do not know a great deal about how union decline has varied for different demographic 
groups; or for different kinds o f employers ”
He does however, go on to recognise the likelihood of divergent experience between 
employee groups, almost getting to the divergence, as between TUC and non-TUC 
unions, addressed in this thesis, saying:
“This paper attempts to give more detail on how union decline has differed across 
different characteristics o f workers and their jobs ” — “it asks whether union decline has 
been neutral across different groups, or whether one can identify convergence or 
divergence in union status for different sets o f workers andjobs”
However, he does not refer subsequently to the divergence, experienced by non-TUC 
unions in respect of membership decline.
Trade union financial resources — long-term decline and its recent acceleration.
2.46 It was said at the start of this literature review that whilst the literature on the 
overall subject of trade union decline and change in industrial relations was large. 
However, literature on the subject of union finances is less so. However, at the time of 
this research being concluded and written up, research funded by the Leverhulme 
Foundation being undertaken by the London School of Economics into “The Future of 
Trade Unions”, is in the process of producing its research results on trade union finance. 
Latta (1972), Roberts (1956), Willman and Morris (1988), Willman et al (1993), are the 
most substantial pieces of research undertaken into trade union finance. However, at the 
time of undertaking the writing up of the thesis, Professor Willman was in the process of 
completing a programme of research a feature of which was the financial situation of UK 
unions, the results of this research undertaken by Willman (2005), forms a chapter within 
Femie and Metcalf (2005)28. There is other literature, which discloses research into 
financial issues, however, as secondary to the main thrust of such research. Nonetheless, 
some of this ‘secondary’ literature is of value to the thesis as it ‘overarches’ union 
finance and material covered by other limbs of this thesis. Such as the propensity to 
amalgamate.
28 Fernie. S and Metcalf. D. (2005) (eds) Trade Unions: Resurgence or Perdition? Routledge. To be 
published mid 2005
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2.47 A review of the historic development of trade union financial problems discloses 
that there has never been any shortage of advice to unions, about the importance of 
sound financial strength. Berkowitz (1954) was quite clear in the advice he proffered. 
On the matter of the adequacy or otherwise of membership contributions, Donovan 
(1967) reported, that as early as 1938 union members were paying contributions on 
average more than twice what they were paying in the in the late 1960’s. However, that 
the decline in contribution levels appeared to have been offset by the rise in membership 
over the period. Union membership had indeed been growing Bain (1966), from 1938 to 
1968, from 6 million to 10 million, and continued to do so through to 1979. It is also a 
matter of record within much of the literature that throughout the period many individual 
unions made efforts to improve the level of membership contributions. Hughes (1964) 
noted that unions appeared to have been making progress in obtaining:
“sizeable and in some cases successive increases in contribution rates ”, and concluded, 
“the breakthrough in union finance is being made”.
Nonetheless, whilst aggregate contribution income increased because of membership 
growth, because it failed to keep pace with membership income growth and inflation and 
costs, its per capita value diminished. The TUC, as recorded by Donovan (1968) and 
McCarthy (1962) had attempted over many years to gain co-operation between groups of 
competing unions to agree a policy by which to increase contributions in a non­
competitive manner. Whilst there is available data that shows efforts were made by 
many individual unions to increase the level of member contributions and improve their 
finances during the period of the 1960’s and 1970’s. There is no evidence to show an 
orchestrated campaign across trade unions. In fact the TUC General Council Reports 
over the period dealing with ‘inter union disputes’, show the highly competitive nature of 
trade union recruitment Buchanan (1974). Consequently the environment throughout 
this period was anything but conducive to co-operation in matters which may affect 
individual union ability to compete in recruitment. Metcalf (2001) puts forward a strong 
view that trade unions would benefit from a concerted ‘infill ’ recruitment campaign, 
targeted at bringing into membership the ‘free-riders’ who are enjoying the benefits of 
union activities within companies where recognition exists. His argument rests strongly 
upon the idea that having pre-existing organisation will greatly assist the process of 
recruitment, at a much lower cost than greenfield recruitment. The short-term financial 
benefits in the form of strengthened liquidity can then be utilised in campaigns to extend 
membership into the unorganised areas of industry and services.
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2.48 Contribution rates in 2002 were on average £2.19 per week29, or some 0.38 percent 
of average earnings, when compared with contribution rates at 0.5 percent of average 
earnings achieved in 1950 Willman et al (1993). Illustrate the rate of decline over fifty 
years. Alternatively, the 1.02 percent of male average earnings contribution recorded for 
1938 by Donovan, discloses a much larger historic decline in per capita contribution 
income over a period of sixty-five years. The consequence is that, whilst membership 
grew during most of the period from the 1950’s up to 1979, per capita income and 
wealth started to fall, in real terms. Since 1979 the decline has continued at a more 
significant rate. During most of the period since the 1950’s inflation and increases in 
average earnings were at historically high levels, Willman and Morris (1988). It should 
therefore, have been a period when membership was more receptive to contribution 
increases, which were proportional to the movement in earnings and costs. Particularly 
so when, given the high levels of organisation and the operation of the closed shop, the 
elasticity of demand for trade union membership in this period was high.
2.49 Latta (1972), Roberts (1956), Willman et al (1993) and Willman and Morris (1988), 
showed in their research and literature that unions had become increasingly reliant upon 
sources of income other than from contributions, and as Willman (2005) illustrates, the 
problem has become considerably more serious within the past 10 years or so. This 
development occurs primarily because of the effects of inflation and the morbidity of the 
deficit between contribution income and expenditure. Investment income and liquidation 
of investments had historically been the resource with which to bridge the gap between 
contribution income and total expenditure. However, Willman (1988) warned of the 
emerging reliance upon ‘other income’, and his subsequent research, Willman (2005), 
confirmed his predictions pointing out the changing nature of its source, which was 
increasingly coming from the liquidation of assets. His argument was basically that 
depleting contribution income, and the lack of operating surplus, would progressively 
reduced the surplus income from which investment in capital resources was made, and 
from which future development investment may be generated. In other words, the 
consumption o f ‘other income’ emanating from asset liquidation, was akin to ‘selling the 
family silver’.
2.50 Whilst the major cause of the haemorrhage of financial resources has come from 
membership loss and trade union inability to control expenditure, there have been other 
causes that have added to the problem. One of these causes was the loss of the
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employers subsidy as Willman et al (1993) called it. This was a ‘benefit’ that was the 
product of high level membership, frequently in closed shop situations, where unions had 
negotiated facilities for shop stewards such as, check-off and the use of phones, 
stationery, printing etc, etc. With inflation at historically high levels during much of the 
1980’s-90’s left many unions with no alternative other than to dip into reserves and 
consume assets as they were liquidated.
2.51 Coincidental with the date at which Willman published his research, new legislation 
had a very disruptive affect upon one of the ‘pillars’ of the employers subsidy, check off. 
The Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 s 15 (TURER 1993) 
introduced a requirement that trade union members paying contributions through the 
operation of check off must complete new authorisation forms, every three years, for 
check off to continue. Some employers took this development as an opportunity to 
discontinue long existing arrangements on check off. For example, British Rail withdrew 
its check off arrangements for all unions. Some unions were successful in retaining 
continuity of contributions through alternative means of payment, for most of their 
membership30. However, with the historic processes of contribution collection long since 
abandoned there was delay in establishing the alternatives to check off, resulting in 
serious membership and financial losses for all unions31. The requirement under 
TURER 1993 was repealed in 1997.
The Contribution of the Union Shop/Closed Shop to union financial strength
2.52 Within the literature the question is often posed, as to why unions pursued the 
closed shop and fought for its maintenance. Most research has preferred to focus upon 
the ‘monopoly power’ gained in collective bargaining, Voos (1984). Alternatively, that 
unions and their finances must be understood in terms of union oligarchic structure and 
bureaucracy, Crouch (1982). However, whilst it is not the complete answer to the 
question, the major, and more obvious benefit of the closed shop was ‘high elasticity of 
contribution income’. In some industries, principally manufacturing, transport (road and 
rail) printing and mining, unions achieved a very high degree of contribution elasticity 
and revenue yield. These were also as illustrated by Dunn and Gennard (1984) and 
Wright (1996) the main industries where the union shop/closed shop operated. In 
addition, as a direct consequence of the strength of membership, the employers subsidy 
also had widespread application in these industries.
39 TUC Press Release 2002
j0 Labour Research Department (1994) Signing u p - a  Hard Sloe. September 1994.
31 IRS (1994) Employment Trends. Will trade unionists say yes to the union? No 599,1994.
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2.53 Bain and Price (1983) developed an hypothesis of the process by which trade 
unions recruit and lose membership, calling it the “virtuous circle ” and the “vicious 
circle ”. Their basic argument centred on the normal process of developing membership 
from a green-field situation, this they termed “acquired growth”. They explained the 
process of recruiting membership and developing initial density levels to the point that 
would justify recognition. They then showed the process of consolidating initial 
membership, to the point where an employer may become involved in aiding the 
recruitment process, terming this “received growth ”. However, within this “virtuous 
circle” Bain and Price illustrated that there was in operation a continuum “vicious 
circle” that worked against the gains made by “acquire growth” and “received 
Growth ”. What Bain and Price did not do within their analysis of this process, was 
explain the closely interrelated process of developing union density to the point where, 
the closed shop became the means of ‘closing off5 the membership and financial 
haemorrhage of the “vicious circle”. Nor did they sufficiently integrate within their 
analysis the significance of the closely related benefits of the ‘employers subsidy’.
2.54 Seeking to justify the operation of the closed shop by using arguments analogous to 
the citizens responsibility within the state, Lowe (1996) refers to Klosko’s (1992) 
interesting and somewhat compelling argument on the matter of, as Klosko terms it, 
“presumptive benefits ”. Klosko argues that a person obtains a presumptive benefit when 
they cannot be excluded from whatever that benefit is. He takes as his analogy the 
provision of national defence, protection from hostile environment, or a benefit that 
fulfils bodily needs. He applies a two-part test to the question of when such presumptive 
benefit applies:
a) some person benefits from the co-operative efforts of others without contributing to 
those efforts; and,
b) the advantages of not co-operating cannot be extended to all.
These two tests certainly ‘fit’ the criteria that trade unionists set as reasons for 
compulsory union membership during the period when the closed shop was at its zenith.
2.55 Whilst the first two aspects of Klosko’s criteria, national defence and hostile 
environment are irrelevant, the third certainly is not. Interestingly, with the tendency for 
unions particularly through the TUC to become increasingly involved in the Social 
Policies of government, both campaigning and in a participative role. The presumptive 
benefits achieved by workers generally in the form of:
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a) Minimum terms and conditions;
b) Health and Safety;
c) Family friendly benefits;
d) Employment Security;
e) Gender Discrimination;
f) Racial Discrimination;
and many more, increasingly place the trade union movement in a position where it is in 
danger of a strong argument being adduced that the state is sponsoring an alternative 
form of trade unionism. In support of such a development, one can cite the provision of 
public funds for the development and promulgation of ‘government sponsored’ 
alternative systems of recognition such as partnership agreements. On the other hand, 
there is the possibly stronger argument that state provision of presumptive benefits, 
whether with trade union campaigning and participation and co-operation or not, are 
benefits contributed to by all members of society by normal taxation. However, the fact 
that the paradigm used by Klosko is easily defeated does not defeat the overall strength 
of the argument he makes that:
“being indispensable, the benefit must be provided, and i f  so, fairness demands that 
everyone share in the burden o f its production ” (citation in Lowe (1996)(pp 55)).
The employer subsidy or ‘invisible income’
2.56 Willman et al (1993), illustrates that one of the few financial benefits of the relative 
strength of unions in the period prior to 1980 was, as mentioned earlier, the subsidy 
provided by employers. Unfortunately, the increasing ‘contribution’ made to union 
financial stability by this ‘invisible income’, may have masked their financial malaise. 
This ‘invisible income’ attributable to the financial benefits provided by employers, 
primarily applied in the industries where unions held their core membership, and most 
effective organisation. As membership grew, and with it organisational strength, unions 
were able to gain from employers considerable ‘added value’ from they’re recognition 
agreements. A significant contribution to this ‘invisible income’ was the role played by 
shop stewards, in recruitment of new members, and general maintenance and 
organisation at the workplace level.
2.57 Cully et al (WERS) (1999) in their research identified that:
"almost three in five workplaces had no worker representatives o f any kind, and this was 
the case for nine out o f every 10 workplaces where there were no union members". 
Whereas Donovan (1968) recorded that the number of shop stewards was 175,000. On 
the importance of shop-stewards Donovan says:
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“Without shop-stewards, trade unions would lack for members, for money, and for 
means o f keeping in touch with their members”.
Undy et al (1981) were clear in their views about the importance of the ‘subsidy’ nature 
of the ‘unpaid’ efforts of shop stewards and how this ‘benefit’ might be exploited saying: 
“Instead o f the union paying for more but less efficient full-time officials, the employer 
could payfor more efficient and cheaper shop stewards
Teny (2003)32 concludes that, it is not only the decline of UK unions generally that has 
contributed to the decline of the shop steward, but also the changing legislative context, 
particularly the changes wrought by EU law and employee relations ‘models’. The 
competing representation rights, including individual and non union rights to 
information and consultation and the use by management’s of these rights in a 
‘structured format’ have all contributed to the demise of the shop steward and with it the 
decline of local union organisation. However, the industries that provided the greatest 
proportion of ‘new’ membership during the period from 1950 to 1979, were also the 
industries that suffered the greatest decline in local organisation throughout the period of 
the 1980’s and 1990’s. Consequently, the decline of this core membership and the 
agreements with employers that sustained the shop steward and the attendant ‘subsidies’ 
and provided valuable ‘invisible income’ did not simply affect membership contribution 
income. The trade unions can only regain this loss through effective membership 
organisation and, recognition by employers, and by rebuilding local organisation. These 
are the very developments, which have proved most difficult for trade unions to achieve, 
particularly in the newer industries and the services sector. There is of course the 
question of whether, given the experience of the past 20 or so years, unions should again 
become dependent upon such subsidies? Or whether the safer way forward is to greater 
self-sufficiency in finance and the provision of services from external resources?
The propensity to merge, what drove it, and what were its benefits?
2.58 Based upon research undertaken before 1979 Buchanan (1974) Buchanan (1981) 
identified, that a manifestation of the growing financial crisis was the propensity for 
unions to transfer engagements and amalgamate. In many cases the process, added no 
membership, and imported disproportionate costs for acquiring unions. At best, 
amalgamations may have provided respite for failing unions and routes to further 
amalgamation as the data shows. Parodi (1997) as does Waddington (1995) support the 
opinion that the TUC’s policy on mergers has, to a large degree, worked as it was
32 Terry. M. (2003) Employee Representation: Shop Stewards and the New Legal framework, in Edwards. 
P., (ed) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice (Second Edition) Blackwell, Oxford. Chapter 10. p 282- 
283
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intended. In his research Metcalfe (2004) take a considerably different view arguing that 
mergers have failed basically agreeing with the opinion of Willman (2005) on the subject 
of mergers. Therefore, judged against the hoped for benefits, the process of 
amalgamations and transfers has produced non of the benefits of:
a) a more rational union structure;
b) reduction in inter union competition;
c) more focused and improved membership recruitment;
d) economies of scale and improvement in financial performance;
Indeed the arguments put forward by many smaller unions against the philosophy of ‘big 
is best’ and ‘conglomerate unions will succeed because they are strongest’ have so far 
been shown to be well founded. Smaller unions within the TUC argued that:
“they are very effective. They have very high levels o f membership, extremely clear 
target memberships, and provide tailored services — often with a high professional 
content” TUC (1999). The smaller, mainly non-TUC unions have been more successful 
at developing membership and organisation during the most difficult period in union 
history, particularly amongst women as the data and analysis within the body of the 
thesis shows. Willman (1996) focuses on the issue of, as he puts it: “the relationship 
between merger propensity and merger success ”. His basic conclusions are that mergers 
and transfers take place only after lengthy and often tortuous discussion and negotiation. 
They may be the product of a genuine desire to consolidate and strengthen mutual areas 
of recruitment and representation. They may be to salvage a financially demising union, 
here he talks in terms of defensive marriages between the “rich” and the “poor”. 
Pointing out that 32 of the 50 transfers in the period 1986 -  1995 were of this kind 
involving only two unions, the General Municipal and Boilermakers (GMB) and the 
Electrical Electronic Technical and Plumbing Union (EETPU). However, the majority 
reasons given for seeking merger over the period is seen to be, declining financial 
reserves, rapidly growing expenditure and income not rising. From his analysis, 
argument and conclusion, it can be seen that there is little by way of ‘rationalisation of 
union structure’ proffered as a reason for merging. The facts are that there has been little 
‘rationalisation’ if by that it is meant that wasteful competition and overlapping areas of 
interest were being removed by the propensity to merge and form larger general and 
conglomerate unions. The four largest unions have veiy few ‘non-competing’ areas of 
interest, as can be quickly observed by reference to Appendix D. Willman (2005) 
revises his views on union mergers and concludes that they have not served the best 
interests of trade unionism generally and have produced a structure that may be 
instrumental in further decline.
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2.60 The propensity for trade unions to merge has gathered pace, throughout the past 25 
years. Waddington (1995), examined merger ‘waves’ as he termed them over the periods 
1918 -  1924 and 1966 -  1987 and argued that both periods could be analysed using the 
approach of the Kondratieff cycles as a key explanatory variable. Whilst Waddington 
does review individual union amalgamations and carry out a degree of disagreggated 
analysis. He appears not to recognise the importance the changes in law that had taken 
place in 1964 to facilitate transfers of engagements, which became much less onerous to 
achieve. He also does not have sufficient regard for the fact that a great deal of the 
mergers that took place since 1966 have been with relatively small unions. Which were 
predominantly non-TUC-affiliated, and in the main the larger unions within the TUC. 
Undy (1997) and Undy (1996) disagreed with Waddington’s reliance upon the 
Kondratieff cycles. It is with Waddington and Undy’s “so-called second wave ” that this 
thesis is preoccupied, however, bringing the reference period up to the present time, circa 
2003. Therefore, what Undy says about the relevance of Waddington’s approach, so far 
as the second ‘wave’ of mergers is concerned is helpful. Undy says that: “the continued 
stress on merger waves is much more open to criticism when related to the so-called 
‘second wave Consequently, this relieves the necessity for the literature review to 
spend too much space explaining Waddington’s use of Kondratieff cycles. Nonetheless, 
Waddingtons work is of value, most certainly from the historical perspective of his 
analysis of the periods covered, particularly the earlier period of 1918 — 1924. However, 
Undy et al (1996) takes a much more disaggregated approach to his analysis and 
develops his research in a broader focus incorporating in a detailed manner the 
significance of finance as primary reasons for unions seeking to merge. Undy takes the 
view that amalgamations and transfers were “damage limitation policies ” adopted in the 
teeth of the unexpected hostile environment post 1979. An opinion with which, this 
research finds a great deal of common ground. Chapters 2,3 and 4 of his work, also the 
Technical Appendix, were found particularly helpful in giving direction in this research. 
Undy’s chronicling of the trade union merger and transfer continuum of the reference 
period, was one of ‘the’ best sources of data found in this research of the literature.
2.61 To understand Undy’s view of why mergers that have taken place during the period 
from the mid 1960’s are significantly different to preceding periods when the propensity 
for unions to merge has increased, it is important to have reviewed the work of other 
researchers such as Buchanan (1974) and (1981) and Willman (1996) who give a more 
historic purview of the nature of transfers of engagements and mergers, during a period 
when trade unions could afford the luxury of contemplating the strategic benefits of
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transferring engagements or merging, or continuing to develop as independent unions. 
Rather than be compelled, as many unions were, to seek amalgamation or merger in 
order to evade dissolution.
2.62 Some 20 years after Donovan, Willman and Morris (1988) were very clear about 
the serious financial circumstances facing many unions saying:
“For the future, the ability o f many to remain financially healthy depends on the 
relationship between expenditure and non-subscription income. ” Going on to say:
“It may be that several unions depleted their income yielding assets in overcoming 
financial difficulties in 1979-91, thus reducing the scope for investment income growth”, 
and finally: “their capacity to overcome similar crises in the future requires that this 
depletion does not continue ”.
Many trade union leaders would agree with Willman and Morris (1988) that: “most 
unions are not in existence to optimise their financial performance ”. Unions, over many 
years, have failed to raise the level of member contributions to more than match their 
operating costs, as predicted by Latta (1972); Willman and Morris (1988). Willman, and 
Morris (1988), commented on the poor growth of investments apparent in the periods 
covered by their analysis, and the fact that this was a depleting source of ‘subsidy’. The 
facts are that what Willman and Morris (1988) were fearful of, has continued throughout 
the period since their research. In 2002 this trend continued with the amount of 
investment income attributable to many of the sixteen largest unions falling significantly.
2.63 Willman and Morris (1988) noted that “higher membership levels do not 
necessarily improve solvency”, and in later research Willman et al (1993) says: “There 
is an extremely strong negative correlation between union membership and union real 
net worth”. Noting that, whilst more membership increases the contribution income 
flow, there is also an additional cost in servicing the new members. Willman and Morris 
(1988) also noted that the ratio of total income to total expenditure was moving close to 
‘unitary’, and that this was likely to create serious problems in the near future if not 
addressed. Willman and Morris (1988) also noted the disturbing development of 
consuming income from liquidating assets. Latta (1972) referred to a number of unions 
as being “asset rich” and able to operate over prolonged periods of membership and 
contribution income decline by “living o f the proceeds o f their assets ”. Perhaps, it is for 
this reason that the level of investment and asset holdings within the smaller unions 
(many of them older unions) group is much healthier than that for ‘the club’. Davies. J.
(2001), records that the number of disputes reduced from 12.9 million days lost p.a. on
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average in the 1970’s to 7.2 million p.a. in the 1980’s and down to 660,000 p.a. average 
in the 1990’s. The fact that considerably less resources were being expended on disputes 
should have meant a lesser drain on union funds, however, as he notes these continued to 
deteriorate.
2.64 Unions appear to have increasingly viewed greenfield recruitment, particularly 
where employers are antipathetic towards recognition as a very expensive approach to 
developing their membership in order to retain ‘size’. A fact illustrated earlier in respect 
of the early results from cases about recognition taken before the CAC. However, 
membership development by acquisition whilst ‘consolidatory’ and a more aggregated 
method of adding to a unions size, does not add proportionately to trade union density. 
Also, membership acquired by such means is more often than not already covered by 
recognition, consequently it is not ‘expansionist’, as it adds nothing to the organised 
strength of the trade union movement. Consequently, it can be argued that growth by 
acquisition has been a diversionary activity, engaged in by unions to protect size, 
influence and finances, but at the cost of morbidity in union membership and density. It 
has also brought with it a range of problems that have created weakness rather than 
strength. The literature generally portrays that the majority of acquired unions were 
under 5,000 members, had declining membership, declining resources and low levels of 
assets per capita, which doubtless imported economic problems to the acquiring union. 
Morris et al (2001)) provide a good historic background to the amalgamation of the 
unions within the financial services sector (Banking Insurance and Finance Union 
(BIFU), Barclays Group Staff Union and NatWest Staff Union). Unfortunately, the 
research was primarily undertaken in the pre-amalgamation period, and was not followed 
through with research post amalgamation. The thesis corrects this situation by utilising 
up to date data to analyse the development of this amalgamation up to the end of 2002. 
In his subsequent research, referred to earlier, Willman (2005) concurs with the 
conclusions of the thesis on the failure of union mergers as a strategy by which to 
strengthen the movement.
2.65 The area in which the thesis research was being conducted is a very active one, 
consequently the publication of new research and literature is a continuum. It is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, at the margin to determine when a ‘guillotine’ 
must be applied to newly published and emerging literature. However, at the time when 
the thesis was being written up a considerable amount of research, in its general area, 
had recently been published, or was ongoing which could not be ignored. Consequently,
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some of this research and literature has been incorporated within the research for the 
thesis. However, subject to the exceptions, which can be identified by their publication 
date within the body of the thesis and the References, the thesis has not had regard for 
published work after December 2002.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
The Changing Environment of Trade Unions
3. A Brief Historic Review
3.1 Throughout the history of the trade union movement statute and case law has 
intervened in the progress of recognition and collective bargaining, and has increasingly 
played a part in the regulation and control of trade unions, Fox (1985)33, Hyman 
(2003)34, Deakin and Morris (2001)35. The ‘swings’ between progressive and regressive 
statutory and judicial action, were largely consequent upon industrial and political 
perceptions of growth in the strength, power and effectiveness of trade unions. History 
shows that trade unions have tended to prosper more during periods when they were left 
free of intrusive law, with a minimum of underpinning law, leaving them free to 
countervail the employers power, than at times when the law actually attempted to be 
overtly supportive. Freeman and Pelletier (1990) argue that the intrusion of law since 
1980, more than any other consideration led to unions losing membership and their 
general decline. Changes in law did play a significant part in union decline however, 
regard must be had for the contextual changes that have progressively taken place over 
the period since the 1950’s. The pressure upon Governments and businesses of global 
market changes, and the socio-economic changes and the industry structural change, 
taking place World-wide were also major contributors to the trend of union decline. The 
increasing development of low-union and non-union presence workplaces, identified in 
Millward et al (1992) and Cully et al (1999) (WERS) gave opportunities to management 
to develop alternative approaches to managing employees Kessler and Purcell (2003)36. 
The technique of Human Resource Management was rapidly developed to take 
advantage of the changing industrial and legal context affecting unions, to provide 
alternative systems and processes of employee management, supplanting collectivism 
and underinining union strength, Guest (2001) and Millward (2000). This whole process 
of change developed from the 1950’s, through to the late 1970’s, when the process 
accelerated and set the context against which much of the most significant change for
33 Fox. A (1985) History and Heritage: The social origins o f the British Industrial Relations System, 
London, Allen and Unwin 1985
34 Hyman. R. (20031 The Historic Evolution o f British Industrial Relations, pp 37-57, in Edwards. P., (ed) 
Industrial Relations Theory and Practice (Second Edition) Blackwell, Oxford.
35 Deakin and Morris (2001) give a succinct and detailed account of the development of UK law relating to 
collective organisations Section 7.4. pp 685-696.
36 Kessler. I. and Purcell. J. (2003) in Edwards, P. (ed) Industrial Relations '.Theory and Practice in 
Britain,Second Edition. Oxford, Blackwell. Chapter 12.
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trade unions took place. The (WERS)37 records the process of these changes upon the 
organisational strength and operation of unions across industries within the UK 
throughout the period from 1980. Such changes have engendered the ‘individualistic’ 
culture that whilst it is not the cause of trade union decline is apparently an almost 
intractable hurdle to any reversal of the downward trend. Colling (2003)38 terms these 
developments “A Secular Trend”, Waddington (2003)39 cites Phelps Brown (1990) as 
agreeing with Colling’s opinion about the “secular ascendancy o f individualism ”.
3.2. A brief historic review of industrial relations within the United Kingdom will show 
the ‘pendulum’ of trade union rights making some distinct ‘swings’, such as:
a) ‘abstentionist’ philosophy of the early years up the Trades Disputes Act 1906;
b) ‘collectivism’ and state support for collective bargaining and, the development of 
trade union power from 1906 to the Trade Disputes Act 1946;
c) the post 1945 rapid growth in trade union membership and power, considerably 
aided by the nationalisation programme and extension of wage regulation 
machinery;
d) the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959 and Fair Wages Resolution of 
the House of Commons and their ‘underpinning’ effect;
e) the strengthened role of the Ministry of Labour Conciliation Department;
f) the move from national to local collective bargaining in the late 1960’s, trade union 
power identified as being beyond industrial or political control in the period of the 
mid to late 1960’s;
g) the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-6840;
h) the Labour Governments response, ‘In place of Strife’;
i) the Industrial Relations Act 1971, the role of the National Industrial Relations 
Court;
j) the Employment Protection Act 1975, Schedule 11, the role of ACAS, 
the Grunwick41 dispute; 
k) 1979 - 1997, the policies o f ‘deregulation’, removal of trade unions as a
37 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS), a series o f four surveys beginning in 1980, 
(since 1998 re-titled The Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS)) see References.
38 Colling, T. (2003) Managing Without Unions: The Sources and Limitations o f Individualism p 369 in, 
Edwards. P. (ed) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice (Second Edition) Blackwell, Oxford.
39 Waddington, J. (2003) p 214
40 The Tories anticipated the publication of the Donovan Report with their ‘antithesis’ ‘Fair Deal at Work’ 
which contained proposals for strike ballots, a 60 day cooling off period for strikes, removal o f immunities in 
respect of industrial action about closed shops, legally binding agreements. Much of its content mirrored the 
views o f ‘Shonfield’ in his ‘minority report’ in Donovan
41 Grunwick Processing Laboratories -v- ACAS [1978] ICR 231,[1978] 1 A L E R 338, HL.
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countervailing force and, a plethora of trade union and employment laws42;
1) increasing foreign investment, the ‘importation’ of an aggressive opposition to the 
UK ‘collectivist model’, the development of alternatives; 
m) changing product markets and industrial restructuring and the destruction of the 
trade union ‘heartland’; 
n) the underpinning of trade union rights by European and International law and 
Covenants;
o) the Employment Relations Act 1999, Schedule Al, the amendment 
(TULR(C)A)1992;
Abstentionism and the Emergence of the ‘Collectivist Model’
3.3. Protection for trade union activities including the right to strike, emanated from the 
immunities within the ‘golden formula43’, developed over the past hundred years or so44 
and, in this regard, the law (in broad concept) stands little changed today Deakin and 
Morris (2001)45 Ewing (1986) ,46 Painter et al (1996)47. Where the law was used in the 
early years, it was invariably used by employers to restrain and defeat many of the 
activities of trade unions. Only at times of serious legal challenges,48 political or 
economic emergency49, particularly the first and second world wars50, did the 
government take a really active role in shaping the way in which relations between 
employers and trade unions should be managed. Then it was more because of the need 
to control rather than aid trade unions.
42 See: Appendix D which, lists the primary legislation affecting unions during this period.
43 Acts ‘in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute’ the principal formula for the tests of immunity in 
trade disputes developed as a result of the Trades Dispute Act 1906.
44 The Trade Union Act, 1871 gave to trade unions legal status and introduced immunities and protection to 
unions. However, the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1871 introduced severe penalties for those trade 
unionists who may seek to use industrial action.
45 Deakin and Morris (2001) Chapter 11
46 Ewing (1986) pl43
47 Painter et al (1996) Chapter 9
48 The TaffVale Railway Company v Amalgamated Society o f Railway Servants, 1901 HL, Judgment, 
leading to the appointment of a Commission in 1903 to enquire into the state of the law, the rejection of its 
report and the introduction of the Trades Disputes Act 1906, which extended the provisions of the 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 up to this date one of the primary laws giving immunities 
to certain trade union activities
49 The General Strike resulted in the passing of the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act 1927 (repealed by 
the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act, 1946 which restored the position to what it had been pre 1927) die 
provisions of which showed clearly the fears and anti trade union backlash which the General Strike had 
created. The use of trade union funds in strikes, contracting in, not out, o f political funds, the prohibition of 
civil servants joining a trade union with political funds, the outlawing of the closed shop in local authorities 
or businesses contracting services to local authorities
50 The Ministry of Labour was developed after the 1914-18 war designed to support the Governments policy 
of encouraging voluntary methods of industrial relations and settling disputes. It was shortly after the 1914- 
18 war that the Industrial Courts Act, 1919 came into operation. Together with the Conciliation Act 1896, 
the 1919 Act represented much of the underpinning of industrial relations within the UK through to the early 
1960s.
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3.4. Until 1971, trade unions had no statutory right to recognition. Prior to this the 
consensus had been that free collective bargaining was the way to solve industrial 
relations problems. However, whilst Governments tended to encourage ‘collectivism’, 
‘abstentionism’ was the position they took on the question of the ‘right’ to recognition 
and collective bargaining. Collectivism did not, however, even at its zenith in the 
1970’s, cover the majority of the workforce, there remained large sectors of the 
workforce not represented by trade unions.
3.5. In these early years, unions were relatively free of regulation and legal controls and 
could seek the support of other trade-unionists to take secondary action against 
recalcitrant employers and to persuade their employers not to deal with companies that 
did not employ union labour, or who would not recognise trade unions. Because there 
has never been a positive ‘right to strike’, or engage in (as the law terms it) a ‘trade 
dispute’51. Such actions have been the most vexatious issues of industrial relations and 
employment law, frequently exacerbated by inappropriate judgments by the courts, and 
legislation, which it appears owed more to political need than the development of good 
law.
3.6. The ‘golden formula’, has frequently been under legal challenge. In the 1960’s it 
was established that it in fact only protected breaches associated with employment 
contracts, commercial contracts52 were not covered by the immunity Painter et al (1996). 
However, from 1979 the law relating to ‘trade disputes’ began to change significantly, 
with the consequent narrowing of the protection conferred by the ‘golden formula’. The 
removal from the protection of the ‘golden formula’ of trade disputes involving issues of 
trade union recognition, also increased control on the use of the strike weapon, was to 
prove to be a decisive development of law. These developments were a very significant 
change in government policy away from collectivism, which more than any other change 
in law, began the debilitation of the trade union movement. The law changed such that, 
trade unions applying sanctions against employers because they refused recognition or 
that they did not employ union labour, became unlawful acts which, could result in a 
union (and individuals) losing their immunities. Deakin and Morris (2001) illustrate the 
affects of these changes on trade unions over the period from 198053 to 199354, saying: of 
the Conservative Government “They began by dismantling major supports to collective
51 TULR (C) Act 1992 S.219 (1) to (4)
52 J  T Stratford & Sons Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269
53 Employment Act 1980
54 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993
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bargaining ” A remaining ‘underpinning’ of state support for collectivism was
removed in 1982 by rescinding the Fair Wages Resolution, because as Deakin and 
Morris say: “it was perceived as a damaging anachronism which impeded
competitiveness ”. These draconian interventions of law, began to seriously impact upon 
the ‘collectivist model’.
The Early Years - Trade Unions as Conspiracies -The period of ‘abstentionism’. 
State Support for ‘Collective Bargaining’- A brief Overview
3.7. Painter et al (1996) say:
“/« terms o f international law, collective bargaining is the key element in the general 
‘freedom o f association ’ imderpinned by four key legal sources, namely the European 
Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, 
art.ll; the International Labour Organisation Convention 1949 (No.98); the European 
Social Charter 1961; and the EC’s Community Social Charter 1998 (which includes as 
one o f the fundamental social rights o f workers, the ‘right to conclude collective 
agreements’). The Convention is incorporated in UK law by the Human Rights Act 
1998.”
In 1961 the Council of Europe agreed a Social Charter which, in Articles 5 and 6, 
promoted collective bargaining and guaranteed the right to strike. In 1966 the United 
Nations adopted the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
which in article 8 guaranteed the same rights. The United Kingdom ratified each of 
these articles and their sub-clauses. One might therefore have expected an approach to 
emerge about trade union rights more consistent with these provisions. However, Painter 
et al (1996) make the point that whilst collective bargaining may have been accepted by 
some employers as early as the eighteenth century, the existence of trade unions and 
their right to organise and pursue their objectives was far from ‘recognised’. Even today, 
almost 180 years on from the repeal of The Combination Acts55, there are still many 
within industry, politics and the judiciary who would prefer at best an abstentionist 
approach to the whole question of trade unions and collective bargaining, and many who 
continue to embrace anti ‘collectivism’ as the only way.
3.8. There has never been any automatic right to recognition56, nor has there been any 
legal right to strike. The right to strike was based upon legal immunities derived from 
statutory provisions but primarily developed by common law rather than any positive
55 Combination Laws Repeal Act 1824 and Combinations Laws Repeal Act Amendment Act 1825.
56 With the possible exception of the Nationalised Industries where there was a statutory responsibility on the 
employer to establish appropriate ‘joint machinery for the settlement o f terms and conditions of employment 
and for joint consultation on matters of common interest’.
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protections for those who may take part in a trade dispute. However, the ‘right to strike’ 
is critical as an ‘instrument of last resort’ in the furtherance of trade union objectives, 
including the right to recognition and, the right to bargain collectively57. Ultimately it is 
‘the’ countervailing power which can be exercised against the clearly greater power of 
the employer in the work relationship Wrigley (1997) and (2002).
3.9. There have been a number of attempts by governments to provide machinery to 
remove the need to resort to striking. During the period of the Second World War steps 
were taken to prohibit strikes through the introduction of compulsory arbitration. 
Defence Regulation 58AA (Statutory Rules and Orders 1940 No 1217)58 empowered the 
Minister of Labour to make an order for prohibiting a strike or lock-out in connection 
with any trade dispute.59 Trade disputes could be referred, by the Minister, for 
settlement under the Industrial Courts Act 1919. The provisions of these wartime 
regulations and orders were used as background to frame the Industrial Disputes Order 
1951, however, this Order did not contain any prohibition of a strike or other form of 
industrial action. Also the new Order extended its coverage by referring to ‘issues’ 
instead of, as was the case with Order 1305, the somewhat more limited provision of 
“the observance o f terms and conditions o f employment (or terms not less favourable) ”.
3.10. As long ago as 1942, prior to the repeal of the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act 
192760, Lord Wright, in the case of Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed v Veitch61 said: 
“Where the rights o f labour are concerned, the rights o f the employer are conditioned by 
the rights o f the men to give or withhold their services. The right o f workmen to strike is 
an essential element in the principle o f collective bargaining”
This was a view, which held throughout the period of the 1950s/60s. Much of what 
Donovan (1968)62 had to say on this matter supported the principle of the workers right 
to withhold their labour63. However, Donovan rebutted the idea that the right to strike 
could be improved legally. Donovan was also supportive of Lord Denning's opinion
57 The right to bargain collectively increasingly become an important issue for trade unions in that 
employment law has relied upon this concept as its base definition for the purposes of determining whether a 
trade union had various statutory rights eg disclosure of information, collective redundancies, health and 
safety, etc.
58 The order made under the Defence Regulation was entitled: Conditions of Employment and National 
Arbitration Order, 1940 (Statutory Rules and Orders, 1940, No 1305).
59 Industrial Relations Handbook Ministry of Labour, 1961, HMSO, London, pp 144
60 Replaced by the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1946.
61 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed v Veitch (1942) HL
62 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68. Cmnd 3623, HMSO, London
63 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68. Cmnd 3623, HMSO, London, 
paras 928-935
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(mentioned below) referring to the right to strike as “now well recognised”64. However, 
on the specific matter of giving a discrete legal definition to strikes about recognition, 
Donovan was sceptical as to the need for such provisions. In 1968 in the case of Morgan 
v Fry65, at the very time of Donovan, 66 Lord Denning was also clear that the argument 
that an employee taking strike action was a breach of the contract of employment was 
unsustainable.
3.11. The changes in law wrought by Conservative Governments from 1979 did much to 
reverse this position, certainly in the areas of strikes about recognition, union labour 
contracts, secondary strikes etc. The right to picket was also subject to restrictive 
regulation and non-compliance with the law (including the Code67) could lead to the loss 
of immunities, a situation, which in large measure remains so today. The ‘golden 
formula’ of immunities underwent fundamental change. These changes were throughout 
the period of the 1980’s revisited, and built upon by statute and case law in the most 
draconian manner, the costs in every respect for trade unions has been high.
3.12. The ability to use the strike weapon in issues of recognition and collective 
bargaining is as fundamental as its use in any other trade dispute. Recognition, which 
does not include the right to bargain collectively68, has invariably been viewed by trade 
unionists as ineffective recognition69. Unfortunately, Donovan did not see that there 
was a need to give discrete legal definition and specific protection under UK statute law, 
and the immunities, of the right to strike in furtherance of a claim for recognition. Whilst 
it is likely that much of what took place by way of legislative change during the period 
of the 1980-90’s that affected recognition, may nonetheless have taken place, the passage 
of such legal reversals may have been more difficult to accomplish. Given that 
(historically) neither the automatic right to recognition nor the right to strike had any
64 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68. Cmnd 3623, HMSO, London, 
para 935
65 Morgan v Fry, (1968) CA. Per Lord Denning: “It is difficult to see the logical flaw in that argument. But 
there must be something wrong with it: for i f  that argument were correct, it would do away with the right to 
strike in this country. It has been heldfor over 60years that workmen have a right to strike ... provided that 
they give sufficient notice beforehand: and a notice is sufficient if  it is at least as long as the notice required 
to terminate the contract. ”
66Donovan Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68. Cmnd 3623, HMSO, 
London, para 819.
67 Code o f Practice on Picketing 1980 - Revised in 1992
68 Donovan Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68. Cmnd 3623, HMSO, 
London, at para 212 said: “Properly conducted, collective bargaining is the most effective means o f giving 
workers the right to representation in decisions affecting their working lives, a right which is or should be the 
prerogative of every worker in a democratic society.”
69 An attitude on the part o f trade-unionists which has changed quite markedly over the period o f the 1980- 
90s as is argued later.
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express provisions within UK Law70, how then have trade unions overcome (in many 
instances without resorting to strike action) the reluctance of employers to agree 
recognition and collective bargaining?
3.13. The Ministry of Labour Industrial Relations Handbook71 succinctly defines 
collective bargaining. This was at a time when the majority of collective agreements 
were ‘industry-wide’, usually entered into between a union/unions and an employers 
association to cover designated grades of employees. The structure of industry and the 
manner in which industrial relations, tended to be ‘centrally organised’, aided a 
‘collectivist’ approach to regulation. To some extent it was the breakdown of this 
system of ‘centralised’ industrial relations that gave impetus to the progressive incursion 
of law and the decline of ‘collectivism’, as the ‘dominant model’.
3.14. During the 1950-60’s, laws were developed which ‘underpinned’ the principles of 
collective bargaining and indirectly gave support to recognition. In 1957, the 
government decided to abolish the Industrial Disputes Order 1951 and introduced the 
Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959, Section 872of which removed the word 
‘issue’ and introduced the term ‘claim’. Claims could be reported to the Minister of 
Labour for adjudication by the Industrial Court (IC)73. The IC also became responsible 
for dealing with claims arising under the Fair Wages Resolution of the House of 
Commons.
3.15 Whilst it was never the stated intention of the 1959 Act to enforce recognition, it did 
in some cases prove to be a useful device in gaining recognition. Employers tended to 
take the view that there was no alternative other than at least to observe the minimum 
terms and conditions negotiated within their industry or district. In many cases, the 
ultimate value of the 1959 Act was not that it gained for many employees the application 
of industry wide ‘minimum standards’ but, that it helped trade unions gain the right to 
negotiate terms and conditions which, were commensurate with the ability of an 
employer to pay and which, at the very least, reflected the ‘general standards’ within the 
particular industry.
70 TULR(C)A S. 180 provided that it is possible to incorporate into individual contracts the terms of a 
collective agreement not to strike. Rookes v Barnard 1964 AC 1129 has often been cited as authority for 
this in the past, in future this argument will only be relevant where a collective agreement does not come 
under the scope o f TULR(C)A s. 180(1).
71 Ministry o f Labour, Industrial Relations Handbook 1961, HMSO, London, pp 18 second para.
72 Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959S 8(1) (a)(b)(c)
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3.16. Not until we see the emergence of a more ready acceptance of recognition and 
collective bargaining as being the ‘model’ (underpinned by collectivism in the public 
sector and statutory underpinning) do we find the start of a period of significant trade 
union growth and increase in power and influence. However, it is at this time, with the 
extension of trade union organisation into white collar employment, that the right to 
recognition and collective bargaining emerges again as a major issue.
Trade Union Power, Increasing Recognition and Collective Bargaining 
Support for the ‘Collectivist Model’ - The Growth of Staff Unions
3.17. Flanders (1970) argues that over the two decades of the 1960’s and 1970’s trade 
union growth had “stagnated” in terms of union membership density, a fact which is 
bom out by the research of Bain and Price (1980) and Marsh (1979) and Wrigley (1997 
and 2002). Much of the trade union growth that did take place in the 1960-70’s was in 
‘white collar’ or ‘staff employment74, particularly within the manufacturing industries. 
However, during the period 1959 to 1977 unions generally in Mining, Railways, Iron and 
Steel, Building and Construction Textiles and Agriculture lost 900,000 members Marsh 
(1979)75. White-collar unions, particularly within private industry, were the fastest 
growing unions Bain (1970). Marsh (1979)76 illustrates the growth of four major white- 
collar private sector unions (ASTMS, APEX, TASS and NUBE) from an aggregate 
membership of 279,000 to 890,000 over a period of 1966 to 1977. Growth within the 
banking, insurance and finance industries over this same period, was spread over a larger 
number of competing unions, many of which were ‘house unions’77.
3.18. With the development of modem production systems and, the need for integration 
of production and administration to match the increasing scale of company’s there 
developed a tendency for manual workers (with trade union membership tradition and 
many with active backgrounds in trade union representation as shop stewards etc) to be 
transferred into‘new staff jobs’. It was these developments, (new technology affecting 
job content and status) that led some manual unions to establish their own ‘white collar’
73 The terms under which such claims were reported to the IC can be seen in the preamble to each of the 
Industrial Court cases at Appendix IC.l and IC.2
74 Table 1.4 Union Membership and Density by Sector in Great Britain, 1948-1979, in Industrial Relations in 
Britain, Bain G.S., illustrates this rapid growth in white collar unionism, particularly within the 
manufacturing industries. See also: Carter, B.(1985) The Theory o f Middle Class Trade Unionism. Capital 
Class Conflict and the New Middle Class. Routledge, 1985, Table 5.1 pp 153: Marsh. A. (1979) Trade 
Union Handbook. Gower Press, 1979, Table 4 page 15.
75 Marsh (1979) Table 2, p 13.
7^  Marsh (1979) Table 4, p 15.
7/ Unions or staff associations set up to cater solely for the employees within a particular bank or finance 
company. Some of these ‘house unions’ were not TUC affiliated and in some cases were established and 
registered as independent unions during the period of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 as an attempt to 
prevent TUC unions gaining recognition.
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sections. Occasionally this could lead to serious inter union recruitment problems 
Simpson (1993)78. White-collar workers, working in close proximity with the shop floor 
presented the ideal platform from which to organise. However, Carter (1985) has little 
regard for such developments. In the practical experience of the author, it was most 
frequently such developments which created the environment for membership to 
develop, and such employees who were the first contacts that provided the ‘catalyst’ 
when organising activities commenced at a company.
3.19. Notwithstanding the help given by manual workers, staff unions met very strong 
opposition from many employers. In the late 1970’s, whilst most employers accepted 
trade unionism in blue-collar occupations they were not in favour of organisation 
amongst their staff, Marsh (1982). Recognition was often only won after long and hard 
fought disputes. Donovan79 reported on this discriminatory phenomenon and its 
implications for “public policy” (see para 224).80 Many employers saw staff employees 
as ‘the last bastion’ of their ‘prerogative’ and resisted recognition and collective 
bargaining not simply because they were ‘anti collectivist’ (which in most cases was 
probably a fact) so much as they were fearful of staff employees adopting similar 
attitudes to change as was the case with manual workers unions. Issues such as status 
quo ante81 were as much a problem for management in the staff area, as it often was 
with the shop-floor unions, when matters of changed working practices were at issue. 
This was true of manufacturing and particularly the Engineering Industry where there 
was a long experience of the type of restrictions which could be placed upon the change 
process by the use of the status quo ante.
The Fair Wages Resolution and Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959
3.20. The Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959 was frequently used, to 
‘pressurise’ employers into applying the minimum terms agreed within an'industry82.
78 Cheall \  APEX[\9%3>\ 2 AC 180 : See: Simpson, S. (1993) Individualism vs Collectivism: an Evaluation 
of s l4  of the TURERA 1993, Industrial Law Journal, 1993, Vol. 22, No 3, ppl81. The author was the official 
of APEX responsible for recruiting Cheall, and some 300 of his fellow workers and ultimately dealing with 
the TUC Dispute Committee Hearings and Cheall and others expulsion from APEX to give effect to the 
award of the TUC. The author was also witness in chief for APEX in the High Court proceedings.
79 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68. Cmnd 3623, HMSO, London, 
paras 219-224
80 However, Donovan as mentioned above, failed to see the value of the Terms and Conditions o f  
Employment Act 1959 in the very grades of employment to which the report was referring.
81 This was a provision within many agreements between employers and manual unions whereby changes to 
work practices which may have an implication upon terms and conditions could not be given effect by the 
employer until the whole o f an agreed procedure had been exhausted. The staff unions party to the national 
recognition agreement with the Engineering Employers Federation had a similar ‘status quo ante’ provision.
82 It was this fact of the IC being able to impose specific contractual terms upon a respondent employer as 
provided within a national collective agreement which added ‘weight’ to employers preferring to recognise a 
trade union.
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The Fair Wages Resolution of the House of Commons83 (many local authorities also 
adopted similar ‘resolutions’ relating to their contracting policies) was, over many years, 
prior to the 1959 Act, also a useful device for furthering collective bargaining and 
recognition, see Flanders and Clegg (1963)84. The Engineering Industry85 was a prime 
example of the way this legislation could ‘underpin’ the development of recognition and 
collective bargaining, particularly in respect of ‘staff unions’86 within the industry. 
Unions such as the Clerical and Administrative Workers Union (CAWU)87, the National 
Association of Clerical and Supervisory Staff (NACSS) which was the staff section of 
the Transport and General Workers Union, the Association of Scientific Workers88 and, 
the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen89, the Managerial 
Administrative and Technical Staff Association (MATSA) which was the staff section of 
the General and Municipal Workers Union, now the GMB.
3.21. Within the Engineering Industry ‘staff unions’ (with the exception of ASSET 
which became MSF) negotiated at national level with the Engineering Employers 
Federation (EEF), on minimum terms and conditions of employment for their members 
within federated companies. However, not all companies were members of the EEF. In 
1964 the EEF had approximately 4000 member companies employing some 1,900,000 
manual and staff workers90, less than fifty percent91 of those employed within the 
industry at that time. After a round of national negotiations with the EEF each union 
would pursue local negotiations with non-federated companies at which they were 
recognised (where local agreements were not negotiated, which gave the same as or 
better than the national agreement) to seek the application of the newly agreed terms for 
their members. Recognised unions rarely had any problem in gaining the application of 
a pay increase and/or the new minimum terms for the industry. The achievement of a
83 There were three Fair Wages Resolutions of the House of Commons; 1891,1909 and 1946. The Fair 
Wages Resolution in law did not exist, and yet it had a considerable affect upon the recognition o f collective 
agreements and in turn they did, on occasion, have an impact upon employers agreeing to trade union 
recognition and collective bargaining.
84 Flanders, A. and Clegg, H..A. Eds, (1963) The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, Its 
History. Law and Institutions Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1963. pp75 - 87
85 However, a review of the cases heard by the Industrial Court under the Terms and Conditions o f  
Employment Act 1959 will show many trade unions and their members benefited in a wide range of 
industries and services.
86 Donovan referred to such unions as ‘white collar unions’
87 CAWU changed its name to Association of Professional Executive Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX) 
in the mid 1970's and has now been absorbed by the GMB.
88 The Association of Scientific Workers amalgamated with ASSET to form the Association of Scientific 
Technical and Managerial Staff (ASTMS).
89 Which became the Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians Association (DATA) now amalgamated within 
the AEEU
90 Ministry of Labour, Industrial Relations Handbook 1961. HMSO, London, pp 28 second para.
91 Most ‘non-federated’ employers were small to medium size and difficult to organise into trade unions.
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new national agreement was also used by the staff unions as a recruitment opportunity, at 
companies where there was no membership, particularly where it was known that 
salaries or other terms and conditions were below (or not significantly better than) the 
agreed national minimum. Recruitment campaigns were organised around applications 
to employers under the 1959 Act, s.8, to give effect to the new salary increases and/or 
agreed minimum terms and conditions for the industry, with the threat that the Act would 
be used to enforce compliance if necessary92.
3.22. It is unfortunate that Donovan93 appeared to have little regard for the value of the 
Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959, in some cases94, only the existence of 
this Act, and to a lesser extent the Fair Wages Resolution of the House of Commons 
helped retain union membership, particularly amongst employees at companies where no 
recognition had been achieved. The fact that a union was able to apply the pressure of 
these statutory provisions maintained the ‘loyalty’ of membership whilst the campaign to 
recruit more members, and the battle for recognition with the employer continued, 
sometimes over many years.
3.23. Many employers used individual review methods of increasing employees pay, 
particularly for staff employees, frequently producing rates of increase in salaries far 
below those increases agreed nationally95. In many cases it was because these ‘review 
methods’ gave rise to seriously anomalous treatment, that employees turned to trade 
union organisation as the only means of redressing the way in which they were falling 
behind in pay and benefits96.
3.24. A serious limitation of the 1959 Acts value was that its provisions could only be 
used in cases where industry agreements were negotiated, however, its effectiveness has 
been given little credit as a device in gaining recognition. Whilst one must agree it was 
not, a fully effective means of extending the scope of collective bargaining, it did have
92 See: Appendix IC.l, Black Clawson International Ltd and Clerical and Administrative Workers Union , 
award dated 29th January 1968, case 3160, para 6.
93 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68. Cmnd 3623, HMSO, London, 
paras 240-241.
94 Based upon the experience of the author whilst employed as a National Official throughout the 1960s, for 
the CAWU, having responsibility for some 60,000 engineering industry members
95 See Appendix IC.2, para 14, supports what is said about ‘individual reviews of pay’. Paras 18-22. 
Centrax (Appendix IC.2) like Black Clawson (Appendix IC .l) sought to deny the ‘general applicability’ of 
Section 8 of the 1959 Act where it refers to ‘terms and conditions’ see para 25 of Appendix IC.2.
96 There is some evidence to support this contention in the Industrial Court cases generally and as referred to 
later (Black Clawson International Ltd (Appendix IC .l) and Centrax Limited (Appendix IC.2))
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considerable value when used as a strategy in a campaign97 for recognition and collective 
bargaining. Furthermore, in a limited way, particularly where recognition and collective 
bargaining were gained, the Act did assist in raising low pay.
3.25. Unfortunately the records available of cases taken before the IC under the 1959 Act 
appear to be incomplete98. However, the records held at the Public Records Office , 
Kew, (incomplete though they may be) do not support the contention of Deakin and 
Morris(1998) and (2001) 99 that the 1959 Act was “used only infrequently”, the records 
show conclusively a better ‘usage’. However, Deakin and Morris (1998) and (2001) 
recognise the significance of the 1959 Act in enforcing agreed terms and conditions and 
persuading many recalcitrant employers of the futility of seeking to evade union 
recognition. Rubery and Edwards (2003)100 argue that unions had failed in their 
‘industrial mission’ in respect of the low paid, and with the abolition of wage regulatory 
machinery had failed to organise the low paid and bring them within the collective 
bargaining process. However, in their analysis they cite three ways in which law has 
been used in the UK to enforce collective agreements on employers not parties to 
them101: first through the Fair Wages Resolution (1891) and 1946; second through 
Schedule 11 of the Employment Protection Act 1975; and, third was by union action. 
However, their analysis and argument is seriously remiss in that it fails to make any 
mention of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959. However, one must 
accept that, given its success in the cases in which it was used, had it been used more 
generally it could have proven to be an even greater aid to gaining recognition. During 
the Acts final three years IC cases ranged over a wide variety of trades and industries: 
plastics, basket weaving, transport, pottery, football pools, steel production, engineering, 
etc, involving various grades of employees both white collar and manual. There is of 
course another quite plausible reason as to why Deakin and Morris may have arrived at 
their conclusion that the 1959 Act was little used and that is, the threat of its use more
97 See Appendix IC.2 para 4 - illustrates the culmination o f a campaign using the 1959 Act over a number of 
years.
98 Research at the Public Records Office, Kew has produced records for the period 1966-68 (Archive ref:
EW 8/731 Industrial Court and other Arbitration Awards 1966-68). However, during this brief period there 
are records of some 48 cases taken before the Industrial Court under the provisions of the Terms and 
Conditions of Employment Act 1959.
99 Deakin S and Gillian S Morris (2001) Labour Law Third Edition. Butterworths 2001, London, pp 690- 
691.
100 Rubery. J. and Edwards. P. (2003) Low Pay and the National Minimum Waee. in Edwards. P. (ed)
Industrial Relations Theory and Practice. Second Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, pp 452-455
101 Rubery. J., and Edwards. P. (2003) Low Pay and the National Minimum Waee. in Edwards. P. (ed) 
Industrial Relations Theory and Practice. Second Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, Chapter 17 pp 453-455
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often than not produced a desired result, thus obviating the need to go to the IC. A fact 
to which the author can personally testify.
3.26. Two not untypical examples of the value of the 1959 Act are, Black Clawson 
International Ltd and CAWU (Appendix IC.l) and Centrax Limited and CAWU 
(Appendix IC.2), two of many cases that the author pursued102 through the Industrial 
Court (IC) under the provisions of Section 8 of the 1959 Act103.
Black Clawson International Ltd (Industrial Court Case 3160.1968)
3.27. Black Clawson International Ltd recognised shop-floor unions and had 
comprehensive collective agreements and good working relationships. However, 
resistance to trade unions organising their staff and the proposition that it should adopt a 
‘collectivist’ approach to employee relations was uncompromising. The Company 
agreed an ‘Individual Representation Procedure’ with the CAWU and ASSET, however, 
refused to allow any form of collective representation or collective bargaining. The 
Company, sought to defend its refusal to apply the 1967 Engineering Industry 
Agreement on salary increases claiming, it had applied a job evaluation scheme which 
gave increases to staff and that all staff had been advised that National Agreements on 
salary increases would in future no longer be applied by the Company104. It also sought 
to deny the whole thrust of the Act, arguing that Section 8 meant ‘all terms and 
conditions’ not just a ‘single aspect of the contract’ which may affected by an 
Agreement105. In its award106 the IC accepted the arguments of the CAWU. 
Unfortunately, the award was very limited in its application (only a few employees 
benefited), however, the fact that the employer had been compelled to apply the National 
Agreement for the engineering industry bolstered the morale and significantly improved 
the membership position of the CAWU and ASSET.
3.28. The action taken by the CAWU against the Company, resulted in the company, in 
1969, recognising the CAWU and ASSET. The struggle for recognition had involved the 
ASSET, who organised a number of shop-floor supervisors and technicians. However, 
because it was not a party to the National Agreement ASSET could not be joined in the 
IC claim. However, both unions had reported the dispute about recognition to the
102 whilst employed as Assistant General Secretary by the then CAWU
10jThe Industrial Court, Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959, Black Clawson International Ltd 
and Clerical and Administrative Workers Union, award dated 29th January 1968, case 3160, lodged at the 
Public Records Office, Kew, London, Ref EW8/731, (Appendix IC.l).
104 Industrial Court Award 3160, paras 7 and 25 (Appendix IC.l)
105 See Appendix IC.l, para 22 -23.
106 See Appendix IC.l, para 37(1) to (6).
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Ministry of Labour Industrial Relations Department, seeking the assistance of the 
Conciliation Service. Whilst the efforts of the Conciliation Service proved to be fruitless 
in the early stages (prior to the claim by the CAWU to the IC) of the joint unions claim 
for recognition by the Company, subsequent to the CAWU action in the IC, the 
Conciliation Service was instrumental in gaining recognition and collective bargaining. 
Centrax Limited (Industrial Court Case 3150,1967)
3.29. A further example of the value of the 1959 Act is the case of Centrax Limited and 
CAWU107. The CAWU had sought recognition for a number of years and had invariably 
experienced some difficulty in persuading the company to apply the terms of the 
National Agreement negotiated with the Engineering Employers Federation (EEF), 
however, the company had always after delay and argument applied the agreement. In 
1966 Centrax Limited recognised the CAWU for collective bargaining, however, in 1967 
an issue arose regarding the non application of the 1965 National Agreement negotiated 
between the CAWU and the EEF. In this case the IC awarded in favour of the CAWU, 
however, giving effect to its award without retrospection.
3.30. Whilst it was not a ‘perfect instrument’, through which to gain recognition, this Act 
was invaluable as a means to that end, Deakin and Morris (2001)108. Many of those same 
unions which had been so successful in using the 1959 Act were some years later to be 
just as affective in utlising the provisions of the Employment Protection Act 1975, 
Schedule 11 O’Hara (1996)109, on occasions in conjunction with, but often as a separate 
device from, the provisions of Section 11 of the same Act.
The Changing Politics of Collectivism - The Emergence of Increasing Statutory 
Intervention
3.31. Their growth in strength frequently brought the trade union movement into 
conflict, not simply with employers, but also governments. Trade unions were 
increasingly portrayed as the primary reason for the malaise of British industry and its 
uncompetitiveness, Blanchflower and Freeman (1994), Hayek (1985), Williams et al
107Centrax Limited and Clerical and Administrative Workers Union, award dated 31st July 1967, case 3150, 
lodged at the Public Records Office, Kew, London, Ref EW8/731. (Appendix IC.2).
108 Deakin and Morris (2001) pp 690-691.
109 Employment Protection Act 1975, Schedule 11, Part 1, (1), (2) (a) and (b). Schedule 11 was used in a 
different manner to earlier similar laws (the 1959 Act) indeed a deal of wage inflation could be attributed to 
the manner in which it was used particularly within the relatively well paid industries, where it was used 
almost solely as means of bridging differentials which created ‘circuitous claims’ to restore eroded 
differentials; see also O’Hara Community Law and British Industrial Relations. Worker Participation and 
Collective Bargaining in Britain: the Influence o f European Law, The Institute of Employment Rights, 
London 1996. pp23.
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(1985) 110 in World markets. There emerged, in the mid 1960’s, increasing impatience in 
Westminster with the ‘interference’ of trade unions in the political process (particularly 
economic management) and resistance to government policies Bain (1993)111. It was this 
shift in the ‘political power’ Coates (1994) of trade unions that persuaded the 
government to take steps to develop a new order for industrial relations by setting up the 
Donovan Commission, Brown (1992)112. The trade unions co-operated with the work of 
Donovan and in most major respects welcomed its report. However, it was to have only 
transient affects upon the development of industrial relations in the mid to late 1970’s. 
The publication of the Toiy response ‘Fair Deal at Work’ and subsequently the Labour 
Governments ‘In Place of Strife’, had significant political results which were to usher in 
a whole new era for trade unions during the 1970’s. It was these developments which 
proved to be the withdrawal from the historic ‘abstentionist’ policies of governments and 
the move to statutoiy interventionist, regulatory policies. Also at this period the 
industrial relations structure by which trade unions had tended to draw strength and 
develop membership, power and influence, was itself beginning to change. Industry 
structure was itself beginning to change. Collective bargaining (outside the public 
sector) had been moving away from national industry wide agreements to company 
based (in some cases nation-wide across a company group) agreements.
3.32 It is frequently argued within the literature that industry-wide bargaining is more 
attractive to unions than individual plant bargaining Brown et al (2003)113. The 
reasoning behind this argument is that such agreements encompass whole product 
markets on a regional or nation-wide basis. For unions there were ‘economies of scale’ 
in being able to set base pay structures and terms and conditions nationally. For 
employers there is an argument that there were economic advantages in being able to 
“take wages out o f competition” Brown et al (2003)114. However, bargaining for a whole 
industry meant that non-members also benefited from any improvements gained. Within 
many industries (particularly engineering) plant or company wide bargaining covered 
much of the industiy and union members, both ‘federated’ and ‘non-federated’ 
companies. During the 1970’s white-collar unions relinquished national bargaining
110 See: Williams, K. Williams, J. & Thomas, D. (1985) The Relative Importance o f Union Power as a 
Factor In Britain’s Poor Manufacturing Perfomance. in Trade Unions. McCarthy. (Lord) (Ed) Penguin, 
London,1985, 389-402: Hayek (1980) The Trade Unions and Britain’s Economic Decline, in Trade Unions 
(1985) (Ed) W.E.J. McCarthy, Second Edition, Penguin Books. 1985 pp 357-364.
111 Roy Lewis, Collective Labour Law. pp368. Chpt 15
112 Brown. W. (1992) Bargaining Structure and the Impact o f the Law. McCarthy, W. Lord (Ed)
Blackwell, London, 1992, pp881
113 Brown. W. et al (2003) p i99
114 Brown. W. et al (2003) pl99
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within the engineering industry. The white-collar unions felt that there would be greater 
returns in terms of membership recruitment, concentrating upon using plant agreements 
and ‘infill’ organising activities as a means to gain union shop agreements. However, it 
was not until 1990 that the National Agreement between the EEF and the Confederation 
of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions finally ended Cully et al (WERS) (1999)115.
3.33 With the advent of the legislative and contextual changes of the 1980’s and 1990’s, 
what was thought to be an advantage during the 1970’s tended to provide a platform for 
widespread restructuring of collective bargaining and the move to individualisation of 
contract terms. The decline in collective bargaining is illustrated by Brown and Walsh 
(1991)116, Brown et al (2003)117 and Cully et al (1999)(WERS)118 Milward et al 
(2000)(WERS)119. However, Cully provides evidence and data across employers with no 
or little union organisation, showing the scope of negotiation and consultation with 
‘employee representatives’ has continued, albeit more about organisational change and 
procedural than substantive terms.
Post Donovan Commission, the Industrial Relations Act 1971
3.34. The Industrial Relations Act 1971 (IRA 1971) (which had more regard for the 
recommendations of the ‘Shonfield Note of Reservation’120 and ‘Fair Deal at Work’ than 
those of the Donovan Report itself) brought in a whole new approach to industrial 
relations. The IRA 1971 introduced a completely new approach to trade union rights 
and immunities Heaton’s121 being a particular cause celebr'e Lewis (1983)122. From a 
consensus which was that litigation was not the route to resolving industrial conflict, the 
UK was launched upon a path along which trade unions and employers (initially both 
reluctantly) have increasingly been propelled, involved with law, rather than the 
development of effective processes for negotiation, conciliation and arbitration. 
However, as Deakin and Morris say123, the IRA 1971 cannot be compared with later 
Conservative legislation because, whatever its failings, it was still grounded in 
‘collectivism’.
115 Cully. M. et al (WERS) (1999) p 106
116 Brown, W. and Walsh, J. (1991) pp 44-59
117 Brown. W. et al (2003) pl99, Table 8.1
118 Cully. M. et al (WERS) (1999) pp 103-107
119 Millward, N. eta l (2000)(WERS) ppl96-205
120 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68. Cmnd 3623, HMSO, London 
pp288-302
121 Heaton’s Transport Ltd v 7W t/[1973] AC 15; [1972] ICR, 308; [1972] IRLR25
122 See: Industrial Relations in Britain. Edited by: George Sayer Bain, Basil Blackwell, 1983, Oxford, Chpt 
15 Collective Labour law. Roy Lewis, pp.371
123 Deakin, S. and Morris, G,S. Labour Law. Second Edition. Butterworths, 1998, London Chpt 7, pp 695.
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3.35. The Act required the Registration of Trade Unions which meant that only 
‘independent124’ ‘registered’ trade unions would have the advantages and protections 
provided by the Act. A new National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) was 
brought into operation to oversee the implementation of the Acts provisions on:
a) The right to become a member of a trade union;
b) The right to recognition;
c) Sole bargaining rights;
d) Disclosure of information for collective bargaining purposes125;
At this time an Industrial Relations Code of Practice126was introduced. This Code was to 
prove to be the first of many ‘codes’ covering specific areas of industrial relations and 
discrete aspects of legislation (discipline, picketing, strike ballots, equal pay, sex 
discrimination etc). The Code of Practice was viewed by some trade unionists as a 
helpful development. In many of its recommendations such as, collective bargaining and 
recognition of trade unions127 it gave ‘direction’, if not overt support, as to what was 
expected which in itself gave continued underpinning to collectivism.
3.36. A significant development under the new laws was the introduction of a new legal 
definition of recognition and a procedure whereby issues involving recognition could be 
resolved. A process to the same ends was continued under the provisions introduced by 
the Employment Protection Act 1975128, however, discontinued when the procedure was 
abolished by the Employment Act 1980.
The TUC and Employers Boycott of the IRA 1971
3.37. With the exception of a small minority (principally in banking, food manufacturing 
and maritime) unions affiliated to the TUC universally condemned and boycotted the 
IRA 1971 and refused to become registered under its provisions129. It was not solely 
trade unions which opposed the IRA 1971, many substantial employers130 also had little 
regard for its provisions, particularly the legal enforcement of collective agreements,
124 Something which at the time of the IRA 1971 caused a deal of contention and even under the provisions 
of the ERA 1999 appears to be no less contentious, see Prison Officers Association case referred to later.
125 A provision continued through the ACAS Code of Practice No2 and TULR(C)A 1992 S. 181-185
126 Industrial Relations Code of Practice - 28th February 1972
127 Industrial Relations Code of Practice, ppl8 - 22.
128 Employment Protection Act 1975, Section 11.
129 A tactic by the trade unions which tended to frustrate the operation of the Act.
130 British Leyland, Rolls Royce, Massey Ferguson, Plessey are examples of some of the substantial 
employers which declined to accept the implications of the IRA1971 upon their industrial relations 
structures. The author recalls participating in many joint management/union representative workshops 
arranged by these companies and others specifically designed to discuss and review ways by which the 
implications of the IRA 1971 might be avoided. This was a completely different scenario to that which 
emerged during the successive legislative interventions into industrial relations by the Thatcher and Major 
governments.
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which was deemed to apply, unless express terms were included within agreements to 
the contrary. This incursion into the collective bargaining arrangements was regarded 
(by each side for their respective reasons) as unnecessary interference, and contrary to 
the view expressed by Donovan and the Courts131. There was a shared concern, 
employers believing the main disadvantage to be the removal of ‘flexibility’ in the way 
in which collective agreements (and consequently employment contracts) could be 
managed around changing production and company structural needs. Whilst trade 
unions saw legal enforceability as an encumbrance to their needs in being able to 
respond in a countervailing manner (normally industrial action of some form) to the 
change in production methods and structural changes in companies employing their 
members.
3.38. A clear indication of the degree of mutuality (between the employers and unions) 
was the rejection of the IRA 1971 provisions for legally enforceable collective 
agreements132. Trade union and employers (including the EEF) rejection of legally 
enforceable agreements, TINALEA (This Is Not A Legally Enforceable Agreement) 
became an automatic ‘requirement’ in all negotiations under the provisions of 
agreements across industry and commerce. Within the Engineering Industry the 
incorporation of this clause was a pre-requisite before negotiations at national level, or at 
all stages of the procedure agreement. These attitudes were symptomatic of the mutual 
desire to ‘avoid’ the rigors of the IRA 1971,Deakin and Morris (1998)133, to such an 
extent that the Act, had very little effect in most companies and, as a consequence, trade 
union development, Bain and Price (1983)134 was little affected by the IRA 1971, or its 
successor laws of the mid 1970’s.
Development of ‘Alternative Trade Unions’.
3.39. During the era of the IRA 1971 there emerged a ‘raft’ of staff associations and non 
TUC unions, some of which continue to operate today. Many were sponsored by 
employers, claiming ‘independence’ and seeking registration under the Act in order to 
enter ‘sole bargaining rights’ agreements with employers, who wished to provide an 
‘alternative’ means for conducting industrial relations to that of recognising a TUC
131 Ford Motor Co Ltd v A UEW [1969] 2 All ER 482.
132 TULR(C)A Schedule Alrevisit this whole subject both in respect of collective agreements covering terms 
and conditions and ‘no strike agreements’. Whilst trade unions have not been enthusiastic about this, 
employers have not shown their antipathy. However, legal enforceability must be by agreement not by 
‘omission’ as was so under the IRA 1971.
133 Deakin S. and Morris G. S. (1998) Labour Law Second Edition. Butterworths 1998, London, pp77-78
134 Union growth over the period from the publication of Donovan (1968) to the election of the Tories 
(1979) shows increases across the economy in white collar and manual workers, see: Bain G.S. (1983)
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affiliated union135. What became known, as ‘sweetheart deals’ became the vogue in an 
effort to evade the rigors of recognition claims under the Act of ‘bona fide’ trade unions. 
Many such unions comprised a significant part of the non-TUC unions to which the 
thesis makes reference elsewhere. Given the TUC policy on registration such employers 
had in fact little to fear. This development was, however, one of the fears that unions 
such as the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE)136 had and resulted in them 
deciding not to follow the TUC boycott of the IRA 1971 and registered, and as a result 
were expelled from the TUC. NUBE had been facing the growing strength of staff 
associations, Cole (1955)137 over many years within each of the clearing banks138. After 
many years of battling with recalcitrant employers over the whole question of 
recognition and collective bargaining NUBE saw the threat that its agreements with 
employers, membership and future development, would be seriously compromised if it 
did not register. However, contrary to these fears about staff associations posing a 
threat to ‘bona fide’ trade unionism and collective bargaining, they in fact in some areas 
of the financial services industry, actually aided its growth, through transfers of 
engagements with various staff unions. ASTMS was successful in merging with a 
number of staff associations particularly within the insurance and finance sectors. 
However, this activity did lead to a number of inter union disputes, under the Bridlington 
Principles, about whether a merger (transfer139) with a staff association was in fact 
‘commencing organising activities’ by the TUC affiliate, the leading case is Rothwell v 
APEX and the TUC140.
The Employment Protection Act 1975 (some comparisons with the ERA 1999)
3.40. The repeal of the IRA 1971 and the introduction of the EPA 1975 hopes were 
raised that the ‘collectivist model’ would be consolidated. However, this was to prove to 
be illusory. 1975 to 1979 proved to be a moribund experience in the attempts by 
Government to gain progress in the application of law in a number of areas of industrial 
relations and employee involvement. Bullock141 was vigorously opposed by the CBI142,
Industrial Relations in Britain. Bain and Price ‘ Union Growth: Dimensions, Determinants, and Destiny. 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, Part 1, Chpt 1, Table 1.4, ppll.
135 The possibility that something similar is again occurring under the ERA 1999 is discussed later.
136 NUBE changed its name to BIFU and subsequently through merger with a number of independent 
individual bank unions became UNIFI. At the time of the thesis being written up UNIFI was in discussions 
with Amicus with a view to merging to form a significant white collar section together with MSF which had 
earlier amalgamated with the AEU to form Amicus.
137 Cole. G.D.H. (1955) An Introduction to Trade Unionism. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1955. 
pp271
138 Barclays, NatWest, Lloyds, and Midland, Banks.
139 Trade Union (Amalgamation etc) Act 1964
140 Rothwell v APEX and the TUC [1975] 375 CA
141 Bullock 1977, Committee o f Inquiry on Industrial Democracy. Report. Cmnd 6706. London. HMSO.
142 O’Hara (1996) Community Law and British Industrial Relations. Worker Participation and Collective
Bareainins in Britain: the Influence ofEuropean Law. The Institute of Employment Rights, London 1996
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and received little support from the TUC which effectively (at that time) brought to an 
end the whole debate about ‘employee involvement’, the effective re-opening of which 
would have to await European intervention Deakin and Morris(1998)) and O’Hara 
(1996)143 to see it again on the political ‘agenda’, albeit in the form of ‘Works 
Councils144 not ‘Board Representation’.
3.41. The post ERA 1975 period saw some notable cause celebre's, Grunwick 145 being 
an example of a most lengthy and bitterly fought, dispute about the right to recognition 
and collective bargaining, about which, the new laws could contribute little by way of a 
resolution. The damage done by Grunwick was much more than that done to the strikers, 
APEX and ACAS, it went to the core of the cultural support (public policy) for trade 
union rights. However, whilst many aspects of the law were neutered, primarily because 
of Grunwick146. The 1975 Acts strengthening of Codes147 to underpin collectivism and, 
particularly the role of ACAS, it was more of a success than it is given credit for. ACAS 
illustrate in Towers and Brown (2000)148, the extent of the success of the conciliation 
process in assisting trade unions to gain recognition rather than the tortuous (somewhat 
discredited) process of the law. Whilst conciliation was the more successful route, there 
can be no doubt that the reasons for it were, as with other legislative developments on 
‘recognition’, the employer preferring an arrangement over which they have a degree of 
control rather than one where ultimately recognition might be enforced and with it terms 
and conditions of employment149.
pp21; also Lorber. P. An attempt to assess the curious impact o f the European Works Council’s on the 
United Kingdom System of industrial Relations. Jagellonian University Yearbook of Labour Law and Social 
Security 95, 1997, Voll. 9, pp 95-121
143 European Works Council Directive 94/45 of 22nd September 1994: see, Deakin S. and Morris G. 
Labour Law Second Edition. Butterworths 1998, London, Chpt 9,9.4, pp 806-813. See also, O’Hara (1996) 
Community Law and British
Industrial Relations. Worker Participation and Collective Bareainim in Britain: the Influence o f European 
Law. The Institute o f Employment Rights, London 1996., pp1053-1054
144 A debate which has continued over the years and is now in the process of being brought to fruition 
through the adoption of the European Social Chapter and its various Directives, particularly the European 
Works Council Directive (No94/45) and Article 118(2) (Article 2(2) SPA): see - IDS Employment Law 
Supplement 81, The European Social Chapter, Incomes Data Services Ltd, London, September 1997. 81..3 - 
81.4.5 ppl0-35.
145 ACAS v Grunwick Processing Laboratories Ltd [1978] 38 HL; Grunwick Processing Laboratories v 
ACAS [1978] 1 All ER 338,[1978] ICR 231,HL.
146 UKAPEvACAS[\9W] ICR201,[1980] IRLR 124,HL;£M4 v^G45[1980] ICR215,[1980] IRLR 164 
HL. Are additional examples to that of Grunwick which illustrated the inadvisability of having courts 
determine industrial relations matters, and added to the neutering of the role o f ACAS under the EPA, 1975.
147 Code o f Practice Nol Disciplinary practice and procedures in employment; Code of Practice No2 
Disclosure of information to trade unions for collective bargaining purposes; Code of Practice No3 Time off 
for trade union duties and activities.
148 Brian Towers & William Brown, (eds) Employment Relations in Britain. 2000. Blackwell Publishers, 
Oxford, pp 128-129.
149 A recurring ‘theme’, under the 1959 Act repeated pre and post ERA 1999.
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3.42. There are a number of similarities between where the UK now finds itself on the 
matter of recognition and collective bargaining150 and where it was during the ill-fated 
era of the Employment Protection Act 1975. The CAC however, appears to have greater 
powers and has been more successful in exercising control under the 1999 Act than was 
ACAS under the 1975 Act. However, Lord McCarthy151 certainly appears to have 
lingering doubts as to whether the ERA 1999 has covered the ground adequately, 
particularly on the question of an employer bargaining in good faith, should the CAC 
award recognition to a trade union. Pyrrhic results may quickly undermine any 
confidence, which the trade unions may have in the new laws. More importantly a 
disgruntled employer and a new ‘Grunwick’152 may do for the role of the CAC what it in 
effect did for ACAS under the EPA 1975, a fact which ACAS has recognised.153 
However, the political balance over the period since 1999 has been much more in favour 
of the Government than was the case in the period from 1975 to 1979.
3.43. The CAC’s greater powers under the 1999 Act than those of ACAS under the 1975 
Act, also given the chastening (salutary) experiences of the period from 1979, trade 
unions appear to have different expectations of the new laws. Trade unions are also 
operating within a very different industrial, and political culture to that of some twenty- 
five years ago. Also TULR(C)A154 defines the basis of recognition for collective 
bargaining purposes in considerably more flexible terms than trade unions may have 
demanded during the 1975 era. The impact of the last statutory provisions for collective 
bargaining in the period 1975-1980155 appear to have been relatively small in terms of 
support to union membership growth. During that period it is calculated by ACAS156 
that the statutory provisions on recognition brought 64,000 new workers under 
recognition agreements through 518 new agreements. In the same period 77,000 new 
workers were brought under some form of union recognition by the voluntary route
150 Part I of Schedule A1 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULR(C)A), 
as inserted by Section 1 of the Employment Relations Act 1999
151 McCarthy, Lord, Fairness at Work and Trade Union Recognition : Past comparisons and future 
Problems. 1999, London, Institute of Employment Rights.
152 see - People Management 25th January 2001 pp 6, report of dispute between Statex Press and the CAC 
about its decision to award recognition without going through the balloting procedure. Also see - People 
Management, re attitude of Synseal Windows 7th December 2000 p 14. Also see People Management Union 
Recognition. Gregor Gall and Eila Rana re Bentler Automotive, 23rd November 2000 pp7. Also see re 
Bentler Automotive, IDS Brief Employment Law and Practice 677 pp 4 -5. See also re Bentler Automotive, 
IRS Employment Review Number 713, pp 16.
153 Towers and Brown, (2000) p i34.
154 TULR(C)A Section 181(as amended by the ERA 1999). However, the provisions of the Trade Union 
Recognition (Method of Collective Bargaining) Order 2000 are more prescriptive of what is required in the 
event of a CAC award being necessary. Even so the Award can by, mutual agreement, be varied.
155 Employment Protection Act 1975, Section 11
156 ACAS Annual Report, 1981
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using ACAS in its conciliation role. Marsh (1982)157 gives figures that tend to confirm 
the muted extent to which the Employment Protection Act 1975 SI 1 was used in claims 
for recognition. If the accent on voluntarism continues as the current trend on 
‘partnership agreements’ suggests, then the ERA 1999 provisions and the role of ACAS 
and threat of the CAC may work in a similarly indirect manner to those of the EPA 1975. 
In terms of membership growth the experience of the EPA 1975 appears to be repeating 
itself, judged by the fact that membership has not grown as a result of the operation of 
the ERA 1999, to the contrary, as Waddington (2003)158 argues they continue to 
plummet.
3.44. However, the removal of the ACAS duty of:
“Promoting the improvement o f industrial relations and, in particular o f encouraging the 
extension o f collective bargaining and the development and, where necessary, reform o f 
collective bargaining machinery159”
given effect by Conservative legislation in 1993 is not restored by the ERA 1999, which 
instead gives ACAS the duty merely (‘to promote industrial relations160” . The reason for 
the refusal to restore the old objective is said to be that ACAS should not be ‘seen to be 
biased by statute in favour of promoting collective bargaining’. However, the reasoning 
behind the distinction is opaque, whilst the two requirements appear to be very similar 
they are in fact dichotomous. A fundamental feature of industrial relations remains, in 
the minds of most trade unionists, collective bargaining. If the role of ACAS is to act in 
furthering industrial relations, of which ‘collectivism’ is fundamental, one must ask how 
can it be disassociated from having a role to support collective bargaining? Even in its 
much ‘diluted’ form, as an objective collective bargaining is nonetheless ‘there’, and if 
not a stated requirement upon ACAS, it is a fundamental provision within the ERA 1999 
TULR(C )A, and has not by some ‘political pronouncement’ been removed from the 
minds of trade unionists. Therefore if ACAS is to have a meaningful role (as it did under 
the ERA1975 Sectionl 1) it must be one that unequivocally supports the stated objectives 
of the law.
157 Marsh A (1982) .Employee Relations Policy and Decision Making. 1982, Gower Publishing Company 
Ltd. pp 23 figure 2.9
158 Waddington. J. (2003) Trade Union Organisation in Edwards. P. (ed) Industrial Relations Theory and 
Practice. Second Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, pp 219-222
159 S. 1(2) Employment Protection Act 1975
160 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 S. 209
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The Withdrawal from ‘Collectivism’ the Impact of Law, Industrial and Cultural 
Change.
3.45. The period 1980 to 1999 was predominately a time when trade unions lost 
membership, industrial power and influence. The government over this period took 
carefully measured legislative steps to control and effectively undermine trade union 
power161. Trade unions were seen as an effective countervailing influence to the 
deregulation and economic policies of the government, therefore must be ‘neutered’ 
Coates (1994)162, and effectively they were, Metcalfe (1989)163 appears to view this 
development as one of the instruments of turning round the economy. The outlawing of 
the closed shop164 and of union labour only contract compliance165, also the removal of 
Fair Wages Resolution which as Deakin and Morris note “was the first step towards 
encouraging union membership in the private sector”166. The ultimate aim stated by the 
Government to be the outlawing of discrimination against employers who did not 
employ trade union labour as identified by Evans and Lewis (1988)167and Lewis and 
Simpson (1982).168 In truth, they were all aimed at the single objective of removing 
legislative underpinning for trade union activities. Reinforcing these anti collectivist 
developments was the removal of immunities when taking industrial action to enforce or 
protect against de-recognition. Generally, the greater legal control on the use of the 
strike weapon, and picketing169, effectively removed the ability of trade unions to protect 
themselves or their members. Each legislative step being taken in a continuum to that 
objective (see Appendix H).
3.46. The law as it became framed created a labyrinthine threatening legal culture for 
trade unions, to the extent that the most serious inhibitions were created for trade unions 
and employees using the ultimate sanction available to them. A situation which despite
161 The Employment Act 1982 reversed the liability of unions in tort to where it had been pre 1906
162 Coates, D.(1994) The Question o f UK Decline. The Economy. State an Society. Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
Hemel Hempstead, 1994. pp 121-123.
163 Metcalfe, D. (1989) Water Notes Dry Up: The Impact o f the Donovan Reform Proposals and 
Thatcherism At Work On Labour Productivity in British Manufacturing Industry. British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 1989, Vol.27, iv Summary and Conclusions, pp27.
164 TULR(C )A 1992 S.220, also Department of Trade and Industry Code of Practice on Picketing,
Supported by cases such as Young, James and Webster v UK [1981] IRLR 408, ECHR.
165 Employment Act 1982 S.12(l) which became Section 144 -145 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992. The Local Government Act 1988 S. 17 was also introduced to ‘bolster’ these 
employment laws.
166 Deakin and Morris, (1998) Labour Law Second Edition. Butterworths 1998, London, Chpt 7, pp 692 
final para.
167 Evans and Lewis, (1988) Labour Clauses: from Voluntarism to Regulation (1988) 17ILJ 209.
168 Lewis and Simpson ,(1982) Disorsanisins Industrial Relations (1982) 11 ILJ 227
169 The Code of Practice on Picketing first introduced under the Employment Act 1980 and revised in 1992.
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the ERA 1999, remains largely unchanged today.170 The affect of the governments 
legislative programme during the 1980’s, Brown (1992)171 on the whole concept of 
freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively and particularly by its actions 
in the GCHQ dispute172 ‘underwrites’ the anti trade union nature of this period in UK 
industrial relations history.
3.47. However, the ‘collectivist model’, if it did not thrive, lived on mainly because 
many employers continued to see in it, as Painter et al (1998)173 say:
“a disciplined framework within which corporate management could work”. 
Government antipathy towards trade unions, and the restructuring of much of UK 
industry, appear to be two developments which contributed much to reverse the fortunes 
of the trade union movement. However, Basset and Cave (1993)174defined the problem 
of trade union decline during the 1980’s as:
“Quite simply a collapse in the demand for the core product that unions offered to their 
twin markets (employees and employers) - collectivism enshrined most obviously in 
collective bargaining”.
Such a view of the malaise facing trade unions and their decline is I believe far too 
simplistic, to be accepted. Whilst trade unions were unable to hold on to their members, 
many were able to hold on to recognition (though collective bargaining did decline) 
during this period of industrial change Cully et al (1999) (WERS). Perhaps this fact is 
an indication of some truth in what Basset and Cave say. Certainly their view of the 
demise of trade unions was not the first time it had been expressed. Flanders (1970)175 
cites Galbraith as saying that:
“unions in the future would have a drastically reduced function in the industrial system, 
and will retreat more or less permanently into the shadows ”.
3.48. However, if the decline of collectivism was not due to antipathetic laws, it was 
most certainly not predominately because unions were ‘past their sell by. Perhaps more 
credibly, industrial structural change and a range of other macro economic factors have
170 see - London Transport & others v Rail Maritime and Transport Union [2001] All Eng QB, a case 
involving failure by the RMT to correctly advise the employer of appropriate details o f those of its members 
involved in a strike as required by, TULR(C)A 12992, S 234A, and the DFEE Code of Practice on Strike 
Ballots (currently in consultation for a revised version to have regard for the ERA 1999).
171 See: Brown, W .(1992) Bargaining Structures and th impact o f the Law. Legal Intervention in Industrial 
Relations Gains and Losses. McCarthy, W. Lord (Ed), Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, pp302-304
172 The government banned trade unions at GCHQ in contravention of not only international conventions but 
the provisions of its own laws. Note: see Deakin and Morris (2001) p 682
173 Painter, R.W. and Puttick, K. with Holmes, A. (1998) Employment Rights a Reference Handbook 
Second Edition. 1998, Pluto Press, London, Chpt 19, pp315.
174 Basset P. and Cave A. (1993) All for One. The Future o f Trade Unions. 1993, Fabian Society, London
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generated union decline, not the least of which is the advance of technology, and 
changing global markets Hughes (1986)176 Gospel (1992)177. Location has increasingly 
become less of a consideration for communications and information therefore, 
companies have increasingly relocated their operations and service functions to 
developing economies, usually low wage/low cost centres. Underpinning these changes 
has been the progressive relaxation of exchange controls and these developments affects 
upon the need to be efficient and competitive to operate in global markets. The practices 
of the past, when governments provided protections and subsidies to industries that were 
large employers progressively ceased. In many instances compelling them to become 
leaner, more flexible in their ability to respond to market changes more efficient and 
profitable or cease operation, Dex and McCulloch (1997),.
3.49. Added to these changes were the restructuring of core industries that had 
been centres of union strength for generations, the challenges of union law, and 
new approaches to employee relations and human resource management. 
Manufacturing diminished in size as a part of the overall economy and, the 
numbers employed at establishments significantly reduced. Public sector 
industries such as coal, gas and electricity were de-nationalised, deregulated, 
broken up and sold. Each of these industrial sectors had been the bedrock of trade 
union membership in both manual and staff occupations. The new owners of 
these industries and the new structures that emerged for the new businesses, 
proved not to be either sympathetic or conducive to trade union organisation. 
However, Willman (2005) takes a position which tends to take the debate about 
the future of trade unions beyond the arguments of both Galbraith and Basset and 
Cave, and many of their contemporaries, saying:
“  the state o f  the union sector in the UK itself inhibits its recovery. The pattern o f  
births and deaths, the predominant structural form adopted by the principal 
incumbents, and the role o f  unions in influencing behaviour in establishments are 
linked into a pattern o f retrenchment which implies that revitalisation -  which I  
operationalise here to mean substantially improved membership performance -  is
175 Flanders. A. (1970) Management and Unions. Faber and Faber, (1970) pp 37-47
176 Hughes. J 'De-industrialisation Gathers pace: the 1970s'. in D. Coates and J. Hillard (eds.), The 
Economic Decline o f Modern Britain. 1986.
177 Gospel, H. (1992) Markets. Firms, and the Management o f Labour in Modern Britain. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press (1992)
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highly unlikely. Exogenous factors such as sectoral shifts in employment and 
changes in government policy have rightly been accorded causal primacy in the 
explanation o f  union decline. I  argue that the response to these exogenous shocks 
has in practice rendered the causes o f continued decline endogenous”.
He goes on to say:
“the current organisational form o f UK trade unionism at sector, union and 
establishment level is inimical to union revitalisation and thus that the current state o f 
the union movement in the UK has itself become problematic. Put another way, unions in 
decline have made endogenous some o f the motors for further decline and this may in 
part explain their inability to take advantage o f ostensibly more advantageous conditions 
for imion growth which emerged in the late 1990’s. ”
Industrial Restructuring, Deregulation and Membership Decline
3.50. The restructuring of the nationalised industries, the use of ‘outsourcing’ of public 
sector services and ‘hiving off5 of functions, the development of new management 
structures (Executive Agencies), also the introduction of internal markets, the 
introduction of compulsory competitive tendering all quickly depleted trade union 
strength. This restructuring also caused hundreds of thousands of redundancies, many 
trade unionists, who found employment in notoriously difficult to organise service 
industries and the emerging technology industries, servicing the new product markets, 
were lost as members Waddington (2003)178. Added to these developments was that the 
emerging ‘new industries’ in micro electronics and computers and services, began to 
create a generation of ‘new’ highly skilled jobs, requiring employees in scarce supply 
with highly sought after ‘portable skills’. Many were employed in difficult to organise, 
small closely managed groups. A different world to that envisaged by leading trade- 
unionists in the 1950s and 1960s, who believed that the future of the movement was 
assured by the transference of trade union development into these types of industries and 
new technology and skills.
3.51. However, Millward et al (2000)179 in their analysis of the Cully et al (WERS) 
(1998) illustrate that during the early part of the 1980’s180 the presence of trade unions 
generally “at workplace level remained stable”. They go on to illustrate that such
178 Waddington, J. (2003) pp 218-219
179 Millward, N. Bryson, A. & Forth, J. (2000) All Change at Work? British Employee Relations 1980- 
1998 as portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey series. 2000. Routlege, London, pp 84-85,
180 Prior to the Employment Act 1982 and the Employment Act 1988 taking effect on items such as union 
membership agreements.
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stability rapidly deteriorated during the period from 1984 to 1998181, no doubt 
accelerated by the attack on the closed shop and the loss of representation through 
depleting shop steward and workplace representatives Cully et al (WERS) (1998). 
Millward also says that, the aggregate fall in union presence during 1990 to 1998 arose 
wholly because of the lesser penetration of workplaces that joined the population when 
compared with those that left it, stating that there was a union presence in 59per cent of 
workplaces that left the population in this period whilst a presence was achieved of only 
42per cent, in those joining the population. The fall in trade union presence over the 
whole period from 1980 to 1998 for all workplaces was from 65per cent to 36per cent 
Millward et al (2000)182, (table 4.2). Certainly it would appear that one of the significant 
problems for trade union organisation has been the increasing number of ‘start up’ and 
small businesses coming into the economy most of which have been relatively small in 
terms of the numbers employed. Again utilising the research and data of the WERS 
(1998), Millward et al (2000) illustrate (table 4.2), that the fall in trade union presence in 
companies employing 25-49 was an annual average of 3.7per centl984 to 1990 and 
4.0per centl990 to 1998. In the corresponding periods for workplaces employing 500 or 
more the figures were 2.9per cent. The overall fall showed in the smaller workplaces 
during the whole period 1980 to 1998 it was from a 47per cent presence to 23per cent 
and for the larger workplaces from 78per cent to 48per cent.
3.52. The decline in trade union presence, measured in terms of the number of members 
is clearly a significant factor in the whole problem of the decline of collectivism. 
However, Millward et al (2000)183 says that there was, in their research, no significant 
indication that de-recognition was a major cause of this decline, an opinion with which 
Kelly (1990)184 and Wrigley (1997 and 2002) agree. Their research showed de­
recognition occurred across most industries, however, they found few cases in banking, 
finance and business services sector and hardly any in energy, water supply or transport 
and communications. Also they found no cases of complete de-recognition amongst 
newly privatised companies within their survey, and that de-recognition appeared not to 
be associated with change of ownership.
181 See footnote reference to Millward et al. Smith and Thomas (1996) Industrial Law. Sixth Edition. 
Butterworths, London, 1996, pp 516.
182 Millward, Bryson, & Forth,, (2000) All Change at Work? British Employee Relations 1980-1998 as 
portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey series. 2000. Routlege, London, pp 87-88.
183 Millward, Bryson, & Forth,. (2000), pp 105.
184 Kelly.(1990) British Trade Unionism 1979-89 Change. Continuity and Contradictions. Work, 
Employment and society, 1990, May, Special Issue, pp41.
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3.53. Three reasons for de-recognition were, however, given by managers surveyed by 
Cully et al 1998 (WERS), these were:
a) changes in management policies which accounted for half the responses of 
managers;
b) decline in trade union membership which, accounted for a third of managers 
responses; and finally,
c) the lack of trade union activity.
Millward et al (2000) go on to say that:
“their results, on balance, were split roughly equally between those managers who saw 
de-recognition as arising from decline in employees interest in union representation and 
those who saw it as the outcome o f a change in management policy”.
It would appear therefore that there is some further authoritative support for the view 
expressed by Basset and Cave mentioned earlier. Or is it more likely that trade union 
inability to defend its infrastructure giving rise to ‘weakness’ that was more likely the 
real cause of most decline. Much of what Millward argues about the impact of de­
recognition is at variance with what the Trade Union Congress have to say on the matter 
over the same period of time185. The TUC in the April 1998 Survey said there was:
“a marked fall in the number o f de-recognitions, from their high point in the late 
1980 ’s186 and early 1990’s ”187.
The survey also illustrates188 that over the period from the first half of 1996 to the first 
half of 1998 the number of de-recognition’s which were being reported had fallen to only 
8per cent of TUC affiliates (representing some 90per cent of all TUC membership) 
surveyed. Certainly de-recognition, if it was not the primary cause of trade union 
decline, throughout the period from 1979, it was a significant contributory factor. Also as 
Painter et al (1998)189 say, the prerequisites for maintaining the ‘collectivist model’ were 
either lacking or had been removed. Each of the foregoing factors underline the opinions 
put forward by Galbraith (1970)190 and Willman (2005).
3.54. The TUC took a more optimistic view of developments post 1999, which as history 
has shown was unfounded in its Survey of February 1999 the TUC said:
185 Trade Union Congress, Focus on Recognition, April 1998, February 1999, January 2000, TUC, London.
186 Deakin and Morris (1998) Labour Law Second Edition. Butterworths 1998, London, Chpt 1, pp 47,
say: “Apart from some cause celebres withdrawal o f collective bargaining rights was rare throughout the
1980’s ”
187 Trade Union Congress, Focus on Recognition, April 1998, pp 2.
188 Trade Union Congress, Focus on Recognition, April 1998, pp 10.
189 Painter, Puttick, and HoImes,(1998) Employment Rights a Reference Handbook Second Edition. 1998, 
Pluto Press, London, Chpt 19, pp 315-316.
190 Galbraith in - Flanders. (1970) Management and Unions. Faber and Faber, London, 1970
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“The single most likely influence on getting recognition is Employment Relations 
legislation191, according to two thirds o f those responding. Many employers see the new 
legislation as inevitable and some want to reach agreement before it is enacted”192, and 
goes on to say: “New recognition deals cover over 63,500193 workers. Almost a third o f 
unions (29per cent) reported achieving recognition deals in the time period. Eight in ten 
o f these new deals are for full recognition ”.
The data and commentary contained in these TUC Surveys projected a ‘buoyant’ note 
about trade union membership development and recognition. However, when measured 
against the losses of membership (circa 4.5 Million members) and lost recognition 
sustained throughout the period of the 1980’s into 1990’s it represented very small 
progress, particularly when one considers that the TUC when it refered to figures of 
those covered by the new recognition is talking in terms of “workers covered” not 
‘members recruited’.
The Impact of Human Resource Management - Unitarism -v- Pluralism
3.55. There can be little doubt that the human resource management style that emerged 
during the 1980’s and 1990’s194, and the increasing use of individual contracts and a 
move away from collectivism by many substantial employers did have an affect upon the 
employees perception of trade unions and their ability to ‘protect’ their interest. The era 
of human resource management whilst not bom out of the opportunities which the 
political, legal, industrial and economic change process produced, certainly gave an 
opportunity to employers to exploit its development Brown et al (1997)195 also Dickens 
and Hall (1995)196, Ezzamel et al (1996). Where it was used as a feature of company 
policies designed to either resist or diminish trade union influence, it was without doubt 
effective. Armstrong (1995)197 says:
“There are two basic views expressed about the basis o f the relationship between 
management and trade unions in particular or employees in general”.
191 Evidence that shows, that underpinning law and its affect upon the industrial culture is ‘the’ determinant 
of whether the ‘collectivist model’ flourishes or wilts.
192 Trade Union Congress. Focus on Recognition. February 1999, pp 2.
193 A figure o f21,366 workers is reported in the TUC Survey o f January 2000 and a figure of 70,000 in the 
TUC Survey of April 1998.
194 The earliest authoritative explanation of the technique, in the UK, appears in: Guest, D (19871. ‘Human 
Resource Management and Industrial Relations ’ , Journal of Management Studies, 1987, 24(5) pp 503-521.
195 Brown et al (1997) pp 69-83
196 Dickens and Hall (\995)Labour Law and Industrial Relations: A New Settlement, in Edwards, P. (ed) 
Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice in Britain. Oxford, Blackwell
197 Armstrong, M. A (1995) Handbook of Personnel Management Practice. Fifth Edition, 1995, Kogan 
Page, London, pp 700.
Note: Armstrong. M. A., is cited primarily because he is one of the principal advisers to the Chartered 
Institute o f Personnel Development (CIPD) on the design and development of Human Resource 
Management. Consequently, his research and publications have been instrumental in shaping the policies of 
one of the most influential management bodies engaged in employee relations within the UK
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Armstrong goes on to define these two views as, “the unitary view ” and “the pluralist 
view ”. Of the former he says: “This unitary view, which is essentially autocratic and 
authoritarian, has sometimes been expressed in agreements as ‘management’s right to 
manage’. The philosophy of HRM with its emphasis on commitment and mutuality is 
essentially based on the unitary perspective.”
3.56. Of the pluralism view Armstrong cites Cave (1994)198, Clegg (1976)1" , Drucker 
(1951)200, and Fox (1966)201, to illustrate that this view of an industrial organisation and 
relations between its management, trade unions, and employees is one in which, the 
operation its management and control, is achieved by multi-faceted relationships, not 
solely the perceived rights of one grouping. Clegg’s view is cited as:
“an opposition that does not seek to govern ” and Cave’s view as:
“a balance o f power between two organised interests and a sufficient degree o f trust 
within the relationship (usually) for each to respect the other’s legitimate and on 
occasions separate interests, and for both sides to refrain from pushing their interests 
separately to the point where it becomes impossible to keep the show on the road”.
3.57. The ‘unitary view’ of industrial organisation has been unacceptable to trade unions 
throughout their history, and when analysed in detail from a historical perspective it must 
be viewed as the absolute antithesis of collectivism. Armstrong’s argument that some 
unions have accepted, “management’s right to manage”, in collective agreements 
(usually recognition agreements) such acceptance, at its strongest, was only a ‘tacit’ 
acknowledgement that someone has to undertake the day to day business decisions, 
however, beyond that the ‘pluralist view’ had effect.
3.58. One must also have regard for the fact that recognition is little more than the fact 
that enables a union to effectively exercise its role on behalf of its members. The act of 
entering a recognition agreement does not, unless facets of the agreement make it so, 
make a trade union a hostage of management, by for example entering into ‘no strike 
deals’. However, as Cave implies, pluralism is only likely to hold where the show stays 
on the road. It is a fact that relations all too frequently have ‘gone off the road’, and it is 
the business consequences that have driven many employers to seek a process of
198 Cave A. (1994) Organisational Change in the Workplace. 1994, Kogan Page.
199 Clegg H. (1976) The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain. Blackwell, 1976, Oxford.
200 Drucker P. (1951) The New Society. Heineman, 1951, London
201 Fox A. 119661 Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations. Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers Associations Research Paper No 3, HMSO, 1966, London.
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management which might give them the ‘managerial prerogative’ implicit within the 
‘unitary view’ and yet retain some semblance of ‘pluralism’, and the retention of a 
representative mechanism for statutory compliance purposes. Human resource 
management appears to have been adopted as ‘the process’ by which to achieve these 
ends. Armstrong appears to agree with this analysis202”
3.59. Armstrong sets out the ‘prescriptive model’ for the HRM philosophy203. However, 
referring to HRM practices as an alternative to collective bargaining204, he goes on to 
argue205 that it is much more likely that those employers who have made the greatest use 
of HRM practices are those which recognise trade unions and cites Millward (2000)206as 
a source for support for this view. Armstrong also says (p716) that:
“Briefing groups, the method o f communication which showed the fastest increase over 
the period 1984 to 1990 were much more common in the union sector but were hardly 
used at all in the non-union sector”, and goes on to say (p717) that:
“The conclusion from the Millward survey is that there is no correlation between human 
resource management and anti-unionism ”
However, Gennard and Kelly (1995) produce evidence about management opinion on 
the value of HRM, which in some significant respects is at variance with what Millward 
et al have to say on the subject. Ackers et al (1996)207 are relatively uncompromising in 
their view of what HRM is all about, saying:
“At best the new management thinking simply ignores the role o f unions in its search for  
other ways o f winning their consent. ”
3.60. John Monks208 is cited as authority for the view of HRM which tends to give it a 
‘clean bill of health’ when he said: “the more anti-union the employer, the less likely it is 
that HRM techniques will be used”. However, given that the most pronounced growth 
in the use of HRM has been within foreign owned companies, particularly American and
202 Armstrong’s statement regarding derecognition in favour of HRM appears to be at variance with the 
results of the WERS (1998). It should be noted that Armstrong is writing in 1995 about ‘ the current 
emphasis about Partnership’ some two years prior to the ERA 1999.
203 Armstrong, M. (1995) A Handbook o f Personnel Management Practice. Fifth Edition. 1995, Kogan 
Page, London, pp716.
204 Armstrong, M (1995) pp707.
205 Armstrong, M.(1995) pp716-717.
206 Milward N. Stevens M. Smart D. and Hawes W.R.(19920 Workplace Industrial Relations in 
Transition. 1992, Dartmouth Publishing, Hampshire.
207 Ackers. P. Smith. C, and Smith.P. (1995) Asainst all Odds? British Trade Unions in the New 
Workplace, in The New Workplace and Trade Unionism. Ackers, P. Smith,C and Smith P. (eds) 
Routledge,London, pp 1 - 41
208 Monks J. (1994)77ze Union Response to HRM: Fraud or Opportunity? Personnel Management, 
September 1994 pp42-47.
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Japanese Guest (1991)209, Millward and Gennard and Kelly, provide some grounds for 
arguing that what John Monks believed to be the case is misconceived 210. However, 
Purcell(2000)211 gives strong support for the system arguing that HRM is not too far 
away from the mission statement of ACAS itself. Storey212, however, takes the view 
that HRM in the 1990’s was being used as a means of making collective bargaining 
almost irrelevant. A view which is contrary to the findings of the WERS(1999)213. 
However, Storey (2001)214 appears less sanguine about the extent of the use of HRM 
based upon his subsequent research. Foreign owned employers have tended to be 
amongst those who most rigorously resisted recognition and collective bargaining, and 
have tended to be amongst those employers who have been most innovative in 
introducing ‘new approaches’215. Also ‘personal contracts’ introducing what has become 
known as ‘risk pay’, income subject to the attainment of targeted performance levels of 
individuals and company, profit related and profit linked pay, share schemes etc. All of 
these innovations providing employees with ‘flexible’ remuneration and benefit 
packages, as part of the ‘performance (HRM) culture’, approaches to terms and 
conditions of employment which makes collective bargaining a virtual impossibility. 
The preponderant tendency has been for the philosophy (in the authors experience) to be 
used by employers as one of the instruments by which to bypass collectivism and, 
‘wean’ employees away from it, rather than produce worthwhile performance results, 
which it clearly could, if it resulted in more effective management. Colling (2003)216 
tends to agree with this view in his analysis of how employers are managing without 
unions. However, Nolan and O’Donnel (2003)217 in their conclusions about HRM’s 
usage and value are sceptical as to its future role. Perhaps to put HRM within its correct 
context it is best regarded as a convenient label for a variable process, for managing 
employees that can be designed and developed in an employer specific format. Colling
209 Guest, D.E.(1991) ‘Personnel Management: The End o f O r th o d o x y British Journal o f Industrial 
Relations 1991,29,2, pp 149-175
210 Millward, N. Bryson, A & Forth, J.(2000) All Change at Work Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
J980-1998. Routledge, 2000, London, pp54.
211 Purcell. J (20001 Employment Relations in Britain, 25 years of the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service. edited by Brian Towers & William Brown, Chpt 7, pp 178 second para.
212 Storey, J.(19920 Development in the Management o f Human Resources. Blackwell, Oxford, 1992. pp5
213 Cully et al (1999) (WERS) p 295
214 Storey (2001) p 364
215 The Japanese approach o f ‘Sunrise Agreements’ based on single union recognition and binding pendulum 
arbitration (no strikes) is one example of such innovations. See: Lewis, R (19901. Strike Free Deals and 
Pendulum Arbitration ’ British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1990, Vol.28:l.
216 Colling. T. (2003) Managing Without Unions in Edwards, P. (ed) Industrial Relations Theory and 
Practice (Second Edition), Blackwell, Oxford. Chapter 14.
217 Nolan, P. and O’Donnel, K. (2003) Industrial Relations. HRM and Performance. pp 508-509, in 
Edwards, P. (ed) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice (Second Edition), Blackwell, Oxford.
(2003)218 provides corroborative evidence for this view, particularly when HRM is 
utilised to further the development of ‘individualism’ and commitment to company 
objectives.
Labour Returns to Government 1997 - Collectivism a new Approach.
3.61. As discussed earlier the TULR(C)A Schedule Al now provides an opportunity for 
trade unions to secure recognition through two new statutory means, the automatic219 and 
balloting220 routes. There is of course the ‘voluntary route’, preferred by the TUC and 
CBI221. The Right to recognition is the ‘positive limb’ of Schedule Al, its provisions on 
de-recognition222 is the ‘negative limb’. Just as the process for gaining recognition is 
complex223 equally so is the process224 for de-recognition. The right of an employer to 
seek de-recognition is subject to two conditions:
a) there needs to have been an average of fewer than 21 workers225 for a period of at 
least 13 weeks; and,
b) the 13 week period must not have ended before the relevant date226;
the Act sets out the main procedures227 by which, an employer may bring statutory 
recognition to an end. There is within Schedule Al provision for employees to bring 
statutory recognition to an end228. There is, as yet, little case law by which to judge how 
effective the laws on recognition and de-recognition will be in the longer term. 
However, the fact that the law provides complex procedures by which to gain and end 
recognition, and allows for employers to contest recognition claims, as well as allowing 
a trade union to contest applications by employers and employees for de-recognition 
provides a scenario in which, the operation of these facets of law could yet prove very 
tortuous.
218 Colling. T. (2003) Managing without unions: the sources and limitations o f individualism Chapter 14 in 
Edwards, P. (ed) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice (Second Edition), Blackwell, Oxford.
219 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 Schedule A l para 22(2), however, para 
22(3) requires the CAC to hold a ballot even if there is majority trade union membership. See IDS 
Employment Law Handbook, Trade Unions, Incomes Data Services, London, December 2000, pp 114-115
220 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 Schedule A, para 22(3). see IDS 
Employment Law Handbook, Trade Unions, Incomes Data Services, London, December 2000, ppl 16 -118.
221 Statutory trade union recognition Joint statement by TUC and CBI, paragraph 3. “Resolving disputes 
through conciliation”
222 TULR(C)A 1992 Schedule A l, Part IV paras 99-103, establish the right of an employer to bring an award 
of statutory recognition to an end.
223 IDS Trade Unions Employment Law Handbook, Incomes Data Services, December 2000, London ppl79, 
Figure 1.
224 EDS Trade Unions Employment Law Handbook, Incomes Data Services, December 2000, London ppl82, 
Figure 4.
225 Schedule A l S.7(l)(a)(b) require 21 workers to be employed for an application for recognition to be 
‘valid’, the TUC is complains that this level of worker excludes more than 5 million workers form the right 
to claim recognition for their unions, see - People Management, Gregor Gall, TUC censures firms that use 
recognition loophole, 8th February 2001, pp.7.
226 Relevant date is ‘the date of expiry o f three years from the date of a CAC award of recognition’.
227 TULR(C)A 1992 Schedule A l, Part IV paras 104-111 and 117-121
228 TULR(C)A 1992 Schedule A l, Part IV paras 112-121
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1971 and 1999 ‘alternative unionism’ re-visited.
3.62. There have been some early signs those problems, which beset the CIR and the 
NIRC under the IRA 1971 are re-emerging. Staff associations, encouraged and supported 
by employers as a preferred alternative to recognising established unions, are showing 
signs of emerging as they did postl971. What became known as ‘sweetheart deals’, 
recognising unions prepared to enter ‘no strike agreements229’ and generally representing 
a ‘soft option’ when it comes to change management etc, caused serious problems for 
TUC unions. Where such sweetheart deals do not satisfy employees, if recognition is 
statutoiy, they can at least now use the de-recognition procedures of Schedule A l.
3.63. Trade unions making claims for recognition under Schedule Al have encountered 
rejection of their claims because some other union (registered but of doubtful 
independence and non-TUC affiliated) has previously been accorded recognition by an 
employer230. A formal challenge has not arisen from an employer about CAC awards of 
recognition, but it certainly appears that there is a growing resistance, certainly to the 
granting of automatic recognition. The emergence of these types of cases will need the 
most careful handling by the CAC if the process for achieving recognition is not to be 
seen as suspect by TUC unions, or if the CAC was to err consistently towards TUC 
unions, be seen as prejudiced by employers and staff associations. The matter of 
‘independence’ is as Deakin and Morris231say: “a crucial one in terms o f in the context 
o f freedom o f association They go on to support this contention by citing the 
provisions of ILO Convention No 98 (Article 2). The TULR(C)A, S 5(1) states there are 
two tests o f ‘independence’:
a) Not under the domination or control of an employer, and
b) not liable to interference by an employer (arising out of the provisions of financial 
or material support or by any other means) tending towards such control.
3.64. Whereas one of the tests applied by the CAC under TULR(C)A continues to be 
registration232, one other is also that a trade union should be independent for the purposes 
of being awarded recognition by the CAC, as provided by TULR(C)A Schedule Al para
229 TULR(C)A 1992 S.180(1), See EOS Employment Law Handbook, Series 2 No 12 Trade Unions, Incomes 
Data Services, pp 245-246
230 Prison Officers Association and Securicor Custodial Services Ltd; IDS Brief Employment Law and 
Practice 670, October 2000, pp 9.
231 Deakin, S. and Morris, G.S. Labour Law Second Edition. Butterworths 1998, London, pp 707.
232 The Certification Officer (CO) has the responsibility for determining whether a trade union may be 
entered on the register as independent. In arriving at a decision a number of criteria are applied to establish 
compliance with TULR(C)A S5(l). These criteria are contained in the pamphlet published by the CO 
‘Guidance for Trade Unions Wishing to apply for a Certificate of Independence’.
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35(1) and 35(4). In a recent case, Bach and Winchester (2003)233 the CAC was satisfied 
that the Securicor Custodial Services Staff Association (SCSSA) (a registered trade 
union) with a pre-existing agreement with the employer involved in the case satisfied the 
requirements of para 35(1) and 35(4).
3.65. It appears, however, that there was substantial evidence for the contention by the 
Prison Officers Association (POA) that the SCSSA is not ‘independent234’, but was in 
fact an initiative by employees actively supported by the employer in opposition to the 
POA attempts to organise the employers staff and gain recognition. Given that the POA 
had been campaigning for recognition by the employer for some time, and that the Staff 
Association had only been recognised by the employer as of the 14th June 2000 (some 
eight days after the appropriate recognition provisions of the new laws came into effect), 
the scenario is to say the least ‘dubious’. Furthermore, as reported in People 
Management235, the SCSSA appears to have had less support amongst the employees, 
given the membership level of the POA, the SCSSA appears to have less than 50% 
membership. The facts, at the time would therefore appear to support the contention of 
the POA. Notwithstanding that both the employer and SCSSA appear to have been able 
to convince the CAC that collective bargaining had been conducted continuously for the 
preceding three years, there appears substantial grounds for scepticism about this case.
3.66. There can be little doubt that a TUC union would not hesitate to defend pre­
existing recognition, albeit based upon a minority of membership, if a threat to its status 
occurred as a result of a staff association being formed to claim recognition from the 
employer based upon it having a larger membership than the TUC union. Perhaps 
therefore, certainly for the longer term development of these aspects of the recognition 
laws, the approach taken by the CAC may be ‘politically’ sound. The problem for ‘bona 
fide’236 trade unions is that there was no really effective means of challenging the 
Certification Officers (CO) decisions about registration and therefore the independence
233 Bach.S., and Winchester. D, (2003) The Historic Evolution o f British Industrial Relations. p 289, in 
Edwards. P., (ed) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice (Second Edition) Blackwell, Oxford.
234 A leading case on the issue of whether a union is dominated by the employer is that o f Blue Circle Staff 
Association v Certification Officer 1977 ICR 224 in which the EAT held that the Certification Officer was 
right to look beyond the form of the unions constitution and consider the reality o f the situation. On the 
issue of interference Squibb UK Staff Association v Certification Officer 1997 ICR 235, is the leading case - 
see IDS Employment Law Handbook, Series 2 No 12 Trade Unions, Incomes Data Services Ltd, April 1997, 
London, pl2. See also: Smith and Thomas, (2000) Industrial Law, Sixth Edition. Butterworths, London, 
1996. pp 42-43
235 People Management, Legal Analysis, CIPD, 26th October 2000
236 1 define the term ‘bona fide’ as trade unions which, are not solely registered but also affiliated to the TUC 
and, can demonstrate independence through having their own premises and full-time officials paid for by the 
membership and, not directly financially supported by the employer.
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or otherwise of a union which may be ‘blocking’ what they may consider is a more 
legitimate claim for recognition by an employer. Rival unions could make 
representations to the CO, however, there is no legal process by which the CO’s decision 
could be overturned237. A trade union could of course ask the CO to reconsider the 
whole matter of the registration of a trade union at some later date and request that the 
Certificate of Independence be withdrawn. Perhaps ACAS will develop a more 
pragmatic approach to the consideration of independence than has been evidenced so far. 
Given the de-recognition procedures of TULR(C)A, it is not beyond the wit of trade 
union members to contest the ‘bona fide's’ of a ‘sweetheart’ deal.
Partnership Agreements the ‘new’ Recognition and Collectivism.
3.67. Partnership Agreements have mushroomed notwithstanding they were never seen 
as a part of the recognition process under the Schedule A l238. They appear to owe more 
to the policy239 and initiatives of the TUC than any provision in the ERA 1999240. Based 
upon personal experience, gained from advising a number of employers and trade unions 
in the development of partnership agreements, in the period of 1996 to 2000, employers 
have been anxious to reach voluntary agreements many under the ‘partnership’ banner 
rather than face claims for recognition under the TULR(C)A. Many of the agreements 
are seen as answers to long outstanding claims for recognition and in consequence, 
because some do not include collective bargaining, they may yet prove not to be the 
answer which unions wanted, however, they at the very least assure a trade union 
presence with representation and consultation rights, whereas the alternative is to have 
no rights unless they can be gained through statutory process. Gall and Rana (2000)241 
also Gall (2002) say that of the 748 recognition deals on their database only some 150 
describe themselves as ‘Partnership Agreements’. However, they say that whilst few of 
the partnership agreements comply with the TUC model, most deals are effectively 
standard recognition agreements covering rights of information, consultation, 
representation and negotiation.
3.68. Partnership Agreements as a basis of achieving, in some cases ‘sustaining’ trade 
union membership and recognition, (Toray and Zurich also Sainsbury and Computer
237 See - General and Municipal Workers Union v Certification Officer and anor 1977, ICR 183, EAT.
238 They are not a recent phenomenon however, in 1992 Toray Textiles Ltd, a Japanese textile company 
which took over part of Courtaulds and in 1994 Zurich Insurance Company pic which took over IMI both 
concluded ‘partnership agreements’ with MSF under the guidance of the author in both cases in 
circumstances where collectivism was demising, and union recognition was collapsing.
239 Monks, J. (1999) Partners for Progress New Unionism in the Workplace. TUC
240 ERA 1999 s. 30(1)(2) gives the Secretary of State powers to make available funds to support partnership 
initiatives
241 Gall and Rana, (2000) ‘In Place o f Strife \  People Management 14th September 2000, CIPD, pp 29
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Science Corporation (CSC) are examples) are serving a valuable purpose. On the one 
hand they are seen by both employers and trade unions as the means of establishing a 
working relationship (tentative in some cases) for developing stronger arrangements in 
the future. Also employers, given the requirements of the law on the provision of 
information and consultation with representatives of employees242 wrought by the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice and, in particular the requirements of the ERA 
1999243, appear increasingly to have been prepared to accept there may be a ‘role’ for 
‘collectivism’. Partnership Agreements may be the convenient foundation upon which to 
construct arrangements that satisfy the need to cover statutory exposure and evade the 
rigors of collective bargaining. There are also ‘partnership agreements’ where there is 
not only no provision for collective bargaining or at best only to a limited extent, but also 
where trade union representatives may have to share their role with representatives of 
non-trade unionists. Gall and Rana have identified such ‘partnership agreements’ within 
their database of 748 ‘deals’. The Computer Science Company (CSC)244 Partnership 
Agreement is very close to this type of ‘deal’, and is similar to a number in which the 
author has been personally involved in advising on the design and general negotiating 
strategy to both employers and trade unions. However, the CSC Partnership Agreement 
is very detailed and may be regarded as one of that small number of agreements which as 
Sisson and Marginson (2003)245 say “reflectpartnership in any exact sense ”
Partnership at Computer Science Company (CSC)
3.69. An interesting case of partnership serving the interests of the employer whilst 
helping the survival of a union within a company is that of Computer Science Company 
Ltd (CSC) and MSF. This partnership agreement was concluded in September 2000 
(Appendix E ) and represents a ‘rebirth’ of opportunity for MSF246 within a major 
employer in a market sector where few unions have succeeded. For CSC there is a 
significant ‘marketing’ advantage over its competitors. CSC can show to prospective 
clients, wishing to out-source computer services, its capability to manage employees 
who come from a trade union culture. CSC is an example of those ‘new companies’ 
within the business services sector which, “joined the population ” Millward (2000) (p 
87 table 4.2) in which trade unions have had little success in penetrating. The aggregate 
union membership for this sector, shown by Millward, dropped from 36per cent to 15per
242 Commission o f the European Communities v United Kingdom 1994, ICR 664 - TULR(C) Act 1992, S 
188 - Health and Safety at Work Act 1974
243 Employee Relations Act 1999 Section 10,2(a)
244 see Appendix E
245 Sisson. K. and Marginson. P. (2003) Management: Systems, structure and Strategy. in 
Industrial Relations, Theory and Practice . Edwards, P. (ed) Blackwell, Oxford, p 173
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cent over the period of 1980 to 1998. Much of CSC’s growth as a company, over this 
same period, has been primarily through the acquisition of out-sourced services from ex­
public sector undertakings, for example British Aerospace, British Airways, British 
Telecom, Hospital Trusts and many more. An analysis of CSC shows that its growth 
has emanated from the structural and technology which have taken place within the 
British economy, the very events which have contributed to the demise of trade union 
organisation, Ackers et al (1995). From a position where in the 1960s and 1970’s staff 
trade unionism and power had grown rapidly, within the British Aircraft Corporation, 
Hawker Siddley, and other companies which, came together to form British Aerospace, 
during the 1980’s and 1990’s that trade union organisation had dwindled dramatically, 
leaving only MSF with any significant membership in the sectors of these companies 
acquired by CSC. The data247 contained in the Agreement, illustrates how low MSF 
membership levels, within the IT functions of the companies concerned, transferred to 
CSC, had declined.
3.70. Given this level of membership, CSC would certainly have argued that any claim 
for statutory recognition must regard the bargaining unit, (‘compatible with effective 
management248’) as the appropriate grades of employee across CSC UK, it was unlikely 
that MSF could claim statutory recognition in the short term. Without this new 
agreement MSF’s membership and influence within CSC would have continued to 
decline, possibly to a point where the union would have been de-recognised for 
collective bargaining in the few local operations where it had managed to hang on to 
membership.
3.71. Why then did CSC take the initiative? The facts are that, CSC changed its business 
operations and re-structured to become a general service provider to the client companies 
it acquired, instead of continuing to provide a dedicated service to specific client 
companies. It wished to maximise the degree of flexibility of employees across its 
operation by setting up service groups that would provide a specific service input 
(payroll, management accounting, software systems design, etc) to any acquired 
company function, instead of providing general services on a dedicated individual 
acquired company basis. Therefore, CSC effectively destroyed the ‘bargaining unit’
246 An excellent example of a trade union ‘packaging’ its services as a ‘good’ which, provides benefits to its 
membership, and potential members and the employer in its market place.
247 See Appendix E l to the CSC Partnership Agreement ‘Framework for Representation’
248 TULR(C)A 1992 Sch A l para 19(2)(3)(4): see IDS Employment Law Handbook, Series 2 No 12 Trade 
Unions, Incomes Data Services pp 111-112.
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basis by which local management, of acquired business functions, could continue to 
manage industrial relations. This inevitably meant ending all forms of local recognition, 
and collective agreements, which had come across to CSC through its various business 
transfers under TUPE 1981. CSC realised that MSF was the only union, which may 
claim recognition under the provisions of Schedule Al. Consequently, wishing to avoid 
a future battle with MSF, and the affect this would have upon client confidence, also 
wanting to end the acquired collective bargaining rights249operating at various locations 
CSC decided to put in place a new ‘national framework’ for industrial relations policies, 
which would help the company in future business acquisitions. Because most of its 
growth is by acquisition of out-sourced business, involving TUPE, CSC saw the clear 
advantages of having representative structures in place, which facilitated the statutory 
consultation and communication needs of such situations.
3.72. In return for a ‘new order’ CSC offered MSF a ‘new deal’ in the form of a 
Partnership Agreement which:
a) gave MSF sole recognition rights;
b) extended contribution deduction at source for all MSF membership on a 
national basis;
c) removed existing local level recognition and collective bargaining; and,
d) put in place a national representation agreement and structure of union 
representatives;
e) provided for a National Forum to be established which gave rights to 
information and consultation at national level;
f) placed MSF in a strong position to be the ‘employee’ lead in the 
development of Works Council Machinery250.
The CSC agreement contain provisions that illustrate the changes that have taken place 
in UK industrial relations observed by the 1998 WERS over its series of researches, 
outsourcing of ex public sector services, decaying union membership and structures, 
management moving to new methods of communicating and managing its employees. 
At CSC the catalyst which assisted the union to develop a new relationship was the need 
for management to address its needs. CSC, was in the business of acquiring new business 
through Transfers of Undertakings, primarily from the public sector, which being still 
heavily unionised in many areas was sensitive to the need to manage issues under TUPE 
1981 correctly and without offending relations with their recognised unions. To be
249 Appendix E 2 CSC Partnership Agreement, Section 4 sets out the basis o f recognition.
250 Appendix E: Para 5 - 5.1; SOLE RECOGNITION STATUS (asterixed footnote)
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attractive to transferee organisations CSC needed to have in place a sound industrial 
relations structure which could be used in the Transfer consultative process of TUPE 
1981251, and through which it could manage and control the absorption of transferred 
union membership and substantive terms of employment enshrined within collective 
agreements. The significance of this Pamership Agreement is not simply that it 
‘rescued’ MSF from terminal decline within CSC, but that it enshrined each of the 
principles of the TUC criteria on such agreements. Furthermore, it recognises the right 
of MSF to be actively involved in the integration of new employee acquisitions and 
recruit new members. Fundamentally, the agreement recognises and formalises the role 
of union representatives. Finally, the agreement provides a process for MSF 
participation in the introduction of a Works Council modelled along EU Regulation 
requirements.
Recognition Driven by the Need to be ‘compliant’
3.73. Whilst the need to be ‘statutorily compliant’ was certainly not the sole reason for 
CSC agreeing to a Partnership Agreement, there is in the underlying reasons of both 
employers some support for the opinion expressed by Gall and Rana252 when they say 
that the growth in Partnership Agreements and new recognition deals:
“is more than just the product o f the ERA. The Labour Government has helped to 
engender a climate in which many employers are less inclined to behave unilaterally, 
and this has legitimised a union role in organisations253 ”
3.74. ACAS certainly takes the view that the climate engendered by the ERA 1999 is one 
in which it will be much more productive for trade unions to take a very proactive 
posture in seeking recognition agreements through voluntary routes rather than legal 
compulsion. At the TUC Congress on 11 September 2000, Speaking at a ‘fringe 
meeting’, entitled “The end o f industrial relations as we knew it? Derek Evans, Chief 
Conciliator at ACAS, said:
“Growing ACAS involvement in these cases reflects the desire among unions and 
employers to see recognition issues resolved amicably and on a voluntary basis. Our 
extensive experience in resolving disputes, together with our expertise in building 
harmonious relationships in the workplace, means we can play a vital role in helping
251 Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment Regulations 1981
252 Gregor Gall and Rana.(20001 ‘In Place o f Strife’. People Management 14th September 2000, CIPD, 
pp28-29.
253 However, the perceived need for ‘compliance’ is not just with the ERA and Schedule A lit is about 
compliance with the whole infrastructure of responsibilities to inform and consult etc, much of which is 
derived from EU laws, put in place during an era when many employers were set on a completely different 
course to recognising unions.
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bring about voluntary agreements. Our assistance helps build firm foundations for 
fruitful and co-operative relationships. ”
3.75. As is discussed earlier, there was over the period 1997-99, prior to the ERA 1999 
coming into effect, the tendency for employers who were faced with the imminence of a 
claim under the emerging legislation to concede recognition rather than be pressured into 
the ‘maws’ of the new recognition procedures. The table at Appendix F taken from an 
article by Gall and McKay254 illustrates this trend. The data tends to underline what Gall 
and Rana say about “engendering a climate”, certainly the run up to the ERA 1999 
seems to have persuaded some employers to ‘jump before they were pushed’255.
3.76. The data produced by the CAC256 of cases brought under the recognition 
procedures during 2000 were few. In the first year of the Acts operation there appeared 
to be only 11 cases under the provisions of, Parti of Schedule Al TULR(C)A. However, 
over the period to January 2001 there was a three fold increase in the number of 
applications which at this date stood at 36257. However, this was still a relatively low 
level of applications which, would appear to give added credibility to the arguments of 
Gall and Rana and support their data showing a high level of recognition/partnership 
type agreements being concluded ‘privately’ in preference to pursuing the statutory 
route.
3.77. However, as is argued earlier, employers and trade unions may become 
disillusioned with Partnership Agreements as the ‘benefits’ which they hoped for 
become illusory and such agreements, which were hurriedly put together, may yet find 
their way into the formal recognition process of the CAC, as claims for statutory 
recognition. Even in such cases the advantage may be, for the union certainly, that a 
‘Partnership Agreement’ may have helped to raise its profile and membership and thus 
place it in a better position to succeed should the ‘voluntary agreement’ fail resulting in
254 Gall. G. and McKay. S.(2000) Trade Union Recognition in Britain: the dawn of a new eraP.
Department of Management and Organisation, University of Stirling, Labour Research Department, London, 
2000.
255 This appears to be confirmed by the experience of ACAS over this period when they state in a press 
release (ACAS Web-Site December 2000) “The prospect o f a statutory right to trade union recognition has 
led to a leap in voluntary recognition cases being handled by ACAS, according to the latest figures. In the 
year to August 2000, ACAS was asked to assist in 260 recognition disputes, double the number on average 
during the 1990s”. The press release gives a table of recognition disputes dealt with by ACAS as September 
1997 - August 1998 =156 September 1998 - August 1999 =185 September 1999 - August 2000 = 263
256 Data extracted from CAC web site as at October 2000.
257 Appendix F -  Source Gall, and McKay (2000) Trade Union Recognition in Britain: the dawn o f a new 
eral  Department of Management and Organisation, University of Stirling, Labour Research Department, 
London, 2000. Also: Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) Annual Reports 1999-2002
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a claim for statutory recognition. Partnership may at the veiy least become one of the 
processes in the prelude to a ‘new collectivism’.
3.78. The UK has never had laws giving the ‘automatic right’258 to recognition for either 
individual representation259 or collective bargaining. Ewing says the ERA 1999 slO 
(1)(2)(3) is not likely to be “used as a surrogate collective bargaining device ”260. 
Given it is unlikely to be seen as a means of effecting collective representation this 
opinion may be correct. In fact, there appears to be some initial doubt as to whether the 
‘representation’ provisions of the ERA could be evaded if an employer had no 
appropriate procedures. This opinion loses sight of the provisions of the ERA 1996261, 
also the provisions of the ACAS Code262. Even under the ‘old’ Code of Practice263, 
whilst it was not legally binding Tribunals would have regard for its provisions when 
deciding whether an employer acted reasonably in dismissing an employee264, or whether 
an employee had been given a proper hearing, part of which may be effective 
representation265. Based upon case law, all employees have an implied term in their 
contracts that the employer must deal reasonably with grievances266. Furthermore the 
‘new’ law assists a union in demonstrating its value to potential members, without the 
immediate provision of collective rights. The ERA 1999 slO (1)(2)(3), whilst it may not 
be a ‘surrogate for collective bargaining’ it may yet prove to be a form of ‘surrogate 
recognition’ which aids unions to persuade employers of the need for agreed procedures, 
leading ultimately to collective bargaining. If its value is this ‘underpinning’ of 
‘collectivism’ most trade unions will welcome its contribution. Whilst it may never be a 
‘surrogate’ for collective bargaining, this provision of the ERA is valuable because it is 
another clear indication of ‘public policy’ and the direction which the law intends 
recognition should proceed.
3.79. As employers moved towards Human Resource Management as ‘tools’ by which to 
improve employee control and management, the trend to ‘individual contract terms’
258 Except in the circumstances as now provided by Part I of Schedule A1 of the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULR(C)A), as inserted by Section 1 of the Employment Relations Act 
1999.
259 Individual representation can now be given effect by the provisions of the ERA 1999 slO (1) to (6) which 
give the right to an employee to be accompanied by a ‘trade union official’ under ss (3) (a) and (b). 
However, unlikely to be of value in non disciplinary issues.
260 Ewing. Freedom of Association and the Employment Relations Act 1999. Industrial Law Journal, Volume 
28, pp289
261 Employment Rights Act 1996 S.3, requires employers with 20 or more employees to identify procedures 
for dealing with disciplinary or grievance matters.
262 The Employment Code of Practice (Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures) Order 2000 (SI No.2247).
263 ACAS, Code of Practice Nol Disciplinary Practice and Procedures in Employment
264 Lock v Cardiff Railway Co Ltd [1998] IRLR 358
265 McLaren v National Coal Board [1998] IRLR 215
266 W A Goold (Pearmark) Ltd v McConnell and onother [1995] IRLR 516
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accelerated. This has been particularly so where trade unions and collective bargaining 
had decayed and/or where antipathy towards collectivism has taken hold as the ‘new 
culture’. The use o f ‘personal contracts’ and flexible remuneration and benefit systems, 
has been seen to be an effective way of avoiding the rigors of collective agreements and, 
as discussed elsewhere, have been used to reduce the influence of trade unions and 
ultimately undermine their ability to organise and service their members. However, it 
can be argued Dex and McCulloch (1997) also Gospel (1992), that a more flexible 
labour market was necessary in order to give effect to the many organisational changes 
which were essential for the British economy to respond to its changed position in global 
markets. This was particularly so given the rapidly increasing ‘internationalisation’ of 
British industry and commerce, Millward et al (2000)267.
3.80. The “omission” anomaly which so attracted their Lordships in Wilson268 and 
Palmer269 was intended to be corrected by TURERA s i3, which was introduced as an 
amendment to the Act by somewhat peculiar procedures270, so. intent was the 
Government that the trend away from ‘collectivism’ would not be reversed. However, 
the provisions of TULR(C)A271 were significantly ‘diluted’ by this amendment and in 
my opinion the law (post ERA 1999272) still tends to favour the employer because, it 
continues the possibility for discrimination against workers on trade union grounds, a 
view supported by Ewing (1999)273 and the Labour Research Department274, where the
•  •  275employer’s objective may be to undermine, or to destroy, collective bargaining .
267 Millward et al (2000) pp 32 - 34
268 Wilson v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1995] IRLR 258 HL, [1993] IRLR 336 CA and [1992] 440.
269Palmerv Associated British Ports [1995] IRLR 258 HL, [1993] IRLR 336 CA and (1993] IRLR 63.
270 Thomas .(1994) The Trade Union Acts 1992 and 1993 - Text and Commentary. Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 1994. Part 11,19/13 ppl9-13 in General Note.
271 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 19992 sl46 and 148
272 Section 2 and Schedule 2 ERA attempt to correct Wilson and Palmer. In summary the words "action short 
of dismissal" are replaced by "subjected to any detriment as an individual by any act, or any deliberate 
failure to act.". This means that deliberate withholding of a pay increase from union members would qualify 
as a "detriment" leading to a right to complaint. There is now a complex relationship between the right to 
negotiate terms and conditions of employment, and the right of employers and individual employees to fix 
their own terms. This is affected by the Employment Relations Act 1999 s 17, which gives the Secretary of 
State power to make regulations to protect workers from unfair actions. However, payment o f higher wages 
or other monetary benefits, will not be unfair to those not benefiting, provided that there is no inhibition "in 
the contract of employment" of the better paid worker which inhibits membership of a trade union, and the 
benefits "reasonably relate" to services provided by the worker under the contract.
273 Ewing (1999) Freedom of Association and the Employment Relations Act 1999. Industrial Relations Law 
Journal, Vol. 28, N04, December 1999. pp 288
274 The Employment Relations Act 1999 - a suide for trade unionists. Labour Research Department, 
November 1999, London pp28-29.
275 Auerbach (1993) Trade Union Rishts. Derecosntion and Personal Contracts. Fighting Tactics and the 
Law. Institute of Employment Rights, London, 1993, pp34 - 43; The Wilson and Palmer amendment to 
TULR(C) A 1992 actually went further in that it eroded the judgements in Discount Tobacco & 
Confectionery v Armitage [1990] 15 and Ridgway and Fairbrother v National Coal Board [1987] 80 CA 
and [1986] 379
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Therefore, the supremacy of the contract of employment276 over any collective 
agreement277 generated by recognition (the absence of inderogability as Professor Lord 
Wedderbum278calls it) is preserved279 so that the imposition of collective terms may be
undermined by individual contractual variations which may be of a discriminatory
, 280 nature .
Is there a ‘new’ definition of recognition?
3.81. Deakin S. and Morris G. S281, about trade union recognition say:
“I f  an employer elects to ‘recognise' an independent trade union, important legal 
consequences follow282,\
They define trade union recognition as provided by the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992283, s 178(3) (TULRCA) and define collective 
bargaining as provided by TULRCA, s 178(1)(2) 284. Deakin and Morris base their 
definition upon the law as it was at the time of their writing, and about which there was a 
considerable amount of case law which extended the definition of what is and is not
276 The fact that the CAC has imposed a method does not affect the rights of individual workers 
undereither statute or their contracts o f employment. For example, it does not prevent or limit the 
rights of individual workers to discuss, negotiate or agree with their employer terms of their 
contract of employment, which differ from the terms of any collective agreement into which the 
employer and the union may enter
277 See, Neal, (1988) The Collective Agreement as a Public Law Instrument, UK Law in the 
1980 ’.v.fBanankas, (ed)) 1988 pp211-222
278 Wedderburn and Sciarra, ( 1988) Collective Bargaining as Agreement and as Law: Neo-Contractualist 
and Neo-Corporative Tendencies o f our Age, in Pizoruss, (Ed) Law in the Making. 1988, especially at
pp 187-196; also,
Wedderburn, (1992) Inderosabilitv. Collective Agreements and Community Law. 1992,21ILJ pp.245; 
also,
Wedderburti, (1995) Companies and Employees. and Collective Bargaining at European Level: the 
Inderosabilitv Problem, in Wedderburn Labour Law and Freedom. 1995 at pp.85-6 and pp 212-236; and, 
Wedderburn, Labour Law and the Individual in Post-Industrial Societies. in Wedderburn et al. Labour 
Law in the Post-Industrial Era. 1994.
279 The White Paper “Fairness at Work” (Cmnd. 3968 of 1998), at para, viii of Annex said: “Under the 
existing law an employer and employee can agree different terms if they wish. Since the current law allows 
and works
well, the Government sees no reason to change it.”
280Trade Union Recognition (Method of Collective Bargaining) Order 2000, allows employers and 
employees to enter contracts at variance with the terms laid down in collective agreements
281 Deakin, and Morris (T998). Labour Law Second Edition. Butterworths 1998, London,
,Chpt 7.5.3, pp 707 -709
282 Statutory rights were invariably dependent upon a trade union being recognised for collective bargaining 
(TULR( C)A s i78), until the changes in the law wrought by the decisions of EU Court.
283 TULRCA has of course now been amended to give effect to Schedule A l of the Employment Relations 
Act 1999 which makes detailed new provisions on the whole issue of trade union recognition and collective 
bargaining.
284 Smith and Thomas (1996) Industrial Law. Sixth Edition. Butterworths, London, 1996. pp 45 say: “The 
lack of a written recognition agreement will not be conclusive, for recognition may be implied if it exists in 
practice”, and cite Joshua Wilson & Bros Ltd v USDAW\\91% ICR 614,[1978] IRLR 120. Also NUGSAT v 
Albury Bros Ltd [1979JICR 84, [1978 IRLR 503; USDAWv Sketchley Ltd [1981] ICR 644, [1981] IRLR 
291; as being instructive in the matter of case law in the definition of recognition. Deakin and Morris 
(1998) agree with this opinion at Chpt 9.2.1, pp 760-764.
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‘recognition’285. TULR(C)A Schedule Al now provides mechanisms by which trade 
unions may gain recognition, and collective bargaining, however, the legal consequences 
of recognising a union are basically the same. However, the recognition machinery 
eschews the familiar remedy of a collective arbitral award in favour of the legalistic 
measure of specific performance286 which, may be effective in enforcing no strike 
clauses but may be useless in enforcing a duty to bargain in good faith. However, the 
courts will doubtless determine the meaning of specific performance as it relates to 
collective bargaining under Schedule Al. Even where the CAC makes an award under 
Schedule Al enforcing collective bargaining, such an award may be varied by the parties 
to it as we discuss elsewhere. What is apparent is that collective bargaining, under the 
regime of Schedule Al, is not more ‘precisely defined’ in terms of what may or may not 
feature as subject matter for negotiation under any agreed collective bargaining 
machinery. A situation which ‘fits’ well with the partnership philosophy and, will do 
little to disturb the industrial relations culture which has emerged from the past eighteen 
years.. In effect it would appear, but for the question of ‘specific performance’, there is 
little difference between where we are now on the matter of what constitutes collective 
bargaining and therefore recognition, and what has developed by statute and case law. 
Given the changes which have taken place in the determination of the prime terms and 
conditions of employment and the presence (or lack of it) of collective bargaining on 
such items a flexible approach on the matter of just what constitutes collective 
bargaining is to be encouraged. The answer to the question “is there a ‘new’ definition 
of recognition?”, is basically no.
3.82. Deakin and Morris287 make the point that recognition for ‘collective bargaining 
purposes’ is a relatively loose definition when they say:
“The phrase ‘to any extent’ in the definition o f 'recognition' means that it is sufficient 
that the employer negotiates with a imion on any one o f these matters for the union to be 
recognised within the meaning o f the statute288....”.
285 For additional case law on the matter of ‘recognition’ see: IDS Employment Law Supplement 75, 
Information and Consultation Rights, Incomes Data Services Ltd, London, April 1996 75.2, pp 2-6: TGWU 
v Courtenham Products Ltd 1997 IRLR 8, IT .; Makro Self Service Wholesalers Ltd v JJSDA W EAT 828/93; 
AEUWv Sefton Engineering Co Ltd 1976, IRLR, 318, IT: NUTGWv Charles Ingram & Co Ltd 1997, ICR, 
530; TGWU \  Dyer 1977, IRLR 93, EAT; ASTMS v Gliksten Doors Ltd COYI104/161; E Peart & Co Ltd v 
TASS Craft Section, EAT 581/87.
286 The bargaining method imposed by the CAC has effect as if it were a legally binding contract between 
the employer and the union(s). If one party believes the other is failing to respect the method, the first party 
may apply to the court for an order of specific performance, ordering the other party to comply with the 
method.
287 Deakin and Morris(1998). Labour Law Second Edition. Butterworths 1998, London, pp 708.
288 TULRCA, s 178(2).
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Recognition ‘for collective bargaining purposes’ was until 1995 of great importance to a 
trade union to effectively represent the interests of its members289. Up to that date the 
provision of employee rights to consultation in redundancy and transfer situations was 
confined to representatives of independent ‘recognised’ trade unions, as were many other 
Statutory Rights.
3.83. TULR(C)A Schedule Al attempts to give contemporary definition to what is meant 
by recognition and collective bargaining. What is achieved, as we have just discussed in 
the preceding paragraph, is little different to the ‘historic’ definition of recognition (see 
Smith and Thomas290) “partial recognition” will be sufficient to satisfy the term “to any 
extent” when claiming statutory rights, except disclosure of information291. Collective 
bargaining therefore continues to be defined in a form, not requiring all of its elements to 
be agreed, in order that recognition is an established fact. This reflects the realities of 
current management policies and practice in determining terms and conditions of 
employment, the ERA in Schedule Al, para3 sub para (2) (3) and (4) set out this 
‘limited’ form of collective bargaining. Sub-para (4) says:
(4) “If the parties agree matters as the subject of collective bargaining, references to 
collective bargaining are to negotiations relating to the agreed matters; and this is the 
case whether the agreement is made before or after the time when the CAC issues a 
declaration, or the parties agree, that the union is (or unions are) entitled to conduct 
collective bargaining on behalf of a unit.”
3.84. What the law now appears to say about recognition is that, it does not require the 
fact of collective bargaining on all of the primary terms and conditions of employment, 
in order that it is recognition for all purposes within the law. To the contrary, the ‘new
289 The 1995 Amendment Regulations. After the case o f European Communities v United Kingdom [1994] 
IRLR 392 and 412, the Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1995 (SI 1995 No 2587) came into force in respect of transfers of undertakings 
(and collective redundancies) taking effect on or after 1 March 1996. They were designed to remove the 
anomaly in UK law, both in relation to TUPE and collective redundancies, that consultation need only be 
with representatives of independent recognised trade unions. The duty to inform and consult now arises 
regardless of whether the employer recognises a union.
The handling of collective redundancies was governed by sections 99 - 107 of the EPA 1975, which was 
enacted to give effect to Council Directive 75/192/EEC. These provisions are still relevant to situations not 
covered by TUPE but are now incorporated into Chapter II, sections 188- 198 of TULRCA 1992. As 
mentioned above collective redundancy situations no longer rely upon a trade union being recognised in 
order that an employer has the requirement to consult and provide information to representatives of 
employees.
290 Smith and Thomas, (1996) Industrial Law. Sixth Edition. Butterworths, London, 1996 . pp46
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definition’ given to recognition may mean, whatever the parties to the recognition 
agreement have agreed it should292, and for all purposes within the law that will 
suffice293. However, in practical terms, against the background of what Deakin and 
Morris say (see above) about TULRCA 178(2), there is little difference in the definition 
as it stood under the law prior to the ERA and Schedule A l. Even in circumstances 
where an employer may fail to come to an agreement about procedures through which to 
conduct collective bargaining, whilst the new laws provide294 for a means by which an 
award of the CAC that collective bargaining should be agreed, may be given effect. 
However, here again, given the only recent emergence of these ‘subtleties’ as to what is 
really meant by collective bargaining, the future of collectivism appears confirmed to be 
something quite different to its historic (non-statutory) meaning. The question which 
remains is how will the CAC and the courts view applications for disclosure on matters 
for which a union may not have collective bargaining rights?
The Growth of ‘New Recognition’
3.85. There is no doubt that the number of new recognition deals is growing. However, 
the rate at which this is likely to take place in future is unclear. There are no accurate 
statistics to illustrate how many campaigns for recognition are taking place under the 
new laws. In the short to medium the likelihood for recognition and membership to grow 
looks relatively poor. This may be particularly true of the level of trade union 
membership, as the new agreements appear to cover relatively low numbers of members 
as a percentage of total employees. If such agreements produce platforms for further 
recruitment, then membership growth and density may begin to develop.
3.86. What is not clear at this stage is whether the scale of the ‘rush’ to sign voluntary 
deals up to the end of 2000 will be matched by a similar number of employers wishing to 
sign voluntary deals if threatened with the new laws, in the future. Here there is an 
analogy with the rush (in the UK) to sign up to voluntary Works Council Agreements 
prior to 22nd September1996295, which quickly ‘ran out of steam’. Given the benefit of 
that analogy it may be reasonable to presume that some of the easiest deals have already
291 TULR(C)A s 181: i? v CAC, ex parte BTP Tioxide Ltd [1981] ICR 843, QBD [1982] IRLR 60: see also 
Information and Consultation Rights, Employment Law Supplement 75, Incomes Data Services Ltd,
London, 1996, 75.3.1 pp 7 -13.
292 As is the case within many of the partnership agreements, where they provide for collective bargaining, 
discussed elsewhere.
293 SI 2000/1300, Trade Union Recognition (Method of Collective Bargaining) Order 2000
294Under para 168(1) of Schedule Al of TULR(C)A 1992 the Secretary of State, after consulting 
the ACAS, may by order specify for the purposes of paragraphs 31(3) and 63(2) of Schedule A l a 
method by which collective bargaining might be conducted. With effect from 6th June 2000, the 
Trade Union Recognition (Method of Collective Bargaining) Order 2000 came into operation.
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been signed. Perhaps this development is what is driving the ‘infill’ membership drive 
and recognition claims being brought before the CAC under the ERA 1999. Employers 
yet to be faced with claims may not have previously been approached or, more likely are 
those employers who are known, by their track record, to be antipathetic towards any 
form of recognition, and whom trade unions recognise as ‘harder nuts to crack’. But 
some employers attitudes to union recognition may also depend on other issues, like 
whether collectivism has some benefit to them culturally or commercially296. However, 
as with all new approaches there is a ‘learning curve’, even for those who have the 
advantage of experience in previous industrial relations cultures. The first attempts at 
getting the best value from recognition may not be a completely satisfying experience for 
all parties.
The Future for the ‘New Recognition’
3.87. There are some signs that the early partnership agreements have inadequacies, or 
that one or both parties are not satisfied with having taken the approach in that it has not 
delivered all it promised297. Whilst there are many critics of the new approach to 
industrial relations brought about by the ERA and in particular the Partnership 
Agreement approach, there are many who see its provisions as a ‘positive’ development, 
some might say a ‘just in time’ development. Certainly without the new laws trade 
union membership and industrial relations may have continued its decline. John 
Edmonds, General Secretary of the GMB said that298:
“The industrial relations climate is now altogether more positive for trade unions than 
at any time in the last 20 years. There is no doubt that a real sense o f partnership is 
beginning to emerge. Employers are increasingly recognising the value o f establishing 
effective working relationships with trade unions. ”
John Edmonds is also credited with saying299:
"Since the election o f a Labour Government the industrial pendulum is definitely starting 
to swing back [towards us]. ... During the Thatcher era we would have been lucky to 
sign more than two or three deals a year. In the last twelve months w e’ve negotiated 
more than 100."
Whether what John Edmonds and his contemporaries said about the trend on recognition 
meant, there was generally a more favourable attitude from many employers, one can
295 Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 Article 13 Agreements in Force.
296 As in the case of the agreement between Computer Science Corporation and MSF, see discussion of the 
agreement earlier.
297 MSF and Legal and General undertook their first joint review o f their Partnership Agreement signed in 
1997, which had shown a tendency to be failing to deliver expectations o f both parties in a number of areas - 
People Management 14th September 2000.
298 ‘Independent on Sunday’ 13th June 1999
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only speculate. However, given what the Prime Minister had to say about employment 
law within the UK it is extremely doubtful that the government has any intention, or that 
the statutory mechanisms, have any serious possibility of returning trade union strength 
(political power and militancy) to its level of the 1970s. Millward et al300 believe it to 
be:
“inconceivable that the procedures, however widely and vigorously used, will lead to the 
restoration o f collective bargaining to the extent that existed in 1980”.
However, others (Gall et al) appear to believe that the key to the possibility of any large- 
scale increase in trade union power and influence over time is that, it is not likely to be 
through the direct impact of how many workers are brought under union recognition by 
CAC rulings, but through the demonstrative and punitive effect of CAC case law and 
through union threats to take recalcitrant employers through the statutory route leading to 
a continuation of the trend in voluntary deals. Presuming of course that sufficient 
employees join unions to enable claims to be made to employers. Also assuming that the 
‘consensus’ in, industry, politics and the public continues to support the new laws.
3.88 Gall and McKay (2000)301 also believe that there are other forces which impacted 
upon employers attitudes towards recognition saying:
“Finally many non-union employers are reducing their opposition to recognition as a 
result o f the growing juridification...( ‘statutorily compliant’ as argued earlier)... o f 
employee relations, in part, through the implementation o f European Union Directives 
into national law. This is because recognised unions are regarded as helpful in dealing 
with the more complex situation employers find themselves in. ”.
Quoted earlier, the law has “legitimised a union role in organisations ”. In each strand 
of thought the promotion of ‘partnership’ by trade unions has played some part in 
lessening their image as ‘being stuck in the class war rhetoric of the 1970s’, which in 
itself contributes to the ‘swinging back of the pendulum’ to greater acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the ‘collectivist model’ in a sound employee relations culture.
3.89. Turning to the intimately related issue of union membership, Baine and Price 
(1983)302 say increases in overall union membership may help also increase union 
recognition and vice versa:
299 GMB Press Release 13th September 1999
300 Millward, Stevens and Forth. (2000) All Change at Work? British Employment Relations 1980-1998. 
Routledge, London
301 Gall and McKay,(2000) Trade Union Recognition in Britain the Dawn of a New Eral  Labour Research 
Department, 2000, London.
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“the greater degree o f union recognition the more likely workers are to join unions and 
remain in them. Union recognition and union growth are mutually dependent... because 
the degree to which employers are prepared to recognise unions is at least partly 
dependent upon their membership strength. Hence union recognition and union growth 
combine together in a virtuous circle o f cause and effect”.
These reinforcing effects are discussed in detail in subsequent chapters of the thesis.
3.90. The increases in overall union membership (for 1998 and 1999) and the predictions 
by the TUC303of an addition of one million new members over the subsequent five year 
provided some basis for believing that this virtuous circle can be created as depicted by 
Cully et al (1999)(WERS)304. The growth of new union recognition agreements from 
1995 to the end of 2000 Painter et al (1998)305 may warrant a ‘revision’ to Bain and 
Price’s argument concerning the relationship between trade union recruitment, 
recognition and sustain membership growth
302 Bain, and Price, (1983Y Union Growth: Dimensions. Determinants, and Destiny’ in Bain, G.S. (edj. 
Industrial Relations in Britain. 1983, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp3-33.
303 The Guardian 14 September 1999. Note: As at end 2002 three years in to the five year period Monk’s 
used for his prediction of membership growth, aggregate union density had barely increased.
304 Cully, Woodland, O’Reilly, and Dix. (1999) Britain at Work as depicted by the 1998 Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey. Routledge, London, pp 235
305 Painter, Puttick and Holmes, (1998) Employment Rights a Reference Handbook Second Editionl99S, 
Pluto Press, London; pp 314, second para.
305 Bain G.S. (1967) pl4, Table 9
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CHAPTER TWO
4. Changing Composition of Employment, Demographics and The Changes 
Impacting upon Organising Strategies
4.1.Chapter Two analyses the changes in employment which have taken place over the 
past twenty plus years, and the manner in which they have impacted upon trade unions. 
It reviews the historic evidence, which shows that trade union industrial densities have 
been changing over a much longer period than since 1979, Bain (1967)306. It analyses the 
way in which some unions, particularly non-TUC unions, and unions in the public sector 
have not declined at the same rate as TUC and primarily private sector unions. It 
undertakes an analysis of the changes that have developed in the age and gender 
composition of trade union membership, seeking to identify whether such changes are 
portents of a ‘step decline’ in membership brought about by ‘aged’ membership loss and 
the failure to recruit at lower age groups. On the other hand, whether much of the decline 
in young members may be the result of industrial change, and changes in the UK 
educational system. In addition, whether the gender profile of unions is primarily a 
feature of increased part-time working dominated by female employees. On the other 
hand, whether the growth is mainly due to the growth in the service industries and white- 
collar employment. Alternatively, whether recruitment amongst female employees is 
‘localised’ to a few unions principally within the public sector and distributive trades. 
The analysis utilises data taken from the Labour Force Survey series 2002 and 
Certification Officer Annual Reports for the period 1979 to 2002, the WERS (WIRS) 
Survey 1999, also data taken from the TUC Organisation and Membership Department 
records.
4.2. The analysis of non-TUC unions during the period of the 1980-90’s in holding on to 
their membership and in many cases growing whilst most TUC unions were declining 
shows that this ‘success’ owes much to the nature of the employment in which many of 
the non-TUC unions were engaged. In particular, white-collar members in Banking and 
Finance (which eventually faced the same problems of decline as manufacturing), health 
services, which were mainly public sectors of employment. Also professional grades 
attracted to union membership as a form of ‘protectionism’ for profession qualifications, 
also the considerable professional benefits not easily sourced through ‘private providers’,
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and which their unions ‘bulk purchase’ such as professional indemnity insurance in the 
medical professions.
4.3. The Chapter also develops evidence, to illustrate the manner in which, 
throughout the period from the 1950’s, unions increasingly became reliant upon 
compulsory membership and the employers subsidy as ‘props’ to their growth 
and development Cully et al (1999)(WERS)307. It also reviews the extent to which 
unions have been utilising the new recognition procedures of the Employment 
Relations Act 1999 is explored. The data published by both ACAS and the CAC 
(discussed later) indicates that a considerable amount of this activity has been 
focused upon ‘in-fill’ rather than ‘expansionist recruitment’, through claims for 
recognition within the traditional or ‘core’ membership areas, rather than the new 
industries and services sector.
4.4. The analysis of membership recruitment and retention utilises a paradigm that 
focuses upon the processes of ‘achieved growth’ and ‘received growth’. The chosen 
model is similar to that constructed by Bain and Price (1980) to illustrate growth and 
decline in union membership, which illustrates the two processes of, the ‘virtuous cycle’ 
and the ‘vicious cycle’. The model approaches its explanation initial in an historic 
context (pre 1980). It shows growth, first developing because of ‘initiated organising 
(recruiting) activity’ by a union. Secondly by ‘received growth’, that is growth which 
occurs or results from developments consequent upon ‘initiated organising activity’ that 
is, growth that develops because of recognition being agreed and facilities for union 
activities being agreed, leading to the conclusion of a ‘union membership agreement’.
4.5. The analysis in this chapter is ‘overarching’ with Chapters One, Three and Four and 
is particularly so with Chapter Three on union finance. The nature of this 
‘interrelationship’ is defined through the model (see Figure 11 in Chapter Four) 
derived from an approach which appears to have been first devised by Berkowitz (1954) 
and reproduced in Willman et al (1993). This model develops a theoretic explanation, 
which adds to the model of union growth provided by the model mentioned at para 4 
above. It illustrates theoretically the cost structure of recruitment in a ‘green-field’ 
situation as it might have applied pre 1979. Illustrating the manner in which the 
employer subsidy and ultimately the closed shop (union membership agreement)
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developed and made a significant contribution to financing trade union growth and 
stability. The model used in the thesis is based upon the Berkowitz paradigm but utilises 
a different approach in illustrating the analysis and argument, which it is believed, 
represents a more thorough explanation.
4.6. A comparative analysis of the data is undertaken, to show the way in which TUC 
affiliated unions were more seriously affected by some aspects of the changes in 
industrial structure and law than was the case for non-TUC unions. In particular, analysis 
will be undertaken of the affects of the legislation of 1980-1982-1990, which was the 
sequence of legislation outlawing the closed shop, which appears to have had a 
disproportionate affect upon TUC unions. For example, the final outlawing of the closed 
shop308 and of union labour only contract compliance309, also the removal of the Fair 
Wages Resolution which as Deakin and Morris (2001) note: “was the first step towards 
encouraging non-union membership in the private sector”. The significance of the laws 
banning the closed shop is illustrated later in this chapter when operation the ‘virtuous 
cycle’ and ‘vicious cycle’ in the process of union development and decline are explained. 
The ultimate aim often stated by the Government to be the outlawing of discrimination 
against employers who did not employ trade union labour as identified by Lewis and 
Simpson (1982) also Evans and Lewis (1988). These laws, as they became framed, 
created a labyrinthine threatening legal culture for trade unions, to the extent that serious 
inhibitions were created for trade unions and their members contemplating using the 
ultimate sanctions available to them. However, in many respects, despite the 
Employment Relations Act 1999 (ERA 1999) and the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992, (TULRCA (1992) as amended by Schedule A l, as will be 
discussed later, the situation remains largely unchanged today310.
The ‘cocktail of change causing union decline.
4.7. The ‘collectivist model’, if it did not thrive, lived on particularly within the public 
sector, and larger businesses within the private sector, confirmed by much of what is said
307 Cully et al (1999)(WERS) p 89.
308 TULR(C )A 1992 S.220, also Department o f Trade and Industry Code o f Practice on Picketing,
Supported by cases such as Young, James and Webster v UK [1981] IRLR 408, ECHR.
309 Employment Act 1982 S.12(l) which became Section 144 -145 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992. The Local Government Act 1988 S. 17 was also introduced to ‘bolster’ these 
employment laws.
310 see - statement made by the PM Tony Blair see also - London Transport & others v Rail Maritime and 
Transport Union [2001] All Eng QB, a case involving failure by the RMT to correctly advise the employer 
of appropriate details of those of its members involved in a strike as required by, TULR(C)A 1992, S 234A, 
and the DFEE Code of Practice on Strike Ballots (The Code is currently, as at 2002, in consultation for a 
revised version to have regard for the ER Act 1999).
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in Cully et al (WERS) (1999) and Millward et al (1999) mainly because many employers 
continued to see in it, as Painter et al (1998) say:
“a disciplined framework within which corporate management could work”. 
Nonetheless, Tory Government antipathy towards the traditional role of trade unions, 
and collectivism, was put in to legislative effect. Government policy created and was 
assisted by the industrial restructuring, technological development, changes in product 
markets and employment structural changes. It was this ‘cocktail’ of developments 
which set a new contextual background for trade unions and contributed to the reversal 
of the trade union movement, and with it the decline of the collectivism. However, given 
that with the advent of the Labour government in 1997 public policy began to change 
radically in many of the areas which had been so damaging to trade unions, the question 
must be asked, why is it that there has been such a lethargic response in terms of trade 
union membership development, and why is it that membership density has yet to show 
any significant improvement from its lowest point?
4.8. Basset and Cave (1993) defined the problem of trade union decline during the 
1980’sas:
“Quite simply a collapse in the demand for the core product that unions offered to their 
twin markets (employees and employers) - collectivism enshrined most obviously in 
collective bargaining”.
Such a view of the malaise facing trade union and their decline is far too simplistic, to be 
accepted as a material contribution to the debate. However, whilst clearly what Basset 
and Cave say is not the last word on the matter, in respect of the general ‘membership 
malaise’, given that some trade unions were able to hold on to recognition, within the 
private sector, even when membership declined significantly, Cully et al 
(WERS)(1999)311. Nonetheless, collective bargaining did decline dramatically Brown 
(2O03)312, however, many of these same trade unions were able to hold onto a core 
membership, during this period of industrial change Cully et al (WERS) (1999)313. 
However, they are now finding it veiy difficult to rebuild their membership.
4.9. During the 1980’s-1990’s, manufacturing diminished in aggregate as a part of the 
overall economy and, the numbers employed at individual establishments significantly 
reduced. Public sector industries such as coal, gas and electricity were de-nationalised,
311 Cully et al (WERS)(1999) pp 90 - 94
312 Brown et al (2003) pp 198 - 204
313 Cully et al (WERS)(1999) pp 86 - 93
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deregulated, broken up and sold. Each of these industrial sectors had been the bedrock of 
trade union membership in both manual and staff occupations. As discussed at Chapter 
One, restructuring of the public sector was aimed at introducing competition through the 
creation of internal markets. The new owners (managers) and the new structures that 
emerged, for the new businesses, proved in many cases, not to be either sympathetic or 
conducive to trade union organisation. However, Freeman and Pelletier (1990) discount 
in large measure that these industry structural changes were major factors in the decline 
of trade union density and power, and use as a comparator, trade union experience within 
the Irish economy, saying:
“While the decreased share o f employment in manufacturing undoubtedly hurt imions, 
we reject this compositional change as a major cause o f the turnaround”314.
They cite three grounds for their opinion.
First, is that: “density fell in most sectors o f the economy;
Second, is that: “changes within the industry mix o f employment were no greater in the 
UK than in Ireland, where density did not fa ll”;
Third: “the shift from manufacturing during the 1980 ’s was only modestly larger than in 
the 1970’s, when union density rose ”.
They go on to argue that just as compositional change was not a major cause of the fall
315in union density neither was changes in the gender or collar of worker major factors . 
Their argument extends to discount the changed public opinion of unions, and the impact 
of the business cycle, pointing to the fact that union density continued to fall during 1986 
when the economy was rising. Arguments that are at considerable variance to those of 
much of orthodox opinion on what were some of the principal causes of union demise 
during the 20-year period to the turn of the centuiy. Having discounted much of the 
orthodox theories for union membership decline Freeman and Pelletier look for, as they 
say, “something more ” to explain the reasons for it occurring, which is they argue:
“the legal environment for industrial relations, as reflected in laws regulating union and 
management behaviour in the area o f union recognition and membership. ”
4.10. Of course Freeman and Pelletier overlook the fact union membership had been 
declining within the UK for many years prior to 1979. Waddington (2003)316 takes an 
opposing view of union decline citing Brown and Wadhwani (1990)317 and Millward and
314 Freeman R. and Pelletier J (1990) p 143
315 Freeman R. and Pelletier J (1990) pl45
316 Waddington (2003) p 221; in Edwards. P, (2003) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice. Second 
Edition,Blackwell, Oxford.
317 Brown, W. and Wadhwani. S. (1990) pp 57-70
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Stevens (1986)318 in support of his opposing views. The weight of evidence is such that it 
is difficult to disagree with Waddingtons opinion of Freeman and Pelletiers hypothesis. 
One must, consequently, give changes to law their correct contextual importance as a 
development which assisted the implementation of much of the change process which, 
took place over the period of the 1980’s-1990’s.
4.11. Union experience over the period since 1979 has not commonly been one of 
decline. Furthermore the ER Act 1999 should have been a watershed and reversal of the 
decline, however, again for most unions particularly TUC affiliated, private sector, 
decline has tended to continue contrary to non-TUC and some public sector unions. It is 
not simply therefore why trade unions lost so much of their membership and power 
during this period, which needs explanation, but more importantly, why they continue to 
find it so difficult to regain that membership and power.
4.12. It was Hyman (1997) who developed the argument that trade unions had become so 
dominated by management, with so little independent representation, that their power 
and ability to influence the workplace had diminished dramatically. To some extent the 
WERS data and analysis supports this view of union demise in influence319. The WERS 
was, until 1998 the WIRS its title was changed for reasons best explained by the authors 
of the survey who say:
“The Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) series began in 1980. It was 
previously known as the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, or WIRS - the name was 
changed in 1998 to better reflect the present content o f the survey. The primary aim o f 
the survey series is to provide statistically reliable, nationally representative data on the 
current state o f workplace relations and employment practices in Britain. ”32()
Whilst little argument can be raised against the imputation of this statement, it is 
nonetheless salutary to have the authors of one of the leading surveys and data sources 
make a statement which encapsulates the fact of significant ‘irreversible’ changes, in the 
nature of the employment relationship and, the role of unions and collectivism within the 
‘new order’. Perhaps what Hyman says illustrates some truth in what Basset and Cave 
hypothesise. Employee perception that trade unions were neuter and little able to provide 
answers to their concerns and problems may have led to a disinclination to retain
318 Millward. N. and Stevens, M. (1986)
339 Cully et al (WERS)(1999) pp 107-111
320 WERS: SN 4026 - Workplace Employee Relations Survey. 1998 : Panel Survey 1990-1998; UK DATA 
Archive, University of Sussex, website - http://www.data-archive.ac.uk
112
membership of trade unions by some within the ‘older’ generations of employees, and 
for the newer generation of employees the perception that trade unions had little power 
or relevance must have appeared that what Basset and Cave observed was true.
The long-term process of membership and organisational decline
4.13. It is a matter of historic record ( see Chaper One) that the ‘bedrock’ trade union 
membership had been changing over a number of years prior to the emergence of the 
Tory government in 1979. Bain (1967), Marsh (1979), Wrigley (1997), Wrigley (2002), 
identified that the demise of trade unions started some considerable time prior to the 
emergence of The Tories legislative intervention of the 1980’s. In his evidence to the 
Donovan Commission, Bain warned that UK trade unions, whilst having recruited 
significantly over the period from 1892 to 1964 when membership increased by 539 per 
cent, the number of employees only increased by 67 per cent, resulting in the overall 
density of trade union membership increasing by 11 per cent to 43 per cent of the 
employed labour force. When viewed over the short term Bain (1967) illustrates that 
from 1948 to 1964 there was in fact a reduction in membership density from 45.1 per 
cent to 42.6 per cent, however, over this same period potential union membership 
increased by some 14 per cent. Bain attributes this decline in trade union membership 
density to two major reasons:
a) the changing pattern o f employment and particularly those industries with long 
traditions o f trade union membership; and,
b) the highest density o f membership - railways, coal mining, civil service cotton and 
manual employment in general;
4.14. Bain (1967)321 explaining the second factor causing trade union decline illustrates 
the affect of changing employment composition upon union membership density over 
this period of 1948 to 1964, showing that over the period membership density declined 
in eight of the fourteen expanding industries and says that this was because:
“unions are not recruiting members quickly enough among the expanding areas o f 
employment, in particular among the white collar occupations to offset the decline in the 
traditional industries and among manual workers generally. ” Bain (1967)322
321 Bain (1967) pl6 Table 10
322 Bain (1967) Para 25, pp 16
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Bain goes on to say that whilst the absolute amount of white collar trade unionism has 
increased greatly:
“This has prompted many people to speak o f a boom in white collar unionism. Such 
people are suffering from a growth illusion, which results from considering changes in 
union membership in isolation from changes in the labour force. In real terms this boom 
is non existent’ Bain (1967)323.
Bain prophesied almost precisely the malaise of the trade union movement when he said: 
“I f  trade unions focus their attention on the manual labour force, they will be 
concentrating on the least dynamic group in modem society - a group which is 
constantly losing its younger and abler members to other sections o f society. They will 
run the risk o f becoming the increasingly outdated representatives o f a declining 
industrial minority” Bain (1967)324.
4.15. However, throughout this period there was, as Bain identifies, a steady expansion 
of employment in those areas which had a low density of trade union membership, 
professional and business services; insurance, banking and finance, distribution, 
chemicals, food drink and tobacco and white collar employment in all industries. It can 
be shown that had there not been a steady growth in union membership in these 
industries and occupational groups the reduction in membership in the ‘core’ industries 
and occupations would have produced aggregate decline and loss of density analogous to 
the losses during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Marsh (1979)325 shows that for six TUC 
industrial groupings, between 1959 and 1977 there was a membership loss of almost 
900,000, Marsh (1979)326 says that white-collar membership grew by 2.3 million during 
much of this same period. However, during part of this period (1964 to 1970) white- 
collar membership increased by 33.8%, and because employment in these grades grew 
by only 4.1% during this period density increased significantly to the point where in 
1979 white-collar union membership stood at 44% of such employees, Wrigley 
(1997)327. However, much of the growth in white-collar membership was in industries, 
which were undergoing long-term decline, it was in fact a membership that ultimately, 
would be caught in the same malaise as the ‘core’ blue-collar membership. This 
assertion is in large measure bom out by the fact that not one of the independent, 
predominantly private sector white-collar unions which, was engaged in the
323 Bain (1967), para 47 pp 29.
324 Bain (1967) para 48 pp 29.
325 Marsh (1979) p 13 Table 2
326 Marsh (1979) p 15 Table 5
327 Wrigley (1997) pp 30-31 Table 4
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manufacturing industries, exists today (2002). Each has, because of membership loss 
and financial difficulties, discussed at Chapter Three, amalgamated with larger unions
4.16. Writing almost twenty years later Bain (1983), whilst identifying that the trade 
unions had to some extent identified the need for a refocusing of organising effort, and 
had indeed recruited and organised significantly within the white collar areas of 
employment, they had not succeeded to the extent necessary in other poorly organised 
areas of employment, particularly the private sector services, to ensure that density, 
given industrial structural and labour force changes would be maintained in the future. 
In this regard Bain (1983)328 makes an almost ‘prophetic’ analysis, given the facts of 
membership loss and poor recruitment as they occurred during the period he referred to, 
about the problems facing UK unions. Boeri (2001) illustrates that what Bain predicted 
may have been conservative when measured against the facts as we now know them to 
be. The UK trade union density declined over the period 1979 to 1997 for Commerce 
from 10 per cent to 7 per cent, for finance from 22 per cent to 18 per cent and for 
services from 59 per cent to 46 per cent. The consequence of this depletion in Trade 
union density is further illustrated by Boeri in table 2.3 showing density in the private 
sector to have declined from 45 per cent to 19 percent and even in the public sector 
where membership is deemed by some to be “ubiquitous” from 69 per cent to 60 per cent 
over the period 1980 to 1999. However, as Bach and Winchester (2003)329 show, 
employment within the public sector fell from 7.185 million in 1981 to 5.1 million in 
2000, whereas employment in the private sector increased over the same period from 26 
million to 29 million. Therefore, given the much larger falls in employment numbers 
within the public sector, the ability of unions to hold on to a high membership density 
within the sector is significantly divergent to union performance in the private sector.
Industrial Restructuring, Deregulation and Membership Morbidity and Decline, 
the realisation of Bain’s ‘prophesies.
4.17. Industry and employment in the 1980’s and 1990’s was a different world to that 
envisaged by leading trade-unionists in the 1950s and 1960s, who believed that the 
future of the movement was assured by the transference of trade union development into 
the new types of industries. This belief was based upon the presumption that the context 
in which unionism had grown and flourished in the 1960’s and 1970’s would continue. 
That changes would be about the nature of employment type, white-collar as opposed to
328 Bain (1983) p 31
329 Bach.S., and Winchester. D, (20031 The Historic Evolution o f British Industrial Relations. p 294 Table 
11.1, in Edwards. P., (ed) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice (Second Edition) Blackwell, Oxford
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blue collar with greater technological skills requirements. Trade unions were simply not 
ready for the shock of the 1980’s industrial restructuring, increasing employment in 
notoriously difficult to organise service industries and the developing technology 
industries which, were rapidly becoming dominant employment sectors of the economy, 
created a whole new contextual background for unions which, quickly accelerated the 
depletion of trade union density, just as Bain predicted. Added to these developments 
was the fact that the ‘new industries’ in micro electronics and computers and services, 
began to create a generation of ‘new’ high skilled jobs, requiring employees with highly 
sought after ‘portable skills’ McLoughlin and Gourlay (1994). New employment 
sectors, many spawned by the ‘enterprise culture’, and new skills in scarce supply, 
translated into the ideal medium for a free labour market and the development of 
individualising the employment relationship, presaged an employment culture which was 
to prove as destructive to the collectivist model upon which trade unions had been built 
as was draconian laws. The relatively high level of earnings and benefit packages 
offered by employers. The individual nature of contracts and the management culture 
controlling this ‘new’ generation of employees Fairbrother (1996) Geary (2003) . 
The fact that many were employed in, small closely managed undertakings, which were 
difficult, and expensive to organise, also conspired against trade union efforts.
4.18. However, even though trade union density was being dramatically affected by 
these changes, Millward et al (2000) illustrate that during the early part of the 1980’s332 
the presence of trade unions generally “at workplace level remained stable ” However, 
they go on to illustrate that such stability rapidly deteriorated during the period from 
1984 to 1998, primarily, as they illustrate, attributable to the failure of trade unions to 
organise in the new establishments coming into industiy, principally in services and the 
new technologies. Also accelerated by the Tory legislative attack on the closed shop and 
its dramatic decline over the period 1980-98333. The significance of the fact that the vast 
majority of these closed shop agreements were in manualemployment must not be 
overlooked in that this was also the ‘heartland’ of trade union membership density. 
However, Millward et al say that the aggregate fall in union presence during 1990 to
330 Fairbrother (1996) p 110-148 in P. Ackers, C. Smith and P. Smith (eds.) The New Workplace and 
Trade Unionism. London: Routledge.
331 Geary (2003) 339-367 in Edwards. P. (ed) Theory and Practice o f Industrial Relations. Second Edition. 
Blackwell, Oxford, (2003).
332 Prior to the Employment Act 1982 and the Employment Act 1988 taking effect on items such as union 
membership agreements.
333 See footnote reference to Millward and Stevens:. Smith I.T and Thomas, G.H. Industrial Law. Sixth 
Edition. Butterworths, London, 1996, pp 516, also; Millward, N. Bryson, A. & Forth, J. All Change at
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1998 arose wholly because of the lesser penetration of workplaces that joined the 
population when compared with those that left it, stating that:
“there was a union presence in three fifths (59per cent) o f workplaces that left the 
population in this period whilst a presence was achieved o f only two fifths (42per cent) 
in those joining the population
4.19. The fall in trade union presence over the whole period from 1980 to 1998 for all 
workplaces was from 65per cent to 36per cent (Millward et al (2000) table 4.2). 
Certainly it would appear that one of the significant problems for trade union 
organisation has been the increasing number of ‘start up’ and small businesses coming 
into the economy most of which have been relatively small in terms of the numbers 
employed. Millward et al illustrate (table 4.2), that the fall in trade union presence in 
companies employing 25-49 was an annual average of 3.7 per centl984 to 1990 and 4 
per centl990 to 1998. In the corresponding periods for workplaces, employing 500 or 
more the figures were 2.9per cent. The overall fall showed in the smaller workplaces 
during the whole period 1980 to 1998 it was from a 47per-cent presence to 23 per cent 
and for the larger workplaces from 78per cent to 48per cent.
4.20. The decline in trade union presence, measured in terms of the number of members 
is clearly a significant factor in the whole problem of the decline of collectivism. 
However, Millward et al (2000)334 says that there was, in their research, no significant 
indication that de-recognition335 was a major cause of this decline, Kelly (1990) agrees. 
Their research showed de-recognition occurred across most industries, however, they 
found no cases in banking, finance and business services sector and hardly any in energy, 
water supply or transport and communications. Also they found no cases of complete 
de-recognition amongst newly privatised companies within their survey, and that de­
recognition appeared not to be associated with change of ownership.
4.21. Three reasons for de-recognition were, however, given by managers surveyed 
Cully et al (1999), these were:
a) changes in management policies which accounted for half the responses of 
managers;
Work? British Employee Relations 1980-1998 as portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
series. 2000. Routlege, London, pl47 Table 5.4.
334 Millward, N. et al (2000) pp 105.
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b) decline in trade union membership which, accounted for a third of managers 
responses; and,
c) finally, the lack of trade union activity.
Ackers et al (1996) say that:
“At best, the new management thinking simply ignores the role o f unions in its search 
for other ways o f winning employee consent; at worst it sets out to destroy or weaken 
them ”
and, cites Guest (1987), also as Painter et al (1998) say, the prerequisites for maintaining 
the ‘collectivist model’ were either lacking or had been removed. However, Millward et 
al (2000) go on to say that:
“their results, on balance, were split roughly equally between those managers who saw 
de-recognition as arising from decline in employees interest in union representation and 
those who saw it as the outcome o f a change in management policy”.
4.22. It would appear therefore that there is some authoritative support for the view 
expressed by Basset and Cave mentioned earlier. Or was it that trade union inability to 
defend its infrastructure, because of the twin attacks of legislative interference and 
employer withdrawal and indifference to trade unions, gave rise to ‘weakness’, that was 
more likely the real cause of most decline in the collectivist model of employee relations 
and with it the decline in trade union membership density and power!
4.23. One must nonetheless give due weight to employee sentiment on the matter of the 
value or otherwise of trade union representation. Here a number of considerations have 
affect, certainly in the period of the mid to late 1990’s. Millward et al say336:
“A reduced appetite for union membership among employees appears to us the most 
likely explanation for the more recent period”.
Millward et al are clear in their view of the role of the Tories legislative impact
337saying :
“But in our view, the government’s programme had a more pervasive and deeper 
impact. This was to undermine the foundation o f the system o f collective representation 
and joint regulation.” A view very close to that of Freeman and Pelletier.
335 In their analysis of derecognition, Cully et al (1999)(WERS) identify that they used ‘recognition for 
collective bargaining over pay and conditions’ as their definition to determine whether unions were or were 
not recognised see p 91.
336 Millward et al (2000)p 152
337 Millward et al (2000)p234
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4.24. However, much of what Millward et al (2000) argue about the impact of de­
recognition is at variance with what the (TUC) have to say on the matter over the same 
period of time338. The TUC in its April 1998 Survey said there was:
“a marked fall in the number o f de-recognitions, from their high point in the late 
1980’s ”,
Deakin and Morris (1998)339 and early 1990’s TUC (1998)340. The TUC survey also 
illustrates341 that over the period from the first half of 1996 to the first half of 1998 the 
number of de-recognition’s which were being reported had fallen to only 8per cent of 
TUC affiliates (representing some 90per cent of all TUC membership) surveyed. No 
doubt this decline in the rate of derecognition reflecting the advent of a Labour 
government committed to a change in public policy on trade union recognition. 
Certainly de-recognition, if it was not the primary cause of trade union decline, 
throughout the period from 1979, it was a contributory factor.
4.25. The Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) involvement in 
industrial relations ‘overarches’ the period since 1974 and Towers and Brown (2000) 
gives some valuable background to developments, whilst Hutton (1996) and Coates 
(1994) provide general commentary on the political, economic and sociological 
background to the period. The decline in union membership and density over the period 
since 1979, and the impact of decline in manufacturing industries where trade unions had 
historically held much of their core membership. Also their inability to penetrate the 
emerging industries such as microelectronics and the service industries, became a 
‘preoccupation’ for many researchers. Disney (1990), Disney et al (1998), Machin 
(2000), Metcalfe (1991), Sneade (2001). Work produced by Gallie et al (1996) gives a 
disaggregated ‘geographic’ accountant of the affects of industrial decline and changing 
employer attitudes upon union organisation in various towns and cities. However, 
decline in terms of density and core membership areas had attracted research and 
commentary over a lengthy period well prior to 1979, Bain (1966), McCarthy (1962). 
Bain through his statistical analysis showed how trade unions had never, until the mid 
1970’s raised their membership density above 50 percent. Whilst total membership 
tended to increase during periods of increased economic activity, and growing 
employment, membership density always lagged behind this growth Bain (1966).
338 Trade Union Congress, Focus on Recognition. April 1998. February 1999. January 2000. TUC, London.
339 Deakin S. and Morris G. S. (1998) Labour Law Second Edition. Butterworths 1998, London, Chpt 1, pp
47, say: “Apart from some cause celebres withdrawal o f collective bargaining rights was rare
throughout the 1980’s ”
340 Trade Union Congress, Focus on Recognition. April 1998, pp 2.
119
4.26. The research continuum of Millward et al (2000) has been maintained throughout 
the period since the early 1980’s. There have been four publications in the series with 
companion work produced by Cully et al (WERS) (1999). The publications, their data 
and analysis are an ‘overarching’ account of developments during the past 20 years or 
so, and represent valuable material in the subject area. The available (but unpublished) 
research documentation, questionnaires, data sets etc are indispensable sources of 
information about changes taking place that affect trade unions, and the question of 
changes in the collectivist/pluralist model, and the employer employee relationship as 
developed towards the early part of the millennium.
The closed shop and its contribution to union membership density
4.27. Questions are frequently posed about why trade unions seek to attain 100% 
membership and extend their overall size? The most ready answer to the first question is 
that unionists do not like ‘freeloaders’. Any trade union which negotiates collective 
agreements is placing the benefit of those negotiations within the realm of ‘public 
goods’, e.g. benefits which are available for all employees to enjoy, whether trade union 
members or not Voos (1984). However, in economic terms that is not the real answer. 
The real answer is that 100% membership produces the most cost-effective basis of 
operation.
4.28. What is the optimum size for a trade union? The answer to this question derives 
from the answer to the previous question. Trade unions are not businesses, however, 
they do apply some criteria in their growth strategies similar to those applied by 
businesses. For the majority of unions the amount of finance raised by any ‘commercial 
activities is very small, and is derived from the sale of diaries and various union 
ephemera. Some unions, such as the RCN and BMA generate considerable income from 
professional publications, conferences, training courses etc, and have adopted 
administrative structures of a more commercial nature to deal with this side of their 
operation. However, for the majority of unions their primary income is the contributions 
it receives from its membership. Any surplus income when invested and income derived 
and the capital assets of the union are its only other sources of finance.
4.29. Historically part of the services provided to union members involved ‘friendly 
benefits’. Such benefits were invariably provided by blue-collar unions and to a lesser 
extent by white-collar unions, in the latter case Willman et al (1993) are wrong in their
341 Trade Union Congress, Focus on Recognition. April 1998, pp 10.
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assertion about white-collar unions such as BIFU and APEX. Both unions did provide a 
range of such benefits over many years. The provision of such benefits derived from the 
early beginnings of these unions when they modelled themselves on their blue-collar 
‘peers’. APEX for example, developed from the National Union of Clerks and the 
Association of Women Clerks. Benefits such as funeral, long-term sickness, long-term 
unemployment and job search were provided from the 1920’s into the late 1950’s and 
progressively removed through into the late I960’s. The reason for ceasing such benefit 
provision was to allow more of the unions income to be diverted to recruitment and 
organising activities.
4.30. Unions invariably generate growth and financial strength from surplus income. 
The rate at which surpluses are likely to be generated depends upon:
a) the number of members;
b) the level of contribution;
c) the annual income per capita from any given rate of contribution;
d) membership ‘turnover’;
e) the costs of services provided to members;
f) the extent and value of the ‘employer subsidy’;
e) the level of inflation’s impact upon operating costs.
The fact that unions will tend to become involved in trade disputes adds an 
‘imponderable’ element to their costs in the form of ‘dispute benefits’ and costs. 
However, given the fall in the level of trade disputes this cost factor is of lesser 
significance than historically.
4.31. Surpluses provide the margin from which to generate growth, by improving 
services, adding more full-time officials and staff through which to recruit and organise 
more members. This was certainly the strategy of white-collar unions, which where 
invariably heavily dependent upon full-time officials as recruitment agents, rather than 
shop stewards as in the case of blue-collar unions. As trade unions developed their
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organisations prior to the 1980’s, union shop and closed shop situations became 
increasingly commonplace particularly in manufacturing and the public sector. An 
explanation of what is a closed shop or union shop is given above in the section on 
‘Definitions’, for ease of reference both situations will subsequently be referred to as 
‘closed shop’. The discussion within the Introduction provides a brief overview of the 
legislative developments and changes in public policy, which ended the operation of the 
closed shop. At the time when the law ended its operation according to Lewis (1983)
“an estimated half o f all union members — a quarter o f the working population -  are 
employed in closed shops ”
The growth of the closed shop can be ‘gauged’ by the fact that almost 20 years earlier,
McCarthy (1964) put the number of union members coyered by the closed shop at 3.75
!
million, or 2 out of every 5 union members were in a closed shop situation. McCarthy 
defined the closed shop as a situation:
“in which employees come to realise that a particular job is only to be obtained and 
retained i f  they become and remain members o f one o f a specified number o f trade 
union ”
A statement that reflects the relative ‘informality’ of closed shop arrangements some 40 
years ago.
4.32. Since 1964 much has taken place on the matter of the closed shop, for example it 
increasingly became known as a Union Membership Agreement (UMA). TheTrade 
Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 s 30, defined a UMA as an agreement which:
“has the effect o f requiring the terms and conditions o f o f every member o f a specified 
class o f employee to include a condition that the must be or become a member o f the 
union(s) who are parties to the agreement. ” TULRA 1974 s 30.
4.33. As to the implications of the closed shop Donovan (1968) was clear saying:
“In our view the closed shop as it operates at present is not always in the best interests 
either o f workers or o f the community as a whole ”
However, arguing that:
“It is better to recognise that imder proper safeguards a closed shop can serve a useful 
purpose and to devise alternative means o f overcoming the disadvantages which 
accompany it”.
Within a further 20 years or so with political change the closed shop ended. The data 
illustrates that the demise of the closed shop had a significant impact upon union density.
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4.34.Table 19 Illustrates the step decline which took place in trade union membership 
over the period 1982 to 1990 the period during which the law on the closed shop was 
changing. It is not possible to isolate the membership losses solely attributable to the 
outlawing of the closed shop from the membership losses attributable to industrial 
restructuring. However, each legislative step taken in the outlawing of the closed shop 
appears to have had a significant effect upon union membership and density, however, 
more particularly in respect of TUC membership. This disproportionate effect upon 
TUC unions arises from the fact that, the prevalence of the closed shop was very much 
greater within manufacturing and public sector manual occupational groups, than white- 
collar and service sector jobs. It follows therefore that because the non-TUC unions had 
a greater presence within the latter employment groups, they would not be so greatly 
affected.
4.35. During the three-year period of 1980 to 1983 trade unions in aggregate lost 
membership density of 5%, however, TUC unions lost 6%, in membership during this
period.
Table.19
Impact o f Closed Shop ban on TUC membership (year on year loss)
(Thousands)
A B C D E F G
Employees All Union Density All Union TUC Density % TUC TUC
Members all % change members TUC membership %change
unions unions % loss
24,100 1979 13,197 54 12,172 50
24,322 1980 12,636 52 -2 11,721 48 -3.71 -2
23,930 1981 12,294 51 -1 11,005 46 -6.11 -2
23,500 1982 11,716 49 -2 10,510 44 -4.5 -2
22,940 1983 11,271 49 0 10,082 44 -4.08 0
24,078 1984 11,063 48 -1 9,855 43 -2.26 -1
24,430 1985 10,799 44 -4 9,585 39 -2.74 -4
24,562 1986 10,582 43 -1 9,243 37 -3.57 -2
24,911 1987 10,471 42 -1 8,797 35 -4.83 -2
25,813 1988 10,379 40 -2 8,652 33 -1.65 -2
26,608 1989 10,039 37 -3 8,416 31 -2.73 -2
26,833 1990 9,807 40 3 8,192 33 -2.67 2
26,280 1991 9,484 36 -4 7,786 29 -5 -4
25,355 1992 8,928 37 1 7,143 30 -8.26 1
25,345 1993 8,665 34 -3 7,100 28 -0.61 -2
Source: Data for TUC union membership taken from TUC Organisation Department 
records. Aggregate union membership data taken from Certification Office Annual Reports 
1979-1993
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However, the TUC lost 18.5%. During the next ‘step decline’, the period from 1990 to 1992, 
the period when the closed shop finally ended, the TUC lost a further 16% membership. 
Which, represents within an aggregate period of 5 years, from 1980 to 1983 and 1990 to 
1992, a loss of 2.7 million of the 5 million TUC members lost throughout the whole period 
from 1979 to 1992. Throughout the whole period (1979-1992) aggregate union membership, 
whilst it was declining was not doing so as fast as for the TUC, which lost just over 4.5 
million members over the period. The reason for this being, the phenomenon explained in 
Chapter One of non-TUC membership growth over this period.
4.36. The majority of the literature identifies that there are two views of why trade 
unions saw the closed shop as an important issue first, that having all employees within 
the union would give it more ‘authority’. Also it strengthened the collective bargaining 
power of the union. Secondly, was that all employees who benefited from collective 
bargaining should contribute to the union. There was however, for trade unions as 
organisations, a third and equally if not more important reason for achieving the closed 
shop. This third reason was the added financial benefits of 100% membership density. 
Berkowitz (1954) identified the significance of this third reason when he developed his 
model to illustrate how, from the granting of recognition a union builds its membership, 
by its own efforts to an ‘optimum’ level. At which point other opportunities for 
membership, consolidation and exploiting a unions membership strength may provide 
additional impetus to growth, (see Figure 11 Chapter Four) is a model developed to 
illustrate the manner in which this process of membership development took place prior 
to the outlawing of the closed shop. The model explains how the ‘employers subsidy’ 
played an increasingly important part in the membership level and economic strength of 
a trade union.
The link between the ‘employer subsidy’ and the closed shop
4.37. It is not possible to obtain precise data about the extent to which trade union 
organisation, as it developed during the period from 1946 to 1979, became increasingly 
dependent upon the ‘subsidy’ received from employers in the major industries where the 
greatest organisational density existed. The term ‘subsidy’ is used to describe the range 
of facilities which were extended to a recognised trade union and its lay representatives 
(shop stewards). In effect the ‘employer subsidy’ became a not insubstantial ‘invisible 
income stream’, which underpinned a great deal of trade union organisational activity 
within major industries and employers.
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4.38. The growth in the shop steward ‘movement’ during the 1960’s and 1970’s and the 
transference of negotiating responsibility from national bargaining, lead by full-time 
trade union officials, to localised plant and company group bargaining lead by lay 
representatives, added considerable power and influence to the role of lay shop stewards. 
In many of the larger company groups within the manufacturing industries, full-time lay 
representatives or Convenors became the norm. In some cases, groups of unions coming 
together (particularly within the engineering industry through the Confederation of 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU)) to form ‘joint shop stewards 
committees’, with a Convenor as its leader and principal negotiator.
4.39. The facilities provided by employers to this type of local organisation contributed a 
significant subsidy to the ‘membership servicing costs’ of trade unions. The subsidy 
extended through the provision of telephone and printing facilities to provision of office 
space and in many cases to the acceptance of full-time paid trade union representatives. 
Time off for training, attending union meetings etc was commonplace, many employers 
actually meeting the travel and accommodation costs, where meetings were for joint 
negotiating purposes. Many employers providing paid time off for elected delegates to 
attend union policy making conferences and attending executive meetings. With the 
increasing development of pre-entry and post entry closed shops, and latterly (for blue- 
collar unions) within the late 1960’s and 1980’s the growth of the check off, improved 
the per capita contribution income significantly, again contributing to the financial 
strength of unions.
4.40. Some of the literature Willman et al (1993) and Willman (2005)342, Bain and Price 
(1983), describes unions as having tended to become ‘dependent’ upon this ‘subsidy’. 
There can be little doubt that with its loss, during the 1980’s and 1990’s coupled to 
membership loss caused by industrial restructuring, many unions that had been major 
beneficiaries of this ‘subsidy’, almost to the point of ‘dependency’, began to feel a 
disproportionate effect of the change which swept through the collectivist culture.
4.41. The ‘employer subsidy’ was, in the experience of the author very important, and 
where it was provided, possibly more important to white-collar unions given their 
relatively ‘embryonic’ stage of development, and smaller financial resources, however, 
nonetheless important to blue-collar unions also. White-collar unions found the 
provision of any positive gesture on the part of an employer valuable, certainly anything
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that ‘subsidised’ the cost of organising employees was a welcome contribution to 
defraying their disproportionate cost burden.
4.42. The loss of this ‘subsidy’ in a ‘normal situation’ would have been difficult to 
accommodate, however, its loss at the time general membership levels were falling was 
very serious Millward et al (2000) and Willman (2005). The difficulties faced could be 
compared to those faced by a union when commencing organisation at a company, 
however, in the ‘reverse order’:
a) progressive loss of membership;
b) progressive loss of revenue/revenue surplus;
c) attrition of local organisational structure;
d) loss of shop stewards;
e) loss of membership servicing capacity;
f) greater involvement of full-time officials;
g) increasing membership per capita servicing costs.
The recruitment process -  the ‘virtous cycle’ and the ‘vicious cycle’
4.43. Bain and Price (1983) put forward a ‘model’ of trade union growth as a “virtuous 
circle” arguing that union growth is dependent upon union recognition and involvement 
in job regulation. However, there are ‘missing’ elements to their hypothesis about the 
“virtuous circle”. Manual unions tended to utilise their network of shop stewards to 
undertake recruitment and membership development. However, white-collar unions 
tended to place a great deal of reliance upon full-time officials as the recruitment and 
organising agents. For such unions it was also the surplus, which could be generated 
from growth that provided the future financial capacity to appoint more full-time 
officials and staff, to undertake more recruitment and produce more growth.
4.44. Figure 12 is a model of the recruitment process as it applied pre 1980’s. The level 
of aggregate density at 53% (all unions)343 is that which applied as at the end of 1979. 
The model depicts the process of recruitment that took place in building membership 
from a green-field situation e.g. a situation where no level of recognition has been 
achieved, prior to recruitment taking place. It depicts the operation of the virtuous cycle, 
and the development of organisational structure, usually through the 
election/appointment of shop stewards or as in the case of many staff unions
342 Willman (2005) in Fernie and Metcalf (eds) awaiting publishing in mid 2005
343 Certification Officer Annual Report 1979-80.
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‘corresponding members’. Development from Phase 1 to Phase 2 is critical as it 
represented the attainment of a density of membership that made a union more 
representative of the employees it would be seeking recognition for. Achieving a more 
substantial membership opened the possibility of stabilising the unions development 
Through attaining recognition and the commencement of the ‘employer subsidy’ in the 
form of check off. Phase 3 was the ‘development watershed’; it was at these levels of 
membership, having gained recognition, that a union was able to consolidate its
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membership. It achieved this by capitalising on its authority and developing a strong 
network of stewards and gaining facilities for them, that could be exploited in the final 
push for 100% membership. With all of the benefits of recognition in place and with the 
employer subsidy largely achieved, the final Phase 4 was where the union developed the 
process of ‘mopping up’ the ‘freeloaders’ and pressing the employer for a post or pre­
entry ‘union membership agreement’ (UMA) or closed shop.
4.45. In Figure 13, the percentage levels of membership throughout the model are 
‘notional’ and the same considerations apply as for Figure 12. In the model the cycle is 
anti-clockwise commencing at Phase 4 which depicts the initial stage in the decline 
process, it is the origination of the demise of the closed shop. It is at Phase 4 when, 
given the changes that took place under the legislation from 1980 to 1990, employers 
and unions could no longer sustain a closed shop. Consequently, those ‘freeloaders’ that
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had been compelled to join a union through the operation of a closed shop would have 
resigned their membership.
4.46. At the margin, the process of decline would have been accelerated by other less 
committed members following the example of the ‘freeloaders’. Organisational 
Figure 13
TRADE UNION GROWTH AND DECLINE 
*Vicious cycle - DECLINE - Pre Employment Act 1990
(B)
A
I
L
I
( O  REPRESENTATION RIGHTS IN JEOPARDY
(A ) CLOSED SHOP WITHDRAWN - DENSITY DROPS
75-100% Density
*Bain. G. S. and Price. R., (1980) Profiles o f  Union Growth. Oxford. Blackwell.
infrastructure decline would develop as a result of membership loss and with it the 
ability of a union to operate efficiently. The available data shows that the ‘employer 
subsidy’ in the form of check off continued, as did recognition. However, as is discussed 
elsewhere the impact of the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 s 15, 
had a significant disruptive affect upon the operation of check off, which contributed to 
membership and financial losses. Recognition in many cases for collective bargaining 
purposes ceased, with the demise of collective bargaining, and its effect upon the role of 
shop stewards and the decline in membership density caused by the demising ‘utility’ of 
trade union membership. Many employers withdrew from the provision of steward 
facilities, resulting in increasing servicing costs for unions at the same time as income 
would have been declining. In addition, explained elsewhere, trade unions increasingly 
found they were marginalised and bypassed with the advent of the new creed of ‘human 
resource management’, as this methodology for managing employee relations and
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introducing individualised terms and conditions grew rapidly throughout the 1980’s and 
1990’s.
4.47. The employer subsidy and the manner in which it operated, prior to the early 
1980’s, assisting unions develop the ‘momentum’ of the ‘virtuous cycle’ to build very 
strong local organisation has been lost. In addition, the ability of unions to develop and 
maintain closed shops has been outlawed. What then are the long-term consequences of 
these losses? One consequence, which has not been researched as a feature of this work 
is whether the ‘chum factor’ has increased as a result of these losses. It would be safe to 
assume that it has, however, no evidence is adduced within the thesis to show this to be a 
fact.A consequence that can be illustrated is that trade unions at employer, industry or 
national level can never again expect to attain the density levels that they achieved 
during the late 1970’s. Figure 14344 is a model, which illustrates this. It depicts:
a) the membership and organisation building ‘virtuous cycle’ post the outlawing of 
the closed shop, under the Employment Act 1990;
b) aggregate union membership density having fallen to 29% (2002) - (Yellow 
dotted outline arrow) is considerably lower than in the pre 1980’s era of 53%;
c) likely levels of density necessary to develop organisation throughout the ‘virtuous 
cycle’ pre ER Act 1999;
d) (A) as the threshold at which initial rights are likely to be gained invariably the 
right to represent individual members in disciplinary/dismissals procedures;
e) (B) as the normal ‘Range’ of membership density required to justify a ballot under 
ER Act 1999, to gain collective recognition;
f) (C) membership development into this quadrant of the ‘virtuous cycle’ is 
impossible, closed-shop is illegal, ER Act 1999 did not reverse this fact;
the organisational development throughout the ‘virtuous cycle’ may still involve at 
various points the acquisition of ‘rights’ and ‘facilities’ e.g. check off, use of phones, 
shop stewards meetings in works time etc, all of which helps consolidate organisation 
and reduce operating costs - this is the continuation of a ‘diluted’ form of the ‘employer 
subsidy’. These developments took place in tandem with membership development pre 
1990 the year of the final ban of the closed shop. However, since that date less likely to 
be attained, even after a successful ballot under the provisions of the ER Act 1999 on 
recognition; The red dotted outline represents the incidence of the ‘vicious cycle’, 
operating at lower density levels than pre legislative intervention in union membership 
issues.
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Its operation is a ‘continuum’ working against the operation o f the ‘virtuous cycle’. Its affect is to 
inhibit membership density build throughout its process. Bain and Price’s model of the 
relationship between trade union recruitment and recognition, given the fact that the reinforcing 
effect o f union membership agreements or the closed shop is no longer available to influence the 
‘virtuous circle’, require a new approach.
j44 For larger scale models of Figures 12, 13 and 14, see APPENDIX 1
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CHAPTER THREE 
5. Financial Management
Depleting financial resources - Historic background and Introduction
5.1. Unions have lost wealth over a considerable time, due in part to the low level of 
contributions charged to members and the increasing reliance upon investment income 
and liquidated assets as a means of bridging the gap between contribution income and 
total expenditure. The hypothesis of this Chapter is that UK trade union financial 
resources have depleted to the extent where future growth and development may have 
been compromised. It reviews the selected data to ascertain whether there are indications 
that trade unions will be able to reverse their financial decline, and develop a financial 
structure that will support their future needs in terms of growth and the provision of 
membership services. The analysis commences with a brief review of the historic 
research, illustrating that financial decline have been a longer-term problem for unions, 
made worse by the accelerated membership loss of the past 25 years or so. The analysis 
argues that some unions became over dependent upon support given to their activities by 
employers through what is termed the ‘employers subsidy’, and with the demise of many 
of these larger employing industries many unions lost more than just membership and 
contribution income. The Chapter analysis links with Chapter Four on trade union 
mergers, arguing that many unions have been compelled to seek mergers because of 
economic necessity rather than as a means of consolidating industrial organisation. 
Willman (2005) addressing the propensity to merge says, “Reduction in numbers has 
certainly not been associated with improvement in financial resources
5.2. UK trade union financial weakness pre-dates the years of membership decline since 
1979. Webb and Webb (1907) identified the finance problems facing unions, as did 
Roberts (1956). However, the issue of financial adequacy, has not attracted the same 
amount of attention in terms of recent research, as membership decline345, and yet 
finance is probably just as serious a problem, recognised in Willman and Morris (1988) 
and (Undy et al (1996)346. A primary purpose of Chapter Three is the updating of the 
earlier research into trade union financial performance. The analysis uses material and 
data from the Certification Office Data Records347, which includes data extracted from 
union annual reports and accounts (submitted with Certification Office Annual Returns, 
Forms AR21) over the period 1980 to 2002. The Certification Office Records are utilised
345 Willman and Morris (1988) Abstract also p 1
346 Undy et al (1996) p 257-258
347 Certification Office Data Records -  Annual Returns by Trade Unions (Forms AR21)
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because of their consistent collection methodology and reasonably thorough supporting 
documentation, they are therefore the best aggregated and disaggregated data source 
Willman and Morris (1988)348. This data is supplemented by data, which was obtained 
through the administration of a questionnaire to all TUC affiliated unions (68) and a 
sample of non-TUC unions with more than one thousand members (30). Details of the 
survey, which was designed using Pin-Point Software, are contained at Appendix A, B 
and Bl. The structure of the questions used in the Pin-Point Survey was modelled on a 
number of the questions used by Willman et al (1993)349.
5.3. Hughes (1964) noted that unions appeared to have been making progress in 
obtaining” sizeable and in some cases successive increases in contribution rates ”, and 
concluded, “the breakthrough in union finance is being made ”. However, shortly after 
Hughes’ research, Donovan reported, that in real terms as long ago as 1938 union 
members were paying much higher contributions than in the late 1960’s. However, that 
the decline in contribution levels appeared to have been offset by the rise in membership 
over the period. Union membership had indeed been growing350, from 1938 to 1968, 
from 6 million to 10 million, and continued to do so through to 1979. Willman and 
Morris (1988)351 disclose that for many of the largest unions, (over 100,000) constant 
membership growth over this period had assisted in the maintenance of low-level 
increases in contributions. Furthermore, many unions appeared to have become more 
efficient at collecting contributions from their membership352 thus increasing per capita 
yield, the more up to date position of which is discussed later in this Chapter.
5.4. The TUC, as recorded by Donovan (1968) and McCarthy (1962) had attempted over 
many years to gain co-operation between groups of competing unions to agree a policy 
by which to increase contributions in a non-competitive manner. Whilst there is 
available data that shows efforts were made by many individual unions to increase the 
level of member contributions and improve their finances during the period of the 1960’s 
and 1970’s, there is little evidence to show multilateral co-operation across trade unions 
operating within similar industries and areas of recruitment. In fact TUC Congress 
General Council Reports over the period dealing with ‘inter union disputes’, show the
348 Willman and Morris (1988) p 2
349 Willman et al (1993) Appendices 3 to 5; pp 226-236
350 Membership data taken from: Trade Union Growth and Recosnition, Research Paper No6, by G.S.Bain. 
The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations. (1967) also Ministry of Labour 
Gazette 1968.
351 Willman and Morris (1988) pp 53 - 60
352 Willman and Morris (1988) pp 55
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highly competitive nature of trade union recruitment, Willman et al (1993)353 say that 
subscriptions charged by other unions tended to be an “important consideration” when 
reviewing contribution levels, see also Buchanan (1974) and Lata (1972). Consequently 
the environment throughout this period was anything but conducive to co-operation in 
matters which may affect individual union ability to compete in recruitment.
5.5. Throughout the period 1979 to 2002354 the contribution income of trade unions was 
an average 10 percent per annum less than total expenditure. Also, during this same 
period investment income was declining in real terms. During the period 1990 to 2002 
however, the situation worsened, with investment income increased by only 6.8%. 
However, throughout the whole period from 1978 investment income, taken as a rolling 
five year average, decreased from 14.2% in 1982 to 5.9% in 2002, giving an overall 
average investment income for the period of 6.1%. However, an analysis of the 
available historic data shows that this deterioration had been taking place over a very 
much longer period than the past 25 years or so Willman et al (1993). Whilst 
membership grew during most of the period from the 1950’s, up to 1979355, per capita 
income and wealth started to fall in real terms to the present time continuously Lata 
(1976); Willman and Morris (1988); Willman et al (1993). Donovan shows that the 
problem of declining income from contributions goes back much further than even the 
past 50 years. The Report shows356 as a percentage of average weekly earnings union 
contributions declined from 1.02% to 0.39% from 1938 to 1966. Donovan also illustrates 
whilst this deterioration in contributions was taking place the increase in average 
earnings over the same period was 600%. Perhaps therefore, this was a period when 
membership would have been more receptive to contribution increases, proportional to 
the movement in earnings.
5.6. Given the failure of unions, over many years, to raise the level of member 
contributions to more than match their operating costs, as predicted by Willman and 
Morris (1988) unions have increasingly relied upon income from sources other than 
contributions. Consequently, asset and investment management and their performance 
should have taken a higher priority in the administration of resources than it evidently 
has. Latta (1972) and Willman and Morris (1988) commented on the poor growth of 
investments apparent in the periods covered by their analysis. What Willman and
353 Willman et al (1993) p 57
354 Data taken from Certification Officer Annual Reports 1979-2002
355 Bain. G.S. and Price.R. (1983) (ed) Bain. G. S. p 5; Table 1.1
356 Donovan (1966) p 191
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Morris (1988) identified as depletion of investment income and resources, and the 
deterioration in financial performance, has continued throughout the period since their 
research. In 2002 this trend continued with the amount of investment income 
attributable to many of the sixteen largest unions falling significantly357. In their later 
research Willman et al (1993)358 again identified that few unions covered expenditure 
through contribution income, unions instead continuing to fill the gap with investment 
income.
5.7. Some 20 years after Donovan, Willman and Morris (1988) were very clear about the 
serious financial circumstances facing many unions saying:
“For the future, the ability o f many to remain financially healthy depends on the 
relationship between expenditure and non-subscription income. ” Going on to say: “It 
may be that several unions depleted their income yielding assets in overcoming financial 
difficulties in 1979-91, thus reducing the scope for investment income growth ”, also; 
“their capacity to overcome similar crises in the future requires that this depletion does 
not continue
Willman and Morris (1988) go on to note that:
“higher membership levels do not necessarily improve solvency ”, and, in later research 
Willman et al (1993) says:
“There is an extremely strong negative correlation between union membership and union 
real net worth
Which, confirms Willman and Morris (1988)359 argument that given new members bring 
no ‘accumulated wealth’ the per capita net wealth of a union falls, certainly in the short­
term. The converse, ceteris paribus, also applies when a union losses membership, per 
capita net wealth increases, this was evidenced during the period of rapid membership 
decline in the mid 1980’s, when per capita wealth actually increased for some unions. 
Therefore, whilst more membership increases the contribution income flow, it also adds 
an additional cost in terms of servicing the new members.
5.8. Unions, throughout their history, have increasingly relied upon income from sources 
other than contributions Latta (1972), Roberts (1956) Willman et al (1993) and Willman 
and Morris (1988). An approach to financial management that could barely be sustained 
when unions tended to grow year on year, but has increasingly become unsustainable.
357 Annual Report of the Certification Officer 2002-2003 Appendix 4
358 Willman e ta l{ 1993) p 75
359 Willman and Morris (1988) figure 1(b) also p20
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The degree of control, its location within union hierarchies and the manner in which 
control is exercised over financial management varies from union to union, Willman and 
Morris (1988) reported that they found that union rule books were not clear in the way 
they described financial management. In many cases, rules were over generalised, 
leaving specific definition for responsibility for day to day financial maters to the duties 
and responsibilities of designated officers. However, they identified that where major 
expenditure was required, or where general financial oversight was exercised, this was 
usually through the national executive committees, or a sub-committee established for 
that purpose. Undy et al (1996) discuss these problems of financial control citing the 
problems that were faced by the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) during 
the period of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s when the union had grappled with a long 
standing deficit in its accounts, which became a major issue in the General Secretary 
elections in that period. Finally resolving itself into a ‘battle’ for control of the unions 
financial policy, the result of which was the unions head office gaining central control. 
Data taken from a survey of trade unions undertaken in 2002360 (referred to as ‘the 
pinpoint survey’) (Table.18) illustrates the manner in which financial control is
Table 18.
Q1 lb. Q2. BUDGET RESPONSIBILITY. Who is primarily responsible for setting budgets? 
SECT4No2budgresp Frequency Percentage
Other -  specify...................... 0 0.0
Treasurer 1 2.4
General Secretary 2 4.8
Finance Officer 4 9.5
Executive Council 35 83.3
The total number o f respondents to this question, TUC and non-TUC was 42. 
Source: the Pin-Point Survey 2002-2003 (Ray Edwards)
currently exercised by unions representing some 5 million, predominantly TUC 
affiliated, members.
5.9. Table 18 shows that the overwhelming majority of unions exercise budgetary 
control through elected Executive Councils. Invariably, therefore, decisions about
360 The survey is written in PinPoint Software, Designed by Logotron and Published by Cambridge 
Publishers; and is referred to as ‘The Pinpoint Survey’ throughout the thesis, and a copy of the survey 
questionnaire, explanatory information and a list of the responding unions is contained within the thesis 
appendices.
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budgetary control are taken at national level361. Nonetheless, most unions maintain 
either a system of returning a proportion of contribution income to the regions and/or 
branches for meeting local expenditure, or have ‘impressed account’ arrangements which 
allows restricted drawings on central funds for these purposes. However, whilst overall 
budgetary control is exercised by national executive councils, the day to day budgetary 
authority tends to reside in the main with a unions General Secretary, as the data in 
Table 19 indicates.
Table. 19
Q1 lc . Q3. BUDGET CONTROL. Who is primarily responsible for controlling a budget once it is set? 
SECT4 No3 budgcont Frequency Percentage
Treasurer 0 0.0
Other -  specify...................... 1 2.4
Executive Council 2 4.8
Finance Officer 4 9.5
General Secretary 35 83.3
The total number o f respondents to this question, TUC and non-TUC was 42. 
Source: the Pin-Point Survey 2002-2003 (Ray Edwards)
5.10. It should be noted that the position of Treasurer in many of the unions that 
responded to the Pin-Point survey is a ‘lay officer’ post, the member elected serving as a 
member of the Executive Council and where specialist finance sub-committees are 
operated is also the leading member of such sub-committees. Consequently, he/she 
would normally only see financial data in its prepatory stages prior to reports being made 
to the Executive Council, however, the post would have overriding authority if matters 
of dispute arose as to how union finances were being administered. In some cases, the 
position of General Secretary and Treasurer is a ‘joint’ role as is the case with a major 
union such as the GMB. Consequently the ‘zero’ frequency for the position of Treasurer 
should not be identified as peculiar in respect of Pin-Point survey question Q llc. Q3. 
BUDGET CONTROL.
5.11. Whilst there are strong advantages in operating financial management from the 
centre, there are some disadvantages, not the least of which is the infrequency with 
which national Executive Councils tend to meet and consequently receive budgetary and 
general financial reports. Table. 20 shows that the majority of Executive Councils
361 Willman et al (1993) Chapter 5 discusses in detail the pattern of financial management, Figure 18 
confirms that some ten years after his research the situation in respect of ‘centralised’ infrequent financial 
surveillance persisted.
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actually see financial data on an infrequent basis. The Pin-Point Survey did not seek 
information as to whether there was any sub-committee of the Executive Council which 
over-sighted financial management. However, such sub-committees (Finance and 
General Purposes Committees -  FGPC) are in evidence within most union rule books362. 
They tend to meet between Executive Council meetings to receive reports on budgetary 
compliance, major financial decisions in expenditure, investment etc.
Table. 20
Q lle . Q5. BUDGETARY REPORTING. How often are reports made about expenditure, budgetary 
and financial matters?
SECT4No5budgreport Frequency Percentage
Half yearly 0 0.0
Yearly 0 0.0
Some other frequency-specify...................... 0 0.0
Monthly 8 19.0
Two monthly 11 26.2
Quarterly 23 54.8
The total number o f  respondents to this question, TUC and non-TUC was 42. 
Source: the Pin-Point Survey 2002-2003 (Ray Edwards)
5.12. Whilst it is evident from the Pin-Point Survey data that there is a considerable 
amount of financial control exercised at the centre of most unions, such control has not 
produced what Undy et al (1996) reported was the intent of trade unions in the 
administrative changes they made in the late 1980’s early 1990’s. Undy et al (1996)363 
says that:
“Drawing power back to the centre was seen as a means o f exercising greater control 
over expenditure. ”
As is disclosed later in this chapter, the result for most unions, particularly those in ‘the 
club’, the process has produced anything but what was envisaged.
5.13. Having reviewed some of the most significant aspects of the administrative 
arrangements unions make for managing their finances, the Chapter now proceeds to 
undertake a detailed aggregate and disaggregated analysis of trade union financial 
performance:
362 Information about the role of Executive Council sub-committees such as FGPC’s was identified in the 
research undertaken of Forms AR21 and Union Annual Accounts and Reports lodged with the Certification 
Officer
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a) first, a review is undertaken of the historic background to trade union finances;
b) second, the aggregate financial data for all trade unions is analysed to identify the 
manner in which trends in contribution income, the increasing reliance upon ‘other 
income’ and the consumption of liquidated assets has developed;
c) third a comparative analysis is undertaken of the financial performance of 
‘the club’ and non-club unions;
d) fourth, the relative financial performance of TUC and non-TUC unions is 
undertaken;
e) fifth, the financial performance of a number of unions, selected because of 
their perceived importance to the future growth/stability of the trade union 
movement is analysed.
5.14. The analysis shows that over the past 25 years as membership decline has led to 
rationalisation, the trend in contribution income falling short of gross expenditure, has 
accelerated, and liquidated assets released by rationalisation have been quickly 
consumed. In aggregate unions have consumed over £2 billion (gross)364 of investment 
income, liquidated investments and assets in an effort to underpin seriously insufficient 
contribution income. In 2001/2002365 some of the largest unions produced their worst 
financial performance in 50 years, with six of the top 16 unions losing funds and net 
wealth. This latest decline in finance tends to confirm what the historic data produced by 
Latta (1972), Roberts (1956) Willman et al (1993) and Willman and Morris (1988) 
exposed about the disturbing developments in the longer-term trends in the financial 
resources of Britain’s trade unions. Trends which do not augur well for the future of a 
trade union movement, which is:
a) struggling to replace an ageing membership;
b) faced by an apathetic market and employment culture;
c) required to make high levels of investment in recruitment, organisation and 
services if it intends to succeed in the future.
363 Undy et al (1996) p 57
364 Figure calculated from data contained in the Certification Officer Annual Reports 1979 -2002
365 Certification Officer Annual Reports 2001-2002
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5.15. The decline in union membership and union finance are closely linked issues.
There are three issues, which have generated most of the financial problems that have 
faced trade unions:
a) their failure to maintain contributions at a level commensurate with the operating 
needs of the union;
b) their failure to increase the percentage yield of contributions obtained from each 
member over time;
c) their failure to control expenditure within limits commensurate with the level of 
contribution income.
The data shows that the average annual contribution income yield per capita, has 
persistently fallen short of its optimum level, being around 80 percent366 in aggregate for 
listed unions over the past 25 years. Willman et al (1993)367 illustrates how this factor 
affected the income stream for at least one major union, the AEU. The growth in check­
off has taken it to become the majority method for the collection of union contributions, 
however, as Willman explains, the problem for the AEU and possibly many other 
unions368, is that the shortfall is possibly attributable to the ‘chum factor’ and ‘ghost 
membership’.
5.16. Since the publication of earlier research undertaken by Latta (1972), Roberts 
(1956) Willman et al (1993) and Willman and Morris (1988), trade unions have become 
increasingly reliant upon other sources of income in order to bridge the widening gap 
between actual contribution income and total expenditure. The worrying aspect of the 
increasing reliance upon this ‘other income’ is the over dependence on investment 
income, and its increasing proportion of liquidated assets. The continuum of falling 
contribution income and shortfall in contribution yield and the impact upon income of 
periods of high cost inflation have progressively reduced operating surpluses. Marsh 
(1979)369 illustrates the historic nature of these problems. He shows (Table 12) how 
despite contribution and total income almost doubling, administration more than doubled 
from £3.26 to £6.60 per member over the period 1970 to 1975. Consequently, over 
prolonged periods these factors have reduced the surplus income from which investment 
in capital resources is made and from which future investment income and improvements 
to services may be generated. Table 21 shows that over the almost 20 year period 1982
366 Figure calculated using published data, for aggregate contribution income and membership, in the 
Certification Officers Annual Reports for the period 1978-79 to 2002
367 Willman et al (1993) pp 162-163
368 Willman e ta l (1993) p 163
369 Marsh (1979) pp 22-25
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to 2001 the situation in respect of the gap between contribution income and total 
expenditure worsened considerably. Willman (2005)370 comments upon the 
developments that have taken place since his earlier research into union finance saying: 
“From 1990-2000 the nominal increase in union total funds was 32 per cent which is 
substantially lower than the increase in the FTSE 100 (approximately 190 per cent) 
across the same period. Given that a large proportion o f imion funds are held in equities
Table 21
Contribution income and Total Expenditure over five year 
periods 1982 to 2001._____________________________________
Income over Five year
Contrib Total Expenditure % average
Income Expenditure Percentage deficit Deficit
‘000’,s ‘000’, s
1982 292,223 298,561 -2.13 5.36
1987 398,073 446,568 -10.86 9.18
1992 514,125 575,983 -10.74 7.33
1997 548,704 651,086 -15.73 15.04
2001 659,430 811,672 -23.08 18.84
1979-2002 Annual Average deficit = 11.15%
Source: Certification Officer Annual Reports 1979
Table 22
Contribution Income -v- Total Expenditure -  deficit 1979 to 2002
000's 000's 000's 000's 000's 000's
1979 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002
Contribution 194,721 351,205 458,876 524,711 562,403 622,910
Income
Total 208,770 396,126 530,073 623,391 681,458 764,618
Expenditure
Income -v - 93.27% 88.65% 86.56% 84.17% 82.52% 81.46%
Expenditure %
Deficit 14,049 44,921 71,197 98,680 119,055 141,708
Membership 13,989 10,799 9,808 8,028 7,843 7,739
Deficit p.a. per Capita *£1.06 £4.16 £7.26 £12.29 £15.18 £18.31
Deficit p.w. 2p p.w. 8p p.w. 14p p.w. 23.5p p.w. 29p p.w. 35p p.w.
Per capita
Source: Certification Officers Annual Reports 1979-2002
(Willman et al. 1993), the disparity in growth rates here raises the possibility that the 
observed very tight margins o f income over expenditure are sustained by depleting the
370WilIman (2005) in Fernie and Metcalf (eds) awaiting publishing in mid 2005, Prof Paul Willman was in 
the process o f completing research into trade union performance and in particular financial management at 
the time of this thesis being written up. Some of the results o f his research will appear in a chapter of a book 
to be published in mid 2005, the chapter title is ‘Circling the waeons; endogeneity in union decline ’
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asset base. Subsequent falls in equity markets may be behind falls in reserves in 2001- 
2003”.
Willman’s latest research corresponds to the thesis research results, in respect of the 
impact that falling equity markets may have upon union finances since many unions 
changed their policies to hold a greater proportion of invested wealth in this medium. 
Also the final sentence of Willman’s comments sheds some additional light on the 
underlying reasons for the financial losses sustained by 6 of the largest unions discussed 
earlier within the thesis.
5.17. With the change in short-term liquidity needs, caused by the decline in benefit and 
dispute claims, union sentiment on the issue of investing in the equity markets has 
changed. Marsh (1979)371 noted the amount o f ‘liquid reserves’, held by unions saying: 
“Most unions were prevented by rule or principle from profiting in the post war boom in 
equities and have not invested heavily elswhere. ”
Marsh went on to say that:
“ The 28 largest organisations with over 80 per cent o f total union membership have 
under £100 million invested and, in 1975 had investment income o f just over £9 million. ” 
Marsh goes on to say that in 1975 liquid reserves held by these same unions amounted to 
£190 million or £16 per capita. However, with the change in ‘liquidity demand’ 
investment policies have moved away from holding relatively secure investments, gilt’s 
Table. 23
QlOd. Question 10: What percentage o f investments are held in the form o f equities?
Equities Frequency Percentage
Less than 10% 0 0.0
70% - 80% V  • : L . ;  * 0 0.0
Over 80% - i ;  o 0.0
60 - 70% 1 2.4
10-20% 2 4.8
30 - 40% 3 7.1
40 - 50% 8 19.0
20 - 30% 14 33.3
50 - 60% 14 33.3
The total number o f respondents to this question, TUC and non-TUC was 42. 
Source: the Pin-Point Survey 2002 (Ray Edwards)
371 Marsh (1979) p 25
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and near liquid portfolios, towards higher risk (potentially higher return) equity 
portfolios. Data taken from the Pin-Point Survey of trade unions undertaken in 2002 
(Table. 23) illustrates the level of equity holdings and the considerations, which 
influence investment decisions on the part of the unions that responded in the survey.
5.18. Table. 23 shows that of the respondent unions, representing over 5 million 
membership, over 52 percent had equity portfolios to the value of between 40 and 60 
percent of total investments. Whilst more than 38 percent had equity holdings of less 
than 30 percent of their total invested funds, only one union responding to the survey 
indicated that it held more than 60 percent of its invested funds in equities. The amount 
of funds invested in equity markets remains relatively cautionary at circa 20 to 30 
percent for a third of the trade unions covered by the Pin-Point Survey. Table 24 shows 
how poorly investment income has performed in recent years, the fall in financial
Table. 24
All Unions
Investment income % growth
Investment
Percentage
Growth
Income per annum
1978 17,432,000
1979 22,404,000 28.52
1980 25,885,000 15.53
1981 23,626,000 -8.73
1982 29,325,000 24.12
1983 30,502,000 4.01
1984 31,309,000 2.64
1985 36,441,000 16.39
1986 34,644,000 -4.94
1987 35,011,000 1.05
1988 38,639,000 10.36
1989 39,151,000 1.32
1990 41,198,000 5.22
1991 39,938,000 -3.06
1992 41,266,000 3.32
1993 37,735,000 -8.56
1994 33,260,000 -12
1995 34,649,000 4.17
1996 35,305,000 1.89
1997 35,902,000 1.69
1998 41,679,000 16.09
1999 40,626,000 -2.53
2000 46,112,000 13.5
Average growth o f investment income = 6.6% .
Source: Certification Office Annual Reports 197*f - 2000
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markets over recent years. Aggregate annual income growth in the ten years between 
1978 and 1988 more than doubled, however, over the next twelve years it declined by 7 
percent. This decline manifested itself in the form of modest growth in investment 
income of 6.6 percent average over the whole period from 1978, which, after allowing 
for inflation, is in fact negative growth.
5.19. However, whilst the performance for all unions has been poor, that for 
unions, which are members of ‘the club’, has been much worse over the past 25 
years. As the data analysed in this Chapter shows, these largest unions have 
contributed disproportionately to the amount of investment income and liquidated 
assets that have been consumed during the past 25 years. Furthermore, they have 
in aggregate terms, performed financially far less well than their smaller 
contemporaries, as Table 25 shows 
Table 25
Unions over 100k membership(‘the club’) investment levels compared against Unions with less 
than 100k membership
Unions Number Unions Unions Number Unions
100k plus Of 100k plus Under 100k Of Under 100k
Year Investments
r
Unions Membership Investments
-C
Unions Membership
1980
&
132,195,000 25 10,267,084
X
39,205,000 364 2,357,369
1981 130,232,000 25 9,659,600 55,512,000 408 2,634,903
1982 149,623,000 23 9,227,149 54,065,000 386 2,489,597
1983 163,599,000 22 9,040,069 55,014,000 365 2,231,699
1984 141,011,000 21 8,451,195 71,630,000 343 2,302,798
1985 160,836,000 24 8,780,534 79,911,000 340 2,018,919
1986 171,593,000 24 8,518,316 82,635,000 324 2,063,896
1987 168,416,000 24 8,446,216 88,919,000 296 2,025,521
1988 173,887,000 23 8,342,064 93,563,000 281 2,037,439
1989 161,450,000 23 8,163,414 90,454,000 277 1,876,228
1990 158,972,000 23 8,001,574 91,881,000 264 1,806,404
1991 150,385,000 23 7,702,855 94,284,000 253 1,782,128
1992 172,359,000 20 7,159,233 100,334,000 269 1,764,981
1993 123,394,000 19 6,850,096 118,706,000 263 1,811,197
1994 106,734,000 17 6,517,464 134,122,000 243 1,708,122
1995 126,200,000 16 6,351,012 139,811,000 231 1,677,064
1996 174,813,000 16 6,481,482 110,917,000 224 1,452,307
1997 183,227,000 16 6,348,926 129,310,000 217 1,410,363
1998 201,253,000 16 6,399,507 138,631,000 204 1,407,910
1999 224,856,000 16 6,480,864 145,051,000 202 1,362,584
2000 224,856,000 16 6,480,864 145,051,000 202 1,362,584
2001 228,478,000 16 6,397,915 172,177,000 190 1,324,357
2002 248,429,000 16 6,400,225 161,218,000 180 1,339,443
Source: Certification Office Annual Reports 1980 to 2000
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The Top Unions (‘the club’) Performance
5.20. Whilst the finances of trade unions generally are a cause for concern, of greater 
concern is the performance of the largest unions, given the increasing concentration of 
the overwhelming majority of membership in a few large ‘conglomerate’ unions.
Whilst the trend has been for smaller unions to transfer to the larger unions, in aggregate 
the smaller unions are financially healthier, over the period since 1979. Table 25 
illustrates the investment performance of unions with 100,000 membership+ (‘the club’) 
compared with all unions with a lesser number of members.
5.21. In 1980 ‘the club’ held £128.87 of investments per member, whilst the smaller 
unions held £166.33. By the end of 2002 the investments held per member for each 
union group were, £388.16 an increase of 200 percent and £1,203.62 an increase of 625 
percent. Figure 25 shows how both union groups lost considerable membership and 
unions over the period. However, a major proportion of the loss of membership and 
unions from the smaller union group resulted from transfers to unions in ‘the club’. 
Undy et al (1996)372 indicates this cycle occurring over the period 1982 to 1989. A 
further fact worthy of note is that in 1996 the British Medical Association became a 
‘member’ of ‘the club’. Thereby adding its investments of £34.5mln to the aggregate 
for that group, with the concomitant reduction for the smaller union group. Regard must 
also be had for the Royal College of Nursing which is within ‘the club’ however, shows 
no investment holdings within its accounts, which has a marginal negative effect upon 
the per capita investments of this group of unions. The position of each group in respect 
of ‘net wealth’ (funds) shows a similar trend of decline for ‘the club’ unions and, an 
increase for the smaller union group.
5.22. In 1977, 26 unions in ‘the club’, had 10,306,033 members representing 81 percent 
of total union membership, they also held 80 percent of total net wealth (funds). By the 
end of 2002 the 16 unions with over 100,000+ members had 6,400,255 members which 
represented 82 percent of total membership, and held 64 percent of the total net wealth 
(funds). Put another way, 18 percent of union members hold 36 percent of the 
movements net wealth. The situation is little better if one compares investment holdings. 
The top 26 unions in 1977 with 81 percent of total membership held £126 million whilst 
the remaining unions with 19 percent membership held £30.5 million in percentage 
terms, 80 percent and 20 percent respectively. By 2002 the percentage of investments 
held had changed to 60.6 percent and 39.4 percent respectively.
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5.23. Comparisons between the total assets of these respective unions groups over the 
same period show the picture is similar. In 1977 ‘the club’ unions held assets valued at 
£209.2 million, all other unions held assets valued at £53 million 80 percent and 20 
percent respectively. At the end of 2002, assets held by ‘the club’ was £651.2 million 
and all other unions held £354 million 64.7 percent and 35.3 percent respectively. The 
comparative income of ‘the club’ unions over the period shows them to have performed 
little better. In 1977 the top 26 unions had an annual contribution income of nearly 
£118 million with total expenditure of £110 million, with investment and other income 
of £43 million, giving a net surplus of total income over total expender of nearly 
£50million, and total expenditure of £110,565,000 and investment and ‘other income’ of 
£42,533,000, giving a net surplus of total income over total expenditure of £49,935,000. 
By the end of 2002, the number of unions in this group had reduced to 16 through 
amalgamation with other TUC unions373. The contribution income of these 16 unions at 
the end of 2002 was £483million and their total expenditure was £572 million, 
investment and ‘other income’ of £86 million, giving a net surplus of £13,2 million.
5.24. When making comparisons between ‘the club’ unions and the smaller unions it 
must be bom in mind that some of these ‘smaller unions’ are effectively ‘professional 
associations’ organising relatively higher income groups of employees, and charge 
correspondingly higher contribution levels. However, these same unions provide high 
quality individualised membership services, and have historically relied less upon 
collective bargaining as a process of servicing membership, therefore their service 
delivery cost structure tends to be higher. Given the move away from collective 
bargaining confirmed in Cully et al (1999) (WERS), this is the type of cost structure with 
which trade unions in many situations will have to cope in the future. However, many of 
these smaller unions are also some of the ‘oldest unions’, which earlier in union history 
were themselves within ‘the club’, and whilst membership has declined investment 
portfolios and assets have not declined proportionately. In the main, it is within this 
‘smaller union’ group that the researcher will find the type of union to which Latta 
(1972) referred as asset rich and able to operate over prolonged periods of membership 
and contribution income decline by “living o f the proceeds o f their assets Perhaps, it 
is for this reason that the level of investment holding within this group and investment 
income is much healthier than that for ‘the club’ unions. Also, why these same unions
372 Undy et al (1996) Table 3.7 p47
373 In addition this same group of unions undertook the majority of the transfers of engagements with smaller 
unions during this period, amounting to some 540,000 members, many of these being non-TUC unions.
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many of which have experienced prolonged membership decline Willman (1993), due to 
their industrial sector decline, have not so far found the need, to amalgamate for financial 
reasons. However, their relative wealth is starting to show the ravages of 25 or more 
years of declining membership, and ‘living off the family silver’. For the largest unions, 
coincidentally those same unions, which have been the most aggressive ‘merging 
unions’, the depletion of investments and assets has been greatest, and the likelihood that 
they will acquire wealth through their merger activities is remote, as was noted by 
Willman (2005).
Overstated union membership affects density and financial data
5.25. Contribution rates in the year 2001-2002 were on average £2.19 per week374, some
0.38 percent of average earnings, according to figures published by the TUC. However, 
if this figure of £2.19 per week is to be accepted as a reasonably accurate reflection of 
the average contribution level, it calls into question whether the ‘claimed’ membership 
for ‘listed unions’ is accurate at 7.6 million in 2002375. The aggregate contribution 
income, based upon this average contribution, should have been circa £854 million, 
instead it was £590376 million, 31 per cent lower. Allowing for the fact that in aggregate 
only 80 per cent377 of contributions are collected each year, this leaves an additional 
shortfall of 11 per cent of aggregate contributions. The inconsistencies in these figures 
may be accounted for in part by the fact that within their ‘claimed’ membership trade 
unions carry a high percentage of what can only be termed ‘ghost members’ (see Table 
27). These members have joined the union at some time and have lapsed their 
membership but have not been removed from the unions records. Under their rules some 
unions have arrangements whereby such members are maintained ‘on the books’, in 
order to ensure their membership is continuous for benefit purposes, or is maintained 
extant for when they return to work.
5.26. Given that the density of trade union membership is measured as a percentage of 
the number of employees in employment within the UK, the aggregate figures for trade 
union membership used for the purpose of measuring density appear to be overstated. 
For example, the Certification Officers Annual Reports for the period 1998 to 2001 show
374 John Monks. General Secretary TUC, statement to the TUC General Council, Press Release September 
2002.
375 Certification Officers Annual Report 2001-2002
376 Data taken from the Certification Officers Annual Report
377 Figure calculated using published data, for aggregate contribution income and membership, in the 
Certification Officers Annual Reports for the period 1978-79 to 2002
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that the total number of contributing members was significantly less than total 
membership shown in the annual report data, (see Table 27).
Table 27
‘Ghost’ Membership 1999-2002 
1999-2000 -6 percent
2000-2001 -10 percent
2001-2002 -10 percent
2002-2003 -11 percent
Source: Annual Reports of the Certification Officer 1999-2000 to 2002-2003378
These percentage differences in the total membership figure and the total for 
‘contributing membership’ are made up of (according to the Certification Officer): 
“retired, unemployed, long term sick, and members on maternity/paternity/child-care 
leave ”
Whilst those on long term sick, matemity/patemity/child-care leave may resume work, 
and therefore become ‘contributing members’ of their particular union, it is less probable 
in respect of the retired and unemployed categories. Consequently, the density for trade 
Figure 17.
Ghost membership (selected unions) 2001-2002
25 i
15
10
5
0
^  ^  ^
union
Source: Certification Office Report -  Union Annual Returns (AR21 data) 2001-2002
j78 Note: The C ertification Officer Annual Reports show a variation between claim ed m em bership and 
contributing m em bership continued, in 2002-2003 the difference was 11%, in 2003-2004 the difference was 
12%.
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union membership must be regarded as inaccurate, to the extent of almost certainly 
whatever is the aggregate number of retired and unemployed union members at the date 
of the Certification Officers data. Unfortunately the figure for these two non­
contributing member categories is not available within the published data. However, if 
the figure was say, half of the aggregate of 11 percent for 2002, this would mean that 
union membership for the purposes of measuring density reduces to circa 7,324,685 a 
reduction in trade union density of 5.5%.
5.27. Figurel7 which uses a sample of unions across the public and private sector and 
TUC and non-TUC unions illustrates the extent to which this problem of ‘ghost’ 
membership varies across union types. Unions such as EQUITY and the NUJ which tend 
to have a more fluid employment market than is the norm for most other unions have by 
far the largest percentage of their membership within the ‘ghost’ category at any given 
time. Second, are those unions within the medical profession, where the frequency of 
training and re-training of a medium to long-term nature is high. Third are the teaching 
unions, which, similar to the medical profession, have a high proportion of membership, 
involved in training. BALPA is unique with an employment market more structured 
towards short-term contract work and seasonal contract work due to the vagaries of the 
charter flight business. The fourth and final group are the conglomerate or general 
unions, which show a significantly lower level of ‘ghost’ membership. The average 
‘ghost’ membership for the unions in Figure 17 is 12.8 percent. The aggregate 
membership for these unions in 2001-2002 was 5,120,068 net o f ‘ghost’ membership the 
figure declines to 4,464,993 a loss of 655,075 full fee paying members.
5.28. It is not possible to say with any precision what the net effect of ‘ghost’ 
membership is upon the finances of any individual trade union or trade unions in 
aggregate, because the precise data by which to make such calculations is not available. 
Furthermore, the contribution levels between individual unions vary greatly, and there is 
considerable variation in contribution rates within individual unions. However, it has 
been indicated earlier the ‘short-fall’ in per capita income, which, whilst not wholly 
attributable to ‘ghost’ membership, a considerable proportion must be. However, the 
problem of ‘ghost’ membership is a part of the overall problem of the ‘chum factor’, and 
whilst ‘temporarily’ non-fee paying members are nonetheless ‘members’ under union 
mles, the fact of the existence of this phenomena does little to inspire confidence that 
trade union membership figures are reliable, certainly when quoted as membership 
density. There is further evidence to support this scepticism in the analysis (elsewhere)
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of ‘pre’ and ‘post’ membership figures as at the time of a trade union transfer or 
amalgamation. Perhaps therefore, there is a need to review the basis for calculating union 
membership density. A new approach should have regard for the fact that, whilst the 
“retired and unemployed” may be regarded as members by some unions under the terms 
of their rules (albeit in the main non-contributing) they are not appropriate to be regarded 
as ‘employees’ for the purposes of measuring union membership density.
Fundamental Divergences between Income and Expenditure
5.29. In 1977 UK unions generated a modest surplus of total contribution income over 
total expenditure379. Income from investments and all other sources (‘other income’) 
added a further surplus. However, within ten years the surplus of contribution income 
over gross expenditure became a substantial deficit. By1992 the deficit had grown 
significantly and, by the end of 2002, the deficit represented 24 per cent of aggregate 
contribution income. Table 28 illustrates these divergences in contribution income and 
expenditure over the past 25 years. . Gross expenditure between 1992 and 2002 had 
accelerated significantly, to a point where it represented 98% of total income. It is this 
‘runaway’ growth in gross expenditure that resulted in the significant deterioration in 
overall financial performance, resulting in many unions actually losing funds over this 
Table 28.
Growing gap between contribution income and gross expenditure
Surpus/deficit income Investment Total
over expenditure plus other income surpus/deficit
£000 £000 £000
1977 4,700 25,300 30,000
1987 59,800- 90,600 30,800
1992 83,200- 105,200 21,900
2002 152,000- 154,700 2,400
Source: Certification Officers Annual Reports 1979-
period.
In 2002, six of the top sixteen unions showed a net deficit of gross expenditure over 
gross income, thus actually reducing their net wealth, something which has not occurred 
during the past 50 years.
379 Financial data is taken from trade the Certification Officers Annual Reports, it includes financial data for 
the TUC which is a relatively small amount of resources and has very limited affect upon the aggregated 
figures.
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5.30. Therefore during the past 25 years, whilst contribution income had increased by 
£507.7 million and investment income and ‘other income’ had increased by £137.8 
million the net surplus had actually decreased by 51 percent to £2.3 million. Willman 
and Morris (1988) noted that the ratio of total income to total expenditure was moving 
close to ‘unitary’, by the end of 2002 it was almost there! The impact of all this upon 
the level of investments over the same period is that, whilst total investments have grown 
over the period (see Table 29), portfolio holdings have not kept pace with inflation .
Table 29
Investment Portfolio Growth all trade unions 1977-2002 [millions]
1977 £157.3
1987 £216.4
1992 £271.2
1997 £434.5
2002 £443.1
Source: Certification Officers Annual Reports 1977 -  2002
Similarly, whilst investment income has grown, after allowing for inflation its growth 
has been modest. This is particularly so when the return on almost all forms of 
investment in markets generally during this period achieved record levels.
5.31. Therefore, allowing for market performance and inflation the investments held by 
unions, as a percentage of total wealth, were considerably lower in 2002 than in 
1977.The consequential affect of the relative decline in investment portfolios has been a 
reduction by 50 percent in the income emanating from this source. Contribution income 
was also falling over this same period, by some 17 percent. The ‘gap’ created between 
income and expenditure has been filled by ‘other income’ primarily from the liquidation 
of assets. A process which has also contributed to the decline in the level of investments 
and, ceteris paribus, the income they generate, a development about which Willman and 
Morris (1988), mentioned earlier, also cautioned.
5.32. Undy et al (1996)380 shows that unions whilst losing membership were evidently 
gaining some economies of scale because of their ability to:
1. reduce full-time staff and officials;
2. reduce fixed asset costs (offices maintenance, etc);
3. generally, reduce operating overheads;
4. reduce or discontinue friendly benefits381 and,
380 Undy et al (1996) pp 56-58
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5. liquidate assets;
Accepting that almost all unions adopt accounting policies, which grossly understate the 
value of their fixed assets, usually, their various office premises, therefore their 
‘liquidated’ net worth is likely to be considerably greater than that shown in their annual 
accounts. The fact is that the financial resources, which can be accessed, have 
diminished and continue to diminish at an accelerating rate Willman (2005). The 
availability of these additional liquidated resources has been ‘fortuitous’ however, it is a 
declining income stream and one not likely to be repeated. As well as economies of 
scale, unions have benefited from the reduced calls on resources to support industrial 
disputes, which, according to Davies (2001) reduced from 12.9 million days lost p.a. on 
average in the 1970’s to 7.2 million p.a. in the 1980’s and down to 660,000 p.a. in the 
1990’s 382.
Table 30
Trade union worth 1975 to 2002 — All TTK trade unions
2002 2001 1985 1975
1 Net worth
Per capita 117.68 114.76 48.82 16.32
2 Tnvest. Tncome 
As % total income
5.85% 4.93% 9% 10%
3 Subs Tncome 
As % total income
79.87% 70.68% 80% 83%
4 Other Tncome 
As % total income
13.33% 17.52% 11% 7%
5 Solvency ratio 0.89 1.04 1.07 1.15
6 Operating Ratio 1.12 1.15 1.46 1.95
7 Administration 98.31 84.57% 73% 75%
NOTES:
1 Net worth is the per capita value o f investments and assets.
2 Solvency is the ratio o f available funds (minus liabilities) to expenditure
3 Operating ratio is the ratio o f available funds to expenditure
Source:Calculated using Raw Data taken from Certification Officers Reports 1975 to 2002; 
updating Willman et al (1988)
381 The Annual Reports of the Certification Officer no longer give separate data in respect o f Membership 
Benefits, however, in the Certification Officers Report for 1975 the amount of total trade union expenditure 
on Benefits was £16,689,000 or 16.8 percent of contribution income.
382 Davies. J. Labour Disputes in 2001. National Statistics Feature. Office for National Statistics, London, 
2001.
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Therefore, union deteriorating financial performance throughout the period, even 
allowing for membership decline, having regard for this further evidence should be a 
cause for concern on the part of trade union leaders.
5.33. Table 30 illustrates the way in which various aspects of trade union financial 
performance have been moving over the reference period. The table illustrates that the 
trend, which Willman et al (1993) showed to be emerging in 1988, has in fact continued. 
However, Willman and Morris (1988) whilst appearing to intimate there was a growing 
trend to depend upon income other than from members contributions, he could not have 
foreseen the shift to a large dependency upon other income flowing from liquidated 
assets383. Willman et al (1993) explained the probability that the defining differences 
between the wealth of manual unions and white-collar unions being the fact that the 
former had built up large investment and asset reserves, they could likely withstand 
membership loss far better. However, he warned that liquidation could not continue to 
underwrite fundamental divergences between income and expenditure.
5.34. The decline in the investment income component of total income appears therefore 
to be a symptom of failing investment portfolios, both in terms of relative size and yield. 
H ie replacement of investment income with what is referred to as ‘other income’ is 
possibly of greater concern. The ‘non-core’ activities of unions do earn some additional 
income, however, not of the levels indicated by ‘other income’ within their accounts. In 
the main this ‘other income’, as we have said elswhere, emanates from liquidation of 
investments and assets released through the process of rationalisation caused by 
membership loss and reduced scale of operation, and the process of rationalisation that 
takes place subsequent to amalgamations and transfers.
5.35. Over the period since 1978 the £2Billion mentioned earlier which listed trade 
unions have consumed is made up of, over £1.3 billion of ‘other income’, together with 
£830 million of investment income. These two sources of income produced revenue 
equal to 21% of the income raised by contributions over the period. However, these 
sources of ‘subsidy’ have been depleting fast over the past 25 years. Therefore, if in the 
near future as it appears likely, unions can no longer rely upon non-contribution income 
streams as a means of subsidising artificially low contribution levels, the question arises,
383 Prof Paul Willman in his later research Fernie. S and Metcalf. D. (2005) (eds) Trade Unions: 
Resurgence or Perdition? Routledee. to be published in mid 2005), does illustrate that the trend of financial 
decay had continued and, that the increasing tendency to consume investment income and the proceeds from 
liquidated assets as a significant contributor to trade unions managing to stay solvent.
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will they be able to increase contribution levels by a sufficient amount to replace this lost 
‘subsidy’? Also, is it likely that if the reason for applying a ‘subsidy’ to contribution 
costs was for the primary purpose of keeping contributions low, will efforts to increase 
contributions to more realistic levels seriously inhibit union attempts to recruit and retain 
membership? A Very serious question to be addressed by a trade union movement, 
which is hoping for a renaissance that is yet to arrive.
5.36. As we have shown earlier, the long-term reliance upon income from sources other 
than membership contributions is becoming increasingly tenuous, and its demise could 
be accelerated by any collapse of the financial markets similar to that experienced in 
recent years. The changes in investment policies that increased the tendency of trade 
unions to hold a higher proportion of equities384, possibly because of the reduced need to 
hold high levels of near liquid investments, exposed them to market vagaries upon a 
significant portion of their asset wealth. The consequential effect has been that income 
from these sources has tended to decline Willman (2005). Given the possible decline in 
income from investments, and the depletion in portfolio values, the affect is likely to be 
serious particularly for those unions already facing financial problems, relying upon 
investments for a high percentage of total income. Such a development could trigger an 
unexpected, intensively aggressive, phase in the propensity to merge Undy et al (1996). 
Previously asset rich unions, who have ‘consumed the family silver’ may feel the need to 
look to amalgamation as the answer to the increasingly hostile financial environment.
What affect do mergers have upon financial strength?
5.37. Unions appear to have increasingly viewed green-field recruitment, particularly 
where employers are antipathetic towards recognition as a very expensive approach to 
developing their membership in order to retain ‘size’ Willman (2001)385, Willman 
(2005). However, membership development by acquisition whilst ‘consolidatory’ and a 
more aggregated method of adding to a unions size, does not add proportionately to trade 
union density. In addition, membership acquired by such means is more often than not 
already covered by recognition, consequently it is not ‘expansionist’, as it adds nothing 
to the organised strength of the trade union movement. Consequently, it can be argued 
that growth by acquisition has been a diversionary activity that unions have engaged in 
to protect size, influence and finances, but at the cost of morbidity in union membership
384 Willman et al (1993) p8 show how this process began to shape as long ago as 1950 with assets held in 
British Government Securities at 50%; Municipal Securities at 10.5%; and cash deposits at 23.9%.
385 Willman (2001) pp 97-117.
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and density. It has also brought with it a range of problems that have created weakness 
rather than strength. Aston (1990) noted that the majority of acquired unions were 
under 5,000 members, had declining membership, declining resources and low levels of 
assets per capita, which doubtless imported economic problems to the acquiring union.
(MSF -  AEU -  Amicus)
5.38. The failing financial performance of both the AEU over the period from the 1970’s 
into the 1990’s is discussed at length in Willman et al (1993)386. MSF’s financial failure 
has been a continuum throughout most of its history, certainly from the 1960’s, as 
ASSET and ASTMS387. After its amalgamation with the Association of Scientific 
Workers, MSF owed much of its membership growth throughout the period since that 
time, to its policy of growth by acquisition and by diversifying its membership structure. 
ASSET through its various novations became in effect a very competitive, aggressively 
acquisitive, ‘conglomerate white-collar union’. Over the period from 1977, MSF 
membership grew from 441,000 to 653,000 ten years later388, having merged with many 
smaller unions through transfers of engagements. Like most independent white-collar 
unions, MSF was never financially strong, however, throughout this same period 
notwithstanding its membership growth its financial strength moved in inverse ratio and 
latterly deteriorated dramatically.
5.39. Part of its financial difficulties may have emerged from its amalgamation with 
TASS which, through its amalgamations with other unions during the period 1983 -  85, 
experienced a dramatic decline in its overall financial position Willman et al (1993). 
MSF lost 49,000389 members by 1990, two years after the TASS amalgamation. Willman 
et al (1993) identified the parlous condition of MSF’s finances in the early 1990’s, 
shortly after its amalgamation with TASS, caused by the fact that both unions were in 
serious financial difficulties at the time of their amalgamation. It is clear that MSF had 
made efforts over many years to get control of its deepening debt crisis390. Much of it 
caused by the same reasons many other unions had encountered similar problems 
throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, loss of membership contribution income, very little 
investment income and very weak reserves. MSF however, appears to have been a 
victim of its own success. Many of the smaller unions with which it transferred
386 Willman. et al (1993) pp 154-169.
387 Willman. et al (1993) p 25
388 Annual Report of the Certification Officer 1978 -88
389 Annual Report of the Certification Officer 1990-91
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engagements brought increased membership, in many cases lower levels of contribution 
income per capita and little by way of reserves. However, they brought added 
membership servicing costs. These factors plus an apparent failure to quickly rationalise 
its structure at each transfer and merger acquisition added disproportionately to MSF’s 
operating costs.
5.40. Throughout the period of 1990 to 1996 MSF lost 158,000 members, equivalent to 
80 percent of the membership acquired in the amalgamation with TASS. The loss 
appears to have been a major contributory reason for MSF closing 10 of its offices 
around the country during 1995-96391. This provided the opportunity to liquidate these 
assets in order to clear the major proportion of its long outstanding bank debt of some 
£15mln. The General Purposes and Finance Committee (GPFC) Report to the Annual 
Conference of 1996 said of the office closures:
“This was in order to assist the union’s debt reduction programme and move towards 
modern integrated regional centres ”.
By 1999 however, membership had collapsed to 404,741 only slightly higher than its 
pre- TASS amalgamation level. Consequently by 2000 MSF’s financial situation had 
deteriorated further, to the extent that the GPFC reported:
“the union is unable to extend and expand the range o f services required for the 
future. ”
The financial and membership collapse of MSF must be viewed against the background 
that it was ‘the’ most successful union in achieving transfers and mergers. MSF’s 
success in the period up to the early 1990’s, in growing predominantly by acquisition, 
rather than organic development, appears to have given little advantage by way of long­
term membership stability or financial strength, to the contrary. Part of the problems 
MSF experienced stems from the fact that it had a long-term problem of financial decline 
and most of the unions it acquired were in a similar situation. Unlike the situation 
described by Undy et al (1996) as “defensive on the one side and aggressive on the 
other”. In January 2002 MSF amalgamated with the AEU to form Amicus. 
Interestingly, in the year prior to its amalgamation with the AEU, MSF ‘shed’ some
390 MSF Annual Conference Agenda 1996, page 4 paragraph 37, also MSF Annual Conference Agenda 
1997, page 5, paragraph 39.
391 At this time (1995) MSF had long outstanding debt to its bankers of some £15,000,000 (as can be seen in 
its accounts for the period) with very little by way of investments its primary capital resources were its fixed 
assets mainly offices.
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54,000392 members, therefore at amalgamation to form Amicus, MSF had a membership 
of 350,974. Slightly less than the level of membership, it held in 1976.
Table 31
Financial Consequences o f amalgamation
MSF AEU Amicus
£ £ £
Per capita contributions 75.02 52.5 59.91
Additional income per capita 0.58 13.7(5 14.34
Total expenditure per capita 79 57.98 64.82
Surplus/deficit -3.4 8.28 9.43
Funds per capita 40.56 90.28 74,11
Investment Portfolio 2,296,000 61,918,000 64,214,000
Total Funds 14,239,000 65,748,000 79.987,000
Total Assets 19,815,000 65,748,000 85,563,000
Total liabilities 5,576,000 12,123,000 17,699,000
Source: Certification Officer Annual Report 2000-2001
Figure 31 constructs a picture of the consequences of bring together MSF and the 
AEUillustrate the financial situation of the AEU and MSF at the year-end (2001) prior to 
amalgamation, and shows the primary features of the ‘estimated’ combined financial 
resources of Amicus, going forward into the amalgamations first year.
felFU -  BGSU -  NATWEST - Unifi
5.41. The BIFU during the period from the 1960’s was frequently in competition with 
MSF in its membership development and acquisition campaigning within the financial 
services sector. BIFU over the period since the 1960’s has like MSF been reasonably 
successful in achieving mergers with a number of the financial services sector unions. 
However, like MSF it too appears to have been a ‘victim of its success’. Like MSF, 
whilst many unions were declining it was growing, but only in membership terms not in 
terms of financial resources.
392 This decline in membership over the course of the year prior to the amalgamation with the AEU may well 
represent an ‘administrative correction in membership due to the audit of ‘voting members’ (those eligible to 
vote under the unions rules) for the purposes of the amalgamation ballot. Nonetheless, it is a phenomenon 
that can be identified at almost every amalgamation ballot.
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5.42. The individual bank unions, which comprised the Clearing Bank Union, had been 
in competition with BIFU throughout much of its existence. Consequently, the 
amalgamation of BIFU, NatWest and Barclays staff unions to form Unifi was viewed as 
the ending of the divisive wrangling within the clearing banks and the development 
leading to ‘the’ major heavyweight union covering the bank and financial services sector 
Morris et al (2001). However, the merger of the three organisations appears to have 
involved a series of ‘compromises’ particularly in respect of the financial structure of the 
new union Morris et al (2001) say:
“the outcome was a compromise based on central control in principle but with 
substantial devolved autonomy over spending”.
Morris likened the merger to a “reverse take-over”. At the time of the merger, whilst 
BIFU was some three times larger than the either of the other two unions it was by far 
the financially weaker, and consequently not in a strong negotiating position to impose 
its financial administrative structure upon its merger partners. Nonetheless, whilst 
NatWest and the Barclays Staff Union were financially stronger, they both suffered from 
the same problems of an industry undergoing major restructuring and consequently 
declining membership, the scenario facing all of the parties to the merger was basically 
the same, requiring the same response of a ‘defensive merger’. By adopting a ‘flexible’ 
structure, particularly in respect of the degree of autonomy over finance, it was hoped by 
all three unions that this would help in developing future mergers with the other staff 
unions within the financial services sector, Morris et al (2001).
5.43. Unfortunately, some two years in from the amalgamation the ‘flexibility’ does not 
appear to have been the success hoped for. Some of the problems of Unifi are associated 
with the continuing haemorrhaging of jobs and membership within the sector. 
However, it appears that the problems go deeper than this and resolve themselves to a 
large degree in terms of financial resources and the viability of the newly amalgamated 
union, and the need for further ‘defensive mergers’.
5.44. BIFU, historically, suffered from the problem of all white-collar unions, a very 
high dependency upon contribution income with little additional income from 
investments. Also a high staff to membership ratio and consequently high administrative 
costs. Immediately prior its amalgamation to form Unifi, BIFU had at the end of 1998,
106,000 members, with a per capita contribution income of £62.00 and a total per capita 
income of £67.96. BIFU held only £791,000 in investments and had total assets of 
£3,663,000 (per capita £34.55) and total funds of £2,987,000 (per capita £28.17).
157
5.45. At the end of 1999, its first year393 as Unifi its membership was 171,249, however, 
its financial resources did not reflect such a large accretion in membership. Unifi’s per 
capita contribution income was £36.87 with a total per capita income of £40.81. The 
unions investments improved to £3,731,000 and total assets increased to £8,412,000 (per 
capita £49.12) however, total funds reduced to £4,466,000 (per capita £26.07). In this 
first year Unifi had a deficit of total expenditure over total income of £3,177,000.
5.46. By the end of 2000 Unifi’s membership had declined to 160,267 and it is evident 
that at the time there were no short-term possibilities of further ‘defensive mergers’, with 
any of the other sector unions. The possibility of merging with MSF because of its 
‘know’ financial problems was not seen as a viable prospect. Unifi’s financial position 
began to weaken, its per capita contribution income was £62.00 with a total income per 
capita of £70.20, whilst its total costs were per capita £75.00. The union’s investments 
had reduced to £2,489,000 (per capita £15.53) and total assets had declined to 
£7,803,000 (per capita £48.68). At the end of this its second year Unifi had a deficit of 
£766,000. Given that MSF has merged with the AEU to form Amicus, it comes as little 
surprise therefore that Unifi and Amicus have recently announced that negotiations are at 
an advance stage to establish a basis for amalgamation, a development which Morris et 
al (2001) appear to have gleaned as a possibility. Particularly so, given the increasing 
exploitation of technology facilitating the trend for many of financial services companies 
to outsource major employment sectors of their operations, and increasingly transfer high 
labour cost operations overseas to low edmirigs economies. All of which is having a 
serious affect upon unions organising within the financial sector.
393 These figures are based upon only a part year (7 months) the amalgamation registration date was 11-5 — 
99 therefore the figures for income of all forms should have regard for this fact. However, as the data shows, 
in the subsequent years membership declined and finances improved only slightly.
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CHAPTER FOUR
6. Survival Strategies, Organisational Change and Union Mergers.
6.1. This chapter explores the strategies many unions have developed in their efforts to 
replace ‘core membership’ losses sustained since 1979. Some unions, including public 
sector unions, have developed their organisations into new ‘structural formats’. In some 
cases these strategies have been developed to follow their traditional membership into 
new public sector organisations, and forms of employment in the private sector, when 
public undertakings have been privatised. To achieve this some unions have moved into 
new areas of employment through the process of transfers of engagements and mergers. 
Some have become general unions394 and the largest have become ‘conglomerates’. In 
many cases this has increased recruitment in ‘brown-field’ unionised areas or industries, 
which has tended to exacerbate the degree of organising overlap and inter-union 
competition.
6.2. The chapter analyses the preoccupation of some unions with these processes of 
change, and argues whilst helping some unions to maintain their operation, and 
‘survive’, it has added little in terms of the strength of survivor unions and the movement 
as a whole Willman and Aston (1988)395 Willman et al (1993)396 Metcalfe (2004)397. 
Research addressing the value of union merger policies, until recently, generally saw the 
process as an uncoordinated attempt to consolidate membership, rationalise structures, 
and survive Parodi (1997), Undy (1996). However, more recent research tends to 
confirm many of the results of the thesis research, that the process has been failing, in 
many of these objectives, Willman (2005)398. Metcalfe (2004) is sanguine in his view 
saying:
394 The ISTC is one such union. It developed a policy of ‘community unionism’ seeking to follow its 
membership into areas of employment within communities where large scale redundancies through steel 
plant closures had driven large numbers o f ISTC members into other forms of employment within the 
community. Since completing the research for this thesis the ISTC amalgamated with NUKFAT in May 
2004 to become a section of the ISTC -COMMUNITY union, NUKFAT had experienced problems of 
membership loss similar to the ISTC. It was a union specialising in a particular declining industry that 
historically had tended to be geographically localised and therefore the ‘Community Union’ organising 
approach appeared to fit its needs. As yet there are few examples of the benefits which may emerge from the 
‘Community Organisng’ approach. Other examples are unions, which had specialised in organising civil 
servants, that changed their organising policies to follow membership into services which were privatised.
395 Willman and Aston (1988) p 98
396 Willman et al (1993) pp 154-198
397 Metcalfe. D., (2004) British Unions: Resurgence or Perdition? Provocation Series, Volume 1 
Number 1, The Work Foundation, London
398 Willman (2005)
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“The bulk o f mergers were aimed at raising market share -  shuffling members around-  
rather than generating scale economies which would release extra resources for 
servicing and organising”.
The analysis of pre and post-merger membership levels illustrates that ‘acquired growth’ 
may not have helped improve the membership levels of some unions, and has probably, 
for the trade union movement as a whole, contributed significantly to the ‘chum factor’ 
and aggregate density loss. The data also shows that the structure of the trade union 
movement, certainly so far as removing wasteful competition is concerned, has not been 
improved by this process of transfers and mergers, an argument with which Willman 
(2005) broadly agrees.
6.3. The analysis in this chapter is ‘overarching’, interrelating with Chapter One and 
particularly with Chapter Three on union finance. To explain this a model is constructed 
which is derived from an approach first devised by Berkowitz (1954) and reproduced in 
Willman et al (1993). The model used in the thesis is based upon the Berkowitz 
paradigm but utilises a different approach in illustrating the analysis and argument, 
which it is believed represents a more thorough explanation. The model also illustrates 
theoretically the cost structure of recruitment in a ‘green-field’ situation as it might have 
applied pre 1979. Illustrating the manner in which the employer subsidy and ultimately 
the closed shop developed and made a significant contribution to financing trade union 
growth and stability.
6.4. A disaggregated analysis is undertaken of the changing structure of union 
membership, in terms of occupation, gender and age, for all unions, comparing TUC 
unions and non-TUC unions. The analysis utilises data taken from the Labour Force 
Survey series 2002 and Certification Officer Annual Reports for the period, data taken 
from the TUC Organisation and Membership Department records. This aspect of the 
chapter illustrates that; the age and gender profile, which has developed over the past 25 
years, is an issue, which if not successfully addressed will reinforce the long-term 
problems of membership decline. Part of the analysis of membership recruitment and 
retention utilises a paradigm that focuses upon the processes of ‘achieved growth’ and 
‘received growth’. The chosen model is similar to that developed by Bain and Price 
(1980) to illustrate growth and decline in union membership, which illustrates the two 
processes of, the ‘virtuous cycle’ and, the ‘vicious cycle’. The model shows growth, first 
developing because o f ‘initiated organising (recruiting) activity’ by a union. Secondly by 
‘received growth’, that is growth which occurs or results from developments consequent
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upon ‘initiated organising activity’ that is, growth that develops because of recognition 
being agreed and facilities for union activities being agreed by the employer, such as, the 
right and reasons for joining a trade union forming a part of the employee induction 
process, check off, paid release for representatives, office accommodation and facilities, 
administrative support etc, also agreement to operate a post entry/pre-entry close shop.
6.5. A comparative analysis of the data is undertaken to show the way in which TUC 
affiliated unions were more seriously affected by some aspects of the changes in law 
than was the case for non-TUC unions. In particular, analysis will be undertaken of the 
affects of the legislation of 1980-1982-1990, which was the sequence of legislation 
outlawing the closed shop. The data illustrates that after allowing for the membership 
loss that was taking place, because of industrial restructuring, changes in law outlawing 
the closed shop contributed to a series of step reductions in density. Using examples of 
individual unions, and aggregated data, the analysis shows that transfers and mergers 
have actually contributed to the process of decline in individual union membership and 
aggregate trade union density.
Industrial restructuring, its affects upon unions.
6.6. The diminishing size of manufacturing, and the restructuring of public sector 
industries such as coal, gas and electricity, which were de-nationalised, deregulated, 
broken up and sold, seriously affected the bedrock of employment and trade union 
membership in both manual and staff occupations. Nolan and Slater (2003)399 illustrate 
the developments that took place in labour markets over the period as a consequence of 
these changes. The new companies, owners and the new structures that emerged for the 
new businesses, proved in many cases, not to be either sympathetic because of 
management philosophy or conducive, because of relatively small size, to trade union 
organisation Cully et al (WERS)(1998)400 Millward et al (1999)401.
6.7. However, Freeman and Pelletier (1990) give three grounds for their opinion which 
was changes in law rather than contextual change caused by industrial restructuring that 
caused union decline, saying:
first, “density fell in most sectors o f the economy”; second, that: “changes within the 
industry mix o f employment were no greater in the UK than in Ireland, where density did
399 Nolan. P. and Slater. G. (2003) The Labour Market: History. Structure and Prospects in Edwards. P. 
(ed) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice. Second Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, pp58-71
400 Millward et al (1998) pp 85-94
401 Cully et al (WERS)(1999) Chapter 11
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not fa ll”; and, third: “the shift from manufacturing during the 1980 ’s was only modestly 
larger than in the 1970's, when union density rose”.
They go on to argue that just as compositional change was not a major cause of the fall 
in union density, neither was changes in the gender or ‘collar’ of worker major factors402. 
Their argument extends to discount the changed public opinion of unions, and the impact 
of the business cycle, pointing to the fact that union density continued to fall during 1986 
when the economy was rising. Arguments, which are at considerable variance to those 
of much of orthodox opinion on what were some of the principal causes of union decline. 
Having discounted much of the orthodox theories for union membership decline 
Freeman and Pelletier look for, as they say, “something more ” to explain the reasons for 
it occurring, which is they argue:
“the legal environment for industrial relations, as reflected in laws regulating union and 
management behaviour in the area o f union recognition and membership. ”
However, the overwhelming weight of evidence is such that Freeman and Pelletiers 
analysis must be placed within its correct context, as ‘one of the many contributory 
reasons for union decline’, however, it was not the major cause.
6.8. Chapter One showed that union experience over the period since 1979 has not 
commonly been one of decline, and yet the same laws applied to all unions. Furthermore, 
whilst all the Tory laws of the 1980’s were not amended or repealed, the law has 
considerably changed to now favour a return to a ‘pluralistic’ form of employee 
relations. However, these changes in law and particularly the ER Act 1999, should have 
been a watershed and helped the reversal of the decline, but, for most unions, decline has 
tended to continue particularly within the private sector. Unions have taken many 
initiatives throughout the 1980’s and to the present time, to improve their ability to 
manage the affects of the changing context in which they operated. Metcalfe (2001) also 
(2004) Waddington (2003)403 provide detailed analysis of the efforts made by the unions 
to cope with the affect of macro economic and social change.
Reducing the number of unions, the road towards ‘oligopoly’
6.9. In 1989 a survey of all unions showed that 40% had been involved in merger 
discussions Willman (1996)404. Initially, the outcomes of these discussions produced far 
less mergers than one would have imagined, given the number of unions involved. In the
402 Freeman R. and Pelletier J (1990) p i45
403 Waddington. J. (2003) Trade union Organisation, in Industrial Relations Second Edition Theory and 
Practice (edl Edwards.P. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 227-244
404 Willman (1996) p 332
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main mergers tended to involve larger unions acquiring much smaller ‘minnows’405 
Willman (1996), however, over a period of four years the financial reasons for merger 
evidently became much more acute. Declining financial reserves together with an 
accelerating decline in income and rapid growth in expenditure became more serious 
issues. Data produced by Willman (1996)406 shows that over the period 1989-1993 
unions responding to his research data questionnaire on reasons for merging said that, by 
1993 financial reserves were less of a reason, however, rapidly increasing expenditure 
and declining income had both significantly increased as reasons for seeking merger. 
The PinPoint Survey undertaken as a feature of this thesis research (Table 13) show that 
the issues of declining income and increasing expenditure had not diminished by 2002. 
Of the 40 unions representing over 6 million union members responding to the PinPoint 
Survey questionnaire just under 25% were driven by expenditure exceeding income to 
seek merger, whilst over 25% felt that income could not fund development of the union. 
However, given the rate of consumption of capital reserves over the period this also had 
become a more important consideration, with just over 20% saying that falling capital 
reserves were a consideration. In almost all cases unions ranking one of these three sub 
questions (g,h,i) as a reason for merger also ranked high one or both of the other two 
issues. Allowing for the fact that each of the four largest unions representing 3.6 million 
members are included in the respondent unions, the responses to sub questions (g,h,i) 
indicate that 36 unions representing some 2.4 million members place greatest importance 
upon deteriorating financial resources as reasons for seeking merger.
6.10. In 1979 when aggregate union membership was at its highest the top five unions 
held 45% of aggregate union membership, and 49.6 of TUC membership. At the end of 
2002 five TUC unions held 62.8% of TUC union membership, and 50.6% of aggregate 
union membership. One reason why the ‘top five’ unions have not ‘consolidated’ their 
hold on aggregate membership to the same extent as they have on TUC union 
membership is because some non-TUC unions have been growing, whereas the majority 
of TUC unions have been declining. Considering the very large number of TUC and 
non-TUC unions transferred to these ‘top five’ TUC unions (see Appendix G),
405 The type of mergers illustrated at Appendix G show this to be a fact.
406 Willman (1996) p 335; Table 2
163
Table 13
Please rank in order o f importance as reasons for deciding to enter a merger/transfer the following 
considerations (a = most important to i = least important)_________________________________________ __
Ranking of reasons for seeking merger Popularity
a. other specify......................... 0.6
b. weak competitive position 2.9
c. inability o f  union to increase subscriptions 5.6
d. decreasing membership 6.1
e. bargaining power declining 6.2
f. inability o f union to provide adequate membership services 6.5
g. depleting capital reserves 8.1
h. income not rising fast enough to fund development 10.3
i. expenditure exceeding income 9.7
Data taken from the Ray Edwards PinPoint Survey 2002
Table 14
1
The Negative Value o f Transfer and Merger 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Year Transferee Membership Transferor Membership Aggregate New Union Membership
Union at merger Union Prior to Membership Membership Loss
1978 APEX 146,000 AA staff
merger
6,700 152,700
After merger 
152,000 700
1979 BIFU 126,000 PheonixSA 9,800 135,800 131,000 4,800
1979 NGA 109,000 NUWDAT 11,400 120,400 111,000 9,400
1982 TGWU 1,700,000 NUAAW 66,800 1,766,800 **
1982 TGWU 1,700,000 NUDBTW 40,000 1,806,800 1,600,000 206,800
1982 NUGMW 866,000 SBSBSW 98,000 964,000 825,000 139,000
1982 NGA 114,000 SLADE 22,000 136,000 112,000 24,000
1983 SOGAT 185,000 NATSOPA 49,000 234,000 216,000 18,000
1984 GMB 846,000 *10 28,500 874,500 826,000 48,500
1987 SCPS 68,000
TEXTILE
CSU 33,000 101,000 81,000 20,000
1989 GMB 789,500 APEX 87,500 877,000 823,000 54,000
1990 NUR 101,000 NUS 43,000 144,000 114,000 30,000
1991 SOGAT 168,700 NGA 129,500 298,200 269,800 28,400
1991 GMB 865,000 NUTGW 36,000 901,000 884,400 16,600
1992 NALGO 764,000 NUPE 527,400 1,291,400 ***
1992 NALGO 764,000 COHSE 195,500 1,469,000 1,368,800 100,200
1996 NUCPS 102,800 IRSF 52,300 155,100 149,200 5,900
1998 PSTCU 154,300 CPSA 111,600 265,900 258,200 7,700
1999
1999
BIFU
BIFU
112.900
112.900
BGSU
NatWest
63,000
28,900
175,900
204,800 171,200 33,600
SA
1,639,900 747,600
Source: Certification Officer Annual Reports and Archive data 1978-1999
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1. Year o f merger ballot
2 & 5. Membership at date o f merger ballot as published 
by the Certification Officer
6. Aggregate membership o f merging unions
7. Actual membership as recorded by the Certification Office Records in the first AR21 after the merger.
8. Is the difference between 6 & 7
9. Is the year in which the first AR21 return was made for the merged union.
* these are 10 independent textile unions some with less than 5,000 members, however, data 
was incorporated because o f their aggregate size
** The membership figures for the mergers o f NUAAW & NUDBTW have been aggregated in 
calculating the 1982 new union membership figure
*** The membership figures for the mergers o f  COHSE & NUPE have been aggregated in 
calculating the 1982 new union membership figure_______________________________________________
it might have been expected that the data would have shown a higher density for these 
‘top five’ unions. However, as Table 14 shows, the process of merger appears to have 
contributed to loss of membership and density.
Additionally, a number of public sector unions not in this TUC ‘top five’ group, were 
public sector unions which either lost membership at a slower rate or grew, whilst the 
TUC ‘top five’ declined
6.11. The data used in Table 14 and throughout the analysis of union mergers is taken 
from the Certification Officer Reports 1979 to 2002, (unless otherwise specified) also in 
the sections and appendices dealing with trade union mergers and transfers of 
engagements. The membership of each separate amalgamating union, shown at Table 
14, is the membership eligible to vote in the merger or transfer, immediately prior to the 
ballot, which gave a ‘pre-merger’ aggregate membership ‘potential’ for the two unions.
The aggregate membership published for the newly amalgamated union, at the end of its 
first year, is then compared against its pre-merger ‘aggregated potential’. The result is 
shown in the respective data in the Table 14.
6.12. Table 14 illustrates that the major mergers over the period 1979 to 1999 should 
have contributed a gain in aggregate membership for the new union, in the year of 
merger of 892,300. However, the data shows an outcome of a net loss of aggregate 
membership of 747,600. The loss (or difference between the pre and post membership 
figures) cannot be attributed to poor membership accounting records ‘ghost members’ 
etc, because the pre merger figures (columns 2 and 5) are taken from the Certification 
Officers data of those members eligible to vote in the ballot for merger. Therefore, the 
‘pre-merger’ figures are ‘paid up’ members under the rules of each union.
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The data is not shown in Table 14, however, if the pre-merger membership figures are 
taken from each unions year end returns to the Certification Officer, it can be seen that 
there is a larger reduction in membership after the merger. However, allowance must be 
made for the fact that these mergers were taking place during a time of general 
membership decline. Consequently, irrespective of how the pre and post merger 
membership data is taken, some of the loss in membership, which will vary from union 
to union, must be attributable to the general causes of membership decline operating 
throughout this period.
6.13. For example in the case of the TGWU mergers with the NUAAW and NUDBTW 
almost 107,000 members were involved, the net result was that after the merging of these 
unions with the TGWU it showed a loss of over 206,00, therefore a net loss of almost
100,000 members. BIFU also, after amalgamating with the Barclays Group Staff Union 
and NatWest Staff Association showed a membership loss on the aggregate pre-merger 
membership of the unions involved of over 33,000. In both these examples, the average 
membership loss per annum over the four-year period preceding the merger had been 
running at lower levels than in the year of merger. For two unions the TGWU which is 
at the top end of the scale by size, it was an average of 160,000 and for BEFU a much 
smaller union, it was an average of 9,500. However, whilst an accurate figure cannot be 
calculated because of the nature of the variables which affect the direction in which 
membership may move over any given period of time, without the membership acquired 
through merger both the transferee and transferor unions would possibly have lost 
membership. Given that in many cases the smaller unions were seeking merger because 
of financial difficulties, they could possibly have failed completely. It is reasonable 
certain therefore that if no other value emanated from the propensity to merge, mergers 
did prevent the failure of smaller unions and, slowed down the rate of membership 
decline of the larger merging unions, and helped mitigate aggregate membership loss.
6.14. Waddington (1995)407, examined merger ‘waves’ as he termed them over the 
periods 1918 -  1924 and 1966 -  1987 and argued that both periods could be analysed 
using the approach of Kondatrieff cycles408 as a key explanatory variable. Whilst 
Waddington does review individual union mergers and carry out a degree of 
disagreggated analysis he appears not to recognise in sufficient importance the changes 
in law that had taken place in 1964 to facilitate transfers of engagements. These changes
407 Waddington. J. (1995)
408 Waddington. J. (1995). pp44-77.
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in law, as Willman (1996) recognises, made union mergers much less onerous to 
achieve, and in fact accounted for the overwhelming majority of union mergers 
throughout the latter part of the years of Waddington’s analysis. He also does not have 
sufficient regard for the fact that a great deal of the mergers that took place since 1966 
have been between small unions, which were predominantly non-TUC-affiliated, and in 
the main the larger unions within the TUC. Undy (1996)409 and Undy(1997)410 disagreed 
with Waddington’s reliance upon the Kondatrieff cycles. It is with Waddington and 
Undy’s “so-called second wave” that this thesis is preoccupied, however, bringing the 
reference period up to the present time, circa 2003. Therefore, what Undy411 says about 
the relevance of Waddington’s approach, so far as the second ‘wave’ of mergers is 
concerned is helpful. Undy says that: “the continued stress on merger waves is much 
more open to criticism when related to the so-called ‘second wave’”.
6.15. Consequently this relieves the necessity to spend too much space disagreeing with 
Waddington’s analysis. Nonetheless, Waddingtons work is of value, most certainly from 
the historical perspective of his analysis of the periods covered, particularly the earlier 
period of 1918 -  1924. Undy et al (1996) takes a much more disaggregated approach to 
his analysis and develops his research in a broader focus incorporating in a detailed 
manner the significance of finance as a primary reason for unions seeking to merge. 
Chapters 2,3 and 4 of Undy (1996) also the Technical Appendix, were found to be 
particularly helpful in giving direction in this research. His chronicling of the trade 
union merger and transfer continuum of the reference period proved to be an excellent 
source of data and analysis.
6.16. What a structure of a few ‘giant’ unions might mean for member communication, 
involvement and democratic control is not adequately explained by Undy R (1999)412. 
He appears to be confused in his examination of the ‘merger movement’, becoming 
preoccupied with the ‘politics’ of trade union mergers rather than the strategic issues and 
benefits. To understand Undy’s view of why mergers that have taken place during the 
period from the mid 1960’s are significantly different to preceding periods, when the 
propensity for unions to merge has increased, it is important to have reviewed the work
409 Undy. R. (1996) Mergers and Union Restructuring: Externally Determined Waves or Internally 
Generated Reforms? Review Essay. Historical Studies in Industrial relations, Vol 2, pp 125 -  137.
410 Undy. R. (1996) Mergers and Union Restructuring: Externally Determined Waves or Internally 
Generated Reforms? Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, Volume 2, pp 125-137,1996.
411 Undy. R. (1996). pp 128-129
412 Undy R. (1999) The British merger Movement: the importance o f aggressive unions. Industrial relations 
Journal 30:5, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 1999. pp 464-481
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of other researchers such as Buchanan (1974) and (1981)413 and Willman(1996)414 
Willman (2005). However, regard must be had for the opinions of researchers who do 
not necessarily agree that the process of merger and transfers has always benefited the 
trade union movement. Heery et al (2003)415 is quite clear that mergers have not 
benefited trade unions as a means to growth, Willman (2005) takes a more 
uncompromising view of mergers as a policy benefiting unions. Black et al (1997)416 
also argue strongly that there is an overwhelming case, based upon trade union mergers 
up to 1997, that developing big unions does not often produce the hoped for benefits. 
Given that, as is illustrated at Table 13, most unions that have been involved in the 
transfer and merger process have immediately (within 12 months) lost membership and 
have continued to decline, the evidence of the thesis supports Black et al (1997); Heery 
et al (2003); and, Willman (2005).
The changing structure of TUC unions
6.17. The tables at 15 to 20 have been developed to illustrate the distribution of TUC 
membership across various union groupings. Because the TUC at its re-launch in 1994, 
and for a period prior to that, when it was restructuring its basis of representation within 
its General Council, discontinued its Trade Group structure, there is no pre-determined 
structure (internal to the union movement) which can be used to classify TUC unions. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis unions have been grouped based on:
a) unions that are conglomerate, that is those unions which are general by every 
characteristic, industry, occupation, white-collar or manual etc;
b) unions which are general, that is those unions recruiting and organising all 
employees within a particular industry irrespective of occupation, white-collar, 
manual etc;
c) single industry/single occupation unions, that is unions which organise employees 
who are engaged in only one occupational classification within one industry;
d) Professional based unions;
e) Education Professional unions;
f) Single employer unions, that is unions organising all grades of employee of only 
one employer;
413 Buchanan (1981) pp 40-49.
414 Willman (1996)
415 Heery Kelly and Waddington (2003) Union Revitalization in Britain .European Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 2003 SAGE (London) p84.
416 Black, Greene and Ackers (1997) Size and Effectiveness: a case study o f a small union. Industrial 
Relations Journal, 28:2, Blackwell publishing Ltd, 1997. pp 136-148
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6.18. Tables 15 and 16 show that the majority of TUC membership continues to be held 
by unions that have either maintained their ‘general status’ or have developed into the 
‘newer generation’ of conglomerate unions. However, within the conglomerate unions 
listed in Table 15 are some ‘new players’. The ISTC which before the restructuring and 
decline of the Steel Industry was an ‘archetypal’ industry union, organising solely within 
its industry, has now become a ‘community union’, in effect a general union, particularly 
since its merger with NUKFAT, discussed at chapter One. Like many other unions the 
ISTC has changed its identity in an attempt to follow its membership into the new 
industries in which they have become employed as a result of the decline of the steel 
industry. TSSA previously the white-collar rail union has moved out of its declining 
industry to organise employees within the wider travel industry, hotel and catering 
industries, ports, waterways, bureau de change etc. Prospect and the PCS, previously 
‘dedicated’ civil service unions, now organise generally across both white-collar and 
manual occupations having extended into private sector information technology and. 
other service companies
6.19. Table 16 shows the general unions. NUDAGO which is one of the non-TUC 
unions which affiliated during the 1990’s, and would prior to that have been regarded as 
a ‘staff association’, dedicated to representing employees within the Imperial Group of 
Companies (steel and steel products) based primarily within Sheffield, has now 
developed into a general union, seeking to recruit and develop as a ‘community union’ 
similar to the ISTC.
Table 15
General (Conglomerate) Unions (2002)
Male Female Total
Amicus 955,429 176,782 1,132,211
GMB 428,878 263,269 692,147
ISTC 44,940 5,160 50,100
Prospect 87,332 16,610 103,942
PCS 106,748 160,896 267,644
T & G 678,921 179,883 858,804
TSSA 22,038 9,456 31,494
UNISON 356,292 916,178 1,272,470
2,680,578 1,728,234 4,408.812
Total
% of total TUC membership 65.69% 
Female = 39%
4,408,812
Source: TUC Organisation and Membership Department Records 2002
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Table 16
General Industry Unions (2002)
Male Female Total
BECTU 16,863 8,936 25,799
CATU 9,204 6,192 15,396
PCS 224,963 59,459 284,422
GPMU 166,118 34,558 200,676
NUDAGO 1,656 448 2,104
KFAT 10.129 10,521 20,650
UNIFI n/a n/a 153,000
UCATT 121,893 1,107 123,000
USD AW 123,173 187,049 310,222
673,999 308,270 1,135,269
Total 1,135.269
% of total TUC membership 16.91%
Female = 27%
Source: TUC Organisation and Membership Department Records 2002
Changes that have taken place within the structure of trade unions affiliated to the TUC, 
particularly in respect of their organising ambitions, have developed as a response to the 
industrial change processes since the 1970’s. As traditional areas of membership have 
declined or have changed due to restructuring, unions have looked to new, frequently 
‘brown-field’ areas from which to replace declining membership. This has resulted in:
1. single industry unions becoming general unions;
2. public sector (Civil Service) unions becoming general industrial unions, following 
their membership within public sector employment, as it has become ‘privatised’; and,
3. general unions developing into ‘conglomerate unions’, taking into membership and 
seeking to organise and represent any employed person irrespective of industry or 
occupation.
Table 17 ~ " ~  Table 18
Single Industry Unions Professional Based Unions
Male Female Total Male Female Total
ASLEF 15,379 411 15,790 ACM n/a n/a 3,500
BFAWU 15,196 14,293 29,489 AEP 774 1,728 2,502
CSMTS n/a n/a 88 BALPA 7,335 239 7,574
EFTU n/a n/a 230 BACM-TEAM 3,868 263 4,131
FBU n/a n/a 51,855 BDA 135 4,363 4,498
GULO n/a n/a 286 BOS 68 1,328 1,396
NACOD n/a n/a 800 CSP 3,351 29,225 32,576
NULMW 2,018 2,094 4,112 CDNA 85 4,127 4,212
NUM n/a n/a 5,001 Connect 14,677 2,939 17,616
RMT 52,584 5,285 57,869 EIS 13,587 37,867 51,454
POA 24,371 5,981 30,352 EQUITY 17,601 17,645 35,246
SWSWU 12 3 15 FDA 6,576 3,434 10,010
UTW 743 646 1389 HCSA 1,970 255 2,225
110,303 28713 197,276 MU 23,765 7,426 31,191
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Napo 2,596 3,930 6,526
Total 197,276 NUJ 14,216 8,714 22,930
2.93% % of total TUC membership
PFA 3.848
Female = 14% SoR
WGGB
2,830
n/a
15,380
n/a
18,210
1,928
115913 144,489 284,503
Total 284,503
4.24%% of total TUC membership. 
Female = 51%
Source: TUC Organisation and Membership Department Records 2002
The TUC membership within the two groups of unions at Table 15 and 16 shows an 
aggregate membership of 82.6 percent, slightly less than the figure for ‘the club’. The 
two unions missing being the RCN and BMA, both non-TUC unions.
Table 19 Table 20
Single Employer Unions _    Education Professionals
Male Female Total Male Female Total
ACCORD 6,316 17,679 23,995 ATL 31,210 81,849 113,059
ALGUS 576 2,141 2,717 AUT 27,539 15,170 42,709
ANGU 1,922 6,400 8,322 UCAC 986 2,962 3,948
AFA 158 676 834 NUT 49,697 156,403 206,100
AMO 1,808 4,987 6,795 NASUWT 67,044 116,637 183,681
Britannia S A 583 1,770 2,353 NATFHE 34,244 30,787 65,031
Diageo S A 355 224 579 CYWU 1,979 2,521 4,500
NACO 2,011 556 2,567 NAEIAC n/a n/a 2,850
NGSU 2,684 8,334 11,018 212,699 406,329 621,878
UBAC 1,025 1,778 2,803
Y1SA 320 950 1,270 Total 621,878
17,758 45,495 63,253 9.26%% of total TUC membership
Female = 65%
Total 63,253
0.94%% of total TUC membership 
Female = 72%
Source: TI C Organisation and Membership Department Records 2002
6.20. Unfortunately, some of the unions in Tables 15 and 16 do not generally publish 
information about the precise number of membership held within any particular 
occupational grouping, therefore, it has not been possible to develop valid data in this 
regard. However, the majority of the membership within the unions listed in these tables 
is not employed within the public sector (undertakings or services under the control of 
local or central government). Those unions in Table 15 to 20 where it has been possible 
to ascertain that there is a higher proportion of non public sector membership are in ‘red’
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text. Tables 17 to 20 have an aggregate membership of only 17.4 percent, however, 
they comprise most of the TUC unions which have grown in membership over the past 
25 years. The generally smaller unions within the non-TUC group have certainly held 
onto their membership better than the TUC union group. Many have continued to grow 
throughout the period, whilst TUC unions have declined in membership. The 
overwhelming majority of the non-TUC unions are single industry, single employer 
and/or single occupation organisations. They tend to have a highly focused approach, 
and specialised service provision to their membership. Furthermore, these smaller more 
specialised unions appear to have done a better job of organising female membership, 
however, regard must be had for the fact that many of these non-TUC unions organise 
within occupations which employ mainly female staff.
The effects of changing ‘membership profiles’ and the ‘churn factor’
6.21. Research devoted to the consequences of developments since 1979 upon the ability 
of trade unions to rebuild themselves, and provide an effective vehicle for employee 
representation in the future, has shown a number of factors conspired to prevent unions 
retaining their power. The most significant of these factors has been has been the 
depletion of organisational strength. The decision of the TUC to undertake its ‘re-launch’ 
in 1994 was to some extent a recognition of the distance that employees and employers 
had moved, away from the desire to re-embrace collectivism. Employees particularly the 
newer generations of workers have shown a disinclination to accept there is a role for 
trade unions within the new ‘flexible’ and ‘empowered’ work environment. Research 
undertaken throughout the past twenty years has shown an increasing disinclination on 
the part of the young to join unions. Table 11 illustrates the changing age structure of 
union membership during the material period.
6.22. The decline at all age groups within the age density profile of trade union 
membership is attributable to many more reasons than a simple disinclination of 
people to join unions. Trade union membership is frequently argued in much of 
the literature to be an ‘experience good’. However, over the past 25 years there 
are ajnumber of factors that have denied young people the opportunity to gain an 
early experience of trade unionism, for example:
Table 11
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Density percentage by age group (all unions)
Age 1983 1998 2001
18-29 44 18 16
30-39 51 30 30
40+ 57 33 36
Source: Labour Force Survey series 2002
a) the decline in manufacturing affecting the intake of young people to apprenticeship 
training, and the general decline in this type of training;
b) the decline of labour intensive industries which employed higher numbers of 
unskilled workers;
c) the trend towards further education and entry to employment at a later age than was 
the case in the 1950’s to 1970’s;
d) the ‘mature’ age profile of unions which has tended to grow, due mainly to the 
fact that these are unions representing qualified senior employees, managers and 
professionals;
6.23. Young people entering manufacturing employment in the 1950’s to 1970’s would 
have immediately been exposed to trade union organisation and membership. Within the 
craft grades of employment, as apprentices, working with time served craftsmen, would 
have resulted in the requirement to become union members. Working in shopfloor areas 
within the labour intensive industries would have exposed young people to peer-group 
and older generation pressure to become union members. With the decline in these types 
of employment and with them the trade union infrastructure, the inducement or 
compulsion to become union members, particularly amongst the young, has diminished. 
The data produced in the LFS 2000 support this analysis, as does the research by 
Blandon and Machin (2003)417 One must therefore accept that because more young 
people now, than during the 1950’s and 1970’s, enter employment later, and then most
417 Blandon and Machin pp 395-396
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not into the type of industries that are organised by trade unions, are fact. Consequently, 
the lack of opportunity to become involved in union membership, is a fact.
6.24. The result is that the ‘catchment’ for the 18 to 20+ age groups has diminished in 
part for reasons, which are industrial and in part sociological, and therefore the situation 
to a large extent is beyond the organising efforts of trade unions. The significant drop in 
density level to 5 percent (TUC)418 for union membership under age 20 is a strong 
indication of the veracity of these arguments. Perhaps it is for these somewhat self- 
evident reasons that there is a disproportionate decline in union membership within these 
younger age groups. Therefore, the question must be put, should trade unions be 
concerned about the density losses at these earlier age groups? Unfortunately, the 
density loss across the other older age groups, whilst not of the same proportions is 
nonetheless high. Blandon and Machin (2003) illustrated the consequences of 
membership loss amongst the older generation of union members. In their conclusion 
they said:
“Far fewer parents are union members than used to be and so, i f  there is a cross­
generation correlation in union joining patterns, this seems to suggest that fewer young 
people will be likely to join trade unions in the future ”
Therefore, perhaps this loss of younger generation membership is a manifestation of the 
general loss of trade union membership density, and not as appears to be the case, 
attributable to factors which have peculiar reasons. An indication of the future problems 
for trade unions in terms of membership density is not the issue of age group density, but 
its ‘twin’ characteristic of loss of union density by length of service. However, 
Waddington and Kerr (2002) are very clear about the importance of recruiting and 
retaining young workers they say:
“ I f  trade unions are to reverse their membership decline sustained since 1979, more 
young workers must be recruited”419.
6.25. The data in Figure 2 illustrates the nature of this characteristic, showing the very 
low level of density between 1 and 2 to 5 years service. Not until service length reaches 
5 to 10 years does density start to reflect the aggregate union density for all employed 
persons. Members with 20 plus years of service are likely to be comprised mainly of a 
generation of employees that commenced their employed lives in the pre 1979 era. The 
problem is similar to that which is of concern with low density at lower age groups. As
418 TUC (2002) Todays Trade Unionists June 2002 Congress House, London
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the longer service generation, therefore older age group of trade unionists retires from 
where will the replacement for this lost density come? What appears to have been 
occurring, and is a factor that merits further in depth research, is the progressive 
exhaustion of the trade union movements ‘historic’ and ‘ageing’ core membership. 
Bryson and Gomez (2003) whilst adducing evidence and argument which much of the 
data and analysis in this Chapter agrees, put forward a basic argument:
“that it is the reduced likelihood o f ever becoming a member rather than the 
haemorrhaging o f existing members which is behind the decline in overall union 
membership in Britain
with which it finds less agreement. One of the fundamental arguments of this Chapter is 
that it is precisely these two trends of less ‘new’ membership and declining ‘older’ 
membership, working together, which are undermining much of the trade unions efforts 
to rebuild their 
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organisations. When taken together with the very high levels of ‘wastage’ that has 
historically dogged the recruitment efforts of unions, colloquially termed the ‘chum 
factor’, it can be seen that any increase in membership loss has serious implications.
6.26. Table 12 illustrates the impact of the ‘chum factor’ upon a number of large unions 
over the period from 1985 to 2000. Of course, part of the ‘churn factor’ is the 
membership losses taking place by the process of ageing membership population.
Source: Labourforce Survey 2002
U n i o n  D e n s i t y  by l e n g t h  o f  s e r v i c e  (a l l  u n i o n s )
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Y E A R S
419 Waddington. J. and Kerr. A. (2002) p298
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Nonetheless, the numeric value of the ‘chum factor’ for the TGWU in 2000 of 140,000 
new recruits in that year simply to stand still, illustrates the magnitude of the drain 
placed upon union resources. This level of ‘chum’ for only one of the top five unions, in 
size, represents the equivalence of a union that would qualify for inclusion in the top 
sixteen unions ‘the club’ by size. Based upon each unions year end membership for 1999 
the above table shows an aggregate ‘chum factor’ for these unions in 1999-2000 of circa 
750,000 members, circa 12% of total TUC union membership and 10% of total 
membership for all unions.
Table 12_________________________________________________________________________
Recruitment o f new members as a percentage o f stock o f membership for each year
1985 1990 1995 2000
TGWU 19.3 20.1 16.4 16.2
AEU* 13 18.6 14.7 14.4
GMB 15.3 14.8 12.6 12.8
MSF* 17.1 16.3 16 18.3
USDAW 28.4 27.8 28.8 28.7
NALGO 18.5 17.3 n/a n/a
NUPE 16.4 18 n/a n/a
COSHE 15 17.8 n/a n/a
UNISON N/a n/a 14.8 18.6
Source: Calculated from data taken from -  Certification Officer -  Trade Union Annual 
Returnsl985 -  2000, and individual union recruitment data
*Became Amicus as o f end 2003
NOTE: Figures do not include membership acquired as a result o f  transfers o f  
Engagements or amalgamations. There are no figures for UNISON for 1985-1990 because 
union did not exist. Figures for NALGO -NUPE AND COHSE are not available in 1995 -  
2000 due to these unions having amalgamated to form UNISON
6.27. Whilst aggregate density has declined and lower age group density has suffered 
disproportionately, and the age profile of union density has moved to the retirement end 
of the scale, a dichotomous trend has occurred. Largely because of the increase in the 
female work force and the increased trend towards part time working, the density of 
female union membership has tended to move in the opposite direction. Figure 3 
Illustrates the manner in which female union density has tended to compensate for some 
of the aggregate membership loss. However, not only is the growth in female density a
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manifestation of the growth in female employment, it also reflects the changing 
composition of employment, towards a predominantly service based economy. Figure 4 
shows the density of union membership by occupation (all unions). Given the much 
higher density of the white-collar occupational groups which historically female 
employees have tended to favour, there appears to be a related effect between the two 
developments indicated by Figure 3 and Figure 4.
Figure 3.
Union density by age and gender (all unions
under 20 20-29 30-39 40-49
female
SourcerLabourforce Survey 2000
6.28. The literature and research frequently illustrates the manner in which union 
membership has increased proportionately towards greater density within the 
professional and management grades. Figure 4 illustrates the relative position of the 
various occupational groups in aggregate. However, whilst it can be shown, as 
subsequent data illustrates, that these grades of employee have indeed tended to increase 
in numeric terms, the level of density is skewed because of the much higher percentage 
of public sector union membership, caused primarily by the decline in manufacturing 
and manual occupational groups, and to some extent the continuing growth of the public 
sector.
6.29. The implications of this trend towards the public sector membership taking over 
the ‘core membership’ role, from the traditional manual, skilled and semi-skilled
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occupational groups, is discussed in detail by Crouch (2001). Crouch hypotheses that 
the future facing trade unions in Europe, particularly within the UK, is far from assured, 
particularly considering the continuing trend of decline in the traditional core 
membership, and the likelihood that public sector employment will decline and thus 
union density with it. He says:
Figure 4. Union Density by Occupation (All unions)
60 n
50 4
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Source: Labour Force Survey 2002
“Twentieth-Century trade unionism came to have two great reserves o f strength within 
the labour-force: first, its historical base within the industrial manual working class; 
and its second, acquired during the second half o f the Century, in public 
service employment at several levels. ”
6.30. Crouch argues that the further decline in union membership within the UK 
will take place because of the continuing attrition of ‘core membership’ (public 
and private sector), due to rationalisation but also globalisation and, the tendency 
of corporations to seek cheaper labour costs by ‘outsourcing’ services 
internationally. A trend which is likely to be followed, albeit with possibly 
greater difficulties, by public sector services. Companies designed to 
accommodate this growth in ‘outsourcing’ have mushroomed over the past ten
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years or so, aided by the improvement in data management and communications 
technology. One such company is Computer Science Corporation (CSC) 
(discussed elsewhere within the thesis). To some extent, the data below support 
the argument of Crouch. Certainly, it can be shown, particularly for non-TUC 
unions, that the public sector has become the ‘growth area’ for membership. 
However, even after allowing for the fact that many TUC unions not wholly 
engaged in the public sector have significant membership within that sector, it 
has not as yet become ‘the’ dominant sector for TUC membership. However, as 
Marsh (1979)420 records, the public sector as long ago as 1974 was on the verge 
of becoming the majority unionised sector. He shows that in 1974, out of a total 
membership of almost 11 million, 5 million were public sector employees. 
Nonetheless, given the continuing trend of decline in aggregate traditional core 
membership and the trend in the aggregate growth of the public sector 
membership the ‘crossover’ point to the public sector becoming the majority may 
be relatively imminent. Consequently, what Crouch says about the increasing 
dependency upon public sector membership, and its future in terms of 
‘globalisation’ to use his terminology, what has become a “ladder ” in building 
union membership may quickly become the “snake” in its ultimate decline! 
Further, what Crouch says about the implications of globalisation, based upon 
developments since the turn of the century, has gained pace, and is beginning to 
cause concern amongst trade union leaders.
Organising females and young persons
6.31. Given what Cook et al (1992) say, UK trade unions have been reasonably 
successful in organising female workers particularly within the public sector and within 
smaller unions. However, as Salmon and Stewart (1994) say the growth in membership 
was not enough to replace the aggregate losses throughout the 1980’s-90’s. Tables 15 
and 16 show the female membership at 36.7 percent, for the conglomerate and general 
unions, whereas the aggregate percentage for the smaller ‘specialised’ unions shown at 
Tables 17 to 20 is 64.4 percent. It may be argued that the density of female membership 
within these smaller unions is largely attributable to the nature of the employment that 
they organise. Certainly when compared with the ‘single industry unions’ in Table 17 
this is true, and it is reflected in the veiy small percentage of female membership within
420 Marsh (1979) p 17 Table 7
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the unions in Table 17. Another indication of the underlying reasons for the disparity 
between Table 17 and other union groupings is the fact that just under 50 percent of the 
unions in Table 17 do not publish separate figures for male and female membership, a 
factor that was referred to in Chapter One. However, the same justifications cannot be 
ascribed to the disparity in density between unions in Table 15 and 16 and the remaining 
membership tables. Many of the unions within these tables actively campaign to recruit 
female membership, in the case of USDAW by far the major proportion of employees 
within the principal industry it organises are female.
6.32. The Labour Force Survey series (LFS) 2001 showed little change on the previous 
year. According to the survey the number of employees who were union members stood 
at 7.25 million, a density of 29 per cent of all employees. However, for the whole 
workforce (i.e. including the self-employed many of whom are members of trade 
unions), membership was 7.55 million, a density of 27 per cent of all employees.Male 
union members now comprise just over half - 53 per cent or 3.86 million -of all union 
members, female members account for 47 per cent or 3.38 million. An analysis of the 
7.25 million union members shows that, 6 million work full-time, which is 32 per cent of 
all full-time employees, and 1.3 million work part-time which is only 20 cent of all part- 
time employees. The LFS Survey (2001) data shows the dramatic fall in male full-time 
employed union membership density from 44 to 31 per cent between 1990 and 1998, 
confirming the impact of membership losses in union core membership industries, 
particularly in manufacturing. Whilst this decline has slowed since 1998, it has 
nonetheless continued and currently male full-time employed density stands at 30 
percent. The lower unionised density among part-time employees, demonstrated by 
these figures, and the large numbers of females engaged in these jobs, 44 per cent 
compared to 8 per cent of male employees, illustrates one of the primary reasons for the 
lower unionisation rate among female employees at 28 per cent compared to males at 30 
per cent. The part-time labour force has been growing disproportionately throughout the 
past 25 years, and now comprises a high proportion of female employees. It is evident 
that trade unions generally, but more particularly some TUC unions, have failed to 
recruit women, which is a contributory factor in aggregate union density decline. Hidden 
within the shifts that have been taking place in membership composition by industry, 
gender, part-time, full-time and age, there may be a factor that has had an impact upon 
the financial health of some unions. Unions which have benefited in numeric terms from 
recruitment amongst part-time employees, may have added disproportionately to their 
costs in terms of the revenue gained by this membership growth. All unions charge a
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pro-rata lower fee to part-time members. Consequently, the aggregate income from any 
given number of part-time members paying a pro-rata fee, will be less than for the 
equivalent number of full-time members paying the full fee. However, unions cannot 
discriminate in the range of basic services unions provide to part-time members, 
therefore, ceteris paribus, the cost-revenue ratio will be higher. Therefore, given that in 
2001, of the 7.25 million union members 1.3 million were part-time, the implications for 
aggregate union finances could be significant.
6.33. However, when union densities for full time and part-time employment are 
compared, the LFS (2001) data illustrates that female employees are more likely to be 
unionised, 33 per cent of full-time female employees and 22 per cent of part-timer 
female employees, compared to 31 per cent of male full-time employees and 12 per cent 
of male part-time employees. A phenomenon of the past 25 years has been the manner in 
which, despite the dramatic decline in aggregate density, trade union membership 
density in managerial and professional occupations has increased which, in total now 
accounts for 47 per cent of all union members. It is evident from the data that this results 
from the high-density unionised levels among these occupational groups in the public 
sector. However, whilst the public sector, in terms of white-collar employment within 
local and national government, health and other service sectors has not suffered 
privatisation, to the same extent as transport, electricity, gas, water, they have undergone 
considerable restructuring over the past 25 years. As Millward et al (2000)421 say union 
membership in the public sector has remained “ubiquitous ”, indeed, at 48 per cent, the 
highest recorded union density figure is found among professional employees. Whereas, 
at the other end of the scale within an industry that has become one of the primary 
factors of economic activity within the UK, sales & customer services, the lowest union 
density at 13 per cent can be found. It is evident from the LFS (2001) data that 
employees with supervisory responsibilities are much more likely to be union members. 
In these occupational grades union density was 37 per cent. Within this density level 
female managers have one of the highest density levels, at 40 per cent, to some extent 
explained by the higher incidence of union membership among female managers in the 
public sector, particularly within health care generally. Taylor (1994)422 illustrates the 
manner in which female membership within TUC unions was relatively low within some 
of the largest unions. For example unions heavily involved in the private sector such as
421 Millward. N. Bryson. A. and Forth. J. (2000) All Change at Work British Employment Relations
J980- 1998 as Portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey Series. Routledge, London. (2000).
422 Taylor. R. (1994) p 58
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the TGWU had 18%, the AEEU 7% and MSF 26% female membership, whilst unions in 
public services and the private service sector i.e. UNISON with 64%, NUT 75% and 
USDAW 60% had substantial female membership.
6.34. The LFS Survey (2001) confirms that aggregate union density is higher, and varies 
less, within the public sector than for the rest of the economy. The public sector 
aggregate ‘average’ unionisation level was 59 per cent, across all occupational groups, 
compared to a private sector figure of 19 per cent. An aspect of the LFS Survey (2001) 
data that supports the view that the union density of senior grades and particularly 
females is that 68 per cent of female union members were employed in the public sector. 
However, 61 per cent of male union members were employed in the private sector. The 
data also confirms the argument that much of the union density levels is owed to certain 
sectors of the overall public sector. For example, the services within the public sector 
with the highest density are Public Administration and Health & Education with an 
average density of 51 per cent. However, whilst union density has fared better within the 
public sector, and some senior grades of employee, over most of the period from 1979, 
Waddington (2003)423 illustrates that between 1991 and 1999 density had started to show 
significant decline in many employee groups within the public sector also groups such as 
Managers and Professionals
6.35. Of the 7.5 million employees that are members of trade unions, or put another way, 
29 per cent of all those in employment, 96 per cent are employees, only 4 percent are 
what can be regarded as ‘self-employed’ persons. 1997 was the year when the lowest 
union membership recorded for the UK since its highest level in 1979. Since 1997, 
union membership has increased by 150,000. This has not however, produced an 
increase in the density levels of union membership. In fact, density declined almost 
yearly throughout the period from 1979 and since 1997. The reason for the decline in 
union density is the strong expansion of the labour market throughout most of these 
years, and is probably also a contributory reason for the increase in membership since 
1997. The change of government and changes in public policies on the issue of union 
rights had helped in the process of a ‘marginal recovery’, however, union density has 
continued to decline in recent years, albeit at a much slower rate than in previous years. 
For example density was 30.4 per cent in 1997 and in 2001 stood at 29 per cent
423 Waddington. J. (2003) Trade Union Organisation in Edwards. P. (ed) (2003) Industrial Relations 
Second Edition Theory and Practice. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 239 Table 9.3
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Figure 5. Union Membership Density 2001 
Source: LabourForce Survey 2002
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6.36. Whilst it should not be a cause for complacency there has been relative stability in 
union membership since 1997, this has been evident among both men and women with 
their respective unionisation rates (30 and 28 percent) changing little since 1998. In the 
case of male employees this has marked a welcome halt to the rapid fall in density 
evident throughout most of the 1990s, density fell from 44 to 31 per cent between 1990 
and 1998. The ‘gender gap’ in union density has rapidly diminished since the beginning 
of the 1990s when there was an 11 percent difference in density between men and 
women. A reason that is frequently argued as to why density continues to be lower 
amongst female employees is because large numbers of them are engaged in part-time 
work, 44 per cent compared to 8 per cent of men.
Figure 6. Union Membership 2001
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Figure 7. Union Membership Gender distribution by 
employment type
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The Labour Force Survey series (see Figure 6) attributes this difference to the fact that 
“this form o f employment is much less likely to be unionised, which of course is a fact, 
however, why is it much less likely to be unionised?
6.36. Unions stoically defend their claim not to base organisation upon ‘business 
economics’. It is nonetheless evident that unions do find part-time employees, unless 
employed in large concentrations, much more expensive to organise than full-time 
employees (see Figure 6). This attitude arises for all sorts of reasons, not the least of 
which is the relatively high turn-over in employment amongst part-timers, which adds to 
the ‘chum factor’ and low per capita income generated by such membership. One need 
only refer to the membership turnover (chum factor) of USDAW, which is heavily 
involved in retail and wholesale distribution, to see these effects. However, if union 
membership is broken down by job type we get a very different picture. More women in 
full-time jobs, 33 per cent, are union members compared to male full-time employees, 31 
per cent of whom are members. The "gender gap" in union density is even greater among 
part-time employees, with 22 per cent of women part-timers belonging to a union 
compared with only 12 per cent of male part-time employees. There are various reasons 
why union density is higher among women in both full-time and part-time jobs (see 
Figure 7). One of the reasons is that more females work in the public sector compared to 
male employees, and as was explained earlier, much of the literature ascribes this as the 
main reason for the disparity. Another factor, relating specifically to part-time 
employees, is that women are more likely to be in long-term stable part-time jobs 
compared to men, who are more likely to be using part-time employment as a ‘stop- gap’ 
whilst looking for an opportunity to return to their normal occupation. Consequently, 
female part-time employees are more likely to be in a union. However, this is an
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argument more commonly used by trade unions, and avoids acceptance of the fact that 
this is only evidenced where there are high concentrations of female part-time 
employees.
Figure 8. Union density by Age and Gender 
Source: Labour Force Survey 2002
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6.38. However, notwithstanding the higher union density among women part- 
timers there appears to be a general acceptance that the actual number of non­
unionised women part-timers is still much greater than the total number of non­
unionised male part-timers simply because there are so many more women 
employed in these kind of jobs. Unionisation increases rapidly with age. 
Although only 5 per cent of employees aged under 20 are members, just under a 
fifth (19 per cent) of those aged between 20 and 29 years and 30 per cent of those 
aged between 30 and 39 years belong to a trade union in non-unionised part-time 
jobs compared to around 1 million male part-timers (see Figure 8). The highest 
union density recorded for any age group is for employees aged between 40 and 
49 years, at 38 per cent. Low rates of unionisation among young employees can 
be partly explained by the increasing tendency for students to work on a part-time 
and temporary basis in order to supplement their income. It is an unfortunate 
feature of the LFS that it classifies anyone working more than one hour as an 
employee. Therefore, the impact of student part-timers working very few hours 
tends to skew the union density figures for the working population aged under 20 
and in their early twenties.
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6.39. Older women employees are slightly less likely to be union members than male 
employees. Thirty six per cent of women employees aged 40-49 are union members 
(compared to 39 per cent of men) and 32 per cent of women employees over 50 are in a 
union (compared to 37 per cent of men). Union density rates among employees in their 
thirties are identical for both men and women, and there is also little difference among 
twenty-year-olds. However, among the youngest employees i.e. aged under 20, males are 
more likely to be union members (see Figure 9). The data on occupational 
classifications used within the LFS confirm that the most highly unionised employees are 
now those in professional jobs. However, it has to be stressed that these trends do not 
generally reflect the labour market as a whole and that they are skewed by the impact of 
public sector unionisation and the concentration of women employees in this sector.
Outlawing the closed shop and its effects on membership density
6.40. The majority of the literature identifies that there are two views of why trade 
unions saw the closed shop as an important issue:
a) One was that having all employees within the union would give it more ‘authority’ 
and strengthened the collective bargaining power of the union;
b) The second was that all employees who benefited from collective bargaining 
should contribute to the union.
There was however, for trade unions a third and equally if not more important reason for 
achieving the closed shop. This third reason was the added financial benefits of 100% 
membership density. Berkowitz (1954)424 identified the significance of this third reason 
when he developed his model to illustrate how, from the granting of recognition a union 
builds its membership, by its own efforts to an ‘optimum’ level, at which point other 
opportunities for membership consolidation and exploiting a unions membership 
strength may provide additional impetus to growth.
6.41. In Figure 11 The curve C-G represents the average cost of recruiting and servicing 
each new member, costs’ decreasing on average as the curve declines towards point X. 
The marginal cost of recruiting and servicing each new member is represented by the 
curve A-B. R-F on the vertical axis represents the fixed costs of servicing the union 
organisation, without any employer subsidy. X is the optimum point of recruitment at 
which, if recognition is gained, and the employer subsidy starts to take effect,
424 Berkowitz, M. (1954) The Economics o f Trade Union Oreanisation and Administration. Industrial and 
Labour
Relations Review, 7: 512-523.
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recruitment and organisation costs tend to fall, represented by the decline in marginal 
and average costs X-D. However, if recognition is not achieved recruitment and 
retention of membership may become harder, with costs at the margin beginning to 
increase, reducing or possibly removing any revenue surplus. This development is 
depicted by the ‘upswing’ in marginal and average costs X-G and X-B. However, if 
recognition is gained and subsequently lay representatives facilities are agreed, and the 
‘employer subsidy’ begins to develop, fixed costs drop on the vertical axis to Y-D ceteris 
paribus, aiding the production of larger surplus revenue. A feature of the ‘employer 
subsidy’ was almost always, where a union sought it, the agreement by an employer to 
operate check-off. Once membership had developed to the point where a minority of 
employees were non-members, pressure would be applied to achieve a post/pre-entry 
closed shop. With this final development in the recruitment and ‘employer subsidy’ 
cycle, union costs drop to near zero and revenue surplus increases as depicted by to D- 
Revenue in Figure 11. Little benefit is gained by way of surplus revenue in initial 
recruitment until X is achieved.
Figure 11
Union costs of recruiting and servicing membership from ‘Greenfield’ situation 
The effect of recognition and the critical nature of the ‘employers subsidy’ (INVISIBLE
INCOME)
.REVENUE
-*■ >RECRUITMENT
Source: Derived from Berkowitz (1954)
Beyond X, if recognition is not achieved, in the short-term a surplus may be achieved for 
so long as further recruitment is maintained, however, both average and marginal costs
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B-G are likely to increasingly consume revenue. The fact that recognition is not 
achieved represented a considerable disincentive for employees to stay with the union, 
and as this process of membership attrition gained pace, density is lost.
6.44. The decentralised nature of UK trade union organisation and the high cost 
associated with providing full-time officials in sufficient numbers inevitably meant a 
great reliance upon the participation of lay leaders in the day to day servicing of union 
members. Terry (2003)425 says that such was the importance of the shop steward that 
they were perceived by union members as being ‘the union’. The growth in the shop 
steward ‘movement’ during the 1960’s and 1970’s and the transference of negotiating 
responsibility from national bargaining, led by full-time trade union officials, to localised 
plant and company group bargaining led by lay representatives, added considerable 
power and influence to the role of lay shop stewards. In many of the larger company 
groups within the manufacturing industries, full-time lay representatives or Convenors 
became the norm. In some cases, groups of unions coming together (particularly within 
the engineering industry through the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Unions (CSEU)) to form ‘joint shop stewards committees’, with a Convenor as its leader 
and principal negotiator.
6.45. The facilities provided by employers to this type of local organisation contributed a 
significant subsidy to the ‘membership servicing costs’ of trade unions. The subsidy 
extended through the provision of telephone and printing facilities to provision of office 
space and in many cases to the acceptance of full-time paid trade union representatives. 
Time off for training, attending union meetings etc was commonplace, many employers 
actually meeting the travel and accommodation costs, where meetings were for joint 
negotiating purposes. Many employers provided paid time off for elected delegates to 
attend union policy making conferences and attending executive meetings. The 
increasing development of pre-entry and post entry closed shops, and within the late 
1960’s to 1980’s the growth of the check off, improved the per capita contribution 
income significantly, again contributing to the financial strength of unions. Donovan426 
said that 2 in 5 union members were covered by check-off mainly in the public sector, 
however, some 1,200 private companies provided the facility. Millward et al (2000)427
425 Terry. M. (2003) Employee Representation. Shop Stewards and the new Legal framework Second 
Edition Theory and Practice in Industrial Relations Second Edition, (ed) Edwards . P. Blackwell, Oxford, p 
262
426 Donovan (1966) pp 192-193
427 Millward et al (2000) ppl51-152
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say that by 1980 check-off had increased to 73 per cent of companies recognising unions 
and continued to grow to 86 per cent of such companies by 1990, however, then fell to 
75 per cent by 1998. Some of this decline may have been consequent upon changes to 
the law relating to check-off, also the general decline in union membership and the 
number of employers recognising unions over this period. However, whilst facilities 
such as check-off and other aspects of the employers subsidy may have been readily 
accepted by many unions, some union leaders were not so keen on developing ‘cosy 
relationships with employers’, Willman et al (1993)428.
6.46. Some of the literature Willman et al (1993), Bain and Price (1983), describes 
unions as having tended to become ‘dependent’ upon this ‘subsidy’. There can be little 
doubt that with its loss during the 1980’s and 1990’s coupled to membership loss caused 
by industrial restructuring, many unions that had been major beneficiaries of this 
‘subsidy’, almost to the point of ‘dependency’, began to feel a disproportionate effect of 
the change which swept through the collectivist culture.
6.47. The ‘employer subsidy’ was, in the experience of the author very important, and 
where it was provided, possibly more important to white-collar unions given their 
relatively ‘embryonic’ stage of development, and smaller financial resources, however, 
nonetheless important to blue-collar unions also. White-collar unions found the 
provision of any positive gesture on the part of an employer valuable, certainly anything 
that ‘subsidised’ the cost of organising employees and gave ‘surety’ of income, was a 
welcome contribution to defraying their disproportionate cost burden of relatively higher 
full-time official to membership ratios429.
6.48. The loss of this ‘subsidy’ in a ‘normal situation’ would have been difficult to 
accommodate, however, its loss at the time general membership levels were falling was 
veiy serious. The difficulties faced were similar to those ‘virtuous cycle’ problems faced 
by a union when commencing organisation at a company, however, in the ‘reverse order’ 
or as Bain termed it the ‘vicious cycle’:
a) progressive loss of membership;
b) progressive loss of revenue/revenue surplus;
c) attrition of local organisational structure;
d) loss of membership servicing capacity;
428 Willman et al (1993) pp 206-209
429 Willman and Aston (1988)
189
e) greater involvement of full-time officials;
f) increasing membership per capita servicing costs;
6.49. UK trade unions have sought to replace the organisational base, which has been 
lost over the period since 1979, using a number of approaches. Latterly unions having 
recognised the problem of low density within the newer industries and in growth areas, 
such as services, have tended to adopt two approaches in their efforts to develop into 
these new areas and increase membership. Waddington (2003)430 says that the intention 
of these new approaches is to “deepen and extend union organisation”, and cites 
Brofenbrenner et al (1998). For example, in 1998, the TUC opened its Organising 
Academy, since opening has trained around 150 new union organisers, who in turn have 
been instrumental in organising over 30,000 new trade union members431. This 
represents only 200 new members per ‘graduate’ over a period of four years (1998- 
2002). Waddington (2003)432 argues that the extent to which a union may be successful 
in recruiting, organising and servicing members depends upon the efforts of active 
members, and local full-time officials. This is nothing new, it is precisely these groups 
of members who have been the backbone of trade union organisation throughout the 
movements history. Brofenbrenner et al (1998) organising and servicing model is in 
large measure a restatement of the approach which UK trade unions have adopted from 
their earliest beginnings, and was most certainly the model adopted by white-collar 
unions within the private sector throughout the 1960’s 1970’s433. Basically what 
Brofenbrenner describes contributes little by way of ‘new’ thought in terms of how 
unions should set about rebuilding their organisations. However, some of these efforts, 
particularly those of the TUC Organising Academy, are so ‘unproductive’ that they are 
destined to fail, according to Metcalfe (2001).
6.50. The strategies adopted by the trade unions cannot be said to have succeeded in 
reversing the decline in the aggregate membership or density of the movement, they have 
nonetheless been instrumental in the survival of some unions which may have simply 
ceased to function. The merger process must be viewed as a success in that it has helped 
stave off financial decline and has helped in the process of restructuring some unions,
430 Waddington. J. (2003) Trade Union Organisation in Edwards. P. fed) Industrial Relations Second 
Edition Theory and Practice. Blackwell, Oxford, p 238
431 Information taken from the TUC website - www.tuc.org.uk/organisation
432 Waddington. J. (2003) p 241
433 Whilst this assertion carries no other authority than the empirical evidence of the author of the thesis, it is 
validated by work undertaken as an Area Organiser and Deputy General Secretary of the Clerical and 
Administrative Workers Union and latterly APEX over some 30 years.
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both private and public sector, into formats which better facilitates their continuity. 
Merged unions have been better able to rationalise their cost structures and organise 
across their combined historic membership areas. Also, by developing a more ‘general’ 
approach to their organising activities, the new merged union has frequently been able to 
gain entry to new areas of organising opportunity. There is the downside that mergers, 
certainly initially, add nothing to aggregate membership, and as is discussed earlier in 
this Chapter may actually reduce the aggregate membership of the merging unions. The 
fact that merging unions continue to lose membership, as at the time of merging, can be 
seen from tracking the membership of merging unions through the year end membership 
data provided within the CO’s Annual Reports.
6.51. Conglomerate unions, during the reference period, have not performed well in 
terms of finance or membership retention, as is illustrated earlier in this Chapter. 
Willman (2005) and Waddington (2005) are critical of the propensity to merge, 
particularly in the creation of conglomerate unions. Willman’s paradigm is that the 
development of trade unions is at a stage similar to that of the economic theory model of 
‘perfect competition’. His argument is basically that the trade union movement is 
consolidating around a small number of (shrinking in membership and resource terms) 
large organisations. Given that this small number of large organisations has shown no net 
aggregate growth, the question is can a small number of large organisations exploit their 
increasingly ‘oligopolistic’ control of the market, to extract sufficient income from their 
operation to ‘stay in business’, and reverse aggregate density decline as the trade union 
movement goes forward into the 21st Century.
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7. Conclusions
7.1. From the 1940’s governments continued an abstentionist policy towards unions and 
industrial relations. Their policy was nonetheless supportive of ‘collectivism’, evidently 
because it was ‘convenient’ to have an ordered structure, see Fredman (1992)434. 
However, as trade unions increased in strength and influence and countervailed 
government policies, statutory intervention was increasingly used to restrict and control 
their activities. Not until the early 1970’s was ‘acceptance’ of the legitimacy of their 
role, and continuing the support of ‘public policy’ called into question. Millward et al 
(2000)435 appear far too simplistic when they say that there is some natural order about 
the manner in which the system of industrial relations based upon:
“shared values o f the legitimacy o f representation by independent trade unions and o f  
joint regulation, crumbled ”
What happened during the eighteen years of the Conservative Governments was 
disastrous for the trade unions. It was not a case of “crumbling” so much as having the 
very foundations destroyed by a “monstrous attack” Hendy (1993)436, by the twin 
onslaught of a succession of antipathetic statutes and unhelpful case law, which had no 
regard for collectivism, social culture or international conventions and standards. The 
succession of some 16 Acts of Parliament and numerous Statutory Instruments and 
Consolidation Acts437 primarily aimed at ever greater regulation and control of trade 
unions and reversal of collectivism seriously debilitated the unions. Its affects were not 
simply the suppression of union activities so much as removing any effective means by 
which unions could resist the contextual changes with which they were to be faced. 
However, the preoccupation of trade unions with organising manual and white-collar 
workers in the manufacturing sector contributed significantly to the collapse of union 
density. As is illustrated by a range of research, but principally that undertaken by Bain, 
the trade union movements greatest strength, its high density membership in 
manufacturing, became its greatest weaknesses, leaving unions vulnerable to industrial 
restructuring when it gained pace.
7.2. The post Donovan period and the Industrial Relations Act 1971, whilst representing 
a period which many tend to regard as an aberration, contributing little of value but much
434 Fredman, S. (1992) The New Rights: Labour Law and Ideology in the Thatcher Years. Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, 1992, Vol.12, Nol pp 39-40
435 Millward, N. Bryson, A & Forth, J. All Change at Work Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1980- 
1998. Routledge, 2000, London, pp234.
436 See: Hendy, J. (1993) The International Dimension, A Law Unto Themselves Employment Laws: A 
National and International Assessment. Institute of Employment Rights, London, 1993, pp96
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conflict, in fact developed the first attempts to enforce trade union recognition by means 
of law. The UK was unique amongst industrialised nations prior to that time (see Kahn- 
Freund in Flanders and Clegg (1962)438. Whilst for the majority of trade unions 
recognition was not at that time something about which they had any great concern, for 
staff unions generally, and unions within notoriously difficult to organise industries such 
as Banking, Retail, Catering, etc, it was of major significance. The IRA 1971 was 
‘supportive’ of the ‘collectivist model’, unlike the laws of the 1980/90’s. Unfortunately, 
at this point in history the intervention of law was, certainly by trade union leaders, seen 
as anathema, an attitude shared by many employers particularly where the law impinged 
upon the ‘legal status’ of collective agreements. However much the IRA 1971 may 
have been despised and, its passing into history with the election of the Labour 
Government was applauded, its demise did not result in a total reversal of the role of law 
in the regulation of industrial relations.
7.3. However, during the 1980’s and 1990’s unions and employee collective and 
individual rights received some respite from Tory antipathy through EU statutory 
developments which impacted upon UK law. Since 1997, there has been increasing 
support for collectivism through UK statutory provisions. Additionally, UK legislation 
and Regulation has introduced a considerable underpinning for the employment contract, 
through procedural protections, and minimum standards in terms and conditions. The 
provision of statutory support for minimum standards is obviously an important laudable 
feature of social policy. However, protecting the lowest income groups by statute puts 
such rights within the realm of ‘public goods’ and as a consequence tends to remove a 
significant part of the industrial mission of the trade union movement in terms of 
collective bargaining. Historically such issues were a feature of individual union 
policies and industrial campaigns. However, it was precisely such arguments that were 
adduced by unions when they campaigned for the removal of Wages Councils, Rubery 
and Edwards (2003)439. The ambivalence of unions about wage-fixing machinery, did 
not however, ‘convert’ into significant efforts to organise low paid workers into unions 
once it was dissolved. Instead, unions settled back into their preoccupation with their 
core membership groups, failing to increase their organisational base into many of the
437 See Appendix H
438 Flanders, A. and Clegg, H.A. Eds The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, Oxford, 1963. 
Chpt 11 Legal Framework. O. Kahn-Freund, pp 44.
439 Rubery and Edwards (2003) 1 Low Pay and the National Minimum Wage, in Edwards. P. (ed) 
Industrial Relations Theory and Practice. Second Edition, Blackwell, Oxford pp453-455
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service areas, which were covered by Wages Councils, and which have been growth 
areas for employment.
7.4. Some unions did address the twin issues of low pay and non-unionism, through 
statutory provisions, which have been relatively overlooked, by the research into 
statutory regulation of pay and trade union recognition. The thesis adduces evidence and 
argument to show that the ‘underpinning’ of the Terms and Conditions of Employment 
act 1959 and Fair Wages Resolutions 1946 were under-valued and possibly under­
exploited. Nonetheless, where they were used they proved to be effective devices, 
helping to not only raise the standards of terms and conditions but also extend 
collectivism, and consequently provide the basis for extending collective bargaining with 
employers. The 1959 Act served as an ‘instrument of persuasion’ upon employers to 
concede recognition and bargain collectively, as an alternative to its use, this being a 
reason why a minority of cases actually made it to the Industrial Court. The case 
examples cited, and material available at Kew440 put this argument beyond doubt. 
Perhaps those who advised Donovan and provided opinion about the value of the 1959 
Act had little practical knowledge of its use and effectiveness. However, the 1959 Act 
relied for its relevance upon the existence of terms and conditions covering a trade or 
industry. With the demise of national bargaining and the move to company bargaining, 
its relevance, like that of the Fair Wages Resolution 1946, was in decline prior to its final 
repeal. What is often regarded as its replacement, the Employment Protection Act 
1975(EPA 75) had some success as an instrument for improving general terms and 
conditions and furthering recognition. However, the EPA 75 was short-lived being 
repealed by the Tory government shortly after coming to power in 1979. The EPA 75441 
with its Schedule 11 recognition procedures and, the provision of terms and conditions 
equivalent to the ‘general level’ of pay for comparable workers, gave a ‘two pronged’ 
underpinning of the twin issues of recognition and collective bargaining. The former 
provisions proved incapable of effective operation because of general antipathy by 
employers, and unhelpful case law in respect of Schedule 11 claims, involving ACAS442, 
undermine its authority. Schedule 11 was not the progeny of the 1959 Act, but 
something quite different, it was used frequently in circumstances where unions already 
had recognition and collective bargaining rights solely to lift wage rates within a district.
440 Public Records Office, Kew, London
441 The employment Protection Act 1975 Schedule 11 is discussed in more detail in W ood. P  
(1978) and W edderburn Lord, (1995), also Rubery. J., and Edwards. P. (2003) Low Pay and the
National Minimum Wage, in Edwards. P. (ed) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice. Second Edition, 
Blackwell, Oxford, Chapter 17
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Whilst Schedule 11 did help in lifting the standards of terms and conditions for the lower 
paid and gaining recognition and collective bargaining rights, it was also an instrument 
of ‘competitive circuitous wage inflation443’. However, notwithstanding that since 1999 
the trade union movement has been able to use the law in campaigns for improvements 
in a range of procedural and substantive matters, the development has not produced a 
high use of the new laws, nor has the activity shown much ‘payback’ in the form of 
increased aggregate membership. Similarly, the statutory regulation of terms and 
conditions has produced little evidence of any effect upon union membership density. 
Perhaps the ambivalence of earlier generations of trade union leaders on the matter of 
statutory regulation of minimum terms had some foundation, in that the ‘returns’ 
produce by way of organisational density are poor.
7.5. But for ‘public policy’ Coates (1994)444 and the ‘cultural support’ for trade unions 
throughout the period from the early 1940’s, their growth (which relatively failed to 
exploit the growth in employment) would have been much less than it was in the period 
up to 1979, Bain and Price (1985)445. Consequently their decline would have been much 
greater than has proven to be the case since 1979. The ‘underpinnings’ of:
1. legal immunities (the golden formula);
2. the ‘pluralist’ approach to the management of employees;
3. the ‘collectivist model’ as the preponderant approach to determining the terms of
4. the employment contract;
5. statutory enforcement of various kinds throughout much of the period to 1979; 
provided trade unions with the structural base and financial resources to carry them 
through the years of rapid decline from 1980 to 1997. The development of EU law, and 
its countervailing affect upon some of the extremes of UK law, helped trade unions to 
ameliorate some of the decline in collectivism. Also, the emergence of a new approach 
by the TUC from the mid 1990’s Heery (1998)446, and the swing back to a more 
supportive culture placed trade unions in a stronger position towards the end of the 
1990’s, than might have been the case without these developments. However, UK unions
442 Grunwick Processing Laboratories -v- Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service [1978] AC 655
443 Based upon the extensive personal involvement o f the author in pursuing pay and conditions 
claims with employers throughout the regional centers o f  the engineering industry (Coventry, 
Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Sheffield, and many others)
444 Coates, D. The Question o f UK Decline, The Economy. State and Society. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel 
Hempstead, 1994. pp 95 penultimate para.
445 Bain. G.S. and Price. R. The Determinants o f Union Growth. Chpt 17, Trade Unions. Second Edition. 
Me Carthy. W.E.J. Lord, Ed, Penguin Books, London, 1985.
446 Heery, E. tThe Re-launch o f the Trades Union C o n g ressBritish Journal o f Industrial Relations, 
Blackwell, 36(3) September 1998: pp339-360
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continued to demise in a number of ways throughout the period from 1997, and continue 
to do so as at 2002, as the thesis has illustrated. However, whilst the growth in female 
membership has helped defray the losses in male membership, increases in the number 
of part-time members, whilst assisting the density figures are likely to be contributing 
less to the financial strength of unions particularly in terms of fee/costs ratios of 
servicing such members. The growth in part-time employment makes it impossible for 
unions to ignore this area of employment. Unions can and do ‘scale’ their benefit 
structures on a pro-rata to contribution basis. However, whilst this policy carries no risk 
in respect of accusations of discrimination in the provision of benefits when the status of 
members is homogeneous, such accusations could arise if part-time employees are 
offered a ‘lesser’ service or benefit simply because of their employment status. 
Nonetheless, the financial implications of a heavy involvement in organising part-time 
employees are serious matters requiring consideration. However, if the quantum of 
contribution income can be raised to cover costs, with a margin for investment in growth, 
the issue of differential contribution levels for part-time employees could become of 
little significance.
7.6. The reversal of public policy post 1979, and removal of the underpinnings of 
favourable law exposed the fundamental weaknesses of trade unionism. Without these 
two ‘supports’ it could not flourish, however, recognition did not follow the decline in 
union membership and collective bargaining as can be seen from the data and argument 
in WERS (1998). However, Willman (2005) puts forward some compelling arguments 
about the inevitability of further decline of trade union density, given recent past and 
current policies of unions. Willman’s arguments find a measure of support in the
research and empirical knowledge that supports the thesis. However, the pendulum of 
‘public policy’ appears to have taken a ‘swing’ back to cultural acceptance447. Perhaps 
the ‘swing’ since 1997 has been generated by the weight of employment law448 over 
recent years, and its complexity for individuals and, the vulnerability felt by many 
employees, in the modem industrial environment, as much as because of the political 
change that took place from that date. Also the risk of legal exposure perceived by 
many employers who have practiced little transparency in the manner in which they 
consult and communicate with their employees in the recent past and now need to amend 
their practices. Colling (2003)449 argues similar to Kelly (1998) that unions are failing to
447 The Human Rights Act 1998 by Article 11 and 14, give further support to the detail of recent statutes.
448 There were sixteen major statutes plus three consolidation Acts since 1971.
449 Colling. T. (2003) pp 368-391
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raise their profile in their market place in order that workers who have a need for 
representation can readily find the union that can provide it. To achieve this end requires 
more than the activities of a few ‘new organisers’ trained through the TUC. It requires 
mass publicity, and a more active presence within local communities, but more 
importantly a retracing of union history and the ‘re-discovery’ of the fundamentals which 
helped the movement organise over 50% of the UK workforce. Supportive public policy 
is in place, based upon the results of a large body of research the need for representation, 
in many industries and workplaces, is as relevant today as it ever was. The opportunities 
are there, however, it is extremely doubtful whether the resources are in place to exploit 
them.
7.7. The ERA 1999 and its amendments to TULR(C)A 1992 needs more time to show 
whether it is the catalyst to help reverse the decline of collectivism. As Antil (1998)450 
said “the devil is in the detail” and it remains to be seen how the “detail” will be 
translated into law by the CAC and the courts in the longer term. If past experience is 
repeated the courts are likely to come up with some perverse judgments, which will 
possibly require amending legislation to correct them and put in place more precision. 
What one can say is that there are some signs over the past six years of the new 
legislation’s operation that the decline of trade union membership has slowed. However, 
the decline is not yet halted, let alone reversed, nonetheless there are some signs that 
membership decline has slowed and, as the thesis illustrates, collectivism in the form of 
the new Partnership Agreements is undergoing an innovative ‘renaissance’.
7.8. The determination of pay and benefits by collective bargaining is much lower than 
pre 1979 and, is undertaken by a minority of employers covering a small part of the total 
workforce in the private sector. However, within the public sector, even after the Tory 
attempts to deregulate its operations through introducing ‘market concepts’ Bach and 
Winchester (2003)451, collective bargaining is almost as ‘ubiquitous’ as trade union 
membership. However, with the continuation of deregulation, albeit at a slower pace 
than during the 1980’s and 1990’s. In addition, the decline in collective bargaining 
particularly on pay, see Brown et al (2003)452 and moves towards the type of private 
sector arrangements for pay and terms and conditions determination, the change process
450 Antil, D. (1998) Collective Employment Law. NLJ Employment Law Supplement, 1998, ppl305 - 1308
451 Bach. S. and Wincheter. D. (2003) Industrial Relations in the Public Sector in Edwards. P.
(ed) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice. Second Edition, Blackwell, Oxford pp 285-312
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is likely to continue in the public sector, see Bach and Winchester (2003). Certainly, if as 
appears to be the case, the experience in the private sector transfers to the public sector, 
particularly the use of HRM to bypass ‘collectivism’ and collective bargaining, 
particularly on pay, the ‘ubiquitous’ nature of union membership may demise.
7.9. Not only have unions lost power and influence, employers too have lost some of 
their ‘collective power Edwards (1993)’453. As a result of the headlong rush to ‘de­
regulate’ they have not developed any ‘new’ collective means of representing their 
interest industrially or at a macro level, save for the CBI, unlike their EU counterparts 
who still tend to maintain a ‘collectivist’ approach. Consequently, whilst collectivism is 
no longer the dominant model, however, the intervention of law, is leading employees, 
and some employers, to realise, the value in having a ‘collective’ process as an 
independent method of dealing with the laws requirements. Management’s are 
increasingly unsure about how far they can go in running a business without having 
some form of consensus to support them, and by which to comply with statutory 
requirements that increasingly require some form of ‘employee representation and 
consultation’. Many of the initiatives taken by some employers as an alternative to trade 
unions are themselves grounded in a ‘collectivist’ approach, Employee Forums, 
Employee Councils, Focus Groups etc are barely disguised attempts by management’s to 
construct a ‘bespoke collectivism’, one might say ‘redesigning the wheel’. Employers 
may increasingly realise that structured employee relations supported by appropriate 
mechanisms, bespoke and flexible in their design, Guest (1991)454 which are legally 
compliant is preferable to crisis management. Partnership Agreements as a concept, are 
possibly the geneses of the next millennium ‘collectivist model’. Perhaps as collectivism 
grounded in collective bargaining was the dominant model throughout the period we 
have reviewed Partnership (if not by name by ‘form’) will become its replacement. 
Certainly the issue of the legal right to recognition is in less doubt provided that the 
rigors of the current law455 can be met.
452 Brown.W., Marginson. P. and Walsh. J. (2003) The Management o f Pay as the Influence o f Collective 
Bareainine Diminishes in Edwards. P. (ed) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice. Second Edition, 
Blackwell, Oxford pp 189-213.
453 Edwards. P. (1993) Great Britain: “Still Muddling Throueh’'’ - Ferner. A. and Hyman. R. editors, 
Industrial Relations in the New Europe. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1993, 5 and 6.
454 See: Guest, D.E. (1991)‘Personnel Management: The End o f OrthodoxvT . British Journal o f Industrial 
Relations 1991,29,2, ppl69,
455 Part I of Schedule A1 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULR(C)A), 
as inserted by Section 1 of the Employment Relations Act 1999
198
7.10. The Partnership Agreement between CSC and MSF, has been used as a model 
because of its probably unique nature. The Partnership Agreement between CSC and 
MSF is atypical because CSC is one of a very few large companies which specialise in 
undertaking outsourced business of companies which transfer functions that have 
become too expensive to be conducted in house. Such activities as Computer Aided 
Design (CAD) and Computer Aided Management (CAM), Computer Software Systems 
Design, Payroll, Purchase Control, Inventory Control, are some of the ‘outsourced’ 
functions CSC undertakes for clients. CSC acquires not only the function but also the 
staff undertaking the work for the client company through a ‘business transfer’ under the 
Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment Regulations 1981 (TUPE 81). CSC 
is quintessentially a technological service company, and almost by definition amongst 
the most difficult of company’s to organise into a union and with which to gain 
recognition. CSC could on the evidence of its very poor membership levels456 have 
ignored MSF and allowed it to wither and die. However, because of compelling reasons 
associated with its desire to grow its business, particularly in the public sector where 
heavy unionisation existed, CSC wanted to portray a transparent image on industrial 
relations, to its market, showing good agreements and union relations to be part of its 
culture. Given the large number of Partnership Agreements found by Gall and McKay 
(2002),457 the circumstances of companies with needs similar to CSC are likely to be 
found more generally throughout industry. Not necessarily in terms of its type of 
business, but in terms of the need to have ‘stable’ employee relations, and a good image 
in markets for its goods and services and in the employment market. Where unions are 
possibly failing is in not having a detailed profile of the target company, its sensitivity to 
its market needs for ethical employee relations policies, no supply disruption, statutory 
compliance etc. Given the more aggressive and sophisticated market in which unions 
now operate they must develop a capacity for in depth research and a competence in 
company profiling, analogous to the profiling undertaken by predatory company’s 
looking for their next acquisition. Identifying, company markets, products, employee 
recruitment markets, human resource policies, problems, and general culture would 
assist a union, in matching its recruitment activities and approaches for recognition, to 
the profile of the target company.
456 See APPENDIX E 5
457 Gall. G., and M cKay. S.,(2000) Trade Union Recognition in Britain: The dawn o f  a new era?  
University o f  Sterling
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7.11. Apart from the underpinnings of minimum statutory rights in areas such as pay, 
holidays, working hours, Health.and Safety458, Employment Transfers, training etc there 
is unlikely to emerge legislation similar to the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 
1959, Fair Wages Resolutions or the ERA 1975 Schedule 11, that helped trade unions in 
the early years. This is so if for no other reason than the fact that, apart from the public 
sector, employers and unions no longer enter into national bargaining covering an 
industry, and in the Public Sector such bargaining is also demising. However, the 
impetus which such laws create for employers to ‘conform’, in matters of consultation 
and representation, have made them compelling instruments for progress in the 
maintenance/development of collectivism. If trade unions use the law tactically as well 
as in the defence of their members the ERA 1999 s 10 (1)(2)(3) could, as argued earlier, 
become an aid towards recognition and ultimately collective bargaining. The ERA 1999 
and TULR(C)A Schedule Al, and the partnership philosophy do appear to have the 
ingredients for developing into the ‘next generation’ of underpinning for ‘collectivism’. 
Whilst there have been some ‘minor’ problems, whether there will be major challenges 
on the question of recognition arising under the provisions of Schedule Al, Antil 
(1999)459, McCarthy Lord (1999) as at the end o f2002, remains to be seen.
7.12. The increasingly tenuous nature of trade union finance, particularly since 1979, is 
illustrated by the increasing pace and urgency of union mergers. The long standing 
debate and warnings about low contribution rates and the consequences of subsidising 
low contribution income, through the consumption of investment income, and liquidation 
of assets, has had little effect. Hughes, Latta, Willman et al, Undy et al, and others have 
each produced sound analysis and advice over many years about the seriousness of 
failing trade union finances. It is not feasible to single out only one development and 
ascribe to it the major role in the failing fortunes of unions. So many changes affected 
the operation of trade unions during the period since 1979. However, whilst it may not 
be ‘the’ single issue which caused union decline, financial inadequacy has contributed 
greatly to it, and tends to inhibit the ability of unions to regain membership density. The 
issues of inadequate UK trade union finances are of a long-standing nature. Unions, 
which had a long history of operation, primarily manual unions, have managed to come 
through the problems of membership loss since 1979. They have tended to have larger
458 Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974; Safety Representatives and Safety Committee Regulations, s2(4) 
s2(6) 1977/500, also SI 1992
459 TULR(C) Schedule)Al para 7 (l)(a)(b), The TUC appears to be raising concerns about small employers 
as was anticipated b y , Antil,D. Collective and Individual Representation at Work. NLJ, Employment Law 
Supplement, Butterworths, 1999, ppl334.
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capital resources, and have had the dubious benefit of being able to liquidate and convert 
to income fixed assets as membership and organisational requirements declined over the 
period. Unions with a short history and less membership and capital resources, primarily 
white-collar unions, have not managed to come through the period from 1979. As is 
discussed earlier, none of the white-collar unions that were predominantly involved in 
the private sector exists in 2002. MSF struggled into the millennium, only to be 
compelled, for financial reasons, to amalgamate with the AEU to form Amicus. BIFU 
managed to make it to the millennium in its new amalgamated form as UNIFI, to be 
faced with the reality of depleting financial resources and the inevitability of 
amalgamation with Amicus. Furthermore, it is evident that there are a number of other 
substantial unions actively considering mergers currently. . The opportunities available 
from a reduced number of unions could be significant, in terms of economies of scale. 
However, it will require more innovation than has been demonstrated so far in the 
process of structural rationalisation. The TUC could develop as the centralised 
management services agency, extending the role it has attempted to play in orchestrating 
recruitment initiatives. What is required is rationalisation of union fees, and the 
attainment of economies of scale through co-operative purchase of services, (legal, 
insurance, mortgage etc) from external sources. Also centralised capital procurement 
such as motor vehicles acquired through a centralised car leasing company operated 
through the TUC. By spreading costs in some aspects of individual union management 
across all unions, residual resources could be concentrated upon the business of 
organising membership and delivering centrally sourced services.
7.13. Claims that ‘trade unions have been following a long-term policy of rationalisation 
of structure through amalgamations and transfers of engagements’, and this process has 
been of benefit in terms of the economic and organisational health of the trade union 
movement, simply do not hold up under analysis460. The process of rationalisation, 
which gathered pace after 1979 was one driven more by financial collapse on the part of 
many of the merging partners, rather than developments taking place through some
460 Prof Paul Willman in his research to be published mid 2005 says: “The merger process, 
which has generated this set of structures, has not eradicated inter-union competition. Nor has it 
generated the resource benefits following from economies of scale”. This is a view with which 
Metcalfe (2004) agrees when he says: “The bulk of mergers were aimed at raising market share - 
shuffling members around - rather than generating scale economies which would release extra 
resources for servicing and organising. Indeed many mergers are simply a reaction to the loss of 
members and income”.
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centrally orchestrated move to a more rational union structure. Willman (2005) is clear in 
his views about the affects of mergers and the atrophy of the trade union movement 
caused by mergers and the financial predicament of trade unions going forward into the 
21st Century saying:
“The substantial volume o f  net exit from  the union sector and the merger activity 
o f  the 1990s is not associated with improvements in resource availability and 
indeed the union movement which is seeking to revitalise itself in the early part o f  
the 21st century is financially weaker on these measures than it has been fo r  at 
least 50 years”.
The exogenous issues of:
1. failing membership development policies;
2. inability to exploit statutory provisions on collective rights;
3. statutoiy provision of individual and collective rights free of union involvement;
4. increasing statutoiy regulation of terms and conditions;
5. increasing use of human resource management by employers; 
when taken together with the endogenous issues of:
6. depleting financial resources;
7. the gap between fee income and costs, increasing year on year;
8. the number of unions failing to cover cost with aggregate income increasing year by 
year; and,
9. mergers bom out of defence rather than strategies for growth,
UK trade union density may continue to fall, and in aggregate these issues may ensure 
UK unions fail to achieve a watershed in rebuilding their organisations. The net result of 
all this being that much of the movement as it exists at the start of the 21st Century will 
fail to reach the 22nd Millennium. What would then be left would be a few conglomerate 
unions, with overlapping areas of membership by industry, and service, in many cases by 
individual employer, in both the public and private sectors. The exceptions to this 
scenario are likely to be specialised unions within the public sector, particularly in 
professional services such as education and health care. However, as Willman says: 
“Since many mergers have resulted in conglomerate unions with overlapping job  
territories (Willman 1996, 2004) it is possible that the fa ll in the number o f  unions 
has reduced congestion without reducing competition; by this is meant that although 
the number o f choices a prospective member has o f  unions to join (or employers o f  
unions to recognise) has declined, choice, and therefore competition, persists within 
a shrinking resource base
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Inter-union competition for the majority of what remains of the movement, may become 
a more serious issue requiring regulation, which could continue to be accomplished by 
voluntary process through the TUC. However, if this approach fails, as it so often has in 
the past, statutory regulation may be introduced as a final resort to legally determine 
inter-union disputes, about bargaining units and union catering rights based on union 
membership and ‘tenure’. Something that could be achieved through the appropriate 
amendments to the prevailing powers of the CAC in respect of claims for union 
recognition. A considerable part of what is said in this final paragraph describes a 
situation that would be beyond the “twilight zone o f perdition described by Willman
(2005), and may be fertile ground for further research.
RAY EDWARDS 
August 2005 
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APPENDIX A
PinPoint Survey Questionnaire 
Explanatory Information
Main Overview
Welcome to PinPoint, an information collection and analysis package designed to allow 
you to extract and present meaningful facts and conclusions about information.
In some ways, PinPoint may be described as a database - it allows you to store 
information and recall that information for inspection in the way that databases have 
done before. However, PinPoint goes beyond simple storage and retrieval o f information. 
Simple storage and retrieval doesnt tell you much about the information you hold. Whilst 
possible, it is difficult to ascertain facts such as how many people in the database fall into 
certain age ranges, how many days were there more than 5 hours sunshine in each month 
o f the year, this year as against last year, how popular are your products? PinPoint is 
designed to answer questions such as these, and far more complex ones, and to present 
the results in interesting ways.
PinPoint can be used on its own to design a questionnaire or data collection sheet, enter 
collected information and analyse the information. Or it can complement any existing 
database applications you possess. Information can be imported from another 
application, such as a fully relational database, and then analyses performed.
What does PinPoint do?
Within PinPoint the information you need can be quickly and precisely collected and 
compiled into a database. Your information can then be rapidly ordered and analysed in 
many different ways to indicate correlations, patterns and trends, and from these analyses 
hypotheses can be framed and quickly tested and statistics derived.
Results can be summarised in report form or graphically in graph, chart and table format, 
and your final analyses presented (making use o f PinPoint's fully-fledged Windows 
WYSIWYG attributes) on screen or in prin tin  PinPoint you work in familiar settings, 
using easily understood terms and procedures written in plain English. There is no arcane 
language to learn, and no programming is required in order to obtain results which can 
be both useful and applicable to your business, profession or project.
Navigating through PinPoint
There are four main areas in which you will work on a PinPoint 'project'. These are
Foiiii Design and Editing.
Foitli Filling.
Inforlnation Analysis.
Production and Presentation of Graphs, Charts and Tables.
Form Design and Editing
Every new PinPoint project begins with the design o f its 'form', or data collection sheet. 
PinPoint makes form design easy. The questions to which you need answers are written 
in plain English on an electronic piece o f paper. You have no need to be an 'expert' form 
designer, nor do you need to understand complex datafile structures to produce a well 
presented and workable form.
Once designed a form may be printed for use as a 'questionnaire' or for other data 
collection. There is a form at the core o f every PinPoint project.
Form Filling
A completed or 'filled in' copy o f a form is known in PinPoint as an 'answer sheet'. 
During answer sheet compilation a copy o f the form is always displayed on screen. 
Answers can be entered directly onto the screen by your respondents, or else answer data 
can be 'copied in' from a collection of completed paper forms.
Because Pinpoint's forms can contain many question 'formats' together with free-form 
text notes and built-in data entry checks, precise information can entered quickly and 
accurately.
Information Analysis
A completed set of answer sheets is known as a 'stack'. When a stack o f answer sheets 
has been compiled the sheets are placed into a 'worksheet' for analysis.
PinPoint's worksheets provide the tools for displaying completed answer sheets in 
tabular form; sorting and selecting the sheets; performing statistical analyses; creating 
reports; and the production o f graphs, charts and tables.You can add new answer sheets 
to a stack, and edit or 'update' a project's form and any existing answer sheet(s) at any 
time.
Production and Presentation of Graphs, Charts and Tables
Whilst many interesting patterns may emerge from the 'raw' information displayed in 
worksheet format, other interpretations may only become apparent when the data is 
further tabulated or presented graphically in some way.
PinPoint incorporates a powerful cross-tab generator and provides a wide choice o f  chart 
types and graphing options with which to present information for maximum clarity and 
impact.All the same WYSIWYG drawing tools and controls as are used in form design 
are available to you in the Presentation Editor.
The Project
PinPoint stores all project information - the form, the completed answer sheets, the 
worksheet and all its attributes and any associated graphical presentations - in a single 
".ppf' project file.
PIN-POINT SURVEY - UNION SAMPLE
1. Abbey National Group Union -  ANGU
2. Alliance and Leicester Group Union of Staff
3. Amicus
4. Anchor Group Staff Association
5. Association of Chiropodists and Podiatrists
6. Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen
7. Association of Teachers and Lecturers
8. Association of University Teachers
9. Bakers Food and Allied Workers Union
10. Britannia Staff Union
11. British Air Line Pilots Association
12. British Association of Colliery Management
13. British Association of Dental Nurses
14. British Association of Occupational Therapists Limited
15. British Dental Association
16. British Dietetic Association
17. British Medical Association
18. British Orthoptic Society
19. Broadcasting Entertainment Cinematograph and Theatre Union
20. Ceramic and Allied Trades Union
21. Chartered Society of Physiotherapy
22. CGNU Staff Association
23. Communication Workers Union
24. Community and District Nursing Association
25. Connect; The Union for Professionals in Communications
26. Equity (Incorporating the Variety Artistes’ Federation)
27. FDA
28. Friends Provident Line Managers Association
29. Fire Brigades Union
30. Fire Officers Association
31. General Dental Practitioners Association
32. GMB
33. Graphical Paper and Media Union
34. Guinness UDV Staff Association
35. Hospital Consultants and Specialists Association
36. Independent Union of Halifax Staff
37. Irish Bank Officials Association
38. Iron and Steel Trades Confederation
39. Leeds and Holbeck Building Society Staff Association
40. Lloyds TSB Group Union
41. Musicians Union
42. National Association of Educational Inspectors Advisers and Consultants
43. National Association of Head Teachers
44. National Association of Schoolmasters and Union of Women Teachers
45. National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education
46. National Union of Marine Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers
47. National Union of Rail Maritime and Transport Workers
48. National Union of Teachers
49. Nationwide Group Staff Union
50. Portman Staff Association
51. Prison Officers Association
52. Prison Service Union
53. Professional Footballers Association
54. Prospect
55. Public and Commercial Services Union
56. Royal College of Midwives
57. Royal College of Nursing
58. Society of Chiropodists and Podiatrists
59. Society of Radiographers
60. Transport and General Workers Union
61. Transport Salaried Staffs Association
62. UNEFI
63. Union of Construction Allied Trades and Technicians
64. Union of Shop Distributive and Allied Workers
65. UNISON -  The Public Service Union
66. WISA -  The Union for Woolwich Staff
67. Writers Guild of Great Britain
68. Yorkshire Independent Staff Association
A lQ l. Name o f Union APPENDIX B 1 I ,
V
Q2. Name and job title o f person completing questionnaire 
Q3. Date ____________________
TRADE UNION DATA QUESTIONNAIRE 
Q4. First of all we would like to ask you some questions about your unions membership industrial structure
J
Section No 1
34c. Q1 How many of the following classes of 
nembership does your union have? PLEASE TICK 
\S  MANY BOXES AS APPROPRIATE
01□  Manufacturing 
02 □  Electricity 
031 I Water 
041 I Gas
os I I Construction
061 I Wholsale/retail
071 I Hotel/Catering
os I I Insurance Services
091 j Banking Services
i o l  I Transport Rail
11 j | Transport Road Haulage
12I j Transport passenger
13Q  Education
14I I Health primary
15I I Health non-primary
161 I Local Govt
17I I National Govt
18 T 1 Travel-liesure
19I I Civil Air Transport
201 I Communications
Q4f. Q2 MANUFACTURING.
Please indicate which 
percentage is the level of 
membership in this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1 [_] Less than 5%
2 Q  5-10% 
s Q  10-15%
4Q 15-20%
5 □  20-30%
6 □30-40%
7 □40-50%
8 □50-75%
9 □  over 75%
Q4a. Q3 ELECTRICITY. Please 
indicate which percentage is 
the level of membership in this 
industry
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1 □  Less than 5%
2 □5-10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20% 
s Q  20-30% 
e Q  30-40%
7 □40-50%  
s Q  50-75% 
g Q  over 75%
Q4e. Q4 WATER. Please 
indicate which percentage 
is the level of membership 
in this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1 □  Less than 5%
2Q5-10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20%
SQ  20-30%
6 Q  30-40%
7Q  40-50%
8 □  50-75%
9 □  over 75%
Q4g. Q5 GAS. Please indicate which 
percentage is the level of 
membership in this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1 □  Less than 5%
2 □  5-10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20%
SQ  20-30%
e Q  30-40%
7 □40-50%
8 □50-75%
9 Q  over 75%
Q4b. Q6 CONSTRUCTION. 
Please indicate which 
percentage is the level of 
membership in this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1 □  Less than 5%
2Q5-10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20% 
s Q  20-30% 
e O  30-40%
7 □40-50%
8Q  50-75%
91 lover75%
Q4d. Q7 WHOLESALE/RETAIL. 
Please indicate which 
percentage is the level of 
membership in this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1 □  Less than 5% 
2Q5-10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20%
5 020-30%
6 0 3 0 -40%
7Q  40-50% 
s Q  50-75%
9 0  over 75%
Q4h. Q8 HOTEL/CATERING. 
Please indicate which 
percentage is the level of 
membership in this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1 □  Less than 5%
2 05 -10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20%
5Q  20-30% 
e 030-40%
7Q  40-50%
8 Q  50-75%
9 □  over 75% Pagel
41. Q9 INSURANCE 
ERVICES. Please indicate 
hich percentage is the 
vel of membership in this 
dustry
LEASE TICK ONE BOX
f~| Less than 5%
□  5-10%
□  10-15%
□  15-20%
□  20-30%
□  30-40%
□  40-50%
□  50-75%
□  over 75%
Ik. Q10 BANKING 
ERVICES. Please indicate 
lich percentage is the 
rel of membership in this 
dustry
.EASE TICK ONE BOX
_j Less than 5%
J5-10%
J 10-15%
J 15-20%
□  20-30%
□  30-40%
J  40-50%
□  50-75%
_j over 75%
4n. Q11 TRANSPORT 
AIL. Please indicate 
hich percentage is the 
vel of membership in 
tis industry
LEASE TICK ONE BOX
□  Less than 5%
□  5-10%
□  10-15%
□  15-20%
□  20-30%
□  30-40% |
□  40-50%
□  50-75%
Q  over 75%
Q4j. Q12 TRANSPORT ROAD 
PASSENGER. Please indicate 
which percentage is the level of 
membership in this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1 □  Less than 5% 
2Q5-10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20%
5 □20-30%
6Q  30-40%
7[_l 40-50%
8 Q  50-75%
9 □  over 75%
Q4m. Q13 TRANSPORT 
HAULAGE. Please indicate 
which percentage is the 
level of membership in this 
industry
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1 □  Less than 5% 
2Q5-10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20%
5 □20-30%  
e Q  30-40%
7Q  40-50%
8 □50-75%
9 □  over 75%
Q4I. Q15. HEALTH PRIMARY 
Please indicate which 
percentage is the level of 
membership in this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1 □  Less than 5% 
2Q5-10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20%
5 □20-30%
6 Q  30-40%
7 □40-50%
8 □50-75%  
g l o v e r  75%
Q4o. Q14. EDUCATION Please 
indicate which percentage is the level 
of membership in this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
Q4p. Q16. HEALTH NON 
PRIMARY Please indicate 
which percentage is the 
level of membership in 
this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1Q  Less than 5% 
2Q5-10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20% 
s □20-30%
6 030-40%
7[_J 40-50%
8 050-75%
91 j over 75%
1 □  Less than 5% 
2Q5-10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20%
5 0 2 0 -3 0 %
e 030-40%
7 □40-50%  
s1050-75%
91 I over 75%
24s. Q17. LOCAL GOVT Please 
ndicate which percentage is 
he level of membership in this 
ndustry
•LEASE TICK ONE BOX
Q4q. Q18. NATIONAL 
GOVT Please indicate 
which percentage is the 
level of membership in 
this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
Q4r. Q19 TRAVEL-LIESURE. 
Please indicate which 
percentage is the level of 
membership in this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
i □  Less than 5% 
>□5-10%  
j Q  10-15%
» □  15-20%
5 □20-30%  
s Q  30-40%
? □  40-50% 
50-75%
9 □  over 75%
1 □  Less than 5%
2 □5-10%
3Q 10-15%
4Q 15-20%
5 □  20-30%
6 Q  30-40%
7|__j 40-50%
8 □50-75%
9 □  over 75%
1 □  Less than 5% 
2Q5-10%
3 □  10-15%
4Q 15-20%
5Q  20-30%
6Q  30-40%
7 □40-50%
8 □50-75%
9 Q  over 75%
Q4t. Q20.CIVIL AIR 
TRANSPORT Please 
indicate which percentage 
is the level of membership 
in this industry 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
1Q  Less than 5% 
2Q5-10%  
s Q  10-15%
4Q 15-20%
5Q  20-30% 
e Q  30-40%
7 □40-50%  
s □50-75%
9 1 lover75%
Q5. Q21. COMMUNICATIONS: Please indicate 
which percentage is the level o f  membership in 
this industry. PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
Less tha 5%
2 Q  5 -10%
3 Q  10-15%
4 Q  15 -20%
5 □ 2 0 - 3 0 %
6 Q  30-40%
7 □  40-50%
8 Q  50-75%
» □  over 75%
SECTION 2. ABOUT MEMBERSHIP 
ADMINISTRATION AND SUBSCRIPTIONS
Q6. In this section we will be seeking information about the 
unions administration of its membership and subscriptions
Q6a. Q l. MEMBERSHIP RECORDS. How are membership 
records stored? PLEASE TICK BOX AS APPROPRIATE
1 Q  Fully Computerised
2 Q  Part hard copy
3 Q  All hard copy
Q6b. Q2. MEMBERSHIP RECORDS. How up to date are 
membership records? PLEASE TICK BOX AS APPROPRIATE
Correct when return made to Certification Officer each year
2 Q  Updated every month
3 Q  Updated every two months
4 Q  Updated every three months
5 Q  updated every six months
6 Q  Some other period - specify....................
Q6c. Q3. SUBSCRIPTION RECORDS. How are subscription 
records maintained? PLEASE TICK BOX AS APPROPRIATE
1 Q  Fully Computerised
2 Q  Part hard copy
3 Q  All hard copy
Q7. Q4. We wish to know the percentage of subscriptions your union collects from its membership each 
year: PLEASE TICK APPROPRIATE BOX FOR EACH OF THE YEARS LISTED
Q7a. 198Q7b. 198Q7c. 199Q7d. 199Q7e. 200Q7f. 200Q7g. 2002
50% - 55% « □ > □ > □ * □ * □
55% - 60% > □
60% - 65% > □ * □ > □ 3 q > □
65% - 70% « □ « □ « □ « □ 4 Q « □
70% - 75% » □ » □ » □
75% - 80% * □ « □ « □ « □ « □ « □ « □
80% - 85% ? □
85% - 90% » □ « □ » □ * □ » □ * □ » □
over 90% » □ » □ » □ » □ » □ » □ » □
Q6d. Q5. MEMBERSHIP BENEFITS.? What benefits 
does the union provide to its members in addition to 
negotiation and representation PLEASE TICK AS 
MANY BOXES AS ARE APPROPRIATE.
01 □  Discount trading
02 Q  Insurance
03 |_J Travel
04 Q  Holidays
05 Q  Convalecences facilities
06 Q  Retirement counselling
07 Q  Retirement planning
08 Q  Pensions advice
09 Q  Legal advice
10 Q  legal representation - work related
11 [_} legal representation - non work related
12 Q  Unemployment
13 [__) Job search
14 Q  Professional advice/information
15 Q  Other - specify.......................
Q8. Q6. SUBSCRIPTION COLLECTION. What percentage of subscriptions are 
collected by the following methods? PLEASE TICK BOXES AS APPROPRIATE 
AND ENTER % FIGURE.
Q8a. Check off Q8b. Standing orderQ8c. Direct debit Q8d. Steward
collection
1 Q  Under 50% l Q  Under 50% i Q  Under 50% i Q  Under 50%
2 Q  50% -60% 2 Q  50% -60% 2 Q  50% -60% 2 Q  50% -60%
3 Q  60%-70% 3 Q  60%-70% 3 Q  60%-70% 3 Q  60%-70%
4 □  70%-80% 4 □  70%-80% 4 Q  70%-80% 4 □  70%-80%
5 Q  80%-90% 5 Q  80%-90% 5 Q  80%-90% 5 Q  80%-90%
6 Q j over 90% 6 Q  over 90% 6 Q  over 90% 6 Q  over 90%
Q6e. Q7. HOW ARE SUBSCRIPTION LEVELS DECIDED? 
Please indicate which body within the union decides on 
increases in subscriptions. TICK APPROPRIATE BOX.
Executive Committee 
i Q  Annual Conference 
5 □  Special Rules revision conference
Q6f. Q8. FIXING SUBSCRIPTIONS. Please indicate how far 
ahead in time are subscription levels determined. What has been 
the average period of time between suscription changes during the 
past 20 years. PLEASE TICK APPROPRIATE BOX AND GIVE 
AVERAGE PERIOD AS REQUESTED.
1 Q  One year
2 Q  Two Years
3 Q  Three years
4 Q  Longer period - specify..................
5 Q  AVERAGE PERIOD BETWEEN SUBSCRIPTION INCREASES
OVER PAST 20 YEARS.............
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Q6g. Q9. REASONS FOR INCREASING SUBSCRIPTIONS. When 
planning to increase subscriptions what are the main influences? 
PLEASE RANK THE FOLLOWING FACTORS IN ORDER OF 
IMPORTANCE (1= most important and 13 = least important)
i i Meeting administration costs
[ , Subscription levels charged by other unions
, , The level o f benefits provided to members
, , The earnings levels o f members
, , Maintaining current levels o f reserve funds
, , Need to make new capital investment
i | Need to improve membership services
, , Declining membership
, , Increasing membership
i , The level membership is likely to accept
, , Declining subscription income
i , Declining investment income
, , Other - specify.......................
SECTION 3. ABOUT UNION INVESTMENTS AND POLICY
Q9. In this section we will be seeking 
information about the unions investments
Q9a. Q l. INVESTMENT POLICY. Does the union have any 
policy on investments? PLEASE TICK APPROPRIATE BOX.
l □  Yes 
2Q N o
□  Other specify
Q10. Q3.PIease indicate what percentage of unions investments are held in the
BOXES AS APPROPRIATE
QlOa. Land QlOb. Property
□ less than □ less than
10% 10%
□ 10-20% □ 10-20%
□ 20 - 30% □ 20 - 30%
□ 30-40% □ 30-40%
□ 40 - 50% □ 40 - 50%
□ 50 - 60% □ 50 - 60%
□ 60 - 70% □ 60 - 70%
□ 70% - 80% □ 70% - 80%
□ Over 80% □ Over 80%
QlOc. Interest QlOd. Equities 
bearing accounts
□ less than □ less than
10% 10%
□ 10-20% □ 10- 20%
□ 20-30% □ 2 0 - 30%
□ 30-40% □ 3 0 - 40%
□ 40 - 50% □ 4 0 - 50%
□ 50 - 60% □ 5 0 - 60%
□ 60 - 70% □ 6 0 - 70%
□ 70% - 80% □ 70% - 80%
□ Over 80% □ Over 80%
Q9b. Q2. FORMS OF INVESTMENT. 
What types of investments can be made. 
PLEASE TICK APPROPRIATE BOXES
I | Property 
I | Land
[ | Interest bearing accounts 
□  Equities 
[ | Gilts
following form. PLEASE TICK
QlOe. Gilts QlOf. Other
investments
1 I less than 1 I less than
10% 10%n 1 0 - 2 0 % □  10-20%
□  20 - 30% n 20 - 30%
□  30-40% □  30 - 40%
□  40 - 50% □  40 - 50%
□  50 - 60% □  50 - 60%
□  60 - 70% □  60 - 70%
□  70% - 80% □  70% - 80%
□  Over 80% □  Over 80%
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Q9c. Q5. DECISIONS ON INVESTMENTS. Who is responsible for deciding 
what investments can be made. PLEASE TICK APPROPRIATE BOXES
I | General Secretary 
n  Treasurer 
I 1 Finance Officer 
I j Trustees 
I | Executive Council 
I 1 External Advisers 
I I Other-specify.................
Q9d. Q6.INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES. In terms of investment 
policy strategy please rank the following in order of importance.
(l=most important; 5 least important)
, , Maximise annual income
, , Maximise capital growth
, , Provide both income and growth
, , Provide security for member funds
, , Generate funds for new projects
SECTION 4 ABOUT EXPENDITURE AND CONTROLS.
Qll. In this next section we wish to review the way in which your union manages its expenditure. We are 
interested in the systems of control used and where expenditure can arise and who takes decisions about 
expenditure
Q lla . Q l. BUDGETARY SYSTEM. Does your union have a system of 
budgetary control over its expenditure? TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
□  Yes
□  No
Q llb . Q2.BUDGET RESPONSIBILITY. If the answer to the 
previous question was 'yes’ who is primarily responsible for setting 
budgets? TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
□  General Secretary 
I I Treasurer
I I Finance Officer
I | Executive Council
I I Other - specifiy......................
Q llc . Q3.BUDGET CONTROL, who is primarily responsible for 
controlling a budget once it is set? TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
□  General Secretary 
I j Treasurer
I j Finance Officer
□  Executive Council
I I Other - specifiy......................
Q lld . Q4.EXPENDITURE DECISIONS. Who would take decisions 
for major items of capital expenditure? TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
I I General Secretary
I | Treasurer
I | Finance Officer
I | Executive Council
I 1 Other - specifiy......................
Q lle . Q5.BUDGETARY REPORTING. How often are reports made about 
expnditure, budgetary and financial matters? TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
I t Monthly 
F I  Two monthly
□  Quarterly
I | Half yearly 
I | Yearly
I j Some other frequency-specify......................
Section No 5 Recruitment
Q12. In this section we wish to gain information about the 
unions approach to recruitment
Q12a. Ql.RECRUIMENT OFFICIALS: Does your 
union have full time officials solely responsible for 
recruitment? TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
□  Yes
□  No
Q12b. Q2.RECRUITMENT DRIVE. During the past 2 years has the union organised 
a specific campaign to recruit new members? TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
1 h□  Yes
□  No
Q12c. Q3.RECRUITMENT COST/BENEFIT, if the answer to the last 
question was ’yes’, was the cost and benefit of the campaign monitored 
and finally assesed ? TICK APPROPRIATE BOXES
I | Costed but not monitored 
I | Benefit not assesed against costs 
I I Costed and monitored
□  Costs and final benefit assesed 
I j not costed
Q12d. Q4.RECRUITMENT BUDGET. Does the union maintain 
any ’seperate funds' used specifically for recruitment and 
membership development? TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
□  Yes
□  No
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Q12e. Q5.JOINT RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGNS. Has the union cooperated 
with other unions in joint recruitment campaigns? TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
I | Yes 
□  No
Q12f. Q6. JOINT CAMPAIGNS EFFECTIVENESS. If the union has 
cooperated with other unions in joint recruitment campaigns, how 
successful are these judged to have been? TICK APPROPRIATE BOXES
I 1 Very successful
[ | Successful but did not achieve sufficient benefit against cost
I | Cost more than benefit achieved
H  Of little success
[~1 Would do it again
I | Doubt would do it again
I I Would never become involved again
Q12g. Q7. RECRUITMENT METHOD. Which method is most significant 
in recruiting new membership? PLEASE RANK IN ORDER OF 
SIGNIFICANCE, 1 = most significant 8 = least significant.
, , Advertising and direct application
! | Advertising on Union notice boards
, , Induction process facilities
i i Shop stewards
, , Existing membership - word of mouth
, , Campaigns in particular company's/company groups
, , Campaigns in industrial estates, areas
i , National campaigns focused on an industrial issue
, , use TUC recruitment support
This section seeks information about your unions approach to the question of merging or transfering engagements with 
some other union/unions.
SECTION 6 ABOUT UNION MERGERS - TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS
Q13. Q l. MERGER POLICY. Does the union have any policy about its 
requirements/assurances etc should it be approached to merge with some 
other union/unions or should it decide to make such an approach to other 
unions ? TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
Q Y es 
□  No
Q14. Q2. MERGER REQUIREMENTS. What would the unions 
requirements be if it was considering a merger? PLEASE ENTER 
REQUIREMENTS IN TEXT SPACE PROVIDED BELOW.
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Q15. Q3. MERGER APPROACH. Has the union been involved in 
merger/transfer discussions with other unions recently, if so what other 
union/unions were involved? PLEASE ENTER RESPONSES IN TEXT 
SPACE PROVIDED BELOW
Q16. Q4. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS A. How important was the financial position of 
your union in the decision to to undertake discussions about a merger/transfer? TICK 
APPROPRIATE BOX
I | Very important 
I I Important
I I Neither important nor unimportant 
I I Unimportant 
I | Wholly irrelevant
Q17. Q5. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS B. How important was the financial position of the 
other union in your unions decision to to undertake discussions about a merger/transfer? TICK 
APPROPRIATE BOX
I j Very important 
I I Important
I I Neither important nor unimportant 
I 1 Unimportant 
□  Wholly irrelevant
Q18. Q6. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. Please rank in order of importance as reasons for deciding to 
enter a merger/transfer the following items? (l=most important ll= least important)
i , decreasing membership
, , expenditure exceeding income
, , depleting capital reserves
, i income not rising fast enogh to fund development
, i bargaining power declining
, i inability o f union to provide adequate membership services
i , weak competitve position
i i inabilioty o f union to increase subscriptions
i , similar industrial involvement
i , similar type o f membership
i , other specify..........................
Q19. Q7. FEWER UNIONS. Is the reduction in the number of trade unions a 
cause for concern? TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
Q  Yes 
□  No
Q20. Q8. FEWER UNIONS. If you answered ’yes' to the previous question in what 
way do you believe that fewer unions is a cause for concern and would damage the 
trade union movement as a whole? PLEASE RANK THE FOLLOWING 
RESPONSES IN THE ORDER OF PRIORITY; 1= MOST IMPORTANT AND 8 = 
LEAST IMPORTANT.
, , Reduces choice
i , Unions become more general - less focused on needs o f membership
i , Services insufficiently specialised
, , Officials less likely to understand any particular industiy
, , Employees in some industries likely to be 'turned o ff by a general
union
, , Specialist,professional, technical, management grades not likely to
join a general union
, , Fewer unions concentrates too much power.
i , Fewer unions may lead to less democratic control
Q21. Q9. FEWER UNIONS. If  you answered ’No* to the previous question in 
what way do you believe that fewer unions is not a cause for concern and 
would improve the trade union movement as a whole? PLEASE RANK THE 
FOLLOWING RESPONSES IN THE ORDER OF PRIORITY; 1= MOST 
IMPORTANT AND 5 = LEAST IMPORTANT.
, i Reduces inter union competition and disputes about rights
, | Increases numeric strength of individual unions
i i Less unions would be more representative o f the workforce
i i Fewer unions would be more financially sound
, , Fewer unions may produce better finances which would improve membership services
i , General unions have a broader perspective o f employment problems
Q22. Q10. SPECIALIST UNIONS. In circumstances where there are fewer 
unions how important does your union believe it is to ensure that specialist 
unions are retained? PLEASE TICK THE APPROPRIATE BOX.
1 Q  Very important
2 Q  Fairly important
3 Q  Neither important nor unimportant
4 Q  Fairly unimportant
5 Q  Not important at all
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SECTION 7 ABOUT PARTNERSHIP
Section 7. this section asks questions about Partnership Agreements, your unions views on partnership as an approach, what 
the benefits have been for your union, whether your union has partnership agreeements and what such agreements provide.
Q23. Q l. PARTNERSHIP AS A CONCEPT. Has partnership been embraced by 
your union as a means of building the unions membership and influence?
PLEASE TICK APPROPRIATE BOX
Q Y e s  
□  No
Q24. Q2. PARTNERSHIP AS A CONCEPT. If you answered ’Yes' to the 
last question please indicate your unions views about, or experience of, 
Partnership? PLEASE INDICATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE 1 = MOST 
IMPORTANT AND 6 = LEAST IMPORTANT.
i i Helped gain recognition agreements
, , Helped save recognition agreements
, , Improved relationship with management
, , Improved interest in union by employees
i , Increased membership at companies with partnership agreements
, , Helped avoid membership loss
, , Other - specify..................
Q25. Q3. PARTNERSHIP AS A CONCEPT. If you answered 'No' to the last 
question please indicate your unions views about, or experience of, 
Partnership? PLEASE INDICATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE 1 = MOST 
IMPORTANT AND 6 = LEAST IMPORTANT.
, i Not relevant within the industries/companies covered by union
i , A poor alternative to normal recognition and collective bargaining
i , In approaches made so far management has refused to enter a 
partnership agreement
, , Believe partnership identifies the union too closely with the
management o f the business
, , Membership are concerned that union may be prevented from
defending membership by close involement in business operation.
, , Union has a policy o f not becoming involved in partnership
agreements
, , Other - specify.............
Q26. Q4. HOW MANY PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS. ? Does 
your union have any partnership agreements? If yes, please state 
how many.
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Q27. Q5 PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS, WHAT 
COMPANIES? Please list as many companies as possible with 
which the uoinion has partnership agreements. PLEASE 
ASIGN A NUMBER TO EACH COMPANY LISTED.
Q28. Q6 JOINT PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS? Please 
indicate from the list companies in the last question which of 
those partnership agreements are held jointly with other 
unions. PLEASE LIST OTHER UNIONS INVOLVED AND 
INDICATE BY ASIGNING THE COMPANY NUMBER, 
given in response to the previous question, WHICH 
COMPANY IS INVOLVED.
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SECTION 8 ABOUT STAFFING LEVELS AND PAYROLL COSTS
Q29. This question seeks information about the numbers of fulltime officials employed by the union
Q29g. 1979 Q29h. 1997 Q29a. 1985 Q29b. 1995 Q29c. 1998 Q29d.2000
less than 20 □ □
2 0 - 3 0 □ □
3 0 - 4 0 □ □
40 - 50 □ □
50- 60 □ □
6 0 - 8 0 □ □
80 - 100 □ □
1 0 0 -1 5 0 □ □
1 5 0 -2 0 0 □ □
2 0 0 -3 0 0  : □ □
3 0 0 -4 0 0 □ □
400 - 500 □ □
500 and above □ □
□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □
Q29e. 2001Q29f. 2002
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Q30. Please tick the appropriate box that relates nearest to the total number of admin staf employed by 
your union in each of the years listed below
Q30a. 1979 Q 30b.1985 Q30c. 1995 Q30d. 1997 Q30e. 1998 Q30f. 2000 Q30g. 2001 Q30h. 2002
less than 20 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
20 - 30 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
3 0 -4 0 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
4 0 -5 0 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
5 0 -6 0 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
60 -100 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
100-150 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
150-200 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
200 - 250 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
250 - 300 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
300-400 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
400 - 500 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
500 - 600 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
600 - 700 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
700 and above □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Pagel4
Q31. We wish to know the total costs of employing fulltime officials and staff as at the end of 
each of the following years.
Q31a. 1979 ______________
Q31b. 1980 ______________
Q31c. 1985 _______________
Q31d. 1990 ______________
Q31e. 1995 ______________
Q31f. 1997 ______________
Q31g. 1998_________________________________________________________________________
Q31h. 1999 ______________
Q3 li. 2000 ______________
Q31j. 2001 ______________
Q3 lk. 2002______________________________________________________ ______________
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO ASSIST ME IN MY RESEARCH, YOUR HELP 
REALLY IS APPRECIATED
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APPENDIX C 1
ALL TRADE UNION AND TUC UNIONS DENSITY 1892-2001
All % increase union % increase % TUC % Non-TUC % Non-TUC
employees in employees members in members UniOnDensity membership TUCDensity Membership density of all membership
1892 14,126 1,576 11.2 1,219 8.62 357 22.65
1901 15,795 10.57 2,025 28.17 12.8 1,200 7.59 825 40.74
1911 17,555 10.03 3,139 35.49 17.9 1,662 9.46 1477 47.05
1921 17,618 0.35 6,633 111.3 37.6 6,417 36.42 216 3.25
1931 19,328 8.84 4,624 -43.44 23.9 3,719 19.24 907 19.61
1933 . 19,498 0.88 4,392 -5.02 22.5 3,367 17.26 1025 23.33
1938 20,258 3.75 6,053 27.44 29.9 4,460 22.01 1593 26.31
1948 20,767 2.45 9,362 35.34 45.1 7,791 37.5 1571 16.78
1949 20,818 0.2 9,318 -0.5 44.8 7,937 38.12 1381 14.82
1950 21,096 1.3 9,289 -0.3 44 7,883 37.36 1406 15.13
1951 21,222 0.6 9,535 2.6 44.9 7,827 36.88 1708 17.91
1952 21,322 0.5 9,588 0.6 45 8,020 37.61 1568 16.35
1953 21,401 0.4 9,527 -0.6 44.5 8,088 37.79 1439 15.1
1954 21,718 1.5 9,566 0.4 44 8,093 37.26 1473 15.39
1955 21,990 1.3 9,738 1.8 44.3 8,106 36.86 1632 16.75
1956 22,230 1.1 9,776 0.4 44 8,263 37.17 1513 15.47
1957 22,382 0.7 9,827 0.5 43.9 8,304 37.1 1523 15.49
1958 22,346 -0.2 9,636 -1.9 43.1 8,337 37.3 1299 13.48
1959 22,404 0.3 9,621 -0.2 42.9 8,176 36.49 1656 17.21
1960 22,764 1.6 9,832 2.2 43.2 8,128 35.7 1704 17.33
1961 23,037 1.2 9,893 0.6 42.9 8,299 35.72 1594 16.11
1962 23,354 1.4 9,883 -0.1 42.3 8,312 35.59 1571 15.89
1963 23,470 0.5 9,928 0.5 42.3 8,315 35.59 1613 16.24
1964 23,616 0.6 10,065 1.4 42.6 8,325 35.25 1740 17.28
1965 24,424 3.31 10,325 2.5 42.72 8,771 35.91 1554 15.05
1970 23,783 -2.62 11,187 7.71 47 9,402 39.53 1785 15.95
1975 24,005 0.9 12,026 6.9 50 10,363 43.17 1663 13.82
1980 24,322 1.3 12,636 4.83 48.05 12,172 50.04 464 3.7
1985 22,668 -7.29 10,818 -16.8 47.68 9,855 43.47 963 8.9
1990 24,264 6.57 9,810 -10.27 40.45 8,405 34.63 1405 14.32
1995 23,277 -4.24 8,031 -22.15 34.5 6,894 29.61 1137 14.15
2000 25,510 8.75 7,897 -1.69 30.6 6,745 26.44 1152 14.58
2002 27,700 8.62 7,751 -2 28 6,556 23.64 1195 15.4
Source:Bain, G.S. and Price, R.(1983) ‘Union Growth: Dimensions, Determinants, and Destiny1 
Industrial Relations in Britain, 1983, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Tabie1.1 Updated from 1981 by Ray Edwards utilising data taken from Certification Office Annual Reports, 
Trades Union Congress, DU and Home Office
Appendix IC.l
Industrial Court Award 
Black Clawson International
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your
use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and
Conditions of supply of Public Records* leaflet
(ADVANCE COPT) . .
’ • TOE •-INDUSTRIAL COURT
(3160) . Observance o f  Recognised Terms and Conditions 
o f Employment in  respect o f C ler ica l Workers 
- • employed by a firm in  Newport. -Monmouthshire, 
engaged in  the Engineering Industry
Employers concerned;-
. Black Clawson In tern ation a l Limited  
Trade Union reporting the c l aim:—
C ler ic a l and Adm inistrative Workers' Union
1 . The M inister of Labour on tho 2?th October 1967 referred to  th i s  Court fo r  
settlem en t, in--accordance with the provisions o f  th e  Terms and Conditions o f  
Employment Act 1959 (h ere in a fter  referred  to  as "the A ct"), the fo llow in g  claim  
which had been reported -.to him- on the 20th September 1967 by the. C lerica l and 
Adm inistrative Workers' Union under Section  S o f  the.A ct:,-
(a ) That there are estab lish ed  in  the engineering industry in  respect o f  
c le r ic a l workers .terms or conditions o f employment which have been s e t t le d  
by agreement on 6 /7 /6 7  between the Engineering Employers' Federation and 
th e -C ler ica l -and Adm inistrative Workers' Union.-
(b ) That the p a r tie s  to  these agreements are organisations o f  employers
and o f workers which represent, r e sp ec tiv e ly , a su b sta n tia l proportion o f
the. employers and o f  the c le r ic a l workers 'to which the agreements r e la t e .
( c )  That as respects c le r ic a l  workers Black-Clawson In tern ation a l Ltd. 
o f Newport, Mon., being engaged in  the engineering industry, are not 
observing the terms or conditions o f employment in  the agreements 
mentioned in  (a ) above.
The P arties were heard in  London on the 19th December 1967. They 
subsequently submitted fu rther evidence in  w ritin g  which was received  on the  
22nd and tho 28th December 1967*
2 . The claim of the C lerica l and Adm inistrative Workers' Union (h ere in a fter
referred  to  as "the Union") concerns certa in  o f  the 91 c le r ic a l and administra­
t iv e  s t a f f  employed by Black Clawson In ternational Limited (h ere in a fter  
referred  to  as-"the Company") a t Westgate Works, Newport, Monmouthshire. The
-- s t a f f  • concerned- are those who were in  tho Company1 s employment a t  the e f fe c t iv e  
date o f the Agreement s e t  out in  paragraph 3 below, and whose sa la r io s  were 
below tho l im its  proscribed -therein. The Union are claiming th a t the Company 
should observe, in  r e s fo c t o f  tho employees concerned, the terms and conditions  
estab lish ed  in. the Engineering Industry by an agreement r e la t in g  to  general 
wage .-increases* reached on the 6th  Ju ly  1967-and e f f e c t iv e  from the 2ifth. J'uly 
1967 (h ere in a fter  referred  to  as "the 1967 Agreement" or "tho Agreement"), 
between the Engineering E m ployersF ederation  (h e r e in a fter .re ferred ,to  as "the 
Federation") and the Union, together with two other unions.
3.- The provisions o f  the 1967 Agreement are-in  the .follow ing term s:-
• "After formal and informal negotia tion s on 6tii. July, 1967, th e  Unions 
accepted the undqmoted proposals as settlem ent o f.,th e ir  outstanding 
claims fo r  a general increase in  sa la r ie s .
1 . Employers w i l l  bo required to ensure.-that, .including,any  
increases paid dom estically  on or a fte r  20th  Ju ly , 1966, which 
resu lted  from; the. settlem ent o f  a specific--olaim  or which wore paid  
to  a l l  or su b sta n tia lly  a l l  c le r ic a l  workers, the fo llow ing  
increases are applied:-
1
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your
use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information Is given In the enclosed Terms and
    Conditions of supply of Public Records'leaflet
Adult males -  age 2 1 - 2 2 ,  15s. Od. per week
" 23 -  24, 16s. Od. " "
•" 25 and over . 17s. 6d. " "
' Adult females- -  15s. Od. - per week
1 With pro rata in creases fo r  juniors in  accordance with normal 
practice  as fo llow s
15. _ J_6 ‘ 11 1_8 19 - .20 -
Males ) , c rva /  n , n ( -9s 9d 11s 6d
Females) 43 3d 5s 01 6s 01 83 M  (11s 94  13s 34
The sa lary  lim its  which w i l l  apply in  re la tio n  to  those  
increases are as fo llo w s: -
Adult males -  up to  and includ ing £950 per annum -  
Adult females — up to  and including £685 per annum
2 . In  determining whether the provisions o f th ese  proposals have 
been m et,'in creases deferred in  terms of'Government Incomes P o licy  
w il l  "be token in to  account.
3 . Acceptance o f the F ederation's proposals w i l l  s a t i s f y  a l l  
current general sa lary  claims against federated  employers a ffe c tin g  
a l l  or  su b sta n tia lly  a l l  c le r ic a l  workers' e ith e r  in  the works or in  
the general o f f ic e  except in so fa r  as anomalies may e x is t .
I t  was agreed between the p arties th at the' above increases would 
come in to  e f fe c t  on MONDAY 21TH JULY 1967. the Unions accepting that i t  
was necessary fo r  the Federation to  report the settlem ent under the 
voluntary ea r ly  warning system.
I t  was a lso  agreed th at agreed points fo r  guidance would be 
discussed  between o f f i c ia l s  o f  the Federation and the C lerica l and 
A dm inistrative Workers' Union in  r e la tio n  to  the in terp reta tio n  o f  the 
Agreement. -
The e f f e c t  o f the Agreement i s  to  provide for-new minimum salary...- 
sca les  as fo llow s
„Age. -1 5 _  J £ _  ' J 1  -UL JLL 2 0 . -21.
Male ) • n , Q. > , . . Q Q, -.-(12(73 9d 176s 3d • *227s 6d
Female) ' 6^S 7 9 5 9 9 (140s 6d 159s 6d . *180s  6d
*Plus 15s Od in  the London Area”
4 . In  accordance with the -provision^' o f th at Agreement the Federation and 
tho .Union subsequently is s u e d  th e'fo llow in g  agreed points for. guidance
ni .  Where, sin ce  20th July, 1966-, general in creases in. sa la r ie s  have 
been paid under a settlem ent or a'general review o f  sa la r ie s  has taken  
p la ce , y ie ld in g  in  e ith e r  case in creases o f  d if fe r in g  amounts to  a l l  or  
su b sta n tia lly  a l l  c le r ic a l  workers covered by the N ational settlem en t, 
the p arties agree th a t the low est amount conceded to  the appropriate 
' age group and sox in  question -is the figu re  to  be taken-in to  account in  
' determining what increase i s  due in  the terms o f the N ational • 
settlem en t. •-
2.' ' Increases conceded on the b a sis  o f  in d iv id u al merit which do not 
form part o f a general- settlem ent or  review in 'term s o f  paragraph 1 
above; should not b e -o f fse t  against the N ational in c r e a s e s .”
2
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Main submissions on beh a lf o f  the Union
5 . I t  was ■stated th a t , since the Union f i r s t  esta b lish ed  a  membership among 
the Company’ s c le r ic a l  and adm inistrative s t a f f  in  1962, there had been a 
number o f  agreements between the Union and the Federation, and the 1967 
Agreement was the f i r s t  which the Company, who were not members o f the 
Federation, had refused  to  implement.
6 . On tho 10th Ju ly  1967 the Union had w ritten  to  those engineering  
employers in  South Wales who employed Union members, includ ing tho Company, 
informing thorn o f  the terms o f the 1967 Agreement and asking them to  confirm 
that they would implement those terms from the 24th J u ly  1967* The Company’s 
rep ly  dated the 12th J u ly  1967 was considered by tho Unioh to  bo u n sa tis­
factory , and they wrote to  the Company again on the 26th J u ly . The Company’ s 
further rep ly  dated th e  11th August was a lso  considered u n sa tisfactory , and 
arrangements were then made fo r  a meeting between the P artie s which took place 
on the 31st August 1967. (Copies o f  the le t te r s  roferred  to  wore placed- 
before the Court.)
7 . At the meeting on th e  31st August 1967 the Company produced a document (a  
copy o f  which was placed before the Court) s e tt in g  out points o f  guidance to  
intorviow ers in  connection w ith a sa lary  review which the Company"had under­
taken, and incorporating an o u tlin e  o f th e ir  future p o licy  on s a la r ie s .  One 
o f the p oin ts o f  guidance read as fo llo w s :-  "Each person sh a ll be to ld  that 
in  future N ational Awards birthday in creases e tc . w i l l  not n ece ssa r ily  be 
paid." In  the Union's submission th is  c lea r ly  showed th at the Company d id  not 
intend in  the fu tu re , to  implement settlem ents reached between the Union and 
the Federation.
8 . On the 20th September 1967 the Union reported the m atter to  the M inistry  
o f Labour's Ind u str ia l-R ela tion s O fficer  fo r  Wales, and under h is  chairmanship 
a : mooting between tho P a rtie s  took place on the 18th October 1967. As the  
d ifferen ces between them could not be resolved  tho m atter was referred  to  th is  
Court.
9 . I t  was submitted th a t the Company must comply w ith the terms o f  the 1967 
Agroonent un less they-.were ablo to  s a t is f y  tho Union th at they could j u s t i ­
f ia b ly  claim exemption from so doing in  the circumstances se t  out in  the 
points fo r  guidance subsequently issu ed  by the Union and the Federation ( see  
paragraph 4  above). In  other words the only sa lary  in creases which could bo 
o f f s e t  against the general in creases provided by the 1967 Agreement were those 
sp ec ified  in  point 1 o f  tho p o in ts fo r  guidance.
10. The p o in ts fo r  guidance were an in to g ra l part o f  tho Agreement, having 
been drawn up in  order to  se t  out what was the gen era lly  understood p o sitio n  
with regard to  the implementation o f  settlem ents reached between the Union and 
tho Fedoration, and i t  was submitted th at tho true in terp reta tio n  o f th e ir  
wording;was as fo llo w s . Where, s in ce  the 20th J u ly  1966, a company-had a n ti­
cipated  the n ation a l settlem ent by g iv in g  general in creases o f  d if fe r in g  • 
amounts' to  a l l  o r  su b sta n tia lly  a l l  th eirw orkers to  whom th at settlem ent 
applied , only th a t part ;o f the in creases which was given  to  a l l  the workers 
concornod o f  the same'age and sex  could be o f f s e t  against the in creases  
provided by the Agreement. A company might have given  d if feren t in creases to  
d ifferen t workers i n ‘consideration o f  ind iv id ual m erit or o f extra  respon­
s i b i l i t y ,  or n ight .merely have d if fe r e n tia te d  according to  age and sex , and 
tho purpose o f the- points fo r  guidance was to  make i t  c lea r  th at a l l  
ind iv idu al considerations wore to  be ignored in  ascerta in in g  what were the 
go.neral basic  incroases which had boen applied.
11. I t  was th erefore■necessary, in  implementing the tern s o f  the 1967 
Agreement in  the circumstances referred  to  above, to  id e n t ify  tho low est 
increases given to  males and fem ales in  each age group, ignoring any workers 
(who could be on ly  a small minority.) to-whom no’ in creases were g iven . I f ,  fo r  
example, the general p icture was o f  on-increase to  workors o f  the same age and 
sex o f 15s. or more, and the appropriate increase under the Agroonent was 
17s. 6 d ., then a l l  workers in .  th a t1 group would bo e n t it lo d  to  a furth er
2 s . 6 d .,  w hile those who had received  no increase would be e n t i t le d  to  the  
whole o f the national increase o f  1 7 s.’ 6d. I f ,  ex cep tio n a lly , an in d iv id u a l
3
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had received  an increase o f  le s s  than 15s . ,  he would he e n t it le d  to  the 
anount necessary to  "bring h is  increase up to  17s. 6d. I t  was submitted th at 
anything given in  excess o f the general increase must have been given  as 
something personal to  the in d iv id u a l, in  consideration o f'm er it, respon­
s i b i l i t y ,  job evaluation or other fa c to r s , and must be deducted fron tho to t a l  
increases given in  order to  determine the anount which could be o f f s e t  again st 
the national in crease .
12. I t  was sta ted  th at the above in terp reta tion  o f  th e  way in'which the 196? 
Agreement should be inplenented had boon challenged by a number o f  federated  
companies, but had always been upheld as correct by the Federation. In  th is  
connection tho Union p laced'before the Court a copy o f  a tran scrip t o f  the' 
proceedings a t  a Central Conference between the Union and the Federation, held  
oh the 23rd November 1967» which d ea lt w ith the fa ilu r e  o f  a number o f  
companies in  L eicester  to  pay the n ation a l increases in  f u l l .
13 • In  the l ig h t  o f  the inform ation in 'th e  schedule which tho Company had 
produced ( s e e  paragraph 29 below) thore were in  the Union's submission 
eleven  cases (d e t a i ls  o f  which were given) where the f u l l  increases provided  
by tho 1967 Agreement had not been implemented by the Company. According to  
the Union's ca lcu la tion s the general increase which the Company had given  to  
women aged 21 years and over was 10s. and therefore under the terns o f  tho 
p oints fo r  guidance a l l  female c lo r ic a l s t a f f  in  th at category should bo given  
a t le a s t  an add itional 5 s . I t ’w as‘Contended th at anything given in  excess o f  
10s. arose, on the Company's -own evidence (s e e  paragraphs.26 and 27 below ), 
from tho examination o f in d iv id u al m erit and the appraisal o f job values which 
the Goopany had carried  out, and represented tho cost to  the Company o f  
introducing th e ir  job evaluation scheme.
1£. : The Company had a lso  given general-increases o f  10s. to  fem ales o f  19 and 
20‘-years o f  ago, and in  th e ir  case the ad d ition al in creases payable were 
1 s .:9 d . and 3s* 3d. r esp ec tiv e ly . As fa r  as males were concerned, an increase  
o f  1 ij-s• 6d. had been given at age 25 and over and o f  10s. a t 21 years o f age, 
so th a t add itional increases were payable to  the workers concerned o f  3 s . and' 
5 s . resp ec tiv e ly . In  the Union's submission some o f the eleven  employees 
referred  to  had received  no increases a t  a l l  w ithin  the tern s o f  the 1967 
Agreement, -and these ‘should be given  the f u l l  anount o f th e  increase ’ 
provided thereby which was appropriate to  th e ir  age and sex .
15. I t  was submitted that the job evaluation  exercise  which the Company had 
carried  out ( s e e  paragraph 26 below) had not n ecessa r ily  anything to  do w ith  a 
general increase in  sa la r ie s , but-was n ere ly  intended to  e sta b lish  an orderly  
structure w ith in  the Company by bringing sa la r ie s  in to  l in e  with the appro­
p ria te  rates fo r  the jobs. The Company were contending th a t the increases  
they gave during the course o f th e ir  sa lary  review s a t is f ie d  the requirements 
o f  tho 1967 Agreement (s e e  paragraph 27 .below ), but i t  could not be sa id , and 
the Federation would not accept, that any in creases the Company gave before 
the 2nd Ju ly  1967 (th e  e ffe c t iv e  date o f tho review) s a t is f io d  those require­
ments . Such in creases were necessary to  reta in  the s t a f f  concerned and were 
obviously personal to  then. They were th erefore , in  the words o f  point 2 o f  
the points fo r  guidance, "increase’s conceded on the b a s is  o f in d iv id u al m erit 
which do not fore  part o f  a general settlem ent" .
16. “ In the Union's submission any increasq given by the Conpany a fte r  tho 
2nd Ju ly  1967 wa3 a lso  unacceptable as forming part o f  the general settlem en t, 
and was in  fa c t  an ind iv id ual increase given fo r  a s p e c if ic  reason. They 
therefore toolc the view that i f  no increase had been given  on the 2nd J u ly  
then no increase a t a l l  had been given under th e -tere s  of the 1967 Agreement. 
They accepted, however, that th is  Couit would take in to  account any subsequent 
increase given by the Company up to- the 20th September 1967, the date on which 
the present claim was reported to- the M inister,
17* With regard to  the; Company's argument, that the sa laries' o f s t a f f  who 
entered th o ir  employment- a fte r  t h e  20th Ju ly  1966 had been f ix e d  at a le v e l  
which anticipated  the increases provided by the Agreement ( seo paragraph 32 
below ), i t  was subm itted-that as tho Company's review o f  sa la r ie s  wa3 not • 
fin ish ed  u n t i l  Ju ly  1967 (seo  paragraph 26 bolow) i t  could not have been 
p o ssib le  fo r  then to take in to  account a t an o a r lic r  date something which they  
had not then been ab le to  ca lcu la to .
k
1
I v w IP *. / *
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your 
use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further Information is given in the enclosed Terms and 
Conditions of supply of Public Records’ leaflet
18. Tho Company had contended th at any in d iv id u a l c la in  fo r  an increase  
should be regarded as "a sp e c if ic  claim" fo r  Hie purposes of the 1967 Agrccnont 
and could th erefore be o f f s e t  against the nation al increase (s e e  paragraph 30 
below ). The in ten tio n  o f  tho P arties to  the Agreement had however been that 
only in creases a r is in g  from s p e c if ic  claims node by the Union in  respect of 
in d iv id u a l companies, which were paid to  a l l  or su b sta n tia lly  a l l  the workers 
concerned, could be so o f f s e t .
19. As to  the Company's contentions w ith  regard to  the r id er  to  tho po in ts fo r  
guidance, which in d ica ted  th at in d iv id u a l cases might have to  bo examined in  
d e ta i l ( s e e  paragraph 33 below ), i t  was submitted that "individual cases" was 
intended to  refer- to  in d iv id u a l companies and not to  in d iv idual cnploycos 
w ithin  one company. Tho in ten tion  was th at such an examination should take 
place where there was a challenge by the Union as to  the implementation by a 
p articu lar  company o f the 1967 Agreement. j..
20. In  rep ly  to  the..Company's arguments in  support o f  th e ir  contention Hint 
th e ir  terms and conditions were not lo s s  favourable than the recognised terms 
and conditions ( see paragraphs 34 and 35 below ). i t  was submitted that the • - 
proscnt c la in  re la ted  only, to  the general in creases provided, by the Agreement. 
These, were additions to  e x is t in g  s a la r ie s , which varied  very considerab ly , as 
between d if fe r e n t companies. . Some engineering employers in  South Falos paid 
higher sa la r ie s  than tho Conpany and some.- low er, but in  tho Union1 s view a l i  
companies engaged in  engineering should implement the terms o f  the Agreement 
ir re sp ec tiv e  o f  the le v e l  o f  the sa laries: th ey  paid;
21. The Union considered that th e ir  view was endorsed by the d ecision s  
reached in  previous cases o f ’th is  nature by the In d u str ia l D isputos Tribunal' 
in  th e ir  Awards Nos. 248,-838 and SifO, and by: th is  Court in  Award No. 3125-.--.vIt 
was in  th e ir  view important, in  the present-case th at the award, i f  in  their; ] 
favour, should be made retrosp ective .
Main, subm issions<on behalf o f  th e  Company
22. I t  was s ta te d  that the Company1s.arguments, re la ted  to  three p o in ts:- (1 )  
that on the true construction  o f  Section  8 of. the Act the expression  ".tom s'or 
conditions" meant general terms.and- conditions.-of'employment over the whole 
range o f  tho employees' l ig h ts  and o b lig a tio n s, and was not apt to  cover a . . .  
more var ia tion  o f one to m  such as the varia tion  regarding an increase  in,-pay 
which was tho su bject o f  the 1967 Agreement on which-the Union r e lie d ;  (2 )  
that the. Conpany in  any .ovent had net fa i le d  to  comply'with.^ho to m s o f tho 
1967 Agreement; and ( 3) th at i f  the Court should fin d  against' the Conpany on 
poin ts (1 ) and (2 ) ,  the terns and conditions which tho Conpany wore obsorving 
in  respect o f  the workers concerned were not le s s  favourable than the  
recognised to m s  and conditions.
23. With regard to  point ( 1) above reference was made to  tho m ajority  
d ecis io n  o f  the Court - of-Appeal in  tho case o f R. v . Industrial  d isp u tes  
Tribunal. Ex carte Technaloy. ht d . . 1954 2 Q.B. 46, in . which, i t  was submitted, 
i t .  was h e ld -th a t the; expression "tom s or conditions" in  the In d u str ia l 
D isputes Order 1951. £'cant terns and conditions as- a whole and.was not' apt to  
cover a s in g le  v a r ia t io n ,o f wagos. I t  was further-subm itted that the 1951 
Order was the progen itor-of the A ct, th at the wording in -th a t Order and in  tho 
Act wa3 almost ex a ctly  the same, and that the expression "terms or  conditions"  
in  the Act must bo construed in  accordance w ith the m ajority d ec is ion  in  tho 
Technaloy case.
24- In the Company's submission the above in terp reta tion  was borne out by tho 
wording o f the double proviso to  subsection ( 1) o f Section  8  o f  the A ct, which 
was as fo llow s
" (i)  no c la in  sh a ll be reported under th is  sec tio n  as respects workers 
whose remuneration or minimum remuneration i s  fixed ; ( otherwise than by 
tho employer, w ith or w ithout the approval o f  any- other person) in  
•pursuance .of any enactment other than th is  sec tio n -o r  in  the caso o f  whom 
p ro v is io n -is  made by or Undor any enactment other than th is  sec tio n  fo r  
tho settlem ent o f  questions as to  remuneration or minimum remuneration;
( i i )  -no c ia in  sh a ll be reported under th is  section  as resp ects to m s or  
conditions fix o d  as aforesaid ."  • -.
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I t  was submitted tb at if* "terns or  conditions" neant any s in g lo  to m  as 
opposed to  overa ll to m s  and- conditions then i t  would he unnecessary to  re fer  
in  proviso ( i )  to "workers whose remuneration or nininun reriuncration i s  
f i x o d  ", since, they would he covered by the to m s  o f  proviso ( i i )  .
2$. In  support o f  the Conpany1s contention th at they had- not fa i le d  to  comply 
w ith tho terms o f the 19&7 Agreement an explanation was given o f the. way in  
which they  had carried  out th e ir  roviow o f s a la r ie s . I t  was sta ted  th a t the  
'Conpany had s in cere ly  endeavoured to  introduce an enlightened job evaluation  
schbnp. • Thoy had decided on th is  courso in  about A pril 1966, but the 
implementation o f the. scheme had been a ffec ted  by the ’wage freeze* imposed on 
the 20th J u ly  1966 and by tho ensuing period o f  severe r e s tr a in t . Copies o f  
correspondence between the Union and tho Company dated from- 29th A p ril 1966 to  
the 31s t  August 1967 were placed before the Court, together w ith the Minutes 
o f  a mooting between them on tho 1Ath September 1967, and i t  was shown th a t  
the Union had sta ted  th a t thoy wore in  favour o f  job evaluation  schemes in  
p r in c ip le , but had asked fo r : assurances regarding redundancy, reductions in  
salary, and activo  p artic ip a tion  by the Union in  the scheme. They wore given  
assurances th at the scheme i t s e l f  would not breed redundancy and would not 
'lbad to  any reductions in  sa lary , but were to ld  that they could- not p a rti c i -  ' 
pate in  i t  because the very nature o f  tho scheme ruled th is  out-,-- They wore • 
however to ld  that they could make representations as to  each in d iv id u a l ca se ,
26.' The scheme adopted by the Company involved-a job evaluation e x e r c ise , as 
a re su lt  o f  which each job was a lloca ted  to  a grade o f'th e  sa lary  structure  
with a sa lary  band between a minimum and a maximum, follow ed by evaluation  
in terview s by which each in d iv id u a l's  p ositio n  in  the appropriate sa lary  band 
was determined according to  h is  performance, c a p a b ilit ie s  and m erit. The 
ind iv idual s t a f f  in terview s and the d e ta iled  consideration o f  in d iv id u a l 
sa la r ie s  required by the scheme began in  September 1966 and were'- completed in  
J u ly  1967, the increases a r is in g  therefrom hieing paid  on the 20th J u ly  w ith  
e f f e c t  from the 2nd J u ly  1967. In  some cases, however, some very su b stan tia l 
increases were given throughout the Spring and early  Summer o f 1967, e ith e r  
because i t  had become obvious th a t a particu lar  employee was being underpaid 
or because o f an ind iv idu al claim from an employee which the Company had to  
meet in  order to  reta in  h is  s e r v ic e s .
27. This review o f sa la r ie s , i t  was submitted, was not simply and s o le ly  "a 
m erit review, as the Union had suggested. The in d iv id u a l's  performance was 
n atu rally  taken in to  account, but so wore a l l  the other relevant fa c to r s ,  
including cost o f l iv in g , sa la r ie s  paid by lo c a l firm s, national avorages, 
market value, whole job performance, serv ice , r e sp o n s ib ility , au th ority , 
q u a lific a tio n s , a b i l i t y ,  q u a lity  o f work and the general economic climate' of' 
the industry and the Company. Furthermore, the Company had been aware fo r  
some months th at a nation al increase was to  be n egotiated  botwoen tho Union ' 
and tho Fodoration, and a t about tho end o f Juno 1967 had w ritten  in  a fa c to r  
to  take account o f  th is  which in  the event proved to  be two per cen t, below 
tho settlem ent which was in co rp o ra tcd in  the 1967 Agreement. Before 
• f in a lis in g  th e ir  new sa lary  figu res a t the end o f  tho review tho Company had 
roforred a l l  the recommendations back to  departmental heads and had asked 
them whether thoy wished to  make any rev isions in  the l ig h t  o f the increases  
provided by the 1967 Agreement. -The Company had therefore taken th a t  
.Agreement f u l ly  in to  account', together w ith a l l  other relevant fa c to r s , and' 
had ;so informed the Union in  a l e t t e r  dated tho 12th J u ly  1967, & copy o f  
which was before the Court.
28. I t  was sta ted  th at a t a l l  m aterial tim es the Company had paid  the workers 
concerned in  the claim- rates which wero in  ex cess , and u su a lly  su b sta n tia lly  
in  ex cess , o f the minimum rates n egotiated  by the Union; and th a t , taking  
in to  account the whole period since tho 20th J u ly  1966 (th o  date referred  to  
in  clause 1 o f  the 1967 Agreement -  see paragraph 3 above), they had givon  
su b sta n tia lly  greater increases than those provided by the 1967 Agreement.
Tho to t a l  weekly sa la r ie s  being -paid by tho Company to  the workers concerned 
amounted to  £923 3 s . 6dv, whereas' i f  thoy had adhered to  tho minimum rates  
negotiated  by the Union thoy would be paying on ly  £673 I s .  6d. Since the  
20th Ju ly  1966 the increases paid by the Company to  tho workers concerned 
to ta lle d  £73 11s. a week, but tho to t a l  increases which would have' beon due to
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them under the 1967 Agreement amounted to  only £42 18s. 6d. a week. I f  the  
increases paid by the Company before the 2nd J u ly  1967 were excluded the 
increases they had paid to ta lle d  £44 7 s . 6d.- a week. Even i f  the increases  
they had paid w ith effect-from  the 2nd J u ly  1967 were taken in  is o la t io n  and 
thosp paid .before .or a f te r  that date were ignored;'the to t a l  o f  £40 8 s . was 
only-m arginally le s s  than what. would have been required under tho 1967 
Agreement.
29. The Company placed before the Court a schedule s e tt in g  out the name, age 
and occupation o f  each o f  th e ir  c le r ic a l  and adm inistrative employees, 
together with d e ta i ls  in  each case o f the appropriate minimum rate provided by 
the 1967 Agreement, tho weekly sa lary  currently  being paid  by the Company j the 
dates and amounts o f  the la s t  increase and the previous in crea se , and the date 
o f commencement o f  employment w ith the Company. I t  was shown th at in  the 
great m ajority o f  cases the Company had given increases s in ce  the 20th Ju ly  
1966 which were equal to  or greater than those provided-by the 1967 Agreement; 
and th at in  every case where the f u l l  in crease  was not paid  the employee 
concerned had entered  the Company* s employment very recen tly  or during the 
period o f the *wage freeze* . I t  was submitted th a t , on the true construction  
o f the wording o f the 1967 Agreement, the Company had complied w ith i t s  terms 
in  every case . •
30 . I t  was provided in  clause 1 o f  the 1967 Agreement (s e e  paragraph 3 above) 
th at "Employers w i l l  be required’to  ensure th a t , including any in c r e a se s 'paid  
dom estically  on or a f te r  20th Ju ly  1966, which resu lted  from the settlem ent :o f  
a s p e c i f ic 'claim or which were paid to  a l l  or  su b sta n tia lly  a l l  c le r ic a l  
workers, the fo llow ing  in creases are applied:-* . .  ." . In -th e Company's 
submission th is  wording contrasted a sp e c if ic  claim -  which in  th e ir  view  
meant an in d iv id u a l claim or a group o f-in d iv id u a l claim s -'w ith  general 
'across-the-board* in crea ses. There was nothing in  the Agreement I t s e l f  to  
support the Union's contention-that "a sp e c if ic  claim""meant a claim 'by tho 
Union (s e e  paragraph 18 above), and nothing to  show th a t'th e  s p e c if ic  claim  
must have been paid gen era lly  to  a l l  workers. Those increases which had been 
paid by the Company before Ju ly  1967 as the' ro su lt o f in d iv id u a l claim s should 
therefore be o f f s e t  against the .increases p’rovided by the 1967 Agreement.
31. I f ,  however, tho above in terp reta tion  were not accepted, the' in creases  
given to  tho employees concerned during the course o f tho Company's sa lary  
review wore properly to  be regarded as advance payments•against the general 
settlem ent ;Which was concluded in  J u ly  1967, and should bo recognised as 
sa t is fy in g -th e  provisions of-tho  Agreement which permitted such'payments to  be 
taken in to  account.
32.. The 1967 Agreement did not mention employees who had entered employment 
during the 'wage frcezo ' but i t  was submitted that in  view o f  the reference to  
tho 20th Ju ly  1966 in  clause 1 th ereof and o f  the la t e r  reference to  the  
•early  warning system' i t  was c lea r  th at the settlem ent had been reached 
against th e  background o f the Government's incomes p o licy . I t  had been funda­
mental to  th at p o licy  th a t any increases granted during tho period  o f  the 
'freeze* should bo o f f s e t  against any increase's awarded th erea fter . There 
must therefore bo im plied in to  the terms o f  the Agreement th at those who 
entered employment a fte r  20th J u ly  1966 wore not e n t i t le d  autom atically  to  a ' 
f l a t  ra te  increase on th e  24th J u ly  1967, and accordingly those few employees 
o f the Company who had not been paid increases equivalent to  those provided by 
the Agreement wero n o t, i t  was submitted, covered thereby. In  any case the 
sa la r ie s  fo r  those employees had beon f ix e d  having regard to  tho sa lary  review  
which the Company were then undertaking, and could be sa id  to  have an tic ip a ted  
tho increases provided by the Agreement.
33 The points for  guidance on which the Union r e lie d  ( seo paragraph 4  above) 
were n o t, in  the Company's subm ission,- part o f  the 1967 Agreement but merely a 
guide to  a suggested in terp reta tion  o f  i t s  p rov ision s, and the references in  
tho points o f  guidance to  "general increases" (p o in t 1) and to  " increases 
conceded on the b a sis  o f in d iv id u al morit" (p o in t 2) wero in  c o n f l ic t  w ith tho 
toims o f  the Agreement i t s e l f ,  which referred  to  " sp ec ific  claims" and made no 
mention o f ind iv idual m erit. The Federation had issu ed  on tho 25th J u ly  1967 
a document (a  copy o f  which was placed before the Court) which incorporated  
tho agreed points for  guidance w ith the important r id e r : -  " it  being
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recognised that in d iv id u a l cases nay n evertheless have to  be examined - in  
d e ta il."  '.The document in  question, i t  was submitted, showed th at the. po in ts  
fo r  guidance cane into- ex isten ce  some three weeks a fte r  the date o f  the 1967 
Agreemont,; and could not th erefore be regarded as part o f i t .  . I f ,  however, i t  
were .held  that the poin ts fo r  guidance nust be taken in to  account together  
•with the Agreenent, then th ey  must be taken in to  account as a w hole, including  
the r id er  referred  to  above. I t  was sta ted  that in  every case where the 
Company had not inplencnted in  f u l l  tho in creases provided by the 1967 
Agreement tho in d iv id u al circumstances had in  fa c t  boon examined in  d e ta i l ,  
and explanations vrere given to  the Court o f tho reasons fo r  th e  Company's 
d ec is io n .in  oach case.
34. I t  was further submitted that i f ,  contrary to  the Company* s contention , 
they wero h eld  not to  have complied w ith tho provisions o f tho 1967 Agreement, 
the terms and conditions which they were observing wore not l e s s  favourable,
In.:the Company's submission the Court were in v ite d  under the tern s o f  'the Act ' 
to  compare overa ll the tern s and conditions o f  the Company's employees"with 
th e ir  .position  o v era ll under the 1967 Agreement, or  in  other words to  weigh 
tho relevant terms and conditions o f tho Company's employees as a whole 
against tho recognised to m s  and conditions applicable to  them as a whole. To 
look  purely a t  the p o sitio n  o f the in d iv id u a l employee in  r e la t io n  to  the  
recognised terms and conditions would discourage employers from introducing  
enlightened schemes such as tho Conpany had introduced, which provided  
o v era ll su b stan tia l advantages to  employoes, since i t  would mean th a t they  
could bp brought before t h i s  Court simply because, in  one or two sp o c ia l casos 
th ey  had- not implemented a f l a t  ra te  in crea se . - .
35. I f  the Company's contentions w ith  regard to  the con stru ction .o f  the Act 
were r igh t i t  was in  th e ir  view quite c le a r  that ov era ll the Company's scheme 
was not le s s  favourable than the recognised terms and con d ition s. A ll the  
Company's employees would be reviewed annually in  fu tu re , and in  fa c t  a new 
job evaluation review had already begun. Each review would take account o f  
a l l  the factors referred  to  in  paragraph 27 above, and -each employee would 
then be able to  take -up form ally w ith h is  immediate superior the question o f  
h is  in d iv id u a l-sa lary . The f ig u r e s -o f  o v era ll weekly increases and sa la r ie s  
paid  by the Company as a re su lt  o f  the 1966-67 review (se e  paragraph 28 above) 
demonstrated th at th e ir  terms and conditions were more favourable, looking at 
the p o sitio n  as :a whole, than those on which the Union r e lie d . In  the 
Company's submission the o v era ll advantage to  th e ir  employees was not under- • 
mined by the fa c t  th a t a few o f them had not been given the f u l l  in creases  
provided by the 1967 Agreement, sin ce  in  each case there was a ra tio n a l  
explanation fo r  th e ir  having been trea ted  d if fe r e n t ly  from th e othere in  that 
they had joined the Company only a short time before th at Agreement was made.
36. I f  the Company were wrong in  th e ir  submission th a t, in  con sid erin g- 
whothor tho terms and conditions they observed were not lo s s  favourable i t  was 
necessary to  look a t them as a whole, and not to  take any in d iv id u a l 
employee^ case in  is o la t io n , i t  would in  th e ir  view be appropriate and 
indeed h e lp fu l i f  the Court were to  fin d  th a t the Company1 s terms and 
conditions were not le s s  favourable than the recognised terms and conditions 
except in  respect o f  certa in  named employees. The Company d id  not consider  
th a t in  the circumstances o f  the case a restrosp ective  award would be 
ju s t if ie d .
Award
37. Having given carefu l consideration to  the evidence and submissions o f  the 
P a rtie s , the Court fin d  and Avrard as fo llo w s:-
(1)..  There are e stab lish ed  in  the Engineering Industry in  rospoct o f
c le r ic a l and adm inistrative workers recognised terms and conditions of
employment which have been s e t t le d  by agreements n egotiated  from timo to
time between the Union and tho Federation, includ ing the 1967 Agreement.
( 2) The Company are not observing the recognised-term s and conditions
in  that they havo not .implemented in  resp ect o f a l l  the workers concerned
tho increases provided-.by the 1967 Agreement.. .
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(3 ) The Court arc s a t is f ie d  th a t , except as ind icated  in  ( 4) "below, the 
terns and conditions which tho Company arc observing are not lo s s  
favourable than the sa id  recognised terms and conditions.
(h-) At the date when the claim was reported to  the M inister the Company 
wero not paying to  f iv e  o f  the workers concerned the appropriate weekly 
in creases provided fo r  by the 1967 Agreement.
(5 ) The Court require tho Company to  observe the recognised terms and 
conditions by paying to  the f iv e  workers referred  to  in  ( 4 ) above the 
balance o f the weekly increases due to  then, as fo llow s
Mrs. E. H i l l , 7 s . 6d.
Mrs. S . P isa n i, 5 s . Od.
Mrs. C. E . Rcoke, 5 s. Od.
Miss A. Santwris, 1 s . 9a.
Mr3. C. Spinks, 15s. Od.
(6 ) This Award sh a ll have e f f e c t  from the 20th September 1967.
ROY WILSON, P r e s i d e n t .  
A . G . TOMKINS.
F .  I .  TUCKWELL.
J .  A . EAST,
Secretary .
1 A bbey  G ard en ,
Great College S tr e e t ,  
Westminster, S.W.1.
29th January 1968
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Appendix IC.2
Industrial Court Award 
Centrax Limited
teaflet______  I
(ADVANCE COPY) THE INDUSTRIAL COURT
(3150) Observance o f Recognised Terns and Conditions 
of  Baploynent in  respect o f C ler ica l Workers 
~ employed by a  f ir n  in  Newton. .Abbot, Devon 
engaged in  the Engineering Industry
Eaployers concerned:-
Centrax lim ited  
Trade Union reporting the ola i n :-
C ler ica l and Adni n is tr a t iv e  Workers * Union
1 . The M inister o f  Labour .on the 28th A pril 1967 referred  to  t h is  Court for  
settlem ent, in  accordance w ith the provisions o f  the Terns and C onditions o f  
Enploynent Act 1959 (h erein after  referred  to  as "the Act") the fo llow in g  d a in
which had been reported to  him on the 5th A pril 1967 by the C ler ic a l and A dm inistrative  
Workers* Union under Section 8 o f  the A ct:-
(a) That there are estab lish ed  in  the Engineering Industry  
in  resp ect o f C ler ic a l workers terns or oonditions o f  
enploynent whioh have been se t t le d  by agreenent between 
the Engineering Employers* Federation and the C ler ic a l  
and Adm inistrative Workers* Union.
(b) That the p a r tie s  to  these agreenents are organisations
o f  Employers and o f Workers which rep resen t, r e sp e c t iv e ly , 
a su b stan tia l proportion o f  the Eaployers and o f the  
C ler ic a l S ta f f  to  which the agreenents r e la t e .
(c) That, as resp ec ts  C ler ica l workers, Centrax Limited o f  • 
Newton Abbot, being engaged in  the Engineering Industry,
are not observing the terns or conditions o f  enploynent 
in  the agreenents mentioned in  (a) above.
The P artie s  were heard in  London on the 6th Ju ly  1 967.
2 . The d a in  o f the C ler ica l end Adm inistrative Workers’ Union (h ere in a fter  
referred  to  as "the Union") concerns some 130 d e r i c a l  workers enployed by Centrax 
Limited (horeinafter referred  to  as "the Coapany") a t Newton Abbot, Devon. The 
Union, are claim ing th at the Conpany should observe, in  respect o f  the employees - 
concerned, the terns and conditions e f^canrrtUd in  the Engineering Industry by agree- • 
nents nade between the Engineering Employers* Federation (h ere in a fter  referred  to
as "the Federation") and the Union, and in  p articu lar  on agreenent r e la t in g  to  
general wage in creases which was reached on the 25th August 1965 and was e f f e c t iv e  
from the 30th August 1965 (h erein after  referred  to  as "the 1965 Agreement"). .
3 . The provisions o f the 1965 Agreenent are not s e t  out in  any formal docunent, 
but are contained in  e  tran scrip t o f the proceedings o f  the N ational Conference h e ld . 
on the 25th August 1965 between the Federation and the Union. That part o f  the  
tran scrip t which i s  d ir e c t ly  relevant t o  the present d a in  reads as fo llo w s:—
"The Federation w i l l  noko a  reconnendation to  member f lr n s ,  through
federated A ssociation s, for  increases to  be paid to  c le r ic a l  workers, .as 
fo llow s:
M a le s
Age^  Per week
21 and 22 9 s.
23 and 24 10s.
25 end over 11s .  6d.
with proportional increases for ju n iors, as fo llow s:
AS°. J .5  16 17 18 j19_.. .20.
Increase 2sT~6d. 3s7~ 3 s .  6d. As. 9&. 5 s • 9&» 7s.
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Females t
Age Per Week
21 and over 9s.
with proportional increases for  jun iors, in  accordance w ith  
provious p ractice , as fo llow s:
Age 15 16 17 18
^ c r e a s e  2 s . 6d. 3s~. 3 s .  6d. As. 9d.
Those are , o f  course, the sane increases as to  male juniors*
Then, fo r  reasons we a l l  know, a t 19 the figu re  for  fen a les  
i s  7s* inorease and a t  20 8 s . increase; a l i t t l e  nore than i s  
given to  n a les a t  those ages*
We have agreed th a t a l l  these increases should he rpcon- 
nended to  apply as from Monday, 30th August, 1965.
The sa lary  l i n i t s ,  which cu ston arily  we have g iven , s h a l l  
apply in  r e la tio n  to  these reconhendations. These are a ffcc to d  
by what was la s t  done in  general increase agreenents and they  
are: Male c le r ic a l  workers, 21 years o f  ago and over, up to  and 
' includ ing £925 per annun; fenale c le r ic a l  workers, 21 years o f  
age and over, up to  and including £660 p er  annun," ’
Main subnissions on behalf o f  the Union
A* I t  was sta ted  that in  the middle o f 1966 the Union's membership anong the Company*s 
enployees had su b sta n tia lly  increased and on the 28th June 1966 the Company had agreed  
to  recognise the Union. At th a t t in e  the Union had supplied the Company w ith a copy o f  
a  handbook se t t in g  out the various agreenents they had reached with the Federation, but 
the handbook d id  not include the 1965 Agreenent. I t  was unfortunate th a t th e  Union had 
not then nentioned the ex isten ce  o f th a t Agreenent (sec  paragraph 13 below ), but th ey  
were not a t the tin e  aware th at th e  Conpany were not conplying w ith i t s  tern s . The Union 
were f i r s t  infornod by th e ir  nenbers in  January 1967 th a t the Conpany were not so conply- 
in g , and on the 10th February 1967 they had w ritten  to  the Conpany accord ingly ,
5 .  At a  neetin g  with the Conpany on the 22nd February 1967 the Union had 
repeated th e ir  request, th at the Conpany should implement the terns o f  the 196j  
Agreement and had indicated  th at they would be reasonable as regards the 
question o f  retrosp ection . In  response to  a request fron the Conpany the Union 
had w ritten  to then again on the 6th March 1967, quoting the terns o f th i s  
C ourt's Award No. 3123 dated the 29th November 1966, which re la ted  to  a  sim ilar  
claim by the Union against another engineering firm .
6 . On the 29th March 1967 the Conpany had rep lied  that they were unable to  accede to  
the Union’ s claim , pointing out th a t a l l  th e ir  c le r ic a l  employees were paid in  excess of  
the estab lish ed  minimum ra tes  and that a l l  had received  in creases since the 25th  August 
1965 in  excess o f , or equal to , those provided by the 1965 Agreement. The Union had 
accordingly reported th e ir  claim to  the M inister fo r  reference to  th is  Court. (Copies 
o f the correspondence referred  to  in  th is  paragraph and in  paragraphs A and 5 above were 
placed before the Court) •
7 . The Union had been surprised to  r e c e iv e / the Company's le t t e r  o f  29th March 1967# 
p a rticu lar ly  in  view o f the fa c t  th at the Conpany had implemented the in creases provided
in  1963 by" a previous agreenent between the Union and th e  Federation. Although the Company 
were not nenbers o f the Federation, they follow ed the recommendations o f  th a t body in  
resp ect o f th e ir  pnnnal. workers and tech n ica l s t a f f ,  and in  the Union's subm ission they  
should a ls o , as on engineering establishm ent, accept tho settlem ents reached between tho 
Union and the Federation.
8 . The Company’s argument th at they were paying ra te s  in  excess o f  th o  esta b lish ed  
niriim  was in  the Union* s submission irre lev a n t, since those minima we re  not p a id , to  the 
Union's knowledge, by any engineering employer, and in  fa c t  the maximum sa lary  paid by 
the Company to  certa in  grades o f c le r ic a l  workers f e l l  far  short o f  the min i mum paid by 
other sim ilar  firm s.
9 . As to  the Company's contention that' the Union's claim was n et by the in creases p aid  
to  the Company's s t a f f  since August-1965, those increases nore, in  tho U nion's view , 
c le a r ly  m erit increases .such as were commonly given in  recogn ition , for  exanplo, of 
a b i l i t y  and punctuality . The Union could produce a l i s t  o f  f ir n s  which had given  m erit 
increases sim ilar to  those given by the Conpany in  addition  to  the general in creases
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provided by the. 1S65,Agreenent. The Conpany had given th o ir  increases on on 
in d iv id u al b a s is , o f  d if fe r e n t anounts and .at d ifferen t dates, throughout tho yefcr, 
and they could not by any neons bo described as being o f a general nature and' in  
conformity with the 1965 Agreement. The Union could not accept the Company’s 
argument th a t,, since m erit increases we re given only to  employees who were above 
the average, the lower h a lf  of the in creases they had given could be regarded as 
being general in creases (see paragraph 20 below ).
10. I t  was submitted th at the Conpany had in  the past d istin gu ished  between merit 
in creases and general in creases. They had made i t  c lear  in  n' document they had 
issu ed  in  1963 that .the increases they had given at that t in e  ( see paragraph 7 
above) were national in crea ses. A copy o f  the. document in  question was placed  
before the Court.
11 . With regard to  th e  Company’s d iv is io n  o f  th e ir  employees in to  c le r ic a l  and 
n on -c ler ica l grades (see paragraph 16 below ), i t  was sta ted  th at the Union covered 
both c le r ic a l and adm inistrative workers and they represented, employees in  many o f  
the grades which the Company regarded as n o n -c ler ica l. Furthermore th e ir  agreements 
with th e  Federation were generally  accepted as being appropriate to  those other 
grades and were applied to  then. The Union were however prepared, in  the event o f  
an award in  th o ir  favour, to  n egotia te  with tho Company as to  which of th e ir  
employees were covorcd by i t .
12. In  the Union’ s view th e ir  claim  again st the Conpany was supported by 
Awards Nos. 248, 813 and 84O of the In d u stria l D isputes Tribunal and, as they had 
ind icated  to  the Conpany (soe paragraph 5  above), by Award No. 3123 o f th is  Court.
In asking tho Court to fin d  in  th e ir  favour the Union were not seeking a retrospec­
t iv e  award. • ’
Main submissions on b eh a lf  o f the Company
13* I t  was stated, that .the Company had been m isled , a lb e it  u n in ten tion a lly , by the 
Union in  th at th e  Union had not made i t  c loar that the only agreement on which-they  
r e lie d  in  the present reference was represented by the ex tra ct from the tran scrip t  
o f the proceedings roferred t o  in  paragraph 3 above, o f  which, they had sent the 
Conpany a  copy on the -23rd February 1967.  The Union had made no reference to  the 
oxistence o f the 1965 Agreenent when they net tho Conpany in  June 1 966, and i t  was 
.not mentioned in  the handbook they had then produced (sec  paragraph 4- above). Since 
tho reference to  the Court o f tho present claim  tho Conpany ha'd attempted, w ithout 
su ccess, to  obtain a  copy o f  the relevant Agreement fron the Union and the M inistry  
o f  Labour, and had even tually  been sent a c ircu lar  by the Federation which uas 
unfortunately o f  no rea l ass istan ce  to  them. They had therefore been unable to 
discover the p recise  nature o f  the claim against them u n t i l  immediately before the 
commencement o f the present hearing, and th is ,- i t  was submitted,-would be relevant 
to  the question o f  the date from which th e  Court’s award should take e f f e c t  in  the 
event that such award were against the Conpany. *
14-. The Company reviewed the sa lary  o f th e ir  c le r ic a l workers in d iv id u a lly  a t  
regular periods. Each department carried  out th e ir  reviews sep arate ly , some every  
three months, some every s ix  months and some every 12 months. The reviews took  
in to  account e l l  relevant fa c to rs ,, includ ing the cost of l iv in g ,  sa lary le v o ls  in  
the d is t r ic t ,  sa t is fa c to ry  service and conduct, a b il i t y  and pu n ctu a lity . I f  tho 
Conpany had known o f the provisions o f  the 1965 Agreement, and i f  they had appre­
c ia ted  that they were applicable to  th e ir  employees, tho increases they had 
implemented since the operative date o f  th at Agreement would havo been granted on 
a d ifferen t b a s is .
15. The wage structure which the Company operatod provided fo r  minimum wages for  
both male and female c le r ic a l workers which werb higher a t a l l  ages than the minimum 
ra tes agreed between the Federation and tho Union. A schedule comparing tho minima 
referred  to  was placed before the Court.
16. Some o f th e  .Company’ s s t a f f  were only p artly  engaged in  c le r ic a l  d u tie s , and 
i t  was th e ir  p ractice to  tr ea t as c le r ic a l  workers only those who spent nore than 
h a lf  th e ir  time on such d u ties . A schedule was placed before th e Court in d ica tin g , 
on the above-described b a s is , those ca tegories o f the Company’ s s t a f f  which they  
regarded as c le r ic a l  and those they regarded ns n o n -c ler ica l. In  the Company’ s - 
view c le r ic a l workers could reasonably be defined as those w holly or mainly ’ 
engaged in  c le r ic a l  work, but th e ir  own c la s s if ic a t io n  was le s s  r ig id  than t h i s .
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They accepted, however, that i f  the Court should fin d  in  favour o f the Union’ s  
c la in  d iscussions should take p lace between the P artie s on th is  point (see  
paragraph 11 above).
17 . The Conpany a lso  placed before the Court a schedule se tt in g  out the nanes, 
ages and occupations'of those s t a f f  when they regarded as c le r ic a l workers and 
who were in  th e ir  enploynent a t -the 30th August 1S6p. (the e f fe c t iv e  date o f  the 
1965 Agreenent), together with d e ta i ls  o f  th e ir  'current sa la r ie s  in  conparison 
with the n ational mininun r a te s , and the increases they had received  sin ce  
August 1965 (and before tho Union had nade th e ir  present c la in  to  the Conpany) 
in  conparison with tho increases to  which they would have been e n t it le d  under 
the 1965 Agreenent. I t  was sta ted  th a t-th e  current"salaries, o f  the employees 
concerned w ere'c learly  very nuch-jhigher than the n a tion a l.n in in a . Moreover the 
in creases they had been • granted were a ln o st uniformly .very nuch larger  than 
those provided by the' 1965 Agreenent. : There were only four cases, d e ta ils  o f  
which were g iven , where the. increases granted by the Conpany had been sm aller 
than those agreed between th e ‘federation  arid the.Union, and-in each o f  those 
cases the worker concerned had since been given a further in crease, back-dated  
to  the 10th February 1967, su f f ic ie n t  to  make up th e .d e fic ien cy . ,
18. . The Conpany were unable to  say why the-!four workers referred  to  above-had ..." 
received  nuch' sm aller increases than those given 'to the m ajority, since these  
n atters were decided by the. heads of departments. I t  could perhaps be' assumed, 
however, that they were not a lto g e th er ' sa tis fa c to ry  in  sone way. op th a t th e ir  
rate o f  renuneration was considered to  be too high having regard to  th e ir  
c a p a b il it ie s , and that the sn a il increase given to  then represented a reduction  
o f  the general increase given to  the other workers, and could not beregarded as
a  measure o f  that 'general in crease. In the Conpany* s view no general-inference  
could be drawn fron these iso la te d  cases in  which' sp ec ia l circumstances a p p lied .,"
19. I t  was submitted th a t, although one or two other workers had been given  
increases only s l ig h t ly  in  excess of those provided by the 1965 Agreement, the 
broad p icture was o f increases su b sta n tia lly  in  excess, and the general assump­
tion  oust be that whore the increase given was nuch below the average i t  was a 
general increase and not a n e r it  in crease . The su b stan tia l nature o f the 
increases given to  a ln ost a l l  the workers concerned, which ranged between £1 
and £2 a week and sonotin.es nore, in d icated  that th ey  included both general 
increases and n e r it  in creases.
20. Since the average worker was. n eith er excep tion a lly  good nor excep tion a lly  
bad, a considerable proportion o f  each o f  the m ajority o f the increases granted 
nust have been in  the nature o f  a. general increase rather than a n e r it  in crease .
I t  was im possible to  determine the exact proportion in  each case, but on average
i t  was probably about 5 peri cent o f  sa lary . I t  vras however u n lik e ly  that nore . < .
than 30 per cen t, o f the workers concerned would deserve n e r it  in creases, and 
i t  was therefore reasonable to  regard the lower h a lf  o f  the increases given as 
being a ln ost w holly general in creases. -- On th is  b a sis  the general in creases had .. 
been sonething o f’ the order o f £t a week, which was w e ll in  excess o f th e - amounts 
provided by-the 1965 Agreement. There was th erefore, in  the Conpany* s submis­
sion , no ground for  the c la in  that the Conpany had not complied with that Agreement, 
even though they had not given th e ir  increases on the basis--set out therein  because
they were.unaware o f i t s  ex is ten ce .
21. Further schedules wore placed before the -Court which re la ted  r e sp ec tiv e ly  to  
those c le r ic a l  workers in  the Conpany* s enploynent'-at'the 30th August 1965 who. litre  
under the- age o f 21 a t'th a t  date, and ,to-. those who had'entered the Conpany* s 
enploynent since th at date. With regard'to the la t t e r  i t  was submitted that tho 
Conpany’ s only ob ligation  as far  as m y  nation al agreenent vras concerned was to  pay 
not le s s  than the estab lish ed  n in ina, and that the sa la r ie s  they paid to  the
workers concerned were in  a l l  cases w e ll above those n in in a .
22. I t  was however conceded th a t , as was shown in  the relevant schedule, f iv e  o f  
the workers in  the Company’s enploynent a t the 30th August 1965 who wore under tho 
ago o f 21 a t  th a t date had since been given only thoso increments based on age 
progression to  which they were contractually  e n t i t le d , and had not received  any 
general incroases over and abovo those increments such as were provided by the 
1965 Agreenent.
A
23. I t  was sta ted  that the Conpany* s f i r s t  l in e  o f  defence was th at broadly they  
had done what wa3 required o f  then, but i f  i t  were held  that they had not given  
general increases in  the nanner provided for  in  the 1965 Agreenent they would 
subnit that th e ir  terras and conditions were not l e s s  favourable. In  th e ir  view  
i t  would be unfair i f  the sca les  were to  be -weighted against then merely because 
the Agreement in  question had not been brought to  th e ir  n o tic e . I f  i t  had been 
brought to  th o ir  n o tice  in  August 19&5, and i f  they had then given the prescribed  
increases, th e ir  employees would have been given sn a ller  increases sin ce  th a t date. 
Tho Company had implemented the national increases provided in  1963 (see  paragraph 7 
above) because they had considered i t  necessary to  do so in  order to  compote 
su ccessfu lly  for s t a f f ,  but th a t reason no longer applied .
21f. The Company operated a  normal working week o f 37'2 hours, which was perm itted  
under agreements between tho Federation and the Union. They paid for overtime a t  
the f l a t  ra te , cxcopt that fo r  n i^ it  work the ra te  was tin e-an d -a -th ird . This 
compared favourably w ith the national overtime cond itions, whereby the f i r s t  th ree  
hours o f  overtime were not n ecessa r ily  remunerated end other overtime, except a t  
7/eelcends, 7/as paid for a t the f l a t  r a te . There was no national agreement which 
la id  down the holiday entitlem ent o f engineering c lo r ic a l workers, whereas tho 
Conpany gave 12 working days of annual holiday in  addition to  th e  usual pub lic  
h olid ays. They a lso  provided a sickness payments scheme and free membership o f  a 
-so c ia l club with sports f a c i l i t i e s ,  as ’w ell as a s t a f f  canteen. In addition  they 
administered a contributory pension fund to  which both the Conpany and th e ir  
employees contributed.
25• I t  was further submitted that fo r  the Union* s claim to  succeed i t  must be 
estab lish ed  under Section  8(1) (a) o f  the Act th at terms or conditions o f  enploynent 
(which must in  the Company*3 viev? be uniform terns or conditions) were esta b lish ed  
in  the relevant trade or industry or sec tio n  th ereof, e ith er  generally  or in  a 
d is t r ic t ,  which had been s e t t le d  by an agreement. In th e  Company's submission the  
extract fron the proceedings o f  the Central Conference on which the Union r e l ie d  
did not con stitu te  an agreenent which estab lish ed  such uniform terns or cond itions, 
but merely an agreenent th a t there should be a varia tion  o f  the terns o f  employment 
by superimposing sp ec ified  increases on varying ra tes o f remuneration. That 
varia tion  would o f course have tho e f f e c t  o f increasin g  a l l  th e  mininun r a te s , but 
as there was no agreement r e la t in g  to  wages other than th at la y in g  down minimum 
ra tes  i t  would a lso  have the e f f e c t  o f  creating  many d ifferen t new ra tes o f remunera­
tio n . Such varying ra tes  could not bo sa id  to  co n stitu te  recognised terms o f  
employment w ith in  the meaning o f  the Act: to  be recognised terns they must be f u l l  
terms. There were therefore no recognised terns o f  employment vzith which to  compare 
the terms and conditions which tho Company observed, and Section 8 o f the Act was not 
applicable to  a s itu a tio n  o f th is  land. The Company appreciated, however, th at they  
had made sim ilar submissions on th i s  point a t  a previous hearing o f  the Court, which 
resu lted  in  Award No. 2877 dated the 16th  November 1961, and th at the Court had 
rejected  then on that occasion .
Award
26. Having given carefu l consideration  to  the evidence and submissions o f the  
P a rtie s , the Court fin d  andAward as fo llow s
(1) There are estab lish ed  in  the Engineering Industry in  resp ect o f  
c le r ic a l workers recognised terns and conditions o f enploynent 
which have boon se t t le d  by agreements between the Federation and the 
Union, includ ing tho 1965 Agreenent referred  to  in  paragraph 3 above.
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(2) The Conpany are not observing the recognised torns and conditions 
contained in  the 1965 Agreenent in  that they havo not paid  to  the 
workers concerned the increases provided fo r  by th at Agreenent.
(3) The Court are not s a t is f ie d  that th e  terns and conditions which 
the Conpany are observing are not l e s s  favourable than tho said  
recognised tern s and conditions,
(A) The Court accordingly require the Conpany to  observe the said
recognised terns and conditions as resp ects a l l  the workers concerned,
(5) This Award sh a ll have e f f e c t  fron the beginning o f the f i r s t  f u l l  pay 
period fo llow ing the date hereof.
kOY WILSON, President 
A. G. TOMKINS 
P. X. TUCKWELL
J. A. EAST,
Secretary.
"1, Abbey Garden, 
Great C ollege S treet, 
W estninstor, S.vif.1,
31st, July 1967
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APPENDIX D
TUC Unions m embership ‘overlap’ by Industry and Em ploym ent- Areas of 
potential conflict
The fo llow in g  is taken from  the web-sites o f  the fou r largest unions. The list shows the 
industries and jo b  classifications covered by these largest unions. Each o f  these largest 
unions not only have overlapping spheres o f  interest one with another, but also all have 
sim ilar overlaps with many o f  the sm aller unions, some o f  whom are relatively highly 
organised ‘specialist unions ’ which are likely to be very defensive o f  their ‘territory ’. A 
clear indication that whilst the number o f  unions may have declined the overlapping  
spheres o f  interest continue.
Amicus -  M em bership 2002 -1,250,000
main trades and industries manufacturing, engineering, energy, construction, IT, 
defence aerospace, motor industry, civil aviation, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
steel and metals, shipbuilding, scientists, technologists, professional and managerial 
staff, electronics and telecommunications, tobacco, food and drink, textiles, ceramics, 
paper, professional staff in universities, commercial sales, the voluntary 
sector, financial services, and the National Health Service
GM B -  M em bership 2002 -  683,680
main trades and industries civil air transport, security, AA, aerospace, defence, 
clothing, textiles, food production and distribution, retail, hotel, catering, chemicals 
and process, construction, building supplies, furniture and timber, local 
government, NHS, care, education, engineering, offshore oil development, 
shipbuilding, energy utilities
T ransport and General W orkers’ Union -  M em bership 2002 -  858,804
main trades and industries administrative, clerical, technical and supervisory; 
agriculture: building, construction and civil engineering; chemical, oil and rubber 
manufacture; civil air transport; docks and waterways; food, drink and tobacco; 
general workers; passenger services; power and engineering; public services; road 
transport commercial; textiles; vehicle building and automotive.
UNISON -  M embership 2002 -  1,272,470
main trades and industries local government, health care, the water, gas and electricity 
industries, further and higher education, schools, transport, voluntary sector, 
housing associations, police support staff
Appendix E
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
between
CSC COMPUTER SCIENCES Limited 
and
THE MANUFACTURING, SCIENCE & FINANCE UNION
THE AGREEMENT
1. DEFINITION OF PARTIES
The Agreement is between CSC Computer Sciences Ltd, UK Division, (which 
includes Managed Services, Support functions and Consulting staff) and UK- 
based Global Infrastructure Services (GIS) staff (hereinafter referred to as 
“CSC”) and Manufacturing, Science & Finance Union (hereinafter referred to 
as “MSF”).
2. PREAMBLE
This Partnership Agreement introduces a partnership approach to the working 
relationship between the two organisations, both of which are key players in the IT 
industry.
CSC and MSF are committed to achieving a constructive and mutually 
beneficial relationship, consistent with the business and management needs 
of a progressive company, operating in a rapidly changing and very 
challenging business environment and a high profile trade union, committed 
to the development of leading edge approaches to modern labour relations.
CSC and MSF share a common objective of ensuring the efficiency and 
prosperity of CSC and the delivery of a  superlative service to the CSC’s 
customers. MSF recognises that it is only by this means that the prosperity of 
CSC for the benefit of customers, employees and shareholders can be 
assured. To this end MSF recognises CSC’s management responsibility to 
plan, organise and manage it’s operations, in order to achieve and maintain 
its optimum efficiency and financial performance. xxii
MSF agrees that the spirit and intent of this Agreement is the attainment of a 
relationship with CSC, which will serve the best interests of all concerned 
and place CSC at the forefront of its market as ‘the employer of choice’. In 
consequence of this, MSF accepts its responsibility under the terms of this 
Agreement to act in strict accordance with the terms of this Agreement. MSF 
agrees not to engage in industrial action of any description, without the whole 
of the appropriate procedures, as agreed with CSC, including the use of the 
TUC and ACAS procedures, as appropriate, and also all statutory 
requirements, having first been completely exhausted.
3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(1) Both parties recognise and respect each other’s separate and shared aims in 
the context of building a  successful business.
(2) CSC recognises its responsibility to seek to maintain the highest possible 
level of employment security for its employees.
(3) MSF recognises its responsibility to do all within its power to assist CSC in 
the attainment of principle (2) above.
(4) MSF recognises the importance of timely employee communication and 
accepts the right of CSC’s management to communicate directly with its 
employees in order to effect the planning and management of the business.
(5) CSC in turn respects and welcomes the right of its employees to elect to join 
a  trade union.
(6) Both parties, in accordance with this Agreement, will seek always to work 
together in a spirit of partnership and co-operation and as such, commit 
themselves to the avoidance of disputes, or any other form of confrontation 
or conflict, which could damage the business.
(7) In the furtherance of collaborative partnership, CSC will consult with MSF 
prior to undertaking any major change programmes.
(8) Information will be shared with the appropriate MSF representatives of the 
Union to establish understanding and where appropriate, mutual co-operative 
action for the joint exploration of issues.
(9) The advantages of joint communication is accepted by both parties and there 
will be commitment to developing jointly effective two-way communications, 
whenever appropriate.
(10) Communications by both CSC and MSF, whether joint or separate, will be 
conducted at all times through the recognised procedures and media and will 
at all times be professional, factual and accurate..
(11) CSC will ensure that each of its managers who may have responsibilities 
under the terms of the Agreement, are fully aware of and act in accordance 
with the provisions, and the provisions of all other associated Agreements, as 
appropriate.
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(12) CSC and MSF agree that, as a means of ensuring better understanding of 
their Partnership Agreement, appropriate ‘joint management /staff 
representative training’ will be arranged from time to time.
4. BASIS OF RECOGNITION
4.1. Individual Representation
CSC acknowledges and supports the legal right of MSF to represent the 
interests of its members as individuals and will set out the framework within 
which this will be undertaken in ‘Framework for Employee Representation’ -  
which is annexed hereto as Appendix 1
4.2.
Collective Consultation
CSC will engage in meaningful collective consultation with MSF in a number 
of formal ways:
4.2.1
MSF representatives, who are employees of CSC, will have 
The right, along with other staff representatives, to be consulted on 
relevant redundancy/TUPE issues, within the framework of sub groups of 
the UK Works Council*, constituted from time to time, as required.
4.2.2.
MSF Representatives will also have the right to membership of other sub 
groups of the UK Works Council, constituted from time to time to deal with 
matters on behalf of staff groups, which include union members.
4.2.3.
CSC will enter into talks with MSF on a national basis through the creation 
of a National Forum. This Forum will meet at least once per year and will 
be chaired by the Chief Operating Officer, of the CSC UK Division. The 
National Forum will appoint joint secretaries and will be attended by at 
least 2 CSC directors and up to 2 MSF national officials, or their 
nominated deputies who must be full-time officials of MSF, together with 4 
employed lay MSF representatives. The constitution and nominated 
attendees will form the ‘National Forum Constitution’ - which is annexed 
here to as Appendix 2.
4.2.4.
All MSF members of the National Forum will be required to sign the’ 
Confidentiality Agreement ‘ -  which is annexed hereto as Appendix 3
4.3.
The terms of this Partnership Agreement will operate on the basis of 
providing collective consultation rights to MSF, and individual 
representation rights, both of which as described within this Agreement 
and its appendices. CSC, however, by this Agreement, intends that MSF
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shall be accorded all of the statutory rights and protections of TULR(C)Act 
1992, Sections 152,168 and 170, such as may apply had it been 
recognised for all or some of the purposes described within Section 178 of 
the Act.
5. SOLE RECOGNITION STATUS
5.1.
The Partnership relationship between the two organisations provides sole 
recognition to MSF for the purposes described in 4 above. In conferring this 
status upon MSF, CSC demonstrates its commitment to an exclusive long 
term working partnership with MSF, the strength of which will be of critical 
future business importance, and thereby mutually beneficial.
* The constitution and administrative provisions of the UK Works Council are at the date of 
this Agreement to be established. However, MSF will work in the spirit of co-operation with the K 
Works Council and CSC management to improve consultation and communication for all of its 
employees.
5.2.
Where CSC has acquired or is bidding for new business, the employees of 
which are already MSF members, MSF will work with CSC to help ensure the 
smooth transition of those MSF members into the framework of this 
Agreement.
5.3.
MSF accepts that from time to time CSC may acquire new business, which 
may result In members of other unions becoming employees of CSC. MSF 
will work with the Company to help ensure the smooth transition of those 
other union members into the framework of this Agreement.
5.4
MSF accepts that CSC cannot lawfully require other such union members to 
relinquish their membership nor transfer their union affiliation to MSF. In such 
circumstances, MSF agrees that they will seek to establish an amicable basis 
for resolving any such union membership issues as may arise. If necessary, 
MSF will negotiate and seek to agree with the ‘other unions’ in consultation 
with and subject to the final agreement of CSC, arrangements for 
representation and consultation on behalf of their members. It is envisaged 
that such arrangements will, as far as practicable, be contained within the 
framework of this Agreement between CSC and MSF.
5.5.
In the event of any dispute, of whatever nature, arising between the MSF and 
any other unions regarding membership, MSF agrees that the provisions of 
the TUC inter-union dispute procedures will be used as  the m eans of 
achieving settlement. MSF also agrees that it will put into immediate effect, 
all provisions of any awards or decisions of such procedures.
Notwithstanding the use or outcome of such procedures and any
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settlement, all inter-union membership disputes will be contained in such a 
manner, as to have no effect upon CSC and its business operation.
5.6.
Should an acquisition involve the transfer of a number of other union 
members similar or greater in size to the MSF membership, MSF accepts 
that such a situation impacts upon the ‘sole union’ provisions of the 
Partnership Agreement and, that CSC reserves the right to review the 
ongoing practicality of the sole recognition status. In such circumstances, 
MSF agrees to co-operate with any review of the sole recognition provisions 
of this Agreement
6. FACILITIES
6.1
Accreditation of representatives, time off for trade union duties, payment of 
expenses and the use of administrative equipment and facilities will be 
afforded according to the agreed procedure set out in ‘Facilities and Other 
Rights’ -  which is annexed hereto as Appendix 4
6.2
Where members so choose, deduction of trade union subscriptions will be 
made by CSC, on behalf of MSF, according to the prevailing statutory 
regulations, in respect of any of its members in the employ of CSC.
7. DATE AND TERMINAL ARRANGEMENTS
This Agreement is effective from 1st October 2000. Termination will be 
subject to 6 months notice in writing given by one party to the other. 
Amendments to the Agreement will be by mutual consent.
Signed on behalf of “CSC”__________________
Name____________ Elizabeth Rosem ever______________________
Designation Director of Human Resources, UKD
Date Wednesday, 13th September 2000
Signed on behalf of “MSF”__________________
Name____________ Roger Lyons_______________________
Designation General Secretary Date
Wednesday, 13th September 2000
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Appendix E 1
CSC-MSF
Framework for Employee Representation
APPENDIX E 1
FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
1. This Appendix to the Partnership Agreement between CSC and MSF 
dated October 2000sets out the agreed framework for employee 
representation associated with the Partnership Agreement:
2. PURPOSE
A framework of union representatives will be created in order to provide 
adequate and consistent coverage of union members for individual 
representation and consultation purposes across the Company’s UK 
Division.
3. ORGANISATION
3.1 This framework will be organised on a  regional basis in order to provide
representation on all sites within the UK, where union members are 
present. These regions will be as follows:
Scotland
North
Midlands
South
(For breakdown of site geography see the Regional Union Representation Framework 
diagram below)
3.2. Representation within each region will be for all union members operating 
within that geographical area, regardless of job function or skill set.
3.3. The number of representatives within each region will broadly be based 
on a ratio of 1:50 union members. Therefore, where necessary, a  number 
of less densely populated sites will be covered by a  Union Representative 
based at a neighbouring site.
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3.4. In addition to individual representation issues, Union Representatives 
within the various regions will also be responsible for liaison and 
communication with union members on inputs to and outputs from 
consultations with the Company.
3.5. AH facilities required for the effective performance of these duties will be 
afforded to Union Representatives a s  defined in the Facilities Appendix to 
the Partnership Agreement.
4. ANNUAL REVIEW
At the outset of this Partnership Agreement, a  quota of 12 Accredited 
Union Representatives has been established. The distribution between 
regions is as set out in the Regional Representation Framework diagram 
below. The ongoing need for the number and distribution of Union 
Representatives will be reviewed on an annual basis at the National 
Forum, or at such time as either party judges that a substatial change has 
taken place.
Regional Union Representation Framework 
(Membership at 31st July 2000)
Suggested
Region
Number 
of Sites
Main
Client
M’ship 
Check off
M’ship
Direct
Debit
M’ship
Total
Unic
Rep
Scotland
Edinburgh 4 Marconi 35 1
Edinburgh 1 UDV 1
Glasgow 1 Marconi 10
Prestwick 1 Bae 3
49 5 54 1
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North
Preston 1 Bae 17 1
Preston 1 C&SI 14
Chorley 1 Bae 56 1
Warton BAe 27 1
Samiesbury 1 Bae 14
Brough 1 Bae 15 1
Chester 1 Bae 12 1
Chadderton 1 Bae 10
Woodford 1 Bae 15 1
Barrow 1 Marconi 26 1
206 44 250 7
Midlands
Birmingham 1 C&SI 9 1
Luton 1 Ford 3
Shirley 1 Lucas 8
Daventry 1 Ford 6
Leicester 1 Marconi
26 8 34 1
South
Filton 1 Bae 54 1
Famborough 1 Bae 7
Maidstone 1 Datacentre 1
Milton
Keynes
1 Marconi 5
Waterlooville Marconi 1
Basildon 1 Marconi 3
Chelmesford 1 Marconi 6
Rochester 1 Marconi 30 1
106 26 132 3
Total 387 83 470 12
Workforce 7018
* Denotes estimated total MSF membership/workforce size by September 2000 due to 
BAeS staff transfer
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CSC-MSF 
National Forum Constitution
APPENDIX E 2
NATIONAL FORUM CONSTITUTION
1. This Appendix to the Partnership Agreement between CSC and MSF 
dated the 1st October 2000, sets out the agreed constitution of the 
National Forum.
2. PURPOSE
2.1. It is agreed between CSC and MSF that in the furtherance of the spirit
and intent of the Partnership Agreement, there is a need to have an 
appropriate means by which collective consultation can take place and 
information can be shared. To this end a National Forum has been 
established and its role defined below.
2.2. The National Forum will not be used as a vehicle for dealing with
individual employee issues. The appropriate procedures must be used in 
all such cases.
3. MEETINGS
3.1 The National Forum will meet at least once each year. The precise date of
the ‘statutory’ meeting will be by agreement between CSC and MSF at 
national level.
4. MEMBERSHIP
4.1. The National Forum will appoint joint secretaries and will be attended by 
at least 2 CSC Directors and up to 2 MSF National officials or their 
nominated deputies who must be full-time officials of the Union, together 
with 4 employed lay union representatives.
5. CO-OPTION
5.1. By agreement between CSC and MSF, persons with specialist knowledge 
or who, in some other respect may be able to assist the National Forum in 
its deliberations, may be co-opted on to its meetings.
6. AGENDA
6.1. The statutory meeting will have as its primary agenda items, the following:
• Company business report - preceding 12 months
• Business developments - preceding 12 months
• Business developments - ensuing 12 months
• Employment security
• Employment benefits
6.2. The agenda for the statutory meetings will be drawn up by the joint 
secretaries in consultation with the appropriate MSF National Official. The 
final agenda will be distributed to those attending the meeting not later 
than two weeks prior to the date of the meeting. Any items additional to 
those listed above must be notified to the joint secretaries no later than 
one month prior to the date of the meeting.
6.3. Either party may request a  meeting of the National Forum and such 
meetings will be held by mutual agreement. The purpose of such 
‘additional meetings’ will be to consult or to provide information about 
serious/urgent matters, which may arise from time to time.
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CSC-MSF 
Facilities and other Rights
APPENDIX E 3
FACILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS
1. This Appendix to the Partnership Agreement between CSC and MSF 
dated the 1st October 2000, sets out the agreed arrangements for the 
facilities and other rights accorded to Union Representatives covered by 
the Partnership Agreement:
2. ACCREDITATION OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVES
2.1. The Company will afford the facilities as defined in this document to 
Accredited Union Representatives up to 12 members of staff, in total, for 
the purposes of individual staff representation and to act as 
representatives to serve on agreed consultative bodies.
2.2. Only Accredited Union Representatives will be accorded the facilities 
described within this Appendix to the Partnership Agreement.
2.3. MSF will ensure that Union Representatives are appointed or elected.
The names and other appropriate information as to the identity of each 
Union Representative will be provided by MSF in writing to Head of 
Employee Relations. Credentials will be signed between both parties (see 
below). Each Union Representative will then be given a ‘credential card’, 
which identifies his/her role.
2.4. Union Representatives must carry their ‘credential card’ with them 
whenever they are engaged in any activity under the terms of the 
Agreement and be prepared to show their ‘credential card’ to 
management when visiting other teams or sites.
2.5. The Company accepts that the Union shall appoint or elect Union 
Representatives in accordance with its own procedures. The Union 
agrees that it will take all necessary steps to ensure that the Union 
Representatives at all times act in accordance with the strict provisions of 
the Agreements between the Company and the Union and their spirit and 
intent. The Company agrees that the performance of the role of Union 
Representative shall not in any respect be detrimental to the individual 
employees.
2.6. The Union accepts the Company has the right to raise with its full-time 
officials any concerns, which it may have about the performance of a
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Union Representative in the pursuit of his/her role under the terms of the 
Agreements between the Company and the Union. Such concerns will be 
raised by the Company’s Head of Employee Relations with the 
appropriate National Official of the Union. The Union undertakes to co­
operate with the Company in jointly enquiring into the circumstances 
giving rise to the complaint. When all appropriate enquiries have been 
pursued, joint discussions will take place without delay, involving all 
appropriate parties to seek a resolution to the complaint.
2.7. Union Representatives shall conform to their conditions of employment 
and the requirements of the Agreement. W here there is potential conflict, 
the representative should discuss this in the first instance with his/her line 
manager. However, actions taken by any employed staff representative in 
good faith and in pursuance of his/her duties, shall not adversely affect 
his/her employment.
2.8. Union Representatives have a responsibility under the terms of the 
Partnership Agreement to ensure that the appropriate procedures are 
used for the purposes of dealing with all matters affecting union members 
for whom they are responsible.
2.9. Any grievance or disciplinary matters requiring the involvement of a Union 
Representative MUST be dealt with through the established procedures.
3. TIME OFF
3.1 Time off with pay will be granted to Union Representatives to carry out the
following:
a) Representation of individual members, including time to interview
the individual, investigate the case, attendance at hearings, etc.
b) Membership of agreed consultative bodies including, time to collect 
input to meetings from members, attendance at meetings, time to 
disseminate the outcomes.
3.1.2 The Company will also grant time off with pay to attend certain agreed 
training courses directly relevant to the Union Representatives’ role.
3.1.3 All such time off must be agreed in advance with the representative’s 
team leader/manager. While every effort will be made to grant such time 
off, decisions will be subject to business demands.
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3.1.4 Requests for time off for any other purpose must be made in the first 
instance to the local Human Resources Adviser, who will liase with the 
representative’s team leader/manager.
3.2. Time off without pay may be granted to Union Representatives in order to 
participate in certain Union activities. All such requests must be agreed in 
advance with both the representative's team leader and the local Human 
Resources Adviser. While every effort will be made to grant such time off, 
decisions will be subject to business demands.
3.2.1. In exceptional circumstances, time off with pay may be granted to
- representatives to attend external union activities. Such requests must be 
made to the local Human Resources Adviser.
3.3. All time off for trade union duties and activities should be recorded on the 
weekly TES system.
4. ACCESS TO STAFF
CSC will give reasonable access to MSF in the pursuance of its 
recruitment efforts.
5. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
Both parties recognise that open sharing of relevant information will be 
fundamental to the creation and development of trust and confidence 
required to underpin the partnership relationship.
6. TRAVEL EXPENSES
The Company will pay travel expenses incurred when attending meetings 
agreed in advance in accordance with to the guidelines set out in 3 
above. Payments will be made inline with the current Company Expenses 
Procedure and should be agreed in advance with the local Human 
Resources Adviser.
7. ADMINISTRATION
7.1 Access to administrative equipment, e-mail, intranet, internet, notice
boards, telephones etc., will be given to union representatives on sites, as 
appropriate, to carry out the duties a s  defined in the Partnership 
Agreement. The use of all such media will be subject to the usual 
Company policies and guidelines.
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7.2 Where a representative requires assistance with the allocation of such 
facilities he/she should contact the local Human Resources Adviser in the 
first instance, who will liase with the appropriate management.
8. DEDUCTION OF CONTRIBUTION AT SOURCE
8.1. Deduction of trade union subscriptions will be made by payroll on receipt 
of duly completed authorisation from individual employees.
8.2. The Union is required to notify the Human Resources Adviser of any 
changes to the amount of subscriptions at least 2 months in advance of 
the effective date.
8.3. The Company will supply a  monthly ‘exception’ report to the Union, in the
agreed format, of all new deductions and cessation of deductions. In 
addition, it will supply a biannual summary of all deductions. The union 
will in turn supply a similar summary of payment details relating to staff 
subscribing by direct debit.
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APPENDIX E 4
UNION REPRESENTATIVES CREDENTIALS
The Company and the Union jointly agree on the following credentials for
(Name)......................................................who has been appointed to represent the
Union.
1. The Union Representative will be accredited for the period for which he/she is 
appointed. If he/she ceases to be an employee of the Company or a  paid up 
member of the Union or if he/she is transferred from the office/location for which 
he/she was appointed as a Union representative, his/her appointment and 
accreditation automatically terminates.
2. When acting in his/her Union Representative capacity he/she will be subject 
to the rules and regulations of the Union. He/she will also be subject to the 
Company's rules and regulations and the terms of his/her contract of 
employment.
3. The union Representative agrees at appointment to accept the provisions of 
all agreements or regulations in respect of the manner in which he/she may 
perform his/her role on behalf of the Union, which may come into force from time 
to time.
4. The Union Representative agrees to abide by and use his/her best efforts to 
ensure that the Unions members abide by the terms of any agreement between 
the Company and the Union.
5. The Union Representative will not act outside the office/location without the 
express agreement of the company’s Head of Employee Relations.
Signed for the Company.
date____________
Signed for the Union......
date.............
Union Representative 
signature..................... date.
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Regional Union Representation Framework
Regional Union Representation Framework 
(Membership at 31st July 2000)
Suggested
Region
Number 
of Sites
Main
Client
M’ship 
Check off
M’ship
Direct
Debit
M’ship
Total
Unic
Rep
Scotland
Edinburgh 4 Mar
coni
35 1
Edinburgh 1 UD
V
1
Glasgow 1 Mar
coni
10
Prestwick 1 Bae 3
49 5 54 1
North
Preston 1 Bae 17 • 1
Preston 1 C&S
I
14
Chorley 1 Bae 56 1
Warton 1 BAe 27 1
Samlesbury 1 Bae 14
Brough 1 Bae 15 1
Chester 1 Bae 12 1
Chadderton 1 Bae 10
Woodford 1 Bae 15 1
Barrow 1 Mar
coni
26 1
206 44 250 7
Midlands
Birmingham 1 C&S
I
9 1
Luton 1 Ford 3
Shirley 1 Luca
s
8
Daventry 1 Ford 6
Leicester 1 Mar
coni
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26 8 34 1
South
Filton 1 Bae 54 1
Famborough 1 Bae 7
Maidstone 1 Data
centr
e
1
Milton Keynes 1 Mar
coni
5
Waterlooville 1 Mar
coni
1
Basildon 1 Mar
coni
3
Chelmesford 1 Mar
coni
6
Rochester 1 Mar
coni
30 1
106 26 132 3
Total 387 83 470 12
Workforce 7018
* Deno tes estimated total MSF membership/workforce size by
September 2GGG due to BAeS staff transfer
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APPENDIX F
The experience o f settling union claims for recognition under the provisions o f the Employment 
Relations Act 1999 (ER Act 1999) procedures is for both trade unions and employers a bit like the 
Curates Egg.
Over the period from 1998, shortly prior to the ER Act 1999 becoming law, cases referred to the 
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) have produced similar results in terms of 
numbers o f recognition claims resolved as follows:
1998-1999 Total cases Full recognition/Partial recognition claim rejected
146 52% 48%
1999-2000
384 66% 33%
2000-2001
385 66% 33%
2001-2002
376 66% 33%
Data Source: Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) UK Annual Reports.
Reviewing the operation o f the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) over the period !2000 to 2002 
shows that the CAC received 174 applications for recognition under Part 1 o f the legislation. Only 99 
o f these claims were accepted and 12 were not accepted. O f the 99 claims accepted two were found to 
be invalid, 86 claims were withdrawn for various reasons including the fact that some were settled 
between the parties. O f the remaining cases completed, 20 have been awarded in favour o f the 
applicant union and 9 have been rejected.
It would seem therefore that there is a one in three chance o f unions failing in the conciliation 
processes operating within the UK on trade union recognition, and a slightly better than 50% chance o f  
achieving recognition through the frill procedures provided by the law.
Data Source: Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) UK, Annual Reports 1999-2002.
1 The CAC did not start its full statutory process o f hearing claims under the ER Act 1999 until mid 
2000.
APPENDIX G
Table 10
Non-TUC Unions merging with TUC unions 1979 -  2002
1979
1. Association of Licensed Aircraft Engineers
2. National Union of Insurance Workers
3. Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society 
Field Staff Association
4. Management Association of Reckitt and Colman
5. South East Lancashire and Cheshire Weavers and 
Winders Association
6. Union of Jute Flax and Kindred Textiles Operatives
7. Coopers and Allied Workers Federation of Great Britain
8. Phoenix Staff Union
9. National Union of Wallcoverings Decorative 
and Allied Trades
10. British Aircraft Corporation (Military Division) 
Professional Staff Association
11. British Aerospace Staff Association
12. Laurence Scott and Electromotors 
Foremans Association
TGWU
ASTMS(MSF)
ASTMS
ASTMS
ATWU
NUDBTW
NUGMW(GMB)
BIFU
NGA
EMA
EMA
EETPU
1980
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20 .
21.
22 .
23.
24.
1981
25. National Union of Gold, Silver and Allied Trades
26. Hawker Siddley Power Engineering Engineers Association
27. Eagle Star Staff Association
Yorkshire Society of Textile Craftsmen 
Huddersfield and District Healders and Twisters 
Trade and Friendly Society 
Telephone Contract Officers Association 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 
London Staff Association
Britannic Assurance Chief Office Staff Association 
United Kingdom Association of Professional Engineers 
Telecommunications Staff Association 
Steel Industry Management Association 
National Wool Sorters Society
Nottingham and District Dyers and Bleachers Association
1983
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
1984
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Textile Workers Union
40. Sheffield Sawmakers Protection Society
41. Association for Adult and Continuing Education
42. National Union of Insurance Workers 
Prudential Section
43. National Union of Insurance Worker Royal
Youth Hostels Association Staff Association
The British Roll Turners Trade Society
The National Association of Executive Managers and Staffs
The National Society of Brushmakers and General Workers
The Scottish Lace and Textile Union
Association of Management and Professional Staffs
Rolls Royce Management Association 
Cosesa
Chelsea Building Society Staff Association 
Coventry Building Society 
Northern Textile Workers Union 
Burnley Nelson Rossendale and District
NUDBTW
NUDBTW
ASTMS
ASTMS
ASTMS
EETPU
EETPU
EETPU
APEX
NUHKW
AUEW (TASS)
EMA
BIFU
ASTMS
AUEW
NATTKE
FTATU
GMB
EETPU
EETPU
ASTMS
BIFU
BIFU
TGWU
TGWU
TGWU
NATFHE
NUIS
London Section
44. Liverpool Victoria Section of National Union 
Of Insurance Workers
NUIS
NUIS
1985
45. Clerical and Secretarial Staffs Association
Of the University of Liverpool ASTM S
46. Bank of New Zealand London Staff Association ASTM S
47. Squibb UK Staff Association A PEX
48. Mercantile Marine Service Association MNAOA
49. Association of Lecturers in Scottish Central Institutions EIS
50. RCN Staff Association APEX
51. Grindlays Staff Association ASTM S
1986
52. Sun Alliance and London Staff Association A STM S
53. Amalgamated Textile Warehouse Operatives
(Bolton & District Branch) GMB
54. Amalgamated Textile Warehouse Operatives
(Hyde & District Branch) GMB
55. Amalgamated Workers Union GMB
56. Amalgamated Textile Workers Union Southern Area GMB
57. Amalgamated Textile Workers Union Staff Section GMB
58. Blackburn and District Weavers Winders and
Warpers Association GMB
59. Colne and Craven Textile Workers Association GMB
60. North West Lancashire Durham and Cumbria
Textile Workers Union GMB
1987
61. Thames Water Staff Association NALGO
62. Bank of England Staff Association BIFU
63. Amalgamated Union of Asphalt Workers TGWU
64. National Tile Faience and Mosaic Fixers Society TGWU
1988
65. Association of Lecturers in Colleges of Education
In Scotland EIS
66. United Friendly Field Management Association M SF
67. Imperial Supervisors Association M SF
68. Church of England Childrens Society
Staff Association M SF
69. Association of HM Inspectors of Taxes AFDCS
1989
70. Imperial Group Staff Association M SF
71. Northern Rock Building Society
Staff Association BIFU
72. Association of British Professional Divers EETPU
73. Ministry of Defence Staff Association EETPU
74. Springfield Foremans Association EETPU
75. Nelson and District Power Loom
Overlookers Society EETPU
76. National Association of Senior Probation Officers EETPU
1990
77. Nationally Integrated Caring Employees EETPU
78. Law Society Legal Aid Staff Association GMB
79. North of England Building Society Staff BIFU
Association
80. Health Visitors Association M SF
81. National Association of Fire Officers EETPU
82. Prison Service Union EETPU
83. Association of Agricultural Education Staff NATFHE
84. National Unilever Managers Association IPMS
85. Institute of Journalists (trade union) EETPU
86. Television and Film Production Employees 
Association
87. Haslingdedene and District Power Loom 
Overlookers
88. National Association of Power Loom 
Overlookers
EETPU
EETPU
EETPU
1991
89. PMB Staff Association
90. Wire Workers Union
91. Australian Mutual Provident Society Staff 
Association
IPMS
ISTC
M SF
1992
92. British Cement Staffs Association
93. Association of National Health Service 
Officer
EETPU
NALGO
1993
94. Yorkshire Association of Power Loom 
Overlookers
95. Association of Staff of Probation and 
Bail Hostels
96. Association of preparatory Workers
97. A.Monk and Company Staff Association
98. Hospital Physicists Association
99. Lancashire Box Packing Case and General Workers 
Friendly Relief Sick and Burial Society
1994
100. Ceram Research Staff Association
TGWU
AEEU
AEEU
AEEU
M SF
TGWU
M SF
1995
101. Electrical and Plumbing Industries Union
102. Film Artist Association
TGWU
BECTU
1996
103. Scottish Health Visitors Association
104. Procurator Fiscal Society
105. Rossendale Union of Boot Shoe and Slipper 
Operatives
106. North of Ireland Bakers Confectioners and 
Allied Workers
UNISON
lsl Div Civil Servants 
NUKFAT
BFAWU
1997
107. United Association of Power Loom 
Overlookers
108. Amalgamated Power Loom Overlookers 
Association
109. College of Health Care Chaplins
110. National Provincial Building Society 
Staff Association
111. Association of University and College 
Lecturers
112. Government Communication Staff Federation
GULO
GULO
M SF
BIFU
AUT
PSTCU
1998
113. Communication Managers Association
114. Gas Managers Association
1999
115. Nat West Staff Association
116. Cabin Crew 89
117. Union of Royal and Sun Alliance
118. Nielsen Staff Association
119. Lufthansa Staff Association UK
120. Corporation of London Staff Association
M SF
GMB
B IFU /U N IFI
AEEU
UNIFI
M SF
M SF
M SF
121. United Friendly Agents Association MSF
122. Britannic Supervisory Union MSF
2000
123. National League of the Blind and Disabled ISTC
124. Scottish Prison Officers Association POA
125. Northern Carpet Traders Union TGWU
126. British Aerospace Senior Staff Association AEEU
127. Lloyds Register (UK) Staff Association MSF
128. Axis The Axa Sun Life Staff Association UNIFI
129. Society of Chief Officers of Probation/
2001
130. Managerial and Professional Officers Union GMB
131. Associated Metal Workers Union AEEU
132. Leicester Housing Association Staff Association MSF
2002
13 3. Union of Woolwich Staff UNIFI
134. Union of Textile Workers MSF
135. Girobank Senior Managers Association ALGUS
137. CGNU Staff Association Amicus
Six m ost frequent ‘acq u irin g’ unions
*MSF = 30 
*EETPU = 19 
**GMB= 13 
* UNIFI (BIFU) = 12 
**TGWU = 10 
**AEEU (Amicus) =10
* Unions with 100K+ membership
**Unions with 500K+ membership
APPENDIX H
Chronology of trade union law 1979-1995 
1980 Employment Act (Jim Prior)
Definition of lawful picketing restricted to own place of work 
80% ballot needed to legalise a closed shop*
Funds offered for union ballots 
Restricted right to take secondary action 
Code of practice (six pickets)
Repeal of statutory recognition procedure 
Restricts unfair dismissal and maternity rights
Unfair dismissal rights to protection minimum length of service period increased from 6 months to 1 year in 
companies under 20
1982 Employment Act (Norman Tebbitt)
Further restrictions on industrial action - eg. definition of trade dispute 
Further restricted action to 'own* employer
Employers could obtain injunctions against unions and sue unions for damages 
80% rule extended to ALL closed shops every 5 years*
Compensation for dismissal because of closed shop*
Removed union only labour clauses in commercial contracts
1984 Trade Union Act
EC elections every 5 years by secret ballot 
Political fund ballots every 10 years 
Secret ballots before industrial action
1986 Public Order Act
Introduced new criminal offences in relation to picketing
1988 Employment Act
Unions to compensate members disciplined for non-compliance with majority decisions
Members can seek injunction if no pre-strike ballot
Union finances to be open to inspection
Unions prevented from paying members’ or officials' fines
Action to preserve post entry closed shop made unlawful *
New restrictions on industrial action and election ballots
Ballots for separate workplaces
Ballots for non-voting EC members
Election addresses controlled
Independent scrutiny
Establishment of CROTUM
1989 Employment Act
Tribunal pre-hearing review and proposed deposit of £150
Removal of restrictions on the work of women and young workers
Exemption of small employer from providing details of disciplinary procedures
Restricts time off with pay for union duties
Written reasons for dismissal now require 2 years' service
Redundancy rebates abolished
Abolition of training commission
1990 Employment Act
Pre-entry closed shop - unlawful to refuse to employ non-union member
1979-1984 membership losses = 1,944,000*
1984-1992 membership losses = 3,367,000*
*1980-1982-1990 were the most significant pieces 
of anti closed shop legislation and coincidentally 
the years of highest membership losses
*Bain. G. S. and 
Price. R., (1980) 
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